O'Holleran v. O'Holleran

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 48981
CHRISTINE R. O’HOLLERAN, )
)
Petitioner-Counterdefendant-Respondent, ) Idaho Falls, August, 2022 Term
)
v. ) Opinion filed: February 28, 2023
)
THOMAS P. O’HOLLERAN, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
Respondent-Counterclaimant-Appellant. )
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, Bingham County. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. Scott H. Hansen,
Magistrate Judge.
The decision of the district court is reversed and remanded.
Whittington Law Office, Idaho Falls, for Appellant. Kent E. Whittington argued.
Blaser, Oleson & Lloyd, Chtd., Blackfoot, for Respondent. Jeromy W. Pharis argued.
_______________________________________________
ZAHN, Justice.
This case concerns whether a magistrate court has authority to decide a tort claim by one
spouse against another as an ancillary matter to a divorce proceeding. For the reasons stated below,
we hold it does not.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Christine and Thomas married in 2005. They had no children during the marriage. On
January 12, 2015, Christine filed for divorce and in her complaint alleged “[t]hat [Thomas] is
guilty of physical and mental abuse toward [Christine], and such is sufficient that this marriage
should be terminated at the fault of [Thomas].” In his response and counterclaim, Thomas
requested a divorce on the grounds of habitual intemperance, extreme cruelty, and irreconcilable
differences. Christine subsequently filed a motion to amend her divorce complaint to add a tort
claim for emotional and physical abuse and requested damages in excess of $10,000. In his answer
to Christine’s amended complaint, Thomas asserted an affirmative defense arguing that the
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magistrate court lacked jurisdiction to hear Christine’s tort claim. The magistrate court granted
Christine’s motion to amend her complaint.
The magistrate court held a bench trial on the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint.
Relevant to this appeal, Christine testified at trial and requested $20,000 in damages for emotional
trauma, physical abuse, and stress she said she suffered due to Thomas’s actions during the
marriage. The magistrate court later issued a written decision granting the divorce upon the
grounds of irreconcilable differences, dividing the parties’ real and personal property, and
awarding Christine spousal maintenance. The decision did not address Christine’s tort claim.
Thomas and Christine both filed motions to reconsider, but neither mentioned the
magistrate court’s lack of findings and conclusions regarding Christine’s tort claim. Similarly, the
magistrate court did not address Christine’s tort claim in its order denying reconsideration.
Both Thomas and Christine appealed the magistrate court’s decision to the district court.
Relevant to this appeal, Christine argued the magistrate court erred by failing to address her tort
claim in its written decision. On this issue, the district court determined that the magistrate court
erred in failing to render a decision on Christine’s tort claim and remanded the matter for the
magistrate court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the claim.
On remand, the magistrate court found, based on Christine’s testimony, that Thomas
physically battered, intimidated, and harassed Christine during the marriage. After considering the
evidence and testimony, the magistrate court awarded Christine $20,000 in damages. The
magistrate court subsequently entered an amended divorce decree that incorporated both its prior
rulings and the damages awarded to Christine on the tort claim.
Thomas appealed the damage award to the district court. Thomas argued that the magistrate
court did not have jurisdiction to decide Christine’s damages claim, Christine’s amended
complaint failed to provide sufficient notice of a tort claim against him, and the magistrate court’s
award was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The district court affirmed the
magistrate court and determined that the magistrate court’s jurisdiction over the parties’ divorce
extended to Christine’s tort claim because her claim concerned events that occurred during the
marriage. Next, the district court determined that Christine’s amended complaint placed Thomas
on notice of a tort claim against him. Finally, the district court found the magistrate court’s damage
award was supported by substantial and competent evidence. Thomas filed a motion to reconsider
which the district court denied. Thomas timely appealed to this Court.
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court erred when it determined that the magistrate court had authority
to decide Christine’s tort damages claim?
2. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees and costs?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When an appeal is initially taken to the district court from a decision by a magistrate, any
subsequent review will be conducted independent of, but with due regard for, the decision of the
district court.” Kelly v. Kelly, 171 Idaho 27, 518 P.3d 326, 333 (2022) (quoting Pratt v. State Tax
Comm’n, 128 Idaho 883, 884, 920 P.2d 400, 401 (1996)). This Court is “procedurally bound to
affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court.” Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d
970, 973 (2012) (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415 n.1, 224 P.3d 480, 482 n.1 (2009)).
