Riverton Citizens Group v. Bingham County Commissioners

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 48743
RIVERTON CITIZENS GROUP, joined )
individuals, property owners and aggrieved
)
citizens collectively, )
)
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Boise, February 2022 Term
)
v. ) Opinion Filed: March 28, 2023
)
BINGHAM COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, a ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
local governmental agency, )
)
Respondent. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bingham County. Darren Simpson, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is vacated, its decision dismissing the petition is
reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings.
Justin B. Oleson, Blaser Oleson & Lloyd, Chartered, Blackfoot, for appellant.
Justin B. Oleson argued.
N. Paul Rogers, Bingham County Prosecuting Attorney, Blackfoot, for respondent.
N. Paul Rogers argued.
_____________________
BRODY, Justice.
This appeal provides important clarifications of the procedure governing petitions for
judicial review under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84, which is distinct from the procedure
governing appeals from magistrate court to district court under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83.
In the proceedings below, a group of pro se aggrieved property owners dubbed “Riverton Citizens
Group,” timely filed a petition for judicial review challenging the Bingham County
Commissioners’ (“the County”) decision to grant a zone change request. The caption of the petition
named “Riverton Citizens Group” as the pro se petitioner, but the body of the petition then named
the aggrieved property owners individually as the parties petitioning the County’s decision, while
also providing that they were proceeding pro se under the title of “Riverton Citizens Group.” The
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petition was not signed by any of the aggrieved property owners. Instead, it was signed by a non-
petitioner who purported to be the “agent” for “Riverton Citizens Group.” The purported “agent”
was not licensed to practice law in Idaho.
After the district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss the petition because Riverton
Citizens Group was not represented by counsel, the aggrieved property owners attempted to correct
the petition through five subsequent filings, each signed by only one of the aggrieved property
owners. The district court subsequently issued a written decision, concluding the petition was
“improperly filed” and therefore was not a “petition” that invoked the district court’s subject matter
jurisdiction under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(n). Because the time for filing a new “petition”
under I.R.C.P. 84(n) had passed, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice—reasoning it
no longer had jurisdiction. A licensed attorney did not appear on behalf of the aggrieved property
owners until after the district court’s decision to dismiss.
For the reasons discussed below, the district court’s judgment of dismissal is vacated, its
decision striking and dismissing the timely petition is reversed, and this case is remanded with
instructions to determine an appropriate sanction for the filing of the petition in violation of the
requirements of I.A.R. 11.2(a). While Rule 11.2(a) provides for the imposition of an appropriate
sanction, the errors in the caption and the omitted signatures were not fatal or so defective as to
render the petition a nullity or “improperly filed” such that the district court had no subject matter
jurisdiction. Instead, these errors may be corrected through a filing or amended petition on remand
that relates back to the date of the timely petition. See I.A.R. 17(m).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 4, 2021, a group of pro se aggrieved property owners, who called themselves
the “Riverton Citizens Group” in proceedings before the County, collectively filed a petition for
judicial review in district court challenging the December 7, 2020, final order of the County that
granted a zone change to land adjacent to their land. The petition’s caption listed “Riverton
Citizens Group, joined individuals, property owners and aggrieved citizens collectively” as the
“pro se [p]etitioner” and the County as the respondent. The body of the petition named the
following aggrieved property owners, individually (i.e., collectively the “Riverton Citizens
Group”), as the parties petitioning for judicial review: “Brett McDaniel, Debra Steele, Tricia Gay,
Paul Phelps, Walter & Irma Gay, Paul and Linda McDaniel, [the] Desta M. Johnson Trust, Joyce
Novasad, Lorenzo Rodriguez, Blain & Annette Cathey, and Stecklein Land LLC.” Notably,
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“Riverton Citizens Group” is not a recognized business entity or unincorporated non-profit
association.
The aggrieved property owners did not sign the petition individually or through a licensed
attorney. Instead, it was signed only by a non-attorney named Joel Weaver, who designated himself
as “Agent for Petitioner Riverton Citizens Group.” Later, the aggrieved property owners would
explain, through a filing signed by one aggrieved property owner, Debra Steele, that Weaver
signed the petition not in a representative capacity, but merely to continue a “practice” established
before the County in which Weaver “had been designated as the mutually recognized point of
contact for the Riverton Citizens Group[,]” i.e., the aggrieved property owners.
Roughly one week after the petition was filed, the district court issued a “Notice of Intent
to Dismiss Petition for Judicial Review,” explaining that Weaver was neither a member of Riverton
Citizens Group, nor a licensed attorney, and could not represent the aggrieved property owners,
collectively known as the “Riverton Citizens Group.” In addition, the district court’s notice
explained that the individual aggrieved property owners were not named as parties in the caption,
and that although they appeared to be individually proceeding pro se, none of the property owners
had signed and authorized the petition.
From this, the district court pointed to signature requirements in both Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 11(a) and Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2(a) and ordered that the petition would be dismissed
in twenty-one days unless the aggrieved property owners could show why, through briefing, their
petition for judicial review could proceed. Two days later, the County filed a motion to dismiss
the petition, arguing the petition should be dismissed because, among other things, it did not
identify the individual aggrieved property owners as petitioning “parties,” it was not individually
signed by those property owners, and that it was not signed by a licensed attorney who could
represent the non-existent entity, i.e., the Riverton Citizens Group.
During the twenty-one day period, the aggrieved property owners made five filings—all
signed by one aggrieved property owner—Debra Steele. In each of these filings, above the caption,
Weaver’s contact information remained listed, and added Steele’s, and identified both as
individuals “For Pro Se Plaintiffs.” The first filing provided a supplemental statement of issues for
judicial review pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(c)(5) which allows a statement of
issues to be filed separately from the petition after it is filed. The second filing advised the district
court that “Riverton Citizens Group” intended to formally respond to the district court’s notice of
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intent to dismiss, clarified that Weaver was the “Designated Agent” only for purposes of
transmitting communications—not in a representative capacity, and that another filing would be
made that included the signatures “omitted” from the timely petition.
The third filing provided the signature corrections discussed in the second filing, and
included a signature page as an attachment (“Exhibit A”) with the following signatures purporting
to authorize the original petition: Debra Steele, Blain J. & Annette Cathey, Tricia Gay, Walter A
& Irma Gay, Erik & Shellie Hall, “Shelly Lewis” signing for the Desta M. Johnson Trust, Brett
Ray McDaniel, Joyce C. Novasad, Paul Phelps, Lorenzo Rodriguez, and two individuals with
illegible signatures signing for Stecklein Land LLC. Notably, two of the persons who provided
signatures on Exhibit A—Erik & Shellie Hall—were not named as aggrieved parties in the original
petition; the signature by “Shelly Lewis” did not indicate what relation or authority she has, if any,
to sign on behalf of the Desta M. Johnson Trust (e.g., beneficiary, trustee, or none); and the two
persons who provided illegible signatures also did not indicate what relation or authority they have,
if any, to sign on behalf of Stecklein Land LLC (e.g., members, managers, none). The third filing,
paired with Exhibit A, requested that the district court “incorporat[e]” these signatures into the
original petition.
