State v. Maahs

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 49270
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Boise, June 2022 Term
)
v. ) Opinion filed: March 7, 2023
)
PATRICK TYLER MAAHS, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, Ada County. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge.
The district court’s decision denying motion to suppress is reversed, the judgment
of conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded.
Thomas Monaghan Law, PLLC, Boise, for Appellant. Thomas Monaghan argued.
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Justin R. Porter
argued.
ZAHN, Justice.
Patrick Maahs appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress. For
the reasons stated below, we reverse the district court’s decision, vacate Maahs’s judgment of
conviction, and remand the case.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 10, 2018, a teller working at CapEd Credit Union called the Boise Police
Department to report a suspicious situation. The teller reported that a man came into the credit
union, made a large cash deposit, exited the building, and then changed clothes in the parking lot.
The man subsequently spoke with two other men in the parking lot. The teller reported that the
men’s behavior made credit union employees nervous.
Officers from the Boise Police Department responded to the credit union and detained one
man in the parking lot. As the man in the parking lot was being detained, Officer Will Reimers
1
arrived at the scene and proceeded into the credit union without speaking to the officers in the
parking lot. Reimers entered the foyer of the credit union but found that the interior doors were
locked (it was after 5:00 p.m. and the doors were routinely locked at 5:00 p.m.). As he waited for
an employee to unlock the doors, Reimers observed two men, Patrick Maahs and Jordon Korona,
standing at the teller counter. Reimers was dressed in full police uniform. One of the men made
eye contact with Reimers for what Reimers felt was a prolonged period before notifying the other
man, who then turned to look at Reimers. After the men had a brief conversation, one left the
counter and proceeded down a nearby hallway. About 30 seconds later, the other man followed.
Upon entering the credit union, an employee informed Reimers that both men had gone into a
bathroom, even though they were informed that it was a single person bathroom. Reimers took a
position just behind a wall at the head of the hallway leading to the bathroom and called for backup.
Officer John Mathis responded to Reimers’s request. Reimers shared the information he
had gathered with Mathis and stated that the men were “acting kind of hinky” and that he was
“[n]ot sure what we have, but I figured we’d detain them.” While waiting for backup, Reimers also
heard a toilet flush. The officers observed the bathroom door for several minutes before Maahs
emerged from the bathroom. The officers’ subsequent conduct forms the crux of this appeal.
Reimers and Mathis immediately confronted Maahs as he exited the bathroom. Reimers
later testified that he gestured for Maahs to come toward him, but he was not sure if Maahs noticed
his hand gesture. Reimers noted there was a door at the end of the hallway, immediately behind
Maahs, after he exited the bathroom. At the same time, Mathis issued Maahs loud verbal
commands to come toward the officers. Reimers did not observe Maahs reach for a weapon or take
any other action consistent with him being armed. However, Reimers believed Maahs was looking
for a way to escape because he backed away from officers and “looked around” toward the door
behind him. Reimers testified that he had no prior information suggesting that Maahs and Korona
were armed, acting violently or aggressively, or dangerous. Reimers observed Mathis draw his
service weapon, point it at Maahs, and advance “pretty quickly” on Maahs after he exited the
bathroom. Mathis ordered Maahs to sit on the ground. After Maahs complied, Mathis holstered his
weapon and handcuffed Maahs.
Mathis later testified that he saw Maahs exit the bathroom “and [he] started going away
from us towards another door.” Mathis did not have any information that either Maahs or Korona
was armed or dangerous. Mathis issued Maahs several verbal commands to “come over here.”
2
Mathis testified that Maahs did not come toward Mathis but instead “put his hands up kind of
pushed like no [sic] and turned away to go away.” Mathis drew his weapon and ordered Maahs to
the ground. After handcuffing Maahs, he conducted a pat-down search of Maahs’s person for
weapons. During the pat-down of Maahs, Mathis removed all the contents from Maahs’s pockets,
including a hard metal object that turned out to be a Camas County Sheriff’s badge. Mathis then
took Maahs, still in handcuffs, to his patrol car so that Maahs and Korona could be questioned
separately.
The officers’ actions were captured on their body cameras. The footage shows that the total
time between Maahs emerging from the bathroom to Maahs sitting on the hallway floor with his
hands on his head is roughly five to seven seconds. Within two seconds of Maahs leaving the
bathroom, Mathis walked quickly toward Maahs with his hand on his holstered pistol and drew his
gun roughly one second later while ordering Maahs to get down. When Maahs exited the bathroom,
he was holding a cellphone to his right ear with his left hand, while his right hand remained visible
at his side. As Mathis walked toward him, Maahs transferred his phone to his right hand, raised
his left hand, and took approximately four steps backwards while looking behind him. Later, after
locking Maahs in the back of his patrol vehicle, Mathis searched through the contents of Maahs’s
wallet.
Other officers looked in the bathroom, where they discovered plastic used for vacuum-seal
bags, plastic baggies, “oddly twisted towels,” and a receipt with handwritten numbers on the back.
Mathis called dispatch and learned Maahs was on felony probation. An on-call felony probation
officer arrived on scene and informed Maahs that he was being arrested on an active agent’s
warrant.
As the events inside the credit union were unfolding, one of the officers in the parking lot
radioed for a drug detecting dog to be dispatched to the credit union. Upon its arrival, the drug dog
alerted on the car driven by Maahs. Inside, officers found a loaded 12-gauge shotgun, two safes
containing methamphetamine and cocaine, a scale, a vacuum sealer, and packaging material.
The State charged Maahs with trafficking in methamphetamine, unlawful possession of a
firearm, concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, possession of cocaine, and possession
of drug paraphernalia. Maahs moved to suppress the evidence seized from the search of his car on
the basis that officers had conducted a de facto arrest and that his seizure was unsupported by
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
3
The district court held a hearing on the motion, during which Reimers and Mathis testified,
and their body camera footage was admitted. The district court then issued a written order denying
the motion. The district court concluded that Maahs had not been arrested, but only subjected to
an investigatory detention, or Terry 1 stop, supported by reasonable suspicion. The district court
found that the officers did not draw their weapons until Maahs started looking as though “he was
intending to flee and was ignoring their instructions.” Therefore, the district court determined that
the officers’ tactics in detaining Maahs were reasonable under the circumstances because they
were in a vulnerable situation and needed to act to protect themselves and the public.
Maahs entered a conditional guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine pursuant to
Idaho Code section 37-2732B(a)(4)(C) and reserved his right to appeal the district court’s decision
denying his motion to suppress. All other charges against Maahs were dismissed pursuant to the
plea agreement. Maahs timely appealed the denial of his suppression motion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that “all
of the activity considered as a whole justified the manner . . . of [Maahs’s] detention.” State v.