When a district court decides an issue in its appellate capacity, this Court reviews the magistrate
court’s record “to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those
findings.” Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858, 303 P.3d 214, 217 (2013) (citation omitted). This
Court affirms the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure if “those findings are so
supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed
the magistrate’s decision[.]” Id. This Court exercises “free review over questions regarding the
application of procedural rules.” Bailey, 153 Idaho at 529, 284 P.3d at 973 (citing Zenner v.
Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 450, 210 P.3d 552, 558 (2009)).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The district court erred when it determined that the magistrate court had authority to
decide Christine’s tort claim.
Thomas first argues that the magistrate court did not have jurisdiction to decide Christine’s
tort claim under Idaho Code section 1-2208 and that Christine’s claim should have been transferred
to the district court. Christine responds that the magistrate court was properly assigned the case
pursuant to the Seventh Judicial District rules.
In its decision on intermediate appeal, the district court relied on Carr v. Magistrate Court
of First Judicial District In & For Kootenai County, 108 Idaho 546, 700 P.2d 949 (1985), and
Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180 (1988), for its conclusion that the magistrate
court had jurisdiction to “hear all matters involving the O’Hollerans’ divorce, regardless of dollar
amount.”
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As a preliminary matter we must address Thomas’s attorney’s and the district court’s
discussion regarding whether the magistrate court had “jurisdiction” to consider the tort claim.
Both Thomas’s attorney and the district court misuse the word jurisdiction. This is because whether
the magistrate court had the lawful authority to decide Christine’s tort claim is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but instead, as we explain below, is a matter of assignment. See State v. Jones, 141
Idaho 652, 655, 115 P.3d 743, 746 (2005). (“[T]he authority for a magistrate judge to hear a case
or type of case is purely dependent upon assignment, not jurisdiction.”).
Idaho’s magistrate judges are judicial officers of the district court whose jurisdiction is
established both by the Idaho Constitution and by legislation. See Idaho Const. art. V, § 2. See also
Idaho Code §§ 1-2201, 1-2208, 1-2210. Article V, section 2 of Idaho’s Constitution provides for
“such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as established by the legislature[,]” and that “[t]he
jurisdiction of such inferior courts shall be as prescribed by the legislature.” In 1969, the Idaho
Legislature enacted Idaho Code section 1-2201, which established a magistrate division of the
district court. As a division of the district court, the magistrate courts share the same jurisdiction
of the district court, which includes original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity.
Idaho Const. art. V, § 20. The “jurisdiction” of the district courts and the magistrate courts is
therefore coextensive.
“The district court’s original jurisdiction over marriage dissolution is extended to the
magistrate division.” Smith v. Smith, 167 Idaho 568, 577, 473 P.3d 837, 846 (2020) (citing Baird-
Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 346, 336 P.3d 275, 279 (2014). While the Legislature did not limit
the jurisdiction of magistrate courts, it did limit the types of cases that could be assigned to
magistrate courts. See Idaho Code §§ 1-2208, 1-2210. Idaho Code section 1-2208 provides:
Subject to rules promulgated by the supreme court, the administrative judge in each
judicial district or any district judge in the district designated by him may assign to
magistrates, severally, or by designation of office, or by class or category of cases,
or in specific instances the following matters:
(1) Civil proceedings as follows:
(a) When the amount of money or damages or the value of personal property
claimed does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000):
(i) Actions for. . .damages for injury to person. . . .
Additionally, Idaho Code section 1-2210 grants this Court the authority to “specify additional
categories of matters assignable to [attorney] magistrates,” including “[p]roceedings for
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divorce[.]” Idaho Code § 1-2210(1)(d). “The net effect of I.C. § 1-2210 is to allow categories of
cases to be assigned to attorney magistrates without limit.” Carr, 108 Idaho at 548, 700 P.2d at
951. Therefore, “the authority for a magistrate judge to hear a case or type of case is purely
dependent upon assignment, not jurisdiction.” Jones, 141 Idaho at 655, 115 P.3d at 746.
“[T]he administrative judge in each judicial district or any district judge in the district
designated by him” may assign cases to magistrates, “[s]ubject to rules promulgated by the
supreme court” Idaho Code § 1-2208. Pursuant to Idaho Code sections 1-2208 and 1-2210, this
Court adopted Idaho Court Administrative Rule (“I.C.A.R.”) 5, which recognized the coextensive
jurisdiction of magistrate and district courts and identified those civil cases that would be assigned
to magistrate courts. Relevant to this appeal, I.C.A.R. 5 provides:
(a) Jurisdiction; Assignment by Order. Jurisdiction of magistrates is the same as
that of district judges but assignment of cases to magistrates must be approved by
order of a majority of the district judges in the district. The order of the district
judges stating the assignment of cases to magistrates must be posted in a
conspicuous place in the clerk’s office in each county in the district and published
in the Idaho State Bar Desk Book.
