DocketNumber: No. 6971.
Judges: Givens, Ailshie, Budge, Morgan
Filed Date: 4/22/1942
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Respondent recovered in three respective causes of action: $714.50 for attendance of 31 pupils, residents of appellant county, in the school year 1936-7 at Independent School District No. 30 at Shelley in respondent county; $1,091.87 for 26 pupils in 1937-8; and $1,-396.56 for 67 pupils in 1938-9, under section 32-806 I. C. A ., as amended by the 1933 Session Laws, Chapter 205, pages 408-9.1 The complaint alleged the Shelley School *Page 672 District never notified respondent's school superintendent of such attendance, hence no certificate thereof was submitted to appellant by the superintendent until 1940.
The sole basis of appellant's resistance by general demurrer to the imposition of these charges, and this appeal, is that the complaint disclosing the certificate had not been given within the time specified in the statute (i. e., October first of each current year) did not state a cause of action.
Judgment was rendered upon the overruling of the demurrer and appellant's failure to plead further. *Page 673
The statute contains no prohibition against recovery though the certificate be not sent within the prescribed time, nor is there any penalty attached for such dereliction, nor is time of the essence of the right to the statutory contribution. As to these causes of action the statute as to timely notice is therefore directory not mandatory. (In re Overland Co. v.Utter,
Counties and school districts are continuing entities, arms of the government, hence the levy of taxes by appellant to reimburse through respondent the Shelley School District its proportionate cost for the education of these pupils, after the serial years in which the services were rendered, does not defeat respondent's right of recovery.
"Nor do we consider the contention sound, that the apportionments are made and expended in a specific year, and that they are intended and used for the benefit of the youth who are attending that year's schools and that to take the money out of an apportionment and taxes several years later, to reimburse a district, amounts to visiting upon another generation of students the loss suffered by students who have passed from the student class, and from which the previous body of students profited. A school district is a continuing corporation. (Corum v. Common School Dist. No. 21,
There is no factual showing of loss or injury to appellant, hence we do not consider any corresponding or responsive right of reduction of respondent's claim if there had been such showing or a superintendent's responsibility or liability.
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondent.
Budge and Morgan, JJ., concur.
"He shall apportion to every school district in the county an amount sufficient, when added to the computed yields of the minimum district levies provided in Section
"Provided, further, no apportionment of moneys from the county school fund shall be made to any district whose school was in session for less than seven months during the preceding year, nor to any district for more than the actual number of months its school was in session during the preceding year in the meaning of Section
"The county superintendent shall apportion and transfer to other counties from the county school fund such county's proportionate share of tuition due for its resident pupils attending schools in such counties, as shown by the certificates from their county superintendents. The county superintendent shall certify to each county the amount of tuition due from its county school fund, specifying, also, the students for which such tuition is due, the district in which such students are resident, and the district in which they attended school during the preceding year. Such certificate shall be presented not later than October first of each year. Upon receipt of tuition paid by reason of the provisions of this section the county superintendent shall place the same in the county school fund.
"Provided, for all apportionments in this section any joint district or joint rural high school district shall receive from each county in which it lies for every classroom unit such portion of the apportionment due for such classroom unit as the enrollment of the part of the joint district which lies in said county bore to the whole enrollment of the joint district during the preceding year."
Vaughan v. John C. Winston Co. ( 1936 )
Corum v. Common School District No. Twenty-One ( 1935 )
In Re Overland Co. v. Utter ( 1927 )
Hudgins v. Mooresville Consolidated School District ( 1925 )
Mead v. Jasper County ( 1929 )
Horse Creek Conservation District v. Lincoln Land Co. ( 1936 )