Maahs, No. 47690, 2021 WL 3523469, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2021). Maahs filed a petition
of review with this Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals decision conflicted with relevant
precedent regarding de facto arrests. We granted review.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. On appeal, should this Court apply a de novo or clearly erroneous standard of review to
the district court’s factual findings?
2. Did the district court err in denying Maahs’s motion to suppress?
III. ANALYSIS
A. The clearly erroneous standard of review governs our review of the district court’s
factual findings.
Maahs argues that the ordinarily applied “clearly erroneous” standard of review should not
apply in this case because this Court has the same evidence before it as the district court. Under
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996), he contends that this
Court freely reviews and weighs the evidence akin to a trial court.
This Court ordinarily applies a bifurcated standard of review to district court decisions on
suppression motions. State v. Phipps, 166 Idaho 1, 4, 454 P.3d 1084, 1087 (2019) (citation
1
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4
omitted). “When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial
court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” Id. (quoting State v. Mullins, 164
Idaho 493, 496, 432 P.3d 42, 45 (2018)). This standard reflects deference to the special role of a
trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and judge witnesses’ credibility. State v. Andersen, 164
Idaho 309, 312, 429 P.3d 850, 853 (2018) (citing Hull v. Giesler, 163 Idaho 247, 250, 409 P.3d
827, 830 (2018)). A substantial evidence standard is synonymous with a clearly erroneous standard
of review. See State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 516, 518 (1992).
We have departed from the clearly erroneous standard in unusual and limited
circumstances where this Court has “exactly the same evidence before it as was considered by the
district court[.]” Andersen, 164 Idaho at 312, 429 P.3d at 853. Under those circumstances, “this
Court has determined that its role on appeal is to freely review the evidence and weigh the evidence
in the same manner as the trial court would do.” Id. (quoting State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477,
492, 399 P.3d 804, 819 (2017)). The rationale for this rule is that a trial court that has not heard
witness testimony, but instead relies solely on the exhibits presented to the court, is in no better
position to judge the weight and credibility of evidence than this Court. Roby v. Roby, 10 Idaho
139, 142, 77 P. 213, 214 (1904).
Here, the district court considered the preliminary hearing transcript and the responding
officers’ body camera footage. However, the district court also heard live testimony at the motion
to suppress hearing and drew on that testimony in making its factual findings. As such, we do not
have exactly the same evidence before us as the district court, and this case does not present the
same unique and narrow circumstances as Andersen. Accordingly, we apply the usual standard of
review and consider whether the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous.
B. The district court erred in denying Maahs’s motion to suppress.
1. Officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Maahs.
Maahs contends that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative
detention because they acted on an inchoate hunch about criminal activity rather than articulable
facts. He contends that the district court erred in giving weight to the officers’ reliance on the tip
from the bank teller that amounted to a hunch of criminal activity. Further, he contends that the
district court did not consider circumstances that should have mitigated the officers’ suspicion.
5
The State argues that the district court did not err because the following articulable facts
supported the officers’ determination that reasonable suspicion existed: (1) the tip from the bank
tellers about three suspicious men; (2) the large cash deposit made by Maahs and Korona; (3) the
locked interior doors of the credit union; (4) Maahs and Korona going into a one-person bathroom
after seeing officers; (5) hearing the toilet flush as the men were inside the bathroom; and (6)
Maahs’s attempt to flee upon exiting the bathroom. The State contends that these facts, coupled
with the officers’ reasonable inferences drawn from those facts based on their training and
experience, is sufficient to demonstrate reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 17 of
the Idaho Constitution provide that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. 17, § 17. A seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes may take
the form of an arrest or an investigatory detention. See State v. Pylican, 167 Idaho 745, 750–51,
477 P.3d 180, 185–86 (2020). “For an arrest to be considered lawful, it must be based on probable
cause.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009) (citation omitted).
“However, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible
when justified by an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is
about to commit, a crime.” State v. Huntley, 170 Idaho 521, ___, 513 P.3d 1141, 1146 (2022)
(quoting Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210). Officers need not have reasonable suspicion
of a particular crime, only that “criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 273 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Whether officers had reasonable
suspicion to conduct an investigative detention depends on the totality of the circumstances known
to an officer at the time of the stop. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 410, 283 P.3d 722, 727 (2012).
Reasonable suspicion requires more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (citation omitted); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210. Instead,
reasonable suspicion must be founded on “specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences
that can be drawn from those facts.” State v. Bonner, 167 Idaho 88, 94, 467 P.3d 452, 458 (2020)
(citation omitted). Law enforcement officers may take into account their “experience and law
enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 410, 283
P.3d at 727 (citation omitted). “[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (citations omitted).
6
The totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrate that officers had reasonable
suspicion to detain Maahs. Reimers testified to several specific facts that aroused his suspicion
that Maahs might be engaging in criminal activity. He relied on the information relayed to him
from the teller’s call to Boise Police, including that a man had made a large deposit, left the credit
union, changed clothes in the parking lot, and began talking with two other men. Reimers observed
Maahs and Korona notice his presence at the credit union, briefly confer with each other, and walk
away one after the other down a hallway. Reimers then learned from a credit union employee that
both men entered what they knew was a single-person bathroom. The men were in the bathroom
for more than three minutes and, during that time, Reimers heard the toilet flush. Reimers testified
that in his training and experience investigating drug crimes, bathrooms are a common place for
people to dispose of contraband.
Maahs points to Reimers’s comment to Mathis that something was “hinky” as evidence
that Reimers was acting on nothing more than an inchoate hunch. If considered in a vacuum, Maahs
would be correct. However, Reimers’s comment, while informal, followed his recitation of
specific facts to Mathis that caused him concern. When viewed in the context of the rest of his
discussion with Mathis, Reimers’s comment is simply an expression of his growing suspicion
drawn from the above facts. In sum, the totality of the circumstances known to Reimers and Mathis
before Maahs left the bathroom established reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative
detention.
Maahs argues that the district court failed to account for a variety of facts that should have
dispelled the officers’ suspicion of criminal activity, including that it was unlikely that Maahs
would rob a credit union after depositing more than $8,000, and Maahs’s surprise at seeing the
officers once he exited the bathroom. However, law enforcement officers “need not rule out the
possibility of innocent conduct” to have reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. State v. Perez,
164 Idaho 626, 628, 434 P.3d 801, 803 (2019) (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403
(2014)). Also, law enforcement is not required to have reasonable suspicion that specific crimes
have been, or about to be, committed. See State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 615–16, 329 P.3d
391, 397–98 (Ct. App. 2014). See also Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210 (citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 19) (explaining an investigatory seizure is permissible if it is based on specific,
articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity) (remaining citation omitted). It is sufficient that officers have
7
reasonable suspicion that an individual is involved in some criminal activity. Perez-Jungo, 156
Idaho at 615, 329 P.3d at 397 (citations omitted). As such, the mitigating facts that Maahs
highlights do not alter the analysis that officers had reasonable suspicion that he was engaging in
some criminal activity.