The fourth filing provided affidavits that the County, and interested parties Donald &
Loretta Anderson, were served with the original petition. Finally, the fifth filing provided the pro
se aggrieved property owners’ final response to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss the
petition. That filing, among other things, (1) pointed to the “strike” language in Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 11(a) to explain why the petition should not be stricken as an “unsigned paper” when
their third filing and Exhibit A “cured the omitted signatures problem”; (2) clarified that the
“Group was proceeding Pro Se”; (3) indicated that “with leave of the Court,” the “Group” would
“submit a corrected caption identifying the aggrieved members of the group individually”; and (4)
noticed that the “Group” was still attempting to retain counsel to appear on its behalf.
The next day, the County filed a memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss. The
County argued, among other things, that neither Weaver nor Steele—the only two individuals who
had signed the petition and subsequent five filings—could represent the “Riverton Citizens Group”
because neither was a licensed attorney; that the caption and signatures of individual aggrieved
property owners in Exhibit A did not comply with the requirements for properly identifying the
“parties to an action” under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 2; and that based on these defects, it is
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entirely “unclear who are the Petitioners in this matter[.]” The County also argued that the
aggrieved property owners have had “adequate time to properly represent the Group” and correct
their filings—but have chosen not to hire an attorney.
Three weeks later—based on Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 2 and 11—the district court
entered an order dismissing (and effectively striking) the aggrieved property owners’ petition with
prejudice after reasoning that it was “improperly filed[,]” and because the jurisdictional time-limit
to file a new petition had passed, subject-matter jurisdiction did not exist to entertain a new petition
for judicial review from the aggrieved property owners. Roughly one month later, licensed counsel
entered a notice of appearance on behalf of “Riverton Citizens Group, joined individuals, property
owners and aggrieved citizens collectively,” and timely filed a notice of appeal challenging the
dismissal of the original petition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court exercises free review over jurisdictional issues[.]” Nemeth v. Shoshone Cnty.,
165 Idaho 851, 854, 453 P.3d 844, 847 (2019). The interpretation of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
like the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, is a matter of law. See Medrain v. Lee, 166 Idaho 604,
607, 462 P.3d 132, 135 (2020). “This Court exercises free review of matters of law.” Id.III. ANALYSIS
A. This appeal presents an exceptional circumstance where we must correct a
misunderstanding of the procedural rules governing petitions for judicial review.
From the start of this case, every party—including the district court—has understandably,
but mistakenly, treated Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 2 and 11 as controlling the contents of a
petition for judicial review under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84. However, as explained below,
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 2 and 11 do not apply to petitions for judicial review. Thus, to
clarify this misunderstanding, deciding this case—while applying the proper procedural rules—
requires us to take the exceptional step of setting aside our preservation doctrine in favor of
resolving this case using legal principles that are beyond any doubt.
Typically, issues must be raised before the trial court to be heard on appeal. State v. Garcia-
Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (“We have long held that ‘[a]ppellate
court review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below.’ ”
(quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007))). This is our self-imposed
preservation doctrine, and our adherence to it serves many important purposes: “The rule fosters
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the full testing of issues by the adversarial process, ensures that factual records are fully developed,
aids the Court in the correct resolution of cases through ‘the refinement of . . . arguments on appeal
and the wisdom of the trial court in deciding the matter in the first instance,’ and serves interests
of efficiency and finality.” Carver v. Hornish, 171 Idaho 118, __, 518 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2022)
(quoting State v. Howard, 169 Idaho 379, 385, 496 P.3d 865, 871 (2021)).
However, our preservation doctrine is not absolute or “inflexible” in civil cases. Carver,
171 Idaho at __, 518 P.3d at 1181 (quoting Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976)). “There
may always be exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will prompt a reviewing or
appellate court, where injustice might otherwise result, to consider questions of law which were
neither pressed nor passed upon” by the court below. Carver, 171 Idaho at __, 518 P.3d at 1181
(quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)). Like the United States Supreme Court,
we have never announced a general rule with fixed criteria on what constitutes “exceptional”
circumstances” sufficient to set aside our preservation doctrine. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 121 (1976). But what we have announced, and made clear, is that an exception to the doctrine
exists when “the proper resolution” of an appeal is “beyond any doubt.” Carver, 171 Idaho at __,
518 P.3d at 1181 (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121). This appeal is such a case.
On appeal, Riverton Citizens Group, i.e., the aggrieved property owners, argues that the
dismissal of its petition was in error because the district court misapplied the signature requirement
for pleadings in I.R.C.P. 11(a). In response, the County maintains that the district court correctly
struck the petition for judicial review as an unsigned paper under I.R.C.P. 11(a); that the omitted
signatures filing (Exhibit A to the third filing) does not relate back to cure the defective petition
based on our decision in Medrain v. Lee, 166 Idaho 604, 462 P.3d 132 (2020); and that the petition,
along with the five subsequent filings, all fail to identify the “parties” in the caption, or otherwise,
as required by I.R.C.P. 2(a)(2). The County’s response essentially tracks the reasoning of the
district court in its decision to dismiss the petition below based on I.R.C.P. 11 and 2: The
jurisdictional time-limit to file a petition had expired, and the petition that was timely filed cannot
provide jurisdiction because it did not contain signatures from each pro se aggrieved property
owner, and it did not properly identify which pro se aggrieved property owners were “parties”
through the caption, or otherwise. Thus, according to the district court, the petition was fatally
flawed, and could not serve as a “petition” that triggered the district court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction for judicial review under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84. Furthermore, because the
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time for filing a new petition had passed, the district court concluded that a new and corrected
petition to review the County’s action would not invoke its jurisdiction under Rule 84(n) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, as noted above, I.R.C.P. 2 and 11 do not apply to petitions for judicial review
under I.R.C.P. 84. Thus, every party, as well as the district court, has started their procedural
analysis of what a petition for judicial review must contain—and when corrections to the petition
relate back to the original filing date—was based on the wrong procedural rules. The correct
starting point for procedural requirements of petitions for judicial review, unless otherwise
provided for by statute, is Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84. See I.R.C.P. 84(a)(2). And “[a]ny
procedure for judicial review not specified or covered by” Rule 84 must be in accordance with
“the appropriate rule of the Idaho Appellate Rules” to the extent not contrary to Rule 84. I.R.C.P.
84(r). Because of this, the procedural analysis underpinning this case from below through to appeal
requires our correction and clarification.
After oral argument we ordered the parties to submit additional briefing on the applicability
of the Idaho Appellate Rules to the district court’s decision to, among other reasons, ensure the
“full testing of issues by the adversarial process[,]” Carver, 171 Idaho at __, 518 P.3d at 1181. In
the briefing that was submitted, neither side appeared to recognize the proper reframing of the
procedural analysis under only I.R.C.P. 84, as supplemented by the Idaho Appellate Rules. The
County continued to argue that the district court’s analysis of the signature requirement under
I.R.C.P. 11(a) was correct. In addition, the aggrieved property owners—apart from also focusing
on I.R.C.P. 11(a)—argued that this Court “does not need to base its disposition of this matter” on
the Idaho Appellate Rules because the district was “obliged and mandated” to act in accordance
with Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a), and 17(a), i.e., other procedural rules that also do not
apply to petitions for judicial review. See I.R.C.P. 84(a)(2), (r). However, as explained below,
when the proper rules are applied, the resolution of this appeal is beyond any doubt. Thus, the
exceptional circumstances here require us to set-aside our preservation doctrine to both correct the
interpretation of our rules, and to ensure the proper application of our rules and case law moving
forward.
