DocketNumber： 16202
Judges： Bakes, Bistline, Donaldson, Huntley, Shepard
Filed Date： 8/25/1986
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 11/8/2024
dissenting in Part II.
I dissent to the majority’s analysis and conclusion in Part II of its opinion which purports to allow the plaintiffs to assert a cause of action against the defendants, their instructor and the college, based on an alleged failure to adequately educate the plaintiffs. Whether characterized as being tort or in contract, the factual basis of the plaintiff’s cause of action is the same and is manifestly against public policy.
It is clear from a review of case law on this issue that courts have uniformly refused, based on public policy considerations, to enter the classroom to determine claims based upon what has generally been characterized as “educational malpractice.” Paladino v. Adelphi University, 89 A.D.2d 85, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1982); Hunter v. Board of Ed. of Montgomery County, 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982); D.S.W. v. Fairbanks No. Star Bor. Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981); Helm v. Professional Children’s School, 103 Misc.2d 1053, 431 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1980); Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F.Supp. 110 (D.Conn. 1979); Smith v. Alameda Cty. Soc. Serv. Agency, 90 Cal.App.3d 929, 153 Cal.Rptr. 712 (1979); Hoffman v. Board of Ed. of City of N.Y., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 400 N.E.2d 317 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 391 N.E.2d 1352 (1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 131 Cal.Rptr. 854 (1976).
The federal court in Loughran stated that a claim for damages similar to that asserted by the plaintiffs in the present case “necessarily hinges upon questions of methodology and educational priorities, issues not appropriate for resolution by this court.” Loughran, supra at 115. The court in Hunter noted that were the plaintiffs allowed to proceed on their claim, they would, in effect, position the courts as overseerers of both the day-to-day operation of our educational process, as well as the formulation of its governing policies. Hunter, supra, 292 Md. at 486-88, 439 A.2d at 585. “This responsibility we loathe to impose on our courts,” noted the Maryland Court. Id.
A unanimous Alaska court noted in 1981 that:
“[i]n particular we think that the remedy of money damages is inappropriate as a remedy for one who has been a victim of errors made during his or her education. The level of success which might have been achieved had the mistakes not been made will, we believe, be necessarily incapable of assessment, rendering legal cause an imponderable which is beyond the ability of courts to deal with in a reasoned way.” D.S.W., supra at 556.
In Donohue, the New York Court reasoned that “[rjecognition in the courts of this cause of action would constitute blatant interference with the responsibility for administration of the public school system lodged by constitution and statute in the school administrative agencies.” Donohue, supra, 47 N.Y.2d at 445, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378, 391 N.E.2d at 1354; James v. Board of Educ., 42 N.Y.2d 357, 367, 397 N.Y.S.2d 934, 942, 366 N.E.2d 1291, 1298 (1977). The court in Hoffman noted that it was well settled that a court may not substitute its judgment or the judgment of a jury, for the professional judgment of educators and government officials actually engaged in the complex process of educating thousands of pupils in the public schools. Hoffman, supra, 49 N.Y.2d at 125-26, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 379, 400 N.E.2d at 320. “Clearly, each and every time a student fails to progress academically, it can be argued that he or she would have done better and received a greater benefit if another educational approach or diagnostic tool had been utilized,” but the court system is not the proper forum to test the validity of these educational decisions. Id. at 127, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 379, 400 N.E.2d at 320.
The court in Paladino, after citing similar propositions from case law on this is
In Paladino, the suit was formulated as a breach of contract claim, much as the majority in the present case would allow the plaintiffs to formulate their claim. Yet, the court in Paladino emphasized that as with a claim formulated in tort:
"[wjhere the essence of the complaint is that the school breached its agreement by failing to provide an effective education, the court is again asked to evaluate the course of instruction. It is similarly called upon to review the soundness of the method of teaching that has been adopted by an educational institution. There is nothing novel about a contract action that would permit for judicial intervention into the process of learning. For in effect, the claim still requires judicial displacement of complex educational determinations made by those charged with the responsibility to instruct the child____
“Professional educators — not judges— are charged with the responsibility for determining the method of learning that should be pursued for their students. When the intended results are not obtained, it is the educational community— and not the judiciary — that must resolve the problem. For, in reality, the soundness of educational methodology is always subject to question and a court ought not in hindsight, substitute its notions as to what would have been a better course of instruction to follow for a particular pupil. These are determinations that are to be made by educators and, though they are capable of error, their integrity ought not be subject to judicial inquiry.” Paladino, supra, 89 A.D.2d at 89-93, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73.