Maahs also contends that the district court’s finding that he attempted to flee is clearly
erroneous in light of Mathis’s body cam footage. We need not address this argument, however,
because it is irrelevant to our analysis of reasonable suspicion. As discussed above, the totality of
the remaining circumstances established reasonable suspicion that Maahs was engaged in criminal
activity.
2. Maahs was arrested without probable cause.
Maahs argues that the district court erred in concluding that law enforcement conducted an
investigative detention because the officers’ conduct in seizing him exceeded the scope of a
reasonable investigative detention. He argues that by drawing their weapons, handcuffing him,
handling him in a rough physical manner, and placing him in the back of a police vehicle, officers
conducted a de facto arrest, unsupported by probable cause. Further, as mentioned above, Maahs
asserts that he was not merely frisked after being seized, but was also searched when officers
emptied the contents of his pockets after handcuffing him and searched his wallet as he sat in the
police car.
The State contends that Maahs’s seizure did not exceed the scope of an investigative
detention because the totality of the circumstances justified the officers’ tactics in detaining Maahs.
The State specifically points to the potential risk of harm to officers and credit union employees,
Maahs’s attempt to flee, and the need to remove Maahs to a location outside the building so the
officers could investigate potential criminal activity. The State does not contend that officers
possessed probable cause to arrest or search Maahs.
The district court concluded that Maahs’s seizure did not exceed the scope of an
investigative detention because the officers’ conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. The
district court stressed the officers’ vulnerability to an attack from either Maahs or Korona and the
need to protect civilian employees of the credit union. Further, the district court noted the
commotion in the hallway after Maahs’s detention, reasoning that Mathis was justified in
handcuffing Maahs, removing him from the building, and placing him into the back of a police
cruiser.
8
a. Whether a seizure constitutes an arrest requires an assessment of the totality of the
circumstances.
This Court has not articulated a bright-line test for when a seizure crosses the line from an
investigative detention to a full-fledged arrest. State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 796, 964 P.2d 660,
663 (1998). “Instead, ‘common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid
criteria.’” Id. (quoting State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 423, 901 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1995)). “An
arrest is characterized as a full-scale seizure of the person requiring probable cause.” State v.
Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999). In contrast, “[a]n investigative
detention is characterized as a seizure of limited duration which, when supported by a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, falls within a judicially created exception to the probable cause
requirement.” Id. A determination of whether a seizure amounts to an arrest is measured under the
totality of the circumstances. Buti, 131 Idaho at 796–97, 964 P.2d at 663–64. See also United States
v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2014).
We recently stated that courts may consider a number of “important factors” when
considering whether an arrest or an investigative detention has occurred, including “the seriousness
of the crime, the location of the encounter, the length of the detention, the reasonableness of the
officer’s display of force, and the conduct of the suspect as the encounter unfolds.” Reagan v.
Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 169 Idaho 689, 697, 502 P.3d 1027, 1035 (2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 480, 988 P.2d at 706). We have also directed courts to
consider “the duration of the invasion imposed by the additional restriction,” and “the law
enforcement purposes served.” State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 554, 961 P.2d 641, 645 (1998)
(citing Pannell, 127 Idaho at 423, 901 P.2d at 1324). See also State v. Fields, 168 Idaho 57, 65,
479 P.3d 450, 458 (Ct. App. 2020) (listing all seven factors). These illustrative factors can serve
as guideposts, but ultimately, “common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over
rigid criteria.” See Buti, 131 Idaho at 796, 964 P.2d at 663 (citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court articulated the proper purpose and lawful scope of an
investigative detention under the Fourth Amendment:
The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law
enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the
suspect. The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. This much, however, is clear: an
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed
9
should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the
officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (citations omitted). The State carries the burden to
demonstrate that a seizure it seeks to justify based on reasonable suspicion is sufficiently limited
“in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.” Id.Placing a suspect in handcuffs may convert an investigative detention to an arrest where
law enforcement does not have a reason to believe that a suspect poses a “substantial risk of danger
or flight.” Pannell, 127 Idaho at 424, 901 P.2d at 1325. In Pannell, law enforcement officers
stopped Pannell’s vehicle after a reported domestic dispute. Id. at 421, 901 P.2d at 1322. Before
pulling the vehicle over, dispatch informed the officers that Pannell was inebriated and that officers
should be careful because weapons were involved. See id. The responding officers saw Pannell
reach into the back seat of the vehicle. Id. Officers asked Pannell to step out of the vehicle and
perform field sobriety tests. Id. Following the tests, officers determined that Pannell was likely
unsafe to drive. See id. Based on this information, and the report of weapons being involved in the
domestic dispute, officers determined that Pannell posed a danger to law enforcement personnel
and others if officers did not take steps to prevent Pannell from accessing a weapon before they
completed their investigation of the domestic dispute. Id. Consequently, officers frisked Pannell,
handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of their patrol car to drive him back to the scene of
the domestic disturbance. Id. Officers then searched Pannell’s car, discovering three large bags of
marijuana. Id. at 421–22, 901 P.2d at 1322–23.
Pannell moved to suppress evidence gleaned from the search of his vehicle, which the
district court denied. Id. at 422, 901 P.2d at 1323. In denying Pannell’s motion, the district court
relied on Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), which permits officers to search the passenger
compartment of a vehicle incident to an investigative detention if they have reasonable suspicion
that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. See id. at 422–23, 901
P.2d at 1323–24. This Court reversed the district court, concluding that Long was inapplicable
because Pannell had been arrested, not just briefly detained for an investigation. Id. at 425, 901
P.2d at 1326. This Court reasoned that placing a suspect in handcuffs is a much greater level of
intrusion than other tactics ordinarily associated with an investigative detention, and justifiable
only when officers demonstrated a substantial risk of danger or flight. Id. at 424, 901 P.2d at 1325.
This Court noted the circumstances surrounding Pannell’s seizure: (1) officers knew Pannell was
inebriated, but did not feel as though he was so inebriated as to be charged with driving under the
10
influence; (2) a pat-down search before Pannell was placed in handcuffs revealed no weapons; (3)
there was only one suspect and three responding officers; and (4) officers decided to leave Pannell
alone with only one officer while the others attended to different tasks. Id. at 424–25, 901 P.2d at1325–26. Based on the totality of the circumstances, this Court held that the force used to seize
Pannell exceeded the scope of an investigative detention and rose to the level of an arrest. Id.Law enforcement may also exceed the permissible scope of an investigative detention
when they use a weapon or other aggressive tactics to effectuate a stop in the absence of an
adequate rationale to justify the use of such force. See Edwards, 761 F.3d at 982. Use of a weapon
does not automatically convert an investigative detention into an arrest. See, e.g., United States v.
Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 1982) (explaining that “the use of guns in connection with
a stop is permissible where the police reasonably believe they are necessary for their protection”).
However, the use of a gun to detain a suspect—and the implicit threat of deadly force that comes
along with it—is a much greater intrusion than that typically associated with an investigative
detention. See United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 967–68 (7th Cir. 1988) (“It would be
a sad day for the people of the United States if police had carte blanche to point a gun at each and
every person of whom they had an ‘articulable suspicion’ of engaging in criminal activity.”).
Accordingly, to fall within the scope of a constitutionally permissible investigatory detention, law
enforcement must reasonably believe that the use of a gun is necessary for their protection. Merritt,
965 F.2d at 1273. See also Edwards, 761 F.3d at 981; Pannell, 127 Idaho at 424, 901 P.2d at 1325(noting that the use of intrusive tactics during an investigatory detention are permissible when they
are “a reasonable precaution for the officer’s safety”).
b. The totality of the circumstances indicate that Maahs was arrested.
After considering the totality of the circumstances known to the officers, the display of
force in detaining Maahs exceeded the scope of an investigatory detention. Two tactics, when
viewed in combination, exceeded the means “reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s
suspicion” and therefore lead us to conclude that Maahs was arrested. See Buti, 131 Idaho at 796–
98, 964 P.2d at 663–65.
i. Mathis’s use of a firearm was unreasonable under the circumstances.
First, Mathis’s use of a firearm was unreasonable under the circumstances. The officers
admitted during their testimony that they had no information that either Maahs (or Korona) was
armed, dangerous, or posed any risk of violence. They cited no facts supporting their assertion that
11
the extraordinary display of force in this case was warranted because the men in the bathroom
could have been planning an ambush attack, and their conduct in the credit union belies their
contention. They took no steps to evacuate the building or instruct credit union employees and
customers to stay clear of the bathroom door. Indeed, mere moments before Maahs emerged from
the bathroom Officer Reimers motioned a credit union employee toward him. Nor did the officers
confer with each other about a threat while waiting for the men to leave the bathroom. This is
significant because Reimers testified that if he believed that the men in the bathroom posed a threat
to their safety, he would have discussed the potential threat with Mathis.
The State contends that cases from the Fifth and Tenth Circuits indicate that Mathis’s use
of force was reasonable. See United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Maslanka, 501 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir.
1982). The facts of those cases, however, are distinguishable from the facts in this case.
In Sanders, the officer responded to a report that an armed man wearing a tan jacket was
acting suspiciously at a grocery store. Sanders, 994 F.2d at 201–02. As the officer approached the
scene, he witnessed a man wearing a tan jacket turn and walk away after seeing the officer. Id. The
tan jacket was large and covered the man’s waistband. Id. The officer exited his vehicle, drew his
weapon, and ordered the man to stop and get on the ground. Id. On appeal, Sanders argued, in part,
that the officer exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop by holding him at gunpoint. Id. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the issue as one of reasonableness under the specific
circumstances of Sanders’s case—“[t]he relevant inquiry is always one of reasonableness under
the circumstances. The court must determine case by case whether the police were unreasonable
in failing to use less intrusive procedures to conduct their investigation safely.” Id. at 206–07
(citation omitted).
After reviewing the facts of Sanders’s detention, the court concluded the officer acted
reasonably when he drew his weapon. Id. at 207. The court relied on the officer’s knowledge that
Sanders was armed, that he was wearing clothes that could conceal a weapon, that he held a paper
bag that appeared to contain an alcoholic beverage which suggested he could be under the
influence of alcohol, that he turned and began walking away as the patrol car pulled up, and that
the officer observed several other people standing nearby. Id. The court concluded these facts gave
the officer reason to believe the suspect, who was armed, could be aggressive and the officer
therefore had to act swiftly to preserve the status quo and avoid exacerbating the situation. Id.12
In Maslanka, officers had discovered 18,000 pounds of marijuana in a rural area when they
witnessed a vehicle approaching from a one-way dirt road. Maslanka, 501 F.2d at 210–11. Shortly
after the vehicle came into view, it turned around and headed back to the highway. Id. An officer
chased the vehicle for 5 miles at speeds around 100 miles per hour before it finally came to a stop.
Id. at 211. The lone officer then approached the vehicle with his weapon drawn, ordered the driver
out, and arrested him for eluding a police officer and speeding. Id. On appeal, the defendants
alleged the officer lacked probable cause to arrest them. Id. at 212. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded the arrest was supported by probable cause. Id. at 212–13. The court went on
to state, in dicta contained in a footnote to its probable cause discussion, that the officer’s use of a
weapon as he approached the vehicle did not, at that point, convert the initial detention into an
arrest. Id. at 213 n.10. The court concluded that the officer was entitled to “exhibit[] proper
caution” because he was alone on a lonely highway, and he wished to speak to the driver of a car
with three occupants who had just led him on a high-speed, five-mile chase. Id.In Merritt, police approached a vehicle parked on a residential street and ordered the
occupants out of the vehicle. Merritt, 695 F.2d at 1265–66. Two of the officers had shotguns and
one of the shotguns was pointed at the occupants throughout the detention. Id. at 1267. The police
were searching for a fugitive wanted for murder and had been informed he may be one of the
people in the truck. Id. at 1265. Police searched the vehicle after the occupants got out of the
vehicle and found a .22 caliber revolver under the driver’s seat. Id. Merritt was subsequently
indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. Merritt filed a motion to suppress on the
basis that police lacked sufficient justification to confront him and his companions in the truck. Id.The district court found that the police had violated Merritt’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The
United States took an interlocutory appeal of the decision. Id.The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed three issues on appeal, one of which was
whether the police, due to the manner in which they confronted and detained Merritt and his
companions, in fact arrested them without probable cause. Id. at 1267–68. The court noted the use
of guns in connection with a stop is permissible where the police reasonably believe the guns are
necessary for their protection. Id. at 1273. The court concluded several facts justified the officers’
use of the shotguns to ensure their own protection: (1) that the officers were looking for a murder
suspect who was reportedly armed and dangerous; (2) that earlier in the evening a search of the
residence where the suspect had been staying revealed many weapons and ammunition, thus
13
confirming the report that the suspect was armed and dangerous; and (3) that the suspect had
companions with him who could lend support in the event of a confrontation with law enforcement.
Id. at 1272-74.