B. The errors in the aggrieved property owners’ timely petition for judicial review of the
County’s action may be corrected through amendment and relation back.
As explained below, the petition’s errors relating to the caption, naming of parties, and
signatures are not fatal defects that render the petition a nullity which cannot be amended. See
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Luck v. Rohel, 171 Idaho 51, __, 518 P.3d 350, 356 (2022) (reiterating that this Court has expressly
rejected the common law rule of nullity). Instead, the errors in the petition can be cured through a
subsequent filing (on remand) that amends the petition, and relates back to its original filing date,
sufficient to reserve subject matter jurisdiction in the district court. To begin, we start from the
statutory basis for the petition for judicial review in this case, and then move to our procedural
rules governing a petition for the same: I.R.C.P. 84 and the Idaho Appellate Rules.
Person(s) aggrieved by a final agency decision approving a zone change, I.C. § 67-
6521(1)(a), may, within twenty-eight days, file a petition for judicial review in district court
pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), I.C. §§ 67-5201 to
-5292. See I.C. §§ 67-5270 (right of review), 67-5273 (time for filing). Next, except where the
APA (or another applicable statute) provides for it, Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
sets forth the procedures governing a petition for judicial review in district court. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(2).
Rule 84 is, in effect, its own “mini” set of procedures. Rule 84 makes it clear that the failure to
“physically file” a timely “petition for judicial review” in the district court “is jurisdictional and
will cause automatic dismissal of the petition for judicial review on motion of any party, or on
initiative of the district court.” I.R.C.P. 84(n). However, so long as the petition is “physically
file[d],” the failure of a party to timely take “any other step” in the process for judicial review “will
not be deemed jurisdictional.” Id. Instead, the failure to timely take any other step “may be grounds
only for such other action or sanction as the district court deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the petition for review.” Id.
In other words, to invoke a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, all that is required is
that a “petition for judicial review” be “physically file[d]” within the twenty-eight day window.
See I.R.C.P. 84(n). From this, two interrelated questions arise. First, what information must be in
the filed document for it to constitute a “petition for judicial review” sufficient to satisfy I.R.C.P.
84(n) and invoke a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction? Second, can information that is
erroneously stated in, or omitted from, the timely filed petition be corrected through subsequent
filings that then relate back to the date of the timely petition. We answer each question in turn as
it relates to the issues present in this appeal, i.e., the requirements for the caption, naming of parties,
and signature(s) in the petition for judicial review.
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1. The caption, signatures, and naming of parties in a petition for judicial review
Unless a different procedure is provided by statute, the “contents” of a “petition for judicial
review” are first governed by Rule 84(c) (“Petition for Judicial Review—Contents”). Neither the
relevant provisions of the APA, I.C. §§ 67-5270 to -5279, nor the statute authorizing judicial
review of final agency decision approving a zone change, I.C. § 67-6521(1)(a), provide
requirements for what “content” must be in the document serving as a “petition for judicial
review.” Because of this, Rule 84(c) initially controls the “content” question here, and the Idaho
Appellate Rules serve to provide any further procedure or content requirements otherwise not
specified in, or covered by, I.R.C.P. 84(c). See I.R.C.P. 84(r) (“Any procedure for judicial review
not specified or covered by these rules must be in accordance with the appropriate rule of the Idaho
Appellate Rules to the extent not contrary to this Rule.”).
a. The proper caption of a petition for judicial review
As it relates to the caption, naming of parties, and signature issues in this appeal, Rule 84(c)
only addresses the requirements for a caption. Subsection (3) of Rule 84(c) states that the petition
must include “the date and the heading, case caption or other designation of the agency and the
action for which judicial review is sought[.]” I.R.C.P. 84(c)(3) (emphasis added). This requirement
brings us to the first point of clarification in this appeal: The district court—relying on I.R.C.P.
2(a)(2) instead of I.R.C.P. 84(c)(3)—reasoned that the aggrieved property owners were required
to individually name themselves as parties in the caption on the petition, and that “Riverton
Citizens Group” (which was named in the caption) was not a “party” that could proceed on their
behalf pro se without counsel. See Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147
Idaho 737, 744–45, 215 P.3d 457, 464–65 (2009) (“[T]he law in Idaho is that a business entity,
such as a corporation, limited liability company, or partnership, must be represented by a licensed
attorney before an administrative body or a judicial body.”).
From this, the district court concluded that the following caption, used in the original
petition, was required to properly identify the petitioning parties, and failed to do so:
Riverton Citizens Group, joined )
individuals, property owners and )
aggrieved citizens collectively, ) Case No. CV06-21-0006
)
pro se Petitioner,
)
vs ) PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
)
)
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BINGHAM COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS, )
a local governmental agency, )
Respondent. )
)
However, unlike I.R.C.P. 2(a)(2), which requires that the party filing the lawsuit be named
in the caption (e.g., the plaintiff), I.R.C.P. 84(c)(3) requires a case caption that merely designates
“the agency and the action” from which judicial review is sought. In other words, I.R.C.P. 84(c)(3)
does not require the person(s) filing the petition to be named as parties in the caption. Thus, the
fact that the petition’s caption here states “Riverton Citizens Group, joined individuals, property
owners and aggrieved citizens collectively” instead of individually listing the aggrieved property
owners (as is done in the body of the petition), does not mean the petition was “improperly filed”
without naming or identifying any petitioning parties.
Instead, the “the agency and the action” from which judicial review was sought by the
aggrieved property owners was already included in the body of the original petition as follows:
I.R.C.P. 84(c)(1): Name of Agency for which judicial review is sought
Board of County Commissioners of Bingham County, Idaho
[. . . .]
I.R.C.P. 84(c)(3): Designation of agency action for which judicial review is
sought
In the Matter of: Donald & Loretta Anderson Zone Change from “A” to “R/A”
Reconsidered Reasonings and Final Decision
Dated December 7, 2020
The above referenced action on December 7 was a ruling on reconsideration of a
decision issued October 7, 2020 and the culmination of hearings that proceeded on
August 12, 2020, September 28, 2020, and October 22, 2020.
(Bold and underline in original.)
This information—as provided in the original petition (albeit in the wrong place)—is what
I.R.C.P. 84(c)(3) requires to be in the caption on a petition for judicial review of a final agency
action. Accordingly, on remand, the district court should direct the parties to amend the caption in
this matter to be restyled, at a minimum, to include following title:
In Re: Donald & Loretta Anderson Zone Change from “A” to “R/A”
before the Board of County Commissioners of Bingham County,
Idaho
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Although it may be permissible or customary to name the petitioning parties and the
respondents in a separate portion of the caption below “the agency and action” title required by
I.R.C.P. 84(c)(3), i.e., the restyling above, a petition that does not name all parties in the caption
is not fatally defective. Again, what I.R.C.P. 84(c)(3) requires in the caption, and all that it requires,
is “the agency and the action” for which judicial review is sought. See also I.A.R. 17(a) (“Title”).