(b) Assignment Pursuant (sic) to Idaho Code Section 1-2208. Assignment of cases
to magistrates may be granted pursuant to Idaho Code Section 1-2208, as follows:
1. All of the matters and actions designated in Idaho Code Section 1-2208[.]
...
(c) Assignment Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 1-2210. Additional cases may be
assigned to magistrates pursuant to Idaho Code Section 1-2210 when approved by
the administrative district judge of a judicial district. The additional cases assigned
to magistrates may include:
1. Civil actions regardless of the nature of the action, where the amount of
damages or value of the property claimed does not exceed $10,000;
...
3. All proceedings for divorce, separate maintenance or annulment. . . .
At the time Christine filed her divorce petition and later her amended divorce petition, the Seventh
Judicial District’s order regarding its local rules allowed for the assignment of those cases
identified in I.C.A.R. 5(c) to attorney magistrates.
Turning to the facts of this case, Christine sought civil damages exceeding $10,000.
However, I.C.A.R. 5(c)(1) only permits the assignment of civil cases to magistrate courts when
the amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000. As a result, the Seventh Judicial District’s
order did not grant the magistrate court the authority to decide Christine’s tort claim. However,
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this Court has explained that “[i]f an attorney magistrate is properly assigned a particular
proceeding, he or she is necessarily assigned all ancillary proceedings incident to the underlying
proceeding regardless of the dollar amount of the controversy involved in the ancillary matters.”
Carr, 108 Idaho at 549, 700 P.2d at 952. The district court relied on this rule from Carr when it
permitted the magistrate court to consider Christine’s tort claim because it was ancillary to the
divorce proceeding.
In Carr, the parties to a divorce proceeding filed cross-petitions for an accounting of a
marital business. Id. at 547, 700 P.2d at 950. The magistrate court sua sponte declined to decide
the cross petitions on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction. Id. On appeal, this Court construed
I.R.C.P. 82, which was the predecessor rule to I.C.A.R. 5 and contained substantially the same
language, and determined that the magistrate court presiding over the Carr divorce had jurisdiction
to hear the parties’ cross-petitions for an accounting, even though the amount in controversy
exceeded $10,000. Id. at 550, 700 P.2d at 953. This Court explained that because the subsequent
cross-petitions for an accounting were ancillary matters to the divorce, the assignment of the matter
to the magistrate court was proper. Id. Although the Carr Court used the word “jurisdiction,” it
was actually referring to the authority of the magistrate court to decide the claim for an accounting.
We conclude the word “jurisdiction” was used in error, but the legal holding is sound as it applies
to the magistrate court’s authority to decide claims ancillary to a divorce proceeding.
We conclude that the district court erred in relying on Carr because Christine’s tort claim
was not ancillary to her divorce proceeding. Christine filed for divorce pursuant to title 32, chapter
7, Idaho Code, which is titled “Divorce Actions” and includes provisions governing divorce,
spousal maintenance, child custody, child support, and community property disposition See Idaho
Code §§ 32-701 to 32-720. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an ancillary proceeding as “[a]n action,
either at law or in equity, that grows out of and is auxiliary to another suit and is filed to aid the
primary suit, to enforce a prior judgment, or to impeach a prior decree.” Ancillary Suit (also termed
ancillary proceeding), Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Tort claims are not ancillary to
divorce proceedings because tort claims are not necessary to aid, decide, or enforce the divorce or
any divorce-related matters such as spousal maintenance, child custody, child support, or
community property disposition. Christine has not argued that the determination of her tort claim
played any part in the magistrate court’s decisions on the divorce-related matters pleaded in her
amended complaint. In contrast, the accounting claim in Carr concerned the valuation of a marital
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asset, which was a subject of the divorce proceeding. Carr, 108 Idaho at 547, 700 P.2d at 950.
This case is therefore distinguishable from Carr because Christine’s tort claim was not ancillary
to her divorce claims.