These cases are unpersuasive when compared to the facts of this case. The Sanders decision
is distinguishable because Mathis had not received any information that Maahs was armed, nor did
he identify any facts establishing that Maahs posed a risk of violence. Unlike the defendant in
Maslanka, Maahs did not lead Mathis on a high-speed chase for five miles prior to his detention,
and Mathis was not alone and confronting multiple individuals in a remote location. This case
differs from Merritt because Maahs was not suspected of committing a violent crime, nor had
Mathis been informed that Maahs was armed and dangerous. The cases cited by the State generally
hold that officers are entitled to draw their weapons during an investigative detention if necessary
to protect their personal safety or the safety of bystanders. The State, however, did not establish at
the suppression hearing that either Mathis or Reimers reasonably believed their personal safety, or
the personal safety of other nearby individuals were in danger. As a result, the referenced cases do
not support the State’s position that Mathis’s use of the firearm was reasonable.
We also note that while the State argues that Mathis’s use of the firearm was justified
because of Mathis’s belief that Maahs was attempting to flee, the State has not cited a case holding
that, within the context of an investigative detention, it is reasonable to aim a firearm at a suspect
solely to prevent him from fleeing. Additionally, the State contends that the use of the firearm was
appropriate because Mathis had to pass by the closed bathroom door while a suspect was still
inside the bathroom. Mathis, however, was not pointing his firearm at the bathroom, but instead at
Maahs. Reimers was covering the bathroom and commanded the individual in the bathroom to
come out while Mathis was dealing with Maahs. In sum, the State has failed to establish that
Mathis’s use of his firearm was reasonable in this case.
ii. Mathis’s emptying of all contents from Maahs’s pockets and searching of
Maahs’s wallet were unreasonable under the circumstances.
Second, Mathis’s removal of all contents from Maahs’s pockets and search of Maahs’s
wallet were unreasonable under the circumstances. Maahs argues that the district court’s “finding”
that Mathis conducted a frisk is not supported by the body cam footage, which shows that Mathis
searched him after handcuffing him, conducting, in essence, a search incident to arrest. The State
argues that Mathis appropriately conducted a pat-down for weapons. Further, the State contends
14
that even if Maahs was searched, Maahs has failed to provide adequate support to demonstrate that
searching a suspect lends itself to the conclusion that an arrest has occurred.
Although Maahs argues that the district court’s factual finding on this point was erroneous,
the district court’s determination that Maahs was frisked is a legal conclusion. In essence, Maahs
argues that by removing the contents of his pockets, and later rifling through his wallet, officers
exceeded the scope of a reasonable investigatory detention. The question is not what the body cam
footage reveals, but instead whether Mathis’s conduct was within the scope of a reasonable
investigative detention or otherwise supported by the law. State v. Holler, 136 Idaho 287, 292, 32
P.3d 679, 684 (Ct. App. 2001). We therefore freely review the district court’s legal conclusion that
Maahs was frisked rather than searched. See id. at 291, 32 P.3d at 683.
An officer may conduct a pat-down search for weapons, also referred to as a “frisk,”
incident to an investigative detention if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the suspect may
be armed and dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. A pat-down search is limited to “the minimum
intrusion necessary” to assure an officer that a suspect does not have a weapon. State v. Lee, 162
Idaho 642, 648, 402 P.3d 1095, 1101 (2017) (quoting State v. Watson, 143 Idaho 840, 845, 153
P.3d 1186, 1191 (Ct. App. 2007)). After an officer is satisfied that an object found on an
individual’s person is not a weapon, he lacks authority to continue invading a defendant’s right to
be free from police intrusion absent probable cause to arrest the person. Id.While Mathis testified that the purpose of the initial search was “predominantly for a
weapon pat search,” he also stated that he felt a card in Maahs’s pocket and “just took it out.” In
fact, while Mathis initially patted Maahs’s pockets during the search, he proceeded to remove all
the contents of each of Maahs’s pockets. Mathis did not articulate any facts that established a
reasonable suspicion that Maahs might be armed or dangerous and admitted on cross-examination
that he had no information indicating that Maahs was armed or dangerous. Accordingly, Mathis’s
actions in removing all the contents of Maahs’s pockets exceeded the scope of a reasonable
investigatory stop. See State v. Harrison, 160 Idaho 649, 651–52, 377 P.3d 1112, 1114–15 (Ct.
App. 2016).
The same is true of Mathis’s later search of Maahs’s wallet. While Maahs was seated in
the back of the patrol vehicle, Mathis opened Maahs’s wallet and removed and examined the
contents of the wallet. This occurred prior to the search of Maahs’s vehicle. Mathis’s search of the
contents of Maahs’s wallet likewise exceeded the scope of a reasonable investigatory stop.
15
In sum, the State has not carried its burden to demonstrate that, under the totality of the
circumstances, the seizure of Maahs was an investigative detention. The particular facts and
circumstances of this case did not justify pulling a gun on Maahs, emptying his pockets of all
contents, and searching his wallet. When considered together, these actions were not the least
intrusive means necessary to dispel the officers’ reasonable suspicion. As a result, the investigative
methods employed exceeded the scope of a lawful investigative detention.
3. The items found in the car must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
Given our determination, the State was required to demonstrate that probable cause existed
to arrest Maahs and search his person. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 479, 988
P.2d at 705. The State has not argued that probable cause supported the arrest. Accordingly, we
hold that Maahs’s warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.
Maahs argues that all evidence discovered in the car must be suppressed because it was
obtained as a result of his unlawful arrest. The exclusionary rule bars the use of physical evidence
and verbal statements obtained as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). When determining whether evidence is obtained as a result of a
Fourth Amendment violation—so called “fruit of a poisonous tree”—the Court must consider
whether the evidence was discovered through the exploitation of the illegal actions by police or
“instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. at 487–88.
“Where a defendant has moved to suppress evidence allegedly gained through
unconstitutional police conduct . . . the defendant bears an initial burden of going forward with
evidence to show a factual nexus between the illegality and the state’s acquisition of the evidence.”
State v. Kapelle, 158 Idaho 121, 127, 344 P.3d 901, 907 (Ct. App. 2014). “This requires a prima
facie showing that the evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the
government's unconstitutional conduct.” State v. McBaine, 144 Idaho 130, 133, 157 P.3d 1101,
1104 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This burden does not
require the defendant to prove that the State could not have discovered the evidence absent an
illegal search, but instead, “the defendant need only show that, on the events that did take place,
the discovery of the evidence was a product or result of the unlawful police conduct.” Id. at 134,
157 P.3d at 1105. Once the defendant proves this factual nexus, the burden shifts to “the State to
demonstrate the exception applicable to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. . . .” State v. Bills,
166 Idaho 778, 782, 463 P.3d 412, 416 (Ct. App. 2020). There are three exceptions to the
16
exclusionary rule: independent origin, inevitable discovery, and attenuated basis. Stuart v. State,
136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001).