Thus, to the extent the original petition was dismissed as fatally defective for the caption’s failure
to identify which aggrieved property owners were petitioning parties, this was legal error.
b. The petitioning parties and the signature requirements in a petition
From this, we turn to the procedure governing how a petition for judicial review names and
identifies the petitioning parties, and what signatures are required. As noted above, I.R.C.P. 84(c)
does not have provisions addressing these requirements. In this circumstance, I.R.C.P. 84(r)
instructs us to look to the “appropriate rule” of the Idaho Appellate Rules. Turning to those rules,
it is plain that Idaho Appellate Rule 17 controls.
When it comes to naming the “parties” in a petition for judicial review, the petition must
include the name of the petitioner, the petitioner’s attorney (if any), the name of the adverse party
(i.e., the respondent), and the adverse party’s attorney (if any). See I.A.R. 17(d). In addition, “[a]n
address, phone number and email address must also be given, except no email address is required
for persons appearing pro se.” Id. Here, although the non-existent entity “Riverton Citizens Group”
was improperly employed as a short-hand reference for the individual petitioners in the caption,
the body of the petition clearly identified and named the petitioners as follows: “Brett McDaniel,
Debra Steele, Tricia Gay, Paul Phelps, Walter & Irma Gay, Paul and Linda McDaniel, [the] Desta
M. Johnson Trust, Joyce Novasad, Lorenzo Rodriguez, Blain & Annette Cathey, and Stecklein
Land LLC.” (Alteration added.) In addition, the petition properly identified the adverse party, i.e.,
the respondent, as the “Board of County Commissioners of Bingham County, Idaho[.]”
Although the addresses (but not the phone numbers) and the signatures of most (but not
all) aggrieved property owners petitioning for review of the County’s decision were provided in a
later filing (an issue addressed below), the “content” requirements here must, like all portions of
I.R.C.P. 84, be “construed to provide a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of all petitions
for review.” I.R.C.P. 84(r). In light of this, the naming of individually aggrieved property owners
in the body of the petition was enough to meet the “parties” requirement under I.A.R. 17(d) to
thereby satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite of physically filing a timely “petition” for judicial
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review, I.R.C.P. 84(n). As these aggrieved property owners attempted to clarify in their fifth filing
after filing the petition, the “[g]roup” here was proceeding pro se, “which was consistently
indicated” on the petition and each filing, and “which the group underst[ood] to mean it was
proceeding without legal counsel.” Thus, the petition properly identified and named the petitioning
parties for purpose of I.A.R. 17(d).
When it comes to the “signature” requirement for a petition for judicial review, there are
two layers of analysis. The first layer simply requires the petition to include “[t]he name and
signature of the attorney” for the petitioner(s), or the signed “name[(s)]” of the petitioner(s), if the
petitioner(s) do not have an attorney.” I.A.R. 17(n). Here, there is no dispute that the petition
included neither the signature of an attorney for the aggrieved property owners, nor the signed
names of the aggrieved property owners. That brings us to the second layer. As noted above,
I.R.C.P. 84(c) does not provide the procedure for signatures, or the procedure for filings that
erroneously omit or include an improper signature. Accordingly, to answer this question, I.R.C.P.
84(r) again directs us to the “appropriate rule” in the Idaho Appellate Rules governing the signing
of petitions, motions, briefs, and other papers: Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2(a).
Critically, contrary to the approach taken below and on appeal, I.R.C.P. 84(r) does not
direct us to the “appropriate rule” in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governing the signing of
pleadings, motions, and other papers, i.e., I.R.C.P. 11. The importance of this point is demonstrated
by one major difference between the two rules: Under I.R.C.P. 11(a), a “court must strike an
unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney’s or
party’s attention[,]” while under I.A.R. 11.2(a), there is no authority to “strike” an unsigned paper.
See also Luck, 171 Idaho at __, 518 P.3d at 356 (clarifying the proper procedure under I.R.C.P.
11(a) and (b) in light of the 2016 amendments to I.R.C.P. 11). Thus, the district court legally erred
when it effectively decided to “strike” the original petition as unsigned, and “improperly filed,”
based on the errors discussed above, and thereby deprive itself of subject matter jurisdiction for
judicial review of the County’s action.
Instead, under I.A.R. 11.2(a), the district court is authorized to sanction a person, party, or
attorney who signs a petition for judicial review, or other document, if the signing is done “in
violation of” I.A.R. 11.2(a). As the pertinent part of its text explains, I.A.R. 11.2(a) is typically
violated based on either “(a) the frivolous filings clause or (b) the improper purpose clause[,]”
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Andrews v. State Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 162 Idaho 156, 160, 395 P.3d 375, 379 (2017)
(alteration added):
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or
party has read the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other document; that
to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable
inquiry [(a)] it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and [(b)]
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If the notice of
appeal, petition, motion, brief, or other document is signed in violation of this rule,
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include
an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other
document including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
I.A.R. 11.2(a) (alterations added).
Notably, immediately above these two clauses, I.A.R. 11.2(a) also provides, consistent
with I.A.R. 17(n), that any “party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the . . . petition,
motion, brief or other document and state the party’s address.” I.A.R. 11.2(a) (emphasis added).
However, if petitioners (who are not represented by an attorney) submit an unsigned filing, like in
this case, then there is no “violation of” I.A.R. 11.2(a) by those petitioners because for there to be
a violation of I.A.R. 11.2(a), there first must be a “signature” that is in “violation of” I.A.R. 11.2(a).
See also Section III.B.2., infra (explaining that a signature is made in “violation of” I.A.R. 11.2(a)
when a non-attorney signs a filing purporting to represent another person or entity in court).
This does not mean petitioners unrepresented by counsel are free to file unsigned
documents without consequence. See I.R.C.P. 84(n) (“Failure of a party to timely take any other
step in the process for judicial review [(e.g., provide an omitted signature)] will not be deemed
jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such other action or sanction as the district court deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the petition for review.” (alteration added)). Instead,
it simply means that such an error is not a jurisdictional defect, and the district court does not have
authority to “strike” a timely petition for judicial review that simply omits the proper signatures of
the petitioning parties.
In sum, the timely petition for judicial review in this case properly identified and named
the petitioning parties as required by I.A.R. 17(d). However, the petition still contained an incorrect
caption, erroneously omitted the petitioners’ addresses and phone numbers, and erroneously
13
omitted the petitioners’ individual signatures. This brings us to our next discussion: Errors and
omissions regarding the caption, the naming and identification of the petitioning parties, and
signatures can be corrected through an amended filing that relates back to the date of the petition.
