IDHW v. Jane Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 50048
In the Interest of: John Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMNET OF )
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) Filed: January 17, 2023
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JANE DOE (2022-39), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Anson L. Call, II, Magistrate.
Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.
David R. Martinez, Chief Bannock County Public Defender; Kent V. Reynolds,
Deputy Public Defender, Pocatello, for appellant.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Jason R. Chandler, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
BRAILSFORD, Judge
Jane Doe (Mother) appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment terminating her parental
rights to her minor child. Mother asserts the court erred by concluding that she abandoned and
neglected the child, terminating Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests, and the
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department) met the requirements of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963. Mother also argues the court abused its discretion
by denying her motion to reopen the case following the termination hearing. We affirm.
1
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 11, 2021, Mother gave birth to a child who was born prematurely and suffered
from respiratory distress. After the child’s birth, the Department petitioned under the Child
Protection Act (CPA), Idaho Code §§ 16-1601-1647, for legal custody of the child. In its petition,
the Department alleged Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines at the
time of the child’s birth; the child likewise tested positive; and Mother initially refused to allow
medical care providers to transfer the child to another medical facility to receive necessary,
specialized care. The Department also moved to remove the child “from his home,” although the
child was still in neonatal intensive care at the time. On April 15, the magistrate court granted the
Department’s motion to remove the child, found he was an Indian child1 of the Shoshone Bannock
Tribes (Tribes) implicating the ICWA, and gave notice to the Tribes that the Department was
seeking custody of the child.
In May 2021, the magistrate court held an adjudicatory hearing. Mother attended with her
counsel, and the parties stipulated to the court’s jurisdiction due to the “lack of a stable home
environment.” The court noted that the child’s foster care placement did not comply with ICWA’s
preferences. Nevertheless, the parties agreed to the foster placement. Subsequently, the Tribes
moved to intervene as a party in the case, and the court granted the Tribes’ motion.
In June 2021, the Department notified the magistrate court of a change in the child’s foster
placement to a placement complying with ICWA. Also in June 2021, the court entered a case plan
for Mother’s performance. This plan required, among other things, that Mother demonstrate an
ability to provide suitable housing for the child, allow the Department to complete a home check,
engage in substance abuse treatment, demonstrate an ability to refrain from substance abuse,
comply with drug testing, demonstrate an understanding of how Mother’s substance abuse affected
her mental health, and attend all scheduled visits with the child.
In March 2022, the Department moved for an order approving an adoptive placement for
the child with a member of the Tribes, and the magistrate court granted that motion. Thereafter,
1
Under the ICWA, an “Indian child” means any unmarried person who is under the age of
eighteen years and is either (1) a member of an Indian tribe or (2) the biological child of an Indian
tribe member and eligible for membership in tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). The parties do not dispute
that the child at issue in this case is an Indian child under the ICWA.
2
in April 2022, the court changed the permanency goal from reunification to termination and
adoption. In May 2022, the Department petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights and had
her personally served with both the petition and a notice setting the termination hearing for July 29,
2022.
The termination hearing occurred as scheduled on July 29. Mother did not appear at the
hearing, although her counsel did. Mother’s counsel represented to the magistrate court that
Mother had informed him earlier in the week that she intended to attend the hearing; he had no
explanation for why she was not in attendance; and he was “ready to proceed” if she were present.
Despite Mother’s nonappearance, her counsel addressed the motions in limine he had filed on her
behalf and occasionally objected to testimony, but otherwise, he repeatedly stated during the
hearing that he was not taking an active role because of Mother’s failure to appear.
At the termination hearing, the Department presented the testimony of the Department case
manager, the Department case management specialist, an addiction counselor employed by the
Tribes, and an ICWA expert. Additionally, the child’s guardian ad litem testified. After the
termination hearing concluded, Mother moved to “reopen” the case to permit her “to defend, [to]
present testimony, to cross-examine testimony, and [to] submit evidence and documentation to
challenge the alleged grounds justifying termination of her parental rights.” The motion asserted
Mother’s failure to attend the termination hearing “was not due to neglect or wilful conduct” but
rather “due to inability to appear and contest and present evidence.” In support, Mother’s counsel
submitted