In moving to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle, Maahs thus bore the initial
burden to show a factual nexus between the unlawful arrest and the evidence seized. Maahs argues
that police only discovered the contraband in the car after the K-9 arrived and alerted on the car,
which was well after Maahs had been unlawfully arrested and placed in the back of the patrol car.
Maahs cites to body cam footage and police reports to establish that the K-9 officer arrived on
scene approximately 27 minutes after Mathis encountered Maahs inside the credit union. The K-9
officer then spoke with officers on scene before running his K-9 around the car. Maahs argues that,
had he not been unlawfully arrested, he would have been free to leave the scene before the K-9
officer arrived. The State does not respond to this argument or otherwise contend that an exception
to the exclusionary rule applies.
This was sufficient evidence to satisfy Maahs’s initial obligation. See State v. Babb, 136
Idaho 95, 99, 29 P.3d 406, 410 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding video surveillance showing defendant’s
detention and arrest can be sufficient to demonstrate a factual nexus between arrest and discovery
of evidence). The burden then shifted to the State to demonstrate an exception to the exclusionary
rule. Bills, 166 Idaho at 782, 463 P.3d at 416. The State has not asserted an exception applies, and
we therefore hold that the exclusionary rule bars the use of the evidence found in the car following
Maahs’s unlawful arrest.
The dissent takes issue with Maahs not establishing that, if he had not been unlawfully
arrested, he would have been permitted to leave prior to the K-9 alert that provided probable cause
to search his vehicle. In essence, the dissent would require Maahs to establish that, but for his
unlawful arrest, there is no set of facts—including a hypothetical set of facts—in which officers
would have discovered the evidence. That is the not the standard our appellate courts have
employed, however.
Our Court of Appeals has held that a defendant’s initial burden of demonstrating a causal
nexus does not require a showing based on hypotheticals: “By expressing the query as a ‘but for’
test, we do not imply that a defendant bears the burden to prove a negative—that the State would
not or could not have discovered the evidence on any set of hypothetical circumstances that could
have arisen absent the illegal search.” McBaine, 144 Idaho at 134, 157 P.3d at 1105. Instead, “the
defendant need only show that, on the events that did take place, the discovery of the evidence was
17
a product or result of the unlawful police conduct.” Id. (emphasis added); State v. Vivian, 171
Idaho 79, ___, 518 P.3d 378, 382–83 (2022).
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning and holding in McBaine. We have
consistently held that the State “bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that the
challenged evidence is untainted,” Kapelle, 158 Idaho at 127, 344 P.3d at 907, and “to demonstrate
the exception applicable to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,” Vivian, 171 Idaho at ___, 518
P.3d at 383. In this case, the dissent would effectively place the burden on Maahs to prove that the
evidence would not have been inevitably discovered. State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31, 407 P.3d
1285, 1290 (2017) (alteration and citations omitted) (“[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine asks
courts to engage in a hypothetical finding into the lawful actions law enforcement would have
inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful avenue that led to the evidence.”). This was not
Maahs’s burden, however. See Vivian, 171 Idaho at ___, 518 P.3d at 383.
The dissent relies on the Court of Appeal’s decision in State v. Keene, 144 Idaho 915, 174
P.3d 885 (Ct. App. 2007), to support its position that Maahs has not met his initial burden of
showing a causal nexus, but the circumstances in Keene differ from those present here. In Keene,
an officer was dispatched to an R.V. park in response to a call from the park’s host that the
occupants of a brown Mercury Grand Marquis could be selling drugs. Id. at 917, 174 P.3d at 887.
The officer witnessed a brown Mercury Grand Marquis with two occupants leaving the park as he
arrived. Id.
The following night, the same officer responded to a call reporting that a vehicle was
parked in front of an unoccupied house. Id. When he arrived, the officer saw that the vehicle was
the same brown Mercury Grand Marquis he witnessed the previous night leaving the R.V. park.
Id. The officer called narcotics officers to assist and then approached the vehicle. Id. The two
occupants exited the vehicle and began speaking to the officer. Id. The passenger admitted to being
at the R.V. park the previous night. Id. The defendant, who had exited the driver’s side of the
vehicle, provided her name and date of birth, returned to her car, locked it, and left the scene on
foot. Id. At about the time the defendant was leaving, narcotics officers arrived and chased after
the defendant. Id. After resisting, the defendant was handcuffed and brought back to the scene. Id.
The officers called a drug detecting dog, which arrived about 10 minutes after the defendant had
been handcuffed. Id. The dog alerted on the vehicle, and a subsequent search revealed drugs and
drug paraphernalia. Id.
18
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered in her vehicle, which the district
court denied. Id. at 918, 174 P.3d at 888. On appeal, the defendant argued the district court erred
in denying her motion to suppress because her detention became a de facto arrest unsupported by
probable cause when she was handcuffed and brought back to the initial scene. Id. The Court of
Appeals “assum[ed] arguendo” that the defendant was unlawfully detained. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the defendant had not met her initial burden because “the police had justification
to detain and search the vehicle that was totally independent of their contact with” the defendant.
Id. at 919, 174 P.3d at 889. The passenger admitted to being at the R.V. park the night prior, the
officer recognized the same brown Mercury Grand Marquis, and the incident the night before
connected the vehicle and its occupants to potential drug activity. Id. “This individualized, specific
information amounted to reasonable suspicion that [the passenger] was engaged in the illicit drug
trade and that the car had recently been used to transport drugs.” Id. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the facts provided reasonable suspicion for officers to seize the vehicle itself, so
even if the defendant “attempted to drive away rather than abandon her vehicle, the officer could
have lawfully prevented her from doing so.” Id. Further, the Court of Appeals concluded the 15
minutes between when the passenger voluntarily connected himself and the vehicle to potential
drug activity and when the drug dog alerted did not exceed the time necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop. Id.
Unlike in Keene, responding officers here did not possess reasonable suspicion that
Maahs’s vehicle was connected to criminal activity such that the vehicle itself was seized as part
of the investigation. In other words, the State has neither argued, nor established, that prior to
Maahs’s arrest, they developed reasonable suspicion that his vehicle was involved in potential
illegal activity. Rather, they developed that suspicion after his arrest when the drug dog alerted on
his vehicle. It follows from Maahs’s argument that had he not been illegally arrested, he would
have been able to drive his vehicle away from the scene and the drug dog sniff would not have
occurred. The State has offered no argument or evidence to establish otherwise. We therefore
conclude that Maahs’s argument that his de facto arrest prevented him from getting in his vehicle
and driving away is enough to carry his initial burden.