2. Correcting errors and omissions in the caption, the naming and identification of
petitioning parties, and signatures through amendment and relation back
Returning to I.R.C.P. 84(c), the rule does not provide a procedure to correct errors and
omissions in the “content” of a petition for judicial review. Thus, like before, we turn to Idaho
Appellate Rule 17. Subsection (m) of I.A.R. 17 provides, in pertinent part, that amendment and
relation back is permitted when a petition for judicial review (1) “erroneously states any of the
information and requirements of this rule [(i.e., I.A.R. 17)]” or (2) “additional facts arise after the
filing” of the petition:
(m) Amended Notice of Appeal. In the event the original notice of appeal [(or
petition for judicial review, I.R.C.P. 84(r))] erroneously states any of the
information and requirements of this rule [(i.e., I.A.R. 17)] or additional facts arise
after the filing of the initial notice of appeal, the appellant may thereafter file an
amended notice of appeal correctly setting forth the facts and information. An
amended notice of appeal shall be filed with the clerk of the district court in the
same manner as the original notice of appeal but no filing fee shall be required. If
the original notice of appeal [(or petition for judicial review, I.R.C.P. 84(r))] was
timely filed from an appealable judgment, order or decree, the amended notice of
appeal [(or petition for judicial review, I.R.C.P. 84(r))] will relate back to the date
of filing of the original notice of appeal [(or petition for judicial review, I.R.C.P.
84(r))] . . . .
I.A.R. 17(m) (bold in original) (alterations and emphasis added).
Here, as explained above, the petition did not comply with the caption requirements set
forth in I.R.C.P. 84(c)(3) and as supplemented by I.A.R. 17(a). However, the petition was timely
filed. Thus, with this clarification announced today, the aggrieved property owners are permitted
to file an amended petition with a corrected caption, and that amended petition will relate back to
the timely filed petition so that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to proceed in this
matter. See I.R.C.P. 84(n); cf. Trimble v. Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 302–03, 939 P.2d 1379, 1381–
82 (1997) (“We thus decline to adopt the nullity rule in Idaho and hold that, where a party has been
named improperly, amendment and relation back should be allowed where the requirements of
I.R.C.P. 15(c) are met.”). As we have said before, our modern procedural rules seek to promote
the resolution of disputes on their merits, see I.R.C.P. 1(b), 84(r)—not bar suits by reviving
14
“antiquated pleading requirements” that exalted form over substance. See Trimble, 130 Idaho at
302, 939 P.2d at 1381.
However, there is an important exception. Amendment and relation back here only allow
for the correction of “erroneous information” as it relates to the naming or identifying of the
original petitioners, e.g., the petition mistakenly names a deceased petitioner instead of the
petitioner’s estate, see id. at 301, 939 P.2d at 1380, or must correct for the true party in interest,
Luck, 171 Idaho at __, 518 P.3d at 354. See also I.A.R. 7 (substitution of a party). It does not allow
for new—and wholly unrelated—petitioners to be added to a petition through amendment and
relation back. For if it did, an unforeseeable number of petitioners could thereby pile-on to the
original and timely petition—or a petition could be filed that included no petitioners at all (only to
add them at some later time). That would not only end the “just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of all petitions for judicial review[,]” I.R.C.P. 84(r), but would also eviscerate the
jurisdictional time limit for filing a petition under I.R.C.P. 84(n).
Notably, we made the same point in Medrain v. Lee, 166 Idaho 604, 462 P.3d 132 (2020),
a case that dealt with the procedure for notices of appeal from the magistrate court to the district
court under I.R.C.P. 83. However, for the reasons discussed below, we overrule our application of
I.R.C.P. 83 in Medrain to vindicate—what has been made “plain” and “obvious” through deciding
this case—principles of law regarding amendment and relation back under I.A.R. 17(m). See
Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 585, 226 P.3d 524, 527 (2010) (“[T]he rule of stare
decisis dictates that we follow [controlling precedent], unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” (alteration original) (quoting Reyes v.
Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239, 240, 953 P.2d 989, 990 (1998))).
Before discussing Medrain, we pause to emphasize that the procedure for an appeal under
I.R.C.P. 83, versus the procedure for judicial review under I.R.C.P. 84, should each be treated as
an independent set of rules. To adhere to the proper procedural analysis, persons appealing from
magistrate court to district court must look to I.R.C.P. 83 (and its case law), while persons
petitioning for judicial review of a final agency action to district court must look to I.R.C.P. 84
(and its case law). Unless another statute or rule controls, I.R.C.P. 83 and 84 provide the required—
but differing—starting points for two separate roles of the district court.
15
Returning to Medrain, in that case we dealt with an omitted signature and erroneous caption
problem in a notice of appeal under I.R.C.P. 83. The body of the notice of appeal named three
parties as appealing but the caption listed only one party (pro se) and was signed only by the party
listed in the caption (pro se). Medrain, 166 Idaho at 606, 462 P.3d at 134 (“Bing filed a notice of
appeal naming Bing, Jade, and Golden China LLC as parties. However, it listed Bing Lee as pro
se in the caption and the notice was only signed by Bing Lee as appellant.”). Rule 83(d) provides
the basic contents for a notice of appeal but does not provide for caption or signature procedures.
Thus, the appropriate procedural gap-fillers—under the Idaho Appellate Rules—will apply just as
they do for petitions for judicial review under I.R.C.P. 84.
Critically, in appeals from magistrate court to district court, any procedure not provided
for by I.R.C.P. 83 “must be in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or the Idaho
Appellate Rules.” I.R.C.P. 83(q) (emphasis added). However, this rule does not mean a district
court can freely pick between applying the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or the Idaho Appellate
Rules in every circumstance. When a notice of appeal under I.R.C.P. 83 is filed, the default
“manner” of review requires the district court act as an appellate court, treat the appeal as an
“appellate proceeding[,]” and apply only I.R.C.P. 83 and the Idaho Appellate Rules:
Unless otherwise ordered by the district court, the district court must hear appeals
from the magistrate court as an appellate proceeding and a transcript must be
prepared as provided in Rule 83(g),. [sic] The district court must review the case
on the record and determine the appeal in the same manner and on the same
standards of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under
the statutes and law of this state, and the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I.R.C.P. 83(f)(1) (emphasis added).
Of course, if the district court acting in its appellate capacity cannot locate an applicable
procedure in I.R.C.P. 83 or the Idaho Appellate Rules, then the district court may then turn to the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for the “practice usually followed in such or similar cases[.]” See
I.A.R. 48 (explaining what procedure to apply when not covered by statute or the I.A.R.).
However, a proceeding after a notice of appeal is filed can change into a trial proceeding,
where the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply instead of the Idaho Appellate Rules. If the district
court determines there is an inadequate record for it to proceed in an appellate capacity—and it
decides to not remand—then the district court “must” order the appeal to proceed as a “trial de
novo” and “render a decision in the action as a trial court as though the matter were initially
brought in the district court.” I.R.C.P. 83(f)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, only after an appeal is
16
ordered to be conducted as a trial de novo, will the district court turn to the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule for any procedure “not specified” in I.R.C.P. 83 instead of the Idaho Appellate
Rules. See I.R.C.P. 83(f)(1), (q). Indeed, this is similar to petitions for judicial review under
I.R.C.P. 84, which first apply the Idaho Appellate Rules as a procedural gap-filler, unless a de
novo evidentiary hearing is ordered, in which case the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure will apply
to that hearing. See I.R.C.P. 84(r).
