State v. Estrada

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
05-JUN-2020
07:49 AM
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
BEVERLY KANANI ESTRADA, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(HONOLULU DIVISION)
(CASE NO. 1DTA-17-02191)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and Hiraoka, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Beverly Kanani Estrada (Estrada)
appeals from the Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and
Plea/Judgment,1 filed on November 8, 2017, and the Notice of
Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment,2 filed on May
29, 2018 (Final Judgment), in the District Court of the First
Circuit, Honolulu Division (District Court).
1
The Honorable Melanie M. May presided.
2
The Honorable Sherri-Ann L. Iha presided.
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Estrada was convicted of Operating a Vehicle Under the
Influence of an Intoxicant (OVUII), in violation of Hawaii
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-61(a)(1) (Supp. 2018).3
Estrada raises two points of error on appeal,
contending that: (1) the District Court erred by denying her
Motion to Compel Discovery for failure to provide all material or
information mandated by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
and (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict her of OVUII.
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we
resolve Estrada's points of error as follows:
(1) In the Motion to Compel Discovery, relevant to
this appeal, Estrada requested: "Any and all material or
information which tends to negate the guilt of Defendant as to
the offense charged or would tend to reduce Defendant's
punishment therefore, and all other material as mandated by Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)"; and specifically, information
relating to Officer Siala Seti (Officer Seti) being previously
charged in an assaultive-type case.
3
HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) states:
§ 291E-61 Operating a vehicle under the influence of
an intoxicant. (a) A person commits the offense of
operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant if
the person operates or assumes actual physical control of a
vehicle:
(1) While under the influence of alcohol in an
amount sufficient to impair the person's normal
mental faculties or ability to care for the
person and guard against casualty[.]
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On appeal, Estrada argues that "Officer Seti's prior
assaultive-type behavior, especially if it involved the use of
excessive force against an arrestee, would provide the context
for Officer Seti's claimed use of a light grab and joint lock on
a 64-year old woman. In turn, this could explain Estrada's
subsequent reaction, whether it was yelling and screaming or
talking loudly. This was extremely relevant as the District
Court cited Estrada's alleged post-arrest belligerence as further
evidence of her intoxication." Estrada contends that, "if
Officer Seti was disciplined for the excessive use of force
against an arrestee previously, it could also explain why he
minimized his behavior in this case or why it was important for
him to exaggerate Estrada's reaction - the records would then be
relevant as evidence of bias, interest, or motive under HRE Rule
609.1 and would be again relevant and material to the issue of
guilt."
"[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373
U.S. at 87. Impeachment evidence falls within the Brady rule
because such evidence is favorable to the accused, and, if used
effectively may make the difference between conviction and
acquittal. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)
(citations omitted).
In Birano v. State, 143 Hawai#i 163, 181, 426 P.3d 387,
405 (2018) (quoting State v. Tetu, 139 Hawai#i 207, 219, 386 P.3d
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844, 856 (2016)), the Hawai#i Supreme Court explained that
"[c]entral to the protections of due process is the right to be
accorded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."
(Internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the court held
that "the prosecution has a constitutional obligation to disclose
evidence that is material to the guilt or punishment of the
defendant." Id. at 182, 426 P.3d at 406. "The duty to disclose
evidence that is favorable to the accused includes evidence that
may be used to impeach the government's witnesses by showing
bias, self-interest, or other factors that might undermine the
reliability of the witness's testimony." Id.
For purposes of using a conviction for impeachment, it
has been long understood that "[i]n every instance where a
witness is sought to be impeached, the only issue that arises is
whether the witness is telling the truth." Asato v. Furtado, 52
Haw. 284, 292, 474 P.2d 288, 294 (1970). "It is character and
reputation for truth and veracity, not any other character trait,
that is in issue." Id. "Therefore, any evidence adduced on this
issue, in order to be relevant at all, must go to the issue of
truth and veracity." Id."When the prior crime [or bad act] has nothing to do
with dishonesty, there may be no logical connection whatsoever
between the prior crime and the determination of whether the
defendant may be believed." State v. Stanley, 110 Hawai#i 116,
128, 129 P.3d 1144, 1156 (App. 2005) (quoting State v. Santiago,
53 Haw. 254, 259, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (1971)).
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"[T]here are a great many criminal offenses the
conviction of which has no bearing whatsoever upon the witness'
propensity for lying or truth-telling, and that such convictions
ought not to be admitted for purposes of impeachment." Asato, 52
Haw. at 292, 474 P.2d at 294 (citation omitted). The court in
Asato went on to state:
This is true not only of minor offenses like parking
tickets or driving with loud mufflers or running red lights,
but also of some major offenses like murder or assault and
battery. It is hard to see any rational connection between,
say, a crime of violence and the likelihood that the witness
will tell the truth. In addition, there is the danger that
a moralistic jury might decide not to believe a witness who
has been convicted of a serious crime, even though the crime
has no rational connection to credibility.
For these reasons, we think it unwise to admit
evidence of any and all convictions on the issue of
credibility. We hold that admission of such evidence should
be limited to those convictions that are relevant to the
issue of truth and veracity. A perjury conviction, for
example, would carry considerable probative value in a
determination of whether a witness is likely to falsify
under oath. We also think that other crimes that fall into
the class of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement
would have same value in a rational determination of
credibility.
The rule we adopt is that a prior conviction may
come in if, but only if, the trial judge, in his
discretion, feels that the party offering the evidence
has satisfactorily shown that the conviction to be
proved rationally carries probative value on the issue
of the truth and veracity of the witness.
Id. at 293, 474 P.2d at 295.
In Stanley, this court discussed United States v.
Geston, 299 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2002), in which a defendant
sought to use a witness's two prior violent incidents to attack
his credibility. Stanley, 110 Hawai#i at 126, 129 P.3d at 1154.