The reasoning of the courts cited above is sound and recognizes the serious public policy implications in extending liability to educators and educational institutions for allegedly failing to adequately educate their students. The majority, however, ignores critical public policy concerns implicated by the facts of this case.
I fully recognize that there may be narrow circumstances where an action for breach of contract may lie, such as where an educational institution accepts a student’s tuition and thereafter provides no educational services at all. Similarly, if the contract — whether express or implied— with the school provides for certain specified services, such as a designated number of days or hours of instruction, and the school fails to meet this obligation, then an action for a breach of contract may be available. See e.g., Peretti v. Montana, 464 F.Supp. 784 (D.Mont.1979); Zumbrun v. University of Southern California, 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 101 Cal.Rptr. 499 (1972). These are conditions of the agreement between a student and the school that do not relate to the adequacy of the instruction, and hence, are capable of evaluation and remedy in the courts based on contract principles. However, in the present case, as in the Paladino case, the action the plaintiffs will be allowed to plead is the defendants’ failure to educate the plaintiffs. The asserted breach is predicated upon the quality and the adequacy of the course of instruction. The claim requires the fact finder to enter the classroom and determine whether or not the judgments, curricula and teaching styles of the professional educators involved were deficient. Thus, the plaintiff’s claims require an analysis of the educational function itself. The quality of education and the qualifications of teachers employed by the school are concerns not for the courts, but rather for the local and state boards of education
The case relied upon by the majority, Peretti, supra, is clearly distinguishable from the present case in that it does not involve an evaluation of the quality of education provided by an educational institution. Rather, Peretti involved an action brought by students who had enrolled in an aviation course which the state unlawfully terminated after the students had completed only three out of six quarters. Because the program was integrated, the students could not complete their training and were left with three quarters of training which were of little use without the rest of the training. The school publication on the course formed the measurable boundaries of an implied contract whereby if the plaintiffs enrolled in the aviation course they would be given the opportunity to complete the full six quarters required.
The Peretti case did not deal in any way with the adequacy of the course, its materials, or instructors to prepare a student who completed the six quarters to be a qualified aviation technician. The case simply recognized that the students had a right to the full six quarters of the course when they enrolled in the first three quarters. The present case does deal with the adequacy of the course the plaintiffs took to educate them as mechanics. Judicial inquiry into this case would involve the very public policy concerns noted above, which the Peretti case did not need to deal with because those concerns were not implicated by its holding.
Furthermore, all of the other citations made by the majority do not support its proposition permitting a cause of action against a school for failing to adequately educate the plaintiffs, whether that cause of action is formulated in tort or in contract. The case of Ward v. Washington State University, 39 Wash.App. 630, 695 P.2d 133 (1985) simply holds that the plaintiff did not establish that he was “military personnel” pursuant to statute and the university bulletin which would have entitled him to resident-tuition privileges. The case of Marquez v. University of Washington, 32 Wash.App. 302, 648 P.2d 94 (1982) actually seems to weaken the majority's position in the present case since it holds that a university which admitted a student under its affirmative action program was not obligated to provide adequate tutorial assistance to the student and could terminate that student’s enrollment when he failed to maintain a minimum grade-point average.
In another case cited by the majority, Zumbrun, supra, the court found an instructor liable for simply terminating his course in protest of University policies toward the war in Southeast Asia. The plaintiff’s action was aptly characterized as a breach of contract claim but, like the Peretti case, had nothing to do with the quality of the student’s education. The student could maintain her action because the instructor failed to complete the number of days of instructions he had agreed to provide. Had the instructor completed the instruction as agreed, but allegedly done a poor job or used poor educational techniques, California case law clearly indicates that the student would not have been able to maintain a cause of action, even though she may have formulated it in terms of breach of contract. Hoffman, supra; Peter W, supra.
Thus, the majority provides no authority upon which it bases its conclusion that the plaintiffs may be able to pursue a contract claim in the courts based on the defendant’s alleged failure to adequately educate them in the course they took. This is indeed a dangerous and unprecedented step for this Court to take; a step that I cannot in good conscience condone. This state has established many public avenues to resolve a wide range of problems that arise in our society. The problem of whether an educator is providing an adequate education to his students cannot be resolved through the court system in the same way that a dispute between a manufacturer and a purchaser of a defective product may be resolved. The legislature has established educational boards and agencies governing the quality of education in both public and