State v. Mesenbrink

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the State from the trial judge’s midtrial dismissal of a felony charge of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The sole question presented is the quantum of proof necessary to establish that prior to the instant case a defendant has been validly convicted of two previous driving under the influence charges within the previous five years. See I.C. § 18-8005(3). The trial judge held that the prosecution had failed to present such necessary proof. We dismiss the State’s appeal.

This case came on for trial before a jury, and after two days of trial defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant was sentenced to thirty days in jail, a fine of $1,000.00, and his driving privileges were suspended for one year. No appeal has been taken by the defendant from that conviction or sentence.

The State, following the submission of evidence by the prosecution and defense on the DUI charge, then sought to introduce proof of two prior convictions of the same charge for the purpose of bringing the defendant’s conduct within the purview of I.C. § 18-8005(3), which provides:

18-8005(3). Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of three (3) or more violations of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, within five (5) years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgments), shall be guilty of a felony. (Emphasis added.)

In that phrase of the proceedings the State offered authenticated copies of two prior judgments of conviction of Mesen-brink for driving under the influence. The focus of this appeal is Mesenbrink’s prior judgment of conviction in Canyon County. Mesenbrink asserts that such judgment of conviction in Canyon County does not demonstrate on its face that the defendant in that proceeding was informed of his rights to be represented by legal counsel, to confront witnesses, his rights against compelled self-incrimination, to understand the charges against him, and to understand the consequences of a plea of guilty.

The district court in the instant case agreed with the contentions of Mesenbrink, and dismissed the felony charges.

It is clear that the State carries the burden to show a voluntary waiver of sixth amendment rights. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In Idaho, Boykin has been interpreted to require that the court record affirmatively show that the guilty plea was understood and was voluntary. See State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 557 P.2d 626 (1976). There, the Court stated that a plea should not be accepted unless understood to be voluntary, and that the consequences of the plea are understood. “The trial court should specifically inform the defendant that by pleading guilty he waives his right to a jury trial, he waives his right against self-incrimination, and he waives any defense he may have had to the charges.” In the absence of following the procedures enunciated in Colyer, guilty pleas have been set aside. State v. Watson, 99 Idaho 694, 587 P.2d 835 (1978).

I.C.R. 11 (adopted in 1980), conditions the acceptance of all guilty pleas at the district court and magistrate levels upon the requirements delineated in subsection (c) thereof, i.e., a defendant must be informed of his rights 1) to be represented by legal counsel, 2) to confront witnesses, 3) against compelled self-incrimination, 4) to understand the charges levied against him, and 5) to understand the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments possible.

I.M.C.R. 5(f) (1980), mandates the use of a uniform citation form which contains a checklist of questions to be asked the defendant prior to a court entering judgment. The court is therein required to advise a defendant of constitutional and statutory rights, and the court must indicate such procedures have been followed if the defendant chooses to enter an uncounseled guilty plea.

The form of the judgment entered in defendant’s previous Canyon County conviction of DUI fails to incorporate the information mandated by I.M.C.R. 5. In contrast, the previous judgment of conviction of DUI in Ada County, on its face contains such I.M.C.R. 5 checklist.

We note that the record contains no basis for any contention that the defendant was not convicted of DUI in the Canyon County procedures. There is no indication of any appeal from the Canyon County decision, nor any subsequent proceedings contending that the actions were improper. Nevertheless, we note the point of conflict between two doctrines. First, the desire for finality of judgments and the presumption of the legality and correctness of the procedures underlying those judgments. We note that the requirements are simple and not burdensome. In contrast, we note the constitutional requirement of a showing of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In this regard do we place an unreasonable burden upon the State to go behind the face of the judgment of conviction to show that the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights prior to the entry of that conviction? In the instant case we do not view such a burden as onerous, but merely a perfunctory indication on the face of the documents that compliance has been had with the provisions of I.C.R. 11 and I.M.C. R. 5(f). Hence, we view our decision in the instant case as placing no further or undue burden upon law enforcement officials, but rather as only requiring our courts to follow our mandated rules of procedure. Although we have addressed the assertions of the State in the instant case in the hope of providing future guidance to our courts, we are not convinced that the appeal by the State is well taken. As noted, the defendant was charged, a jury selected and seated, and proof introduced. It was only thereafter that the court, on motion, dismissed the felony charge. We decline to discuss the attachment of jeopardy precluding any retrial of the defendant.

The appeal is dismissed.

BISTLINE and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.