From this, it is clear that our decision in Medrain, which deals with a district court acting
in its appellate capacity (not as a trial court), incorrectly applied the “signature” requirements in
I.R.C.P. 11(a) to effectively “strike” the two parties from the notice of appeal who did not sign it
when only the Idaho Appellate Rules applied (which do not contain a similar “strike” procedure
for unsigned filings). See Medrain, 166 Idaho at 607–08, 462 P.3d at 135–36. As explained above,
the Idaho Appellate Rules already contain procedures for signatures (I.A.R. 11.2 and 17(n)). Thus,
the district court in Medrain had no discretion to apply the signature requirements in I.R.C.P. 11(a).
Connected to this analysis, and relevant to deciding this case, Medrain also dealt with
amendment and relation back under I.A.R. 17(m). See Medrain, 166 Idaho at 608, 462 P.3d at 136.
We reasoned that the amended notice of appeal did not relate back to “Bing’s notice of appeal”
because the “amended notice of appeal did not seek to add information or facts to Bing’s notice of
appeal, instead it sought to add Jade and Golden China LLC as parties.” Id. (emphasis original).
Thus, because only “Bing’s notice of appeal” was timely, and amendment and relation back were
not permitted under I.A.R. 17(m), we affirmed the district court’s order that Jade and Golden China
LLC (who had omitted signatures and were omitted from the caption) did not timely appeal the
magistrate court’s judgment; thus, could not proceed forward as parties alongside Bing. Id.
To be clear, we stand by our point in Medrain that I.A.R. 17(m) does not allow for
amendment and relation back to “add” new parties as discussed above. See Medrain, 166 Idaho at
608, 462 P.3d at 136. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 83 and 84 may provide different starting
points for the procedural analysis between notices of appeal in Medrain and petitions for judicial
review as in this case, but both I.R.C.P. 83 and 84 point to amendment and relation back in I.A.R.
17(m) as a shared procedural gap-filler—and we decline to read I.A.R. 17(m) as meaning one thing
under I.R.C.P. 83, but something different under I.R.C.P. 84. See State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho
40, 44, 408 P.3d 38, 42 (2017) (“We will not interpret a rule in a way that would produce an absurd
result.”). Thus, when it comes to amendment and relation back under I.A.R. 17(m) to cure defects
17
in a filing, this decision controls for both amended notices of appeal under I.R.C.P. 83 and
amended petitions for judicial review under I.R.C.P. 84.
Applying this clarification to the facts of Medrain, the amended notice of appeal in
Medrain simply attempted to correct erroneous information contained in the timely notice of
appeal, i.e., the caption and signature problems. See Medrain, 166 Idaho at 608, 462 P.3d at 136.
The amended notice of appeal did not attempt to “add” Jade and Golden China LLC as entirely
new “parties” to the original notice. Indeed, the body of the original notice already identified and
named Jade and Golden China LLC as appealing parties, along with Bing, where it stated: “Jade
Lee, an individual, Bing Lee, an individual, and Golden China Limited Liability Company, an
Idaho limited liability company, appeals [sic] . . . .” Medrain, 166 Idaho at 608, 462 P.3d at 136
(emphasis added) (alteration original). Notably, whether the amended notice was “timely” enough
to cure the original notice, in the district court’s discretion, is a separate matter not answered by
Medrain. See I.R.C.P. 83(m) (explaining the failure to take a timely step in the appellate process
may be grounds for sanctions, including dismissal, depending on the circumstances).
For these reasons, we now overrule Medrain—to the extent it incorrectly applied I.R.C.P.
11(a) to effectively “strike” the parties who did not sign the notice of appeal, and incorrectly
applied amendment and relation back under I.A.R. 17(m)—so that we may vindicate what has now
been made “plain” and “obvious” only through deciding this case.
In this case, the body of the timely petition identified the following “parties” as petitioning
for judicial review (albeit, through the label of a non-existent entity, “Riverton Citizens Group”):
“Brett McDaniel, Debra Steele, Tricia Gay, Paul Phelps, Walter & Irma Gay, Paul and Linda
McDaniel, [the] Desta M. Johnson Trust, Joyce Novasad, Lorenzo Rodriguez, Blain & Annette
Cathey, and Stecklein Land LLC.” (Alteration added.) As explained above, this is enough to name
and identify the petitioning “parties” as required by I.A.R. 17(d). However, the petition does not
include the physical address and phone numbers for each of these “parties” as required by I.A.R.
17(d) and I.A.R. 11.2(a), and the subsequent omitted signatures filing, Exhibit A, only includes
their physical addresses—not their phone numbers. Nevertheless, on these points, each of these
filings merely “erroneously” states or omits this information as required by I.A.R. 17(d) and I.A.R.
11.2(a). Thus, on remand, such errors may be cured through a timely filing that will relate back to
the original petition, I.A.R. 17(m), and these errors do not render the original petition defective.
18
Notably, there is one problem related to naming and identifying the petitioning parties. The
subsequent omitted signatures filing, Exhibit A, appears to add two new petitioners—“Erik &
Shellie Hall”—who were not named or identified as petitioners in the original petition. Indeed,
neither the omitted signatures filing, nor any other filing subsequent to the petition, suggests that
there was a mistake in the timely petition where, for example, “Erik & Shellie Hall” might be the
correct legal names for two persons already named in the original petition. Thus, without more,
the portion of the omitted signatures filing that adds “Erik & Shellie Hall” as “parties” to the
petition for judicial review does not relate back to the timely petition. In other words, unless error
or mistake as to the naming or identifying of the “parties” is shown on remand, the only “parties”
who may proceed forward as petitioners are those named in the original petition.
We must also address the amendment of erroneously stated or omitted signatures. As noted
above, it is undisputed that the petition did not include either a signature of an attorney for the
aggrieved property owners, or the individual signatures of the aggrieved property owners.
However, on remand, the aggrieved property owners (i.e., the petitioning “parties” identified above
and named in the original petition) are permitted to cure this error through a timely filing that may
relate back to the original petition. I.A.R. 17(m). Indeed, based on the record on appeal, the omitted
signatures filing, Exhibit A, provides only a partial cure for the omitted signatures. This is because
the omitted signatures filing provides proper signatures only for the following ten (out of fourteen)
named petitioners: Debra Steele, Blain J. & Annette Cathey, Tricia L. Gay, Walter A. & Irma M.
Gay, Brett Ray McDaniel, Joyce C. Novasad, Paul Phelps, and Lorenzo Rodriguez.
Regarding the four other petitioners, the filing does not include signatures for petitioners
Paul B. & Linda McDaniel; the signature by “Shelly Lewis” purporting to sign on behalf of
petitioner “Desta M. Johnson Trust” fails to indicate what authority or capacity, if any, “Shelly
Lewis” has to sign on behalf of that trust, see The David & Marvel Benton Tr. v. McCarty, 161
Idaho 145, 156, 384 P.3d 392, 403 (2016); and the illegible signatures by two persons purporting
to sign on behalf of the petitioner “Stecklein Land LLC” similarly fails to indicate what authority
or capacity, if any, those persons have to sign on behalf of that limited liability company, see Est.
of Collins v. Geist, 143 Idaho 821, 827, 153 P.3d 1167, 1173 (2007) (applying now repealed I.C.