The first incident involved the witness being attacked by a
security guard and causing severe injury in self defense and the
second incident was when the witness allegedly "choked out"
another person and was charged with assault. Id. This court
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noted that, in Geston, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the witness's prior conduct was neither probative of his
character for untruthfulness or his credibility, therefore, the
trial court did not err by excluding the evidence. Id. We then
stated: "Unlike evidence of a witness's past sexual conduct,
improper giving of a gift, or prior violent incidents, evidence
of a witness's forgery has been held to be 'probative of
untruthfulness.'" Id. Thus, in Stanley, this court held that
prior violent acts are not probative of untruthfulness.
In State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 218-19, 738 P.2d 812,
823 (1987), citing Rule 404(b) of the Hawaii Rules of Evidence,
the supreme court held that an officer's "attitude problem,
without any specific instances of violence, aggression, or abuse
of official powers, did not relate to" a defendant's self-defense
claims. (Internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, assaultive
type behavior may be used to impeach a witness if it relates to a
claim of self-defense.
HRS § 703-304(1) (2014) states: "Subject to the
provisions of this section and of section 703-308, the use of
force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the
other person on the present occasion." OVUII does not involve
the use of force by any person, thus, self-defense pursuant to
HRS § 703-304 is inapplicable.
Recently, in Boyd v. State, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2019 WL
3082992 *4, (Haw. App. July 15, 2019) (SDO), cert. rejected,
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SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX, 2019 WL 6492519 (Haw. Dec. 3, 2019), this court
rejected Lee Ki Boyd's (Boyd) claim that the prosecution violated
the Brady rule when it failed to disclose prior to trial that an
officer was prosecuted for shoplifting. Boyd argued that such
information could be used to impeach the officer by showing bias,
self-interest, or other factors that might undermine the
credibility or reliability of the officer's testimony in Boyd's
OVUII trial. This court stated:
Boyd provides no legal authority in support, and
more importantly, fails to explain why Officer Yee's
actions were deceptive as to affect his credibility as
a witness or how the information would undermine the
reliability of Officer Yee's testimony in any way.
Rather, Boyd simply reiterates the facts underlying
Officer Yee's shoplifting prosecution.
The record also does not support Boyd's
argument. The subpoenaed documents submitted with the
September 12, 2017 Filing of Police Documents Under
Seal chronicle exactly what Boyd describes. They do
not, however, reflect that Officer Yee's four-year-old
shoplifting incident had any probative value on the
truth and veracity of Officer Yee as a witness in
Boyd's unrelated OVUII trial.
Id. at *4-*5 (format altered).
Contrary to Estrada's claim, prior assaultive-type
behavior by Officer Seti would not have provided context for an
alleged use of excessive force to arrest Estrada or explained
Estrada's yelling and screaming or talking loudly, which was also
described in testimony by a motorist who was in the car behind
Estrada.4 Officer Seti testified that he had to restrain Estrada
after she kept pulling away while being arrested, and that she
attempted to walk away after being told she was under arrest for
OVUII. During the incident, both before and after she was
4
The motorist's further testimony of her observations of the
incident was consistent with Officer Seti's testimony.
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arrested, Estrada yelled or screamed that she was a driving
instructor, she was a preschool teacher, she was okay to drive,
and she was not drunk. Thus, the record does not reflect that
Estrada's behavior changed due to force allegedly used to arrest
her and Officer Seti's alleged conduct did not explain Estrada's
yelling and screaming. In addition, Estrada explained her
conduct as responding back in a loud volume, and described it as,
"I was being myself."
Estrada also claims that a prior assaultive-type
incident involving Officer Seti would show "bias, interest, or
motive under HRE Rule 609.1" because "it could also explain why
he minimized his behavior in this case or why it was important
for him to exaggerate Estrada's reaction." Estrada's argument is
merely a claim Officer Seti would not testify truthfully due to a
prior assaultive-type incident. However, as the supreme court
has observed, "[i]t is hard to see any rational connection
between, say, a crime of violence and the likelihood that the
witness will tell the truth." Asato, 52 Haw. at 293, 474 P.2d at
295. Also, contrary to Estrada's claim, the District Court did
not cite Estrada's yelling while in Officer Seti's vehicle as
evidence of intoxication. Rather, it appears that the District
Court noted her behavior to support its conclusion that Estrada
was intoxicated, because Officer Seti testified that he could
still smell the odor of alcohol coming from Estrada due to her
continued yelling in his vehicle.
(2) When the evidence adduced at trial is considered
in the strongest light for the prosecution, there was substantial
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evidence to support Estrada's conviction for OVUII. See State v.
Matavale, 115 Hawai#i 149, 157-58, 166 P.3d 322, 330-31 (2007).
Estrada failed to heed warning flares that Kalanianaole Highway,
which is a public way, road, street, or highway, was closed due
to a traffic accident. Estrada also attempted to circumvent a
police officer's vehicle blocking the road. After Officer Seti
stopped Estrada from proceeding further, he noticed Estrada
smelled of alcohol after she rolled down her window, her eyes
were red, and she slurred her speech. Estrada fell to the ground
while attempting to exit her vehicle, and her vehicle rolled
forward into the nearby mountain, because it had not been
securely parked. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence
for the trial court to conclude that Estrada operated or assumed
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
an intoxicant in an amount sufficient to impair her ability to
care for her person and guard against casualty.
For these reasons, the District Court's May 29, 2018
Final Judgment is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 5, 2020.
On the briefs: /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
Chief Judge
Allen M. Kaneshiro,
for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Associate Judge
Donn Fudo,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, /s/ Keith H. Hiraoka
City and County of Honolulu, Associate Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
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