The district court also erred when it relied on Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d
1180 (1988). In Nash, the plaintiff filed a complaint against her former husband alleging several
counts of assault and battery. Nash, 114 Idaho at 461, 757 P.2d at 1180. The former husband
argued the tort claim “was barred due to the res judicata effect of the decree of divorce entered
between them.” Id. This Court held that the divorce judgment between the parties did not bar the
wife’s later tort action under the doctrine of res judicata. Id. at 463, 757 P.2d at 1182. In reaching
its decision, the district court relied on this Court’s statement that “Nash’s allegations could have
been litigated during the divorce proceedings.” Id. at 462, 757 P.2d at 1181. Although Nash was
decided three years after Carr, this Court failed to analyze whether the tort claims were ancillary
to the divorce claims. For the reason we explained above, we conclude the tort claims in Nash
would not have been ancillary to the divorce action. For that reason, we conclude this Court’s
statement in Nash is erroneous and the case is overruled to the extent that it suggests that tort
claims can be joined with divorce actions.
Therefore, we conclude that while the magistrate court had jurisdiction to consider
Christine’s tort claim, it did not have the authority to do so. Sections 1-2208 and 1-2210 and
I.C.A.R. 5 limit the case types that can be assigned to magistrate courts to those specified in the
Seventh Judicial District’s order on local rules. That order did not give the magistrate court
authority to decide civil cases seeking damages in excess of $10,000. Nor was the tort claim an
ancillary matter to the divorce proceeding. Accordingly, the district court erred when it determined
the magistrate court had authority to decide Christine’s tort claim.
Our conclusion is further supported by the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure
(“I.R.F.L.P.”). I.R.F.L.P. 102 provides, “[t]he Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.) apply only
when incorporated by reference in these rules.” Relevant here, I.R.C.P. 18(a) discusses joinder of
claims and provides, “[a] party asserting a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim
may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.”
However, the I.R.F.L.P. do not incorporate I.R.C.P. 18. Therefore, the I.R.F.L.P. specifically
preclude the joinder of other, non-divorce claims in a divorce action.
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There are good policy reasons for this limitation because “divorce is an action in equity”
and there is no right to a jury trial in divorce actions. Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 116, 666 P.2d
639, 643 (1983). In the same vein, personal injury claims involve questions of law, and because
of that, the litigants are entitled to a jury trial unless one is waived. If parties were permitted to
join their divorce action with other civil claims, which are normally tried to a jury, our magistrate
courts would be forced to either bifurcate the claims or have a jury trial where the jury would sit
through a divorce trial potentially involving property disputes and child custody issues that are not
for the jury to decide. There are valid policy reasons for limiting divorce proceedings to those
matters that must be decided to finalize a divorce and to those which are truly ancillary to divorce-
related matters.
“It is generally recognized that the constitutional right to a jury trial applies only to legal
claims and not equitable claims.” Ada Cty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Invs., LLC, 145 Idaho
360, 369, 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008). For this reason, other jurisdictions have similarly concluded
that “marital tort actions may not be joined into a divorce action” because “a civil action in tort is
fundamentally different from a divorce proceeding, and that the respective issues involved are
entirely distinct.” Ward v. Ward, 583 A.2d 577, 580–81 (Vt. 1990) (quoting Aubert v. Aubert, 529
A.2d 909, 911 (N.H. 1987)). See also Osborne v. Osborne, 216 So. 3d 1237, 1246 (Ala. Civ. App.
2016) (“[A] divorcing spouse should not be required to include tort claims in a divorce action,
because to do so would deprive each party of his or her right to have a tort action tried before a
jury.”); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah 1988) (holding “[t]ort claims, which are legal
in nature, should be kept separate from divorce actions, which are equitable in nature.”); Walther
v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387, 388 (Utah 1985) (quoting Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah
1983)) (“[A]ctionable torts between married persons should not be litigated in a divorce
proceeding [due in part because] . . . [a] divorce action is highly equitable in nature, whereas the
trial of a tort claim is at law and may well involve . . . a request for trial by jury.”).
We therefore reverse the district court’s decision because the magistrate court did not have
authority to consider Christine’s tort claim. As a result, this matter is remanded to the district court
with instructions to vacate the judgment and remand the case to the magistrate court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Given the dispositive nature of our decision, we do not
address Thomas’s remaining arguments on appeal.
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B. Thomas is not entitled to attorney fees and costs.
Thomas requests attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-120 and 12-121, and
I.R.C.P. 54(d) and 83(q). Thomas’s brief on appeal, however, failed to support his request with
argument or case law and is, therefore, not entitled to an award of fees. See Peterson v. Peterson,
153 Idaho 318, 325, 281 P.3d 1096, 1103 (2012).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s decision affirming the magistrate
court’s award of damages based on Christine’s tort claim.
Chief Justice BEVAN, Justices BRODY, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.
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