§ 53-616(2)(b)); see also I.C. §§ 30-25-105 and -110 (applying to limited liability companies
formed after a certain date or in certain circumstances). On remand, for Paul B. & Linda McDaniel,
the Desta M. Johnson Trust, and Stecklein Land LLC to satisfy the signature requirement and
19
proceed as petitioners, a timely filling with corrected signatures—from a licensed attorney in the
case of the trust and the company—is required. If timely done, this corrected filing will relate back
to cure the defect in the original petition. See I.A.R. 17(m).
We pause here to emphasize that although neither a business entity nor a trust may appear
in court pro se, Indian Springs LLC, 147 Idaho at 744–45, 215 P.3d at 464–65, this does not mean
filings by an entity or trust, done without a licensed attorney, are an uncurable nullity to which a
subsequent filing—done with a licensed attorney—cannot relate back. The “nullity theory” is a
“remnant of an earlier era of strict pleading requirements[,]” and precludes a party from amending
a defective pleading with relation back because the defective pleading is treated as a “legal nullity”
that “never existed.” Trimble, 130 Idaho at 302, 939 P.2d at 1381. We have expressly declined to
adopt the nullity rule in Idaho at the pleading stage, and instead allow amendment and relation
back under I.R.C.P. 15(c) to “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.” Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 1(a) now I.R.C.P. 1(b) as of July 1, 2016). Moreover, we
recently reaffirmed our rejection of the nullity rule, and held that “when a party moves to amend
an improperly signed pleading, written motion, or other paper to cure a violation of [I.R.C.P.
11(a)], a district court has the discretion to permit a party to cure the signature, depending on the
circumstances of the particular case.” Luck, 171 Idaho at__, 518 P.3d at 357 (emphasis added).
Both I.R.C.P. 83 and 84 simply require that a notice of appeal or petition for judicial review
be timely filed to commence the appeal or judicial review proceeding—not that the filing be
perfect. See I.R.C.P. 83(b), (m) and I.R.C.P. 84(b), (n). Accordingly, and consistent with Trimble,
Luck, and I.R.C.P. 1(b), the nullity rule does not operate on a notice of appeal or petition for judicial
review to prevent an entity or trust from timely curing a defective notice or petition filed without
an attorney through amendment and relation back under I.A.R. 17(m).
Instead, filings by nonattorneys on behalf of an entity or trust are curable defects. See
Downtown Disposal Servs., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 979 N.E.2d 50, 55 (Ill. 2012) (citing nineteen
jurisdictions that support this principle and rejecting the line of authority suggesting that all actions
by a nonattorney on behalf of an entity are a nullity). And failure of a party to “timely” cure defects
in a notice of appeal or petition for judicial review is not “jurisdictional”—but may be grounds for
such other action or sanction as the district court deems appropriate, which “may include
dismissal” of the notice or petition after a reasonable opportunity to cure. I.R.C.P. 83(m), 84(n);
see, e.g., In re K.M.A., Inc., 652 F.2d 398, 399 (5th Cir. 1981) (ordering a conditional dismissal of
20
a corporation’s notice of appeal filed by someone who is not an attorney unless the corporation
obtains counsel within thirty days); In re IFC Credit Corp., 663 F.3d 315, 317–21 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Posner, J.) (holding that a bankruptcy petition, signed only by the president of the corporation
who was not an attorney, did not render the proceedings a nullity and did not warrant sanctions or
dismissal based on the circumstances).
Only after a reasonable opportunity to cure the defective notice or petition may the district
court consider the appropriate action or sanction, and whether dismissal is appropriate, by
examining, for example, whether: (1) the nonattorney filing the notice or petition for the entity or
trust did so with knowledge that the action was improper; (2) the entity or trust acted diligently in
correcting the mistake by obtaining counsel; (3) the nonattorney’s participation was minimal; and
(4) the nonattorney’s participation resulted in prejudice to the opposing party. See 9A FLETCHER
CYC. OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORP. § 4463 (Sept. 2022); see, e.g., Perez v. Berhanu, 583 F. Supp.
2d 87, 89 (D. D.C. 2008) (determining that sanctions were appropriate, including a default
judgment, where the defendant entity was given extensions to obtain counsel but failed to do so).
This list of factors is neither required nor exhaustive but may change based on the factual
circumstances of any particular case.
Here, as explained above, the Desta M. Johnson Trust and Stecklein Land LLC were parties
named in the timely petition for judicial review but failed to provide any signatures. Thus, on
remand, each is permitted a reasonable opportunity to cure this defect, through licensed counsel.
Finally, we address the district court’s concern over the signature by Weaver, a non-
petitioner and non-attorney, purporting to represent “Riverton Citizens Group,” i.e., the aggrieved
property owners, and the five signatures by pro se petitioner Debra Steele on the subsequent
filings, purporting to do the same. Such errors do not cause the timely petition to be so defective
as to deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, I.R.C.P. 84(n), nonetheless, those
signatures were made in “violation of” I.A.R. 11.2(a)—as were the signatures in the third filing,
Exhibit A, purporting to represent the Desta M. Johnson Trust and Stecklein Land LLC (unless it
can be shown on remand that those signing are licensed attorneys).
A signature on a filing is typically in “violation of” Rule 11.2(a) when done in violation of
the rule’s frivolous filing or improper purpose clauses. See Andrews, 162 Idaho at 160, 395 P.3d
at 379. But a person also signs a filing in “violation of” Rule 11.2(a) when they sign purporting to
represent another person or entity in court—and are not a licensed attorney. See I.C. § 3-104
21
(prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law); Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254,
260, 220 P.3d 1073, 1079 (2009) (“[W]hile a person has a right to represent himself or herself pro
se, the right does not extend to the representation of other persons or entities.”). When there is a
“violation” of I.A.R. 11.2(a), the imposition of appropriate sanctions is mandatory. See I.A.R.
11.2(a) (“[T]he court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction.” (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, on remand, the district court shall impose the appropriate sanction, and
consider in its discretion who to impose it on (e.g., Weaver, Steele, those signing for the Desta M.
Johnson Trust and Stecklein Land LLC, all of the named petitioners, or some other combination),
for the improper signature of Weaver on the petition, the improper signatures of pro se petitioner
Debra Steele on the five filings, and the presumptively improper signatures of those purporting to
represent the Desta M. Johnson Trust and Stecklein Land LLC. An appropriate sanction here may
include, but is not limited to, “an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred because of” the filings signed in violation of I.A.R. 11.2(a), “including a
reasonable attorney’s fee.” I.A.R. 11.2(a) (emphasis added).
In summary, consistent with the principles above, the errors in the timely petition may be
corrected on remand through a timely filing or amended petition that relates back to the date of the
original petition. None of the errors in the timely petition relating to caption, naming and
identification of parties, or signature requirements deprived the district court of subject matter
jurisdiction. Thus, jurisdiction exists for judicial review of the County’s action, and this case may
proceed consistent with this opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the district court’s judgment of dismissal is vacated, the
district court’s order dismissing the petition is reversed, and this case is remanded for further
proceedings.
Justices STEGNER, MOELLER, and ZAHN, CONCUR.