The dissent’s concern with the record tending to show that officers would have still been
conducting a lawful investigative detention had they not unlawfully arrested Maahs is well-taken,
but that was an inevitable discovery argument for the State to make. It may have been the case that
19
officers would have discovered the evidence seized had they not exceeded the scope of a lawful
investigatory detention, but the State did not argue this point to the district court nor here on appeal.
The State could have argued that Maahs failed to meet his initial burden of showing a
causal nexus, but it chose not to. The State also could have argued that one or more of the
exceptions to the exclusionary rule applied in this case, but no such argument has been offered.
We are left with Maahs’s showing that officers seized evidence 27 minutes after he was initially
confronted, and following a dog sniff which occurred after his unlawful arrest. This was sufficient
to meet Maahs’s initial burden to establish a nexus between the unlawful conduct and the seized
evidence. Without any responsive argument from the State on this point, we cannot say that the
State has met its burden “to prove that the challenged evidence is untainted[.]” Kapelle, 158 Idaho
at 127, 344 P.3d at 907.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in denying Maahs’s motion to suppress
because the items found in the car must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. As a result,
we vacate Maahs’s judgment of conviction and remand this case for further proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court’s decision denying Maahs’s
motion to suppress. Maahs’s judgment of conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justices STEGNER and MOELLER, CONCUR.
BRODY, J., dissenting.
I would affirm the district court’s decision to deny Maahs’s motion to suppress because
Maahs has not demonstrated a causal nexus between the government conduct he contends was
unconstitutional and the discovery of the drug evidence he seeks to suppress. The majority
concludes that based on reasonable suspicion, Maahs was not free to leave the bank with his vehicle
because he was lawfully detained. With that much I agree. However, the majority then concludes
that Maahs would have been free to leave the bank with his vehicle before the drug dog sniff,
because the manner of Maahs’s detention involved officers pulling a gun on him, handcuffing him,
emptying his pockets, and searching his wallet, i.e., the manner of his detention amounted to a de
facto arrest. How can it be that Maahs was not free to leave the bank because he was lawfully
detained—but also free to leave the bank with his vehicle before the sniff?
20
The only sense in which both propositions can be true is if the duration (contrary to the
majority’s focus on manner) of Maahs’s detention was unreasonable, i.e., if Maahs was lawfully
detained—but would have been free to leave before the drug dog alerted on his vehicle because,
at that point, the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the detention was, or should have
been, completed. Thus, the only factual nexus—or logical link—between Maahs’s detention and
the drug dog alert is time. Maahs never made a factual showing regarding time and never
challenged the duration of his detention as unreasonable. Without this—and by improperly
focusing on manner—Maahs has not met his initial burden to show a factual nexus between
governmental conduct he contends was unconstitutional and the discovery of evidence in his
vehicle. Thus, the evidence in his vehicle is not “tainted”—and the burden never shifted to the
State to explain why the evidence (if it was “tainted”) should nevertheless be admitted under, for
example, the inevitable discovery doctrine. See State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31, 407 P.3d 1285,
1290 (2017). I respectfully dissent.
To suppress evidence allegedly gained through unconstitutional governmental conduct,
“the defendant bears an initial burden of going forward with evidence to show a factual nexus
between the illegality and the state’s acquisition of the evidence.” State v. Vivian, 171 Idaho 79,
__, 518 P.3d 378, 382 (2022) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Kapelle, 158 Idaho 121, 127, 344
P.3d 901, 907 (Ct. App. 2014)). To meet this burden, the defendant must make a “prima facie
showing that the evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the
government’s unconstitutional conduct.” Vivian, 171 Idaho at __, 518 P.3d at 382 (emphasis
added) (quoting State v. McBaine, 144 Idaho 130, 133, 157 P.3d 1101, 1104 (Ct. App. 2007)). In
other words, the defendant must show that, “on the events that did take place, the discovery of the
evidence was a product or result of the unlawful police conduct.” Vivian, 171 Idaho at __, 518
P.3d at 382 (emphasis added) (quoting McBaine, 144 Idaho at 134, 157 P.3d at 1105)). “If a
defendant fails to meet this burden, his motion to suppress necessarily fails.” State v. Thla Hum
Lian, 168 Idaho 211, 217, 481 P.3d 759, 765 (Ct. App. 2020).
Unconstitutional government conduct, as it relates to the permissive scope of an
investigative detention under the Fourth Amendment, generally fits into two categories: (1)
unreasonable duration, see, e.g., State v. Karst, 170 Idaho 219, __, 509 P.3d 1148, 1156 (2022)
(clarifying the extended-stop doctrine under Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015));
State v. Huntley, 170 Idaho 521, __, 513 P.3d 1141, 1150 (2022) (holding that a fifteen-minute
21
wait for a K-9 unit was not unreasonable when the action was related to the purpose of the
detention); and (2) unreasonable manner, see, e.g., State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 736 P.2 1327(1987); State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 423, 901 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1995). While offending either
category may require us to deem the detention a de facto arrest that requires probable cause, United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 684–86 (1985), the unreasonable manner of a detention will not
always have a factual nexus—or causal link—to the evidence a defendant seeks to suppress.
The Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Keene, 144 Idaho 915, 174 P.3d 885 (Ct. App.
2007), is instructive on this point. In that case, after a K-9 alert supplied probable cause for a search
of the defendant’s vehicle, officers discovered methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Id. at 917,
174 P.3d at 887. Initially, the encounter between the officers and the defendant and her passenger,
outside the defendant’s vehicle, was consensual. See id. at 918, 174 P.3d at 888. During the
encounter, the passenger admitted to being at an R.V. park the night before—the same R.V. park
where “two people” in a vehicle matching defendant’s vehicle were reportedly engaged in illicit
drug activity. Id. at 917–19, 174 P.3d at 887–89. After the passenger made this admission, the
defendant locked her vehicle, and walked away from the encounter. Id. Officers eventually “ran
after” the defendant (who resisted), handcuffed her, and returned her to the scene of the initial
encounter. Id. at 917, 174 P.3d at 887. A K-9 unit was requested, and roughly ten minutes after the
defendant was handcuffed, the K-9 alerted on the defendant’s vehicle. Id.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered in her vehicle by arguing that
her “detention became a de facto arrest when she was handcuffed,” and that it “was not supported
by probable cause or reasonable suspicion that she was involved in criminal activity.” Id. at 918,
174 P.3d at 888. The trial court disagreed and denied her motion. Id. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court and rejected the defendant’s argument because—“assuming
arguendo” that the manner of her detention amounted to a de facto arrest without probable cause—
there was no factual nexus between that illegality and the discovery of illicit drugs in her vehicle
pursuant to the K-9 alert supplying probable cause. Id. (emphasis original).