BEVAN, Chief Justice, concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that we must reverse this case as to the individual
petitioners, and that based on Luck v. Rohel, 171 Idaho 51, 518 P.3d 350 (2021), the entity-
petitioners will be allowed to seek amendment before the district court through a pleading filed by
22
a properly licensed attorney. I write separately to dissent from the majority’s decision to overrule
Medrain v. Lee, 166 Idaho 604, 462 P.3d 132 (2020), based on the narrow facts of that case.
Medrain was grounded in an appeal from the magistrate division of district court in which the two
“appellants” named in the notice of appeal, Jade Lee and Golden China, LLC were represented by
counsel at the time the notice was filed by Bing Lee. Counsel failed to file a notice of appeal. I
would thus uphold Medrain and not allow today’s opinion to give negligent attorneys a pass to
allow another attorney to file a notice of appeal nearly seven months after the time to appeal
expired. I accordingly dissent on this limited question.
A. The facts of Medrain.
I begin by addressing Medrain and the facts of that case. While the majority opinion
references these facts generally, I reiterate them in more detail to support my position.
Medrain sued Bing and Jade Lee and Golden China LLC for breach of contract. 166 Idaho
at 606, 462 P.3d at 134. The magistrate court found for Medrain. Id. After that decision, Bing filed
a pro se notice of appeal to the district court, which listed Bing, Jade, and Golden China, LLC as
the appellants. Bing was the only signatory to the notice of appeal, though the notice of appeal
listed “Jade Lee, an individual, Bing Lee, an individual, and Golden China Limited Liability
Company, an Idaho limited liability company[.]” Id. at 608, 462 P.3d at 136. All the parties were
represented by an attorney when Bing filed the notice of appeal 1, but the attorney never signed or
filed a notice of appeal as required under Rule 11(a) (“Every pleading, written motion, and other
paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record licensed in the State of Idaho, in the
individual attorney's name, or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.”). Id. Indeed,
nine months after the notice of appeal was first filed, a new attorney entered a notice of appearance
and filed an amended notice of appeal on behalf of all three parties. Id. Medrain moved to dismiss
the appeal in part, which the district court granted, holding that while Bing filed a timely notice of
appeal on his own behalf (this decision remains questionable in my mind, but it was not raised by
1
The legitimacy of a pro se “filing” while represented by counsel has been rejected by this Court in civil cases. See
Ward v. State, 166 Idaho 330, 333, 458 P.3d 199, 202 (2020) (recognizing that Ward’s attempted pro se filing while
represented by counsel was not a “valid motion, properly brought before the district court,” and that “[w]hile the
circumstances of a criminal case may require a court to allow this type of hybrid representation for limited purposes
such as invoking the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, we do not find it appropriate in a civil case.”)
(emphasis added). This question was not raised by the parties in Medrain, but it underpins some of my reasoning for
why Medrain should remain good law going forward.
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Medrain below), he did not have the authority to sign documents for Jade or Golden China. Id.The district court also held that the amended notice of appeal could not relate back to Bing’s
original notice under I.A.R. 17(m) because it was adding parties, not information. Id.On appeal to this Court, we noted that Bing did not have the authority to sign a notice of
appeal on behalf of Jade or Golden China, LLC as a non-attorney; Bing could sign only on behalf
of himself. Id. We explained that “by the time Jade and Golden China retained new counsel and
filed the amended notice of appeal, the time to appeal had long-since expired.” Id. at 608, 462 P.3d
at 136. Because an amended notice of appeal “sought to add Jade and Golden China as parties,” to
Bing’s appeal, rather than “information or facts[,]” we held that the notice of appeal did not relate
back to the date that notice of appeal was filed. Id. As a result, only Bing’s appeal could move
forward. Id. Finally, we noted that, as a business entity, Golden China LLC “could not have signed
Bing’s pro se appeal because ‘a business entity . . . must be represented by a licensed attorney
before an administrative body or judicial body.’” Id. (quoting Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs
Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 744–45, 215 P.3d 457, 464–65 (2009)).
B. Medrain remains good law.
The majority has concluded today that Riverton Citizens Group may file an amended
petition with a corrected caption, which will relate back to the time the original petition was filed
so that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to conduct judicial review. Under the
authority of Luck and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84, I concur with this result as to the individual
petitioners and even as to the entity defendants, even though I have reservations about what
mischief may arise from this holding and how it might be utilized to evade our unauthorized
practice of law statutes. See I. C. § 3-420 (the unauthorized practice of law is a misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine “not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500), or [imprisonment] for a period of
not to exceed six (6) months, or both . . .). Even so, based on Rule 84 and the rationale of the
majority, I must concur.
But I disagree that Medrain should be overruled based on what it decided and how the case
was presented. First, the moving party below only sought to dismiss Jade and Golden China LLC’s
appeals; thus, no issue was raised before this Court about the validity of Bing’s notice of appeal in
the first place. Even so, Medrain was based on both Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 11(a) and 83
and Idaho Appellate Rule 17(m). Rule 83 governs “Appeals from Decisions of Magistrates” and
requires a notice of appeal to be filed within forty-two days from the date of the judgment. I.R.C.P.
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83(b)(1)(a). Under Rule 83, the failure to timely file a notice of appeal will result in automatic
dismissal:
The failure to file a notice of appeal or notice of cross-appeal with the district court
within the time limits set out in this rule is jurisdictional and will cause automatic
dismissal of the appeal. This dismissal may be pursuant to a motion by any party,
or upon the district court’s initiative. Failure of a party to timely take any other step
in the appellate process is not jurisdictional, but may be grounds for other action or
sanction as the district court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the
appeal.
I.R.C.P. 83(m).
Second, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) requires that any document filed in court
(including a notice of appeal from magistrate to district court) be signed by an attorney if the party
is represented or signed by the party if the party is not represented:
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one
attorney of record licensed in the State of Idaho, in the individual attorney’s name,
or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.
(Emphasis added). Under the Idaho Appellate Rule, however:
If the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief, or other document is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the notice of appeal, petition,
motion, brief or other document including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
I.A.R. 11.2(a).
This rule provides broad sanction authority. Thus, an “appropriate sanction” under
Appellate Rule 11.2(a) includes the authority to take no notice of a pleading filed in violation of
the rule, particularly considering Ward’s holding that “hybrid” filings by a litigant while
represented by counsel are not appropriate in a civil case. Ward, 166 Idaho at 333, 458 P.3d at 202.
Thus, the doctrine of nullity, as discussed in Luck, is not applicable to Medrain. The Medrain
opinion never mentions principles of nullity and they were never argued. Those standards do not
limit a trial court’s ability to disregard pleadings filed in contravention of Rule 11.2(a). Idaho
Appellate Rule 17(m) continues to prohibit a party, like Jade or the LLC in Medrain, from filing
an amended notice and adding parties. Medrain, 166 Idaho at 608, 462 P.3d at 136 (“the amended
notice of appeal did not seek to add information or facts to [Mr. Lee’s] notice of appeal, instead it
sought to add Jade and Golden China as parties.”). I would hold that this principle endures since
both the Civil Procedure Rule 11 and the Appellate Rule 11.2 governed the result there. The initial
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pleading signed by Bing on behalf of other presently represented parties was invalid. I therefore
respectfully dissent as to this narrow issue.
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