Many reasons supported the Court of Appeals’ decision in Keene. First, the search of the
defendant’s vehicle was not a product of information from the defendant while she was allegedly
“in custody” or under “arrest.” Id. at 919 (“The police did not gain any information from arresting
[the defendant] that caused them to search the vehicle[.]” (alterations added)). Second, the
defendant had already walked away from her vehicle before she was seized, thus, there was “no
22
way” the K-9 alert and ensuing search “resulted from an exploitation of the allegedly illegal arrest.”
Id. Third, if the defendant had “attempted to drive away rather than abandon her vehicle, the officer
could have lawfully prevented her from doing so” because police had justification to detain the
passenger and the vehicle on suspicion of illicit drug activity related to the R.V. park. Id. Finally,
as to the duration of the detention, “the fifteen minutes between the consensual encounter” and the
K-9 alert “did not exceed the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id. Thus,
whether the use of handcuffs during the defendant’s detention was so unreasonable in manner to
effectively place her “in custody” was beside the point. That alleged illegality had no causal link
to the timing of the K-9 alert and the discovery of evidence in her vehicle.
Here, like the defendant’s complaint about handcuffs in Keene, Maahs complains that the
manner of his detention—the use of a firearm, handcuffs, and a search of his pockets and wallet—
was so unreasonable that he was effectively “in custody” or under “arrest” during his detention.
Yet, for some of the same reasons provided in Keene, nothing about the manner of Maahs’s
detention has any causal or logical link to the K-9 alert, the search of his vehicle, and the evidence
discovered therein. Like the search of the defendant’s vehicle in Keene, the search of Maahs’s
vehicle was—in no conceivable way—a product or result of information obtained from Maahs
while he was effectively “in custody” or under “arrest” during his otherwise lawful detention. It
was a product of time—and Maahs never argued the timing of his detention was unreasonable.
To compare, the discovery of evidence within Maahs’s vehicle would have a causal or
logical link to the manner of his detention if the evidence was obtained as a product or result of:
(1) his involuntary consent to a search after he was “in custody” based on the “surrounding
circumstances,” see State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); (2) his
incriminating statements during a “custodial” interrogation, see United States v. Chamberlin, 644
F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1980), and see, e.g., Johns, 112 Idaho at 876, 736 P.2d at 1330 (addressing
whether a detention amounted to a de facto arrest where the defendant sought to suppress his
statements during the seizure); (3) a search of his pockets and wallet (supplying information that
gives cause to search his vehicle) after he was “in custody,” see State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 649,
402 P.3d 1095, 1102 (2017) (“An officer may perform a warrantless search only incident to
an arrest that is lawful.”); (4) a protective Terry sweep of his vehicle’s passenger compartment,
see Pannell, 127 Idaho at 423–25, 901 P.2d at 1324–26 (holding this exception, as articulated in
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), was not available to make the search of the defendant’s
23
vehicle lawful because the manner of the investigatory detention amounted to a de facto arrest); or
(5) transporting Maahs to a police station during his detention (as that manner of detention would
affect the time he is detained), see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (concluding
the defendant’s seizure was not an investigatory detention but a de facto arrest when he was
transported unwillingly to a police station, and subjected to a custodial interrogation).
Furthermore, if Maahs had attempted to drive away with his vehicle before the K-9 alerted,
the on-scene officers could have lawfully prevented him from doing so because the officers had
underlying justification to stop Maahs from leaving (based on reasonable suspicion) for the time
necessary to effectuate the purpose of his detention. Although the officers in Keene had
justification to detain the vehicle itself (unlike in this case) on top of the reasonable suspicion to
detain the defendant and her passenger, the underlying principle from Keene applies: The manner
of a detention does not always have a causal relationship to whether the individual, otherwise
lawfully detained, would have been free to leave at a time early enough to avoid a K-9 alert.
The circumstances of Maahs’s detention play this out. During his detention, two other
individuals were also detained, and multiple officers were on-scene in an effort to confirm or dispel
the suspicion of criminal activity as to all three, drug related or otherwise. This involved many
actions: interviewing the detained individuals, checking their identification with dispatch,
interviewing bank employees, investigating the bathroom in the bank, collecting the cash Maahs
deposited, contacting Maahs’s felony probation officer to check his supervised release status, and
conducting a “field show-up” for the bank employees to identify the detained individuals. These
actions take time. And Maahs has not made any factual showing or argument related to time so
that we could determine whether the purpose of the underlying detention was, or should have been,
completed before the K-9 alerted on his vehicle.
Nevertheless, even without this showing, the timing evidence that is in the record belies
the majority’s finding that Maahs “would have been free to leave the scene before the K-9 officer
arrived.” Contrary to the majority’s underlying suggestion, “[i]n any investigative detention the
individual is not free to leave[,]” State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 480, 988 P.2d 700, 706 (Ct.
App. 1999) (emphasis added)—for the time necessary “to effectuate the purpose of the stop[,]”
Huntley, 170 Idaho at __, 513 P.3d at 1150. The record reflects that after the K-9 officer arrived
on scene at 6:04 p.m., he briefly spoke to another officer before his K-9 alerted on Maahs’s vehicle.
At around that same time, Maahs was detained in the patrol vehicle, and on-scene officers were
24
still interviewing bank employees, collecting the cash deposited by Maahs, investigating the bank
bathroom, and in the process of contacting Maahs’s probation officer. Indeed, the record shows
that Maahs’s probation officer was not reached until 6:15 p.m. (eleven minutes after the K-9 officer
arrived) and did not arrive on-scene until sometime between 6:45 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. (at least forty
minutes after the K-9 officer arrived).
The district court found (albeit implicitly) that the K-9 alert occurred “[e]arlier” than the
initial contact with Maahs’s probation officer at 6:15 p.m.—and Maahs has not challenged this
finding on appeal. Nor did Maahs show that he should have been able to leave with his vehicle
before the K-9 alerted because his detention was unreasonable in duration. See, e.g., Sharpe, 470
U.S. at 685 (explaining that Terry stops cannot “continu[e] indefinitely” but there is “no rigid time
limitation”); Karst, 170 Idaho at __, 509 P.3d at 1156 (extended-stop doctrine under Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)). Thus, there is simply nothing to warrant the majority’s
adoption of Maahs’s one-sentence assertion—which Maahs made without citation to the record or
a supporting argument—that had the manner of his detention not been unreasonable, “the police
would not have been able to stop him from leaving in the vehicle before the K-9’s arrival.”
In sum, I would conclude that Maahs did not meet his initial burden to show a factual nexus
between unconstitutional governmental conduct and the evidence that he seeks to suppress; thus,
“his motion to suppress necessarily fails.” Thla Hum Lian, 168 Idaho at 217, 481 P.3d at 765.
Chief Justice BEVAN concurs in the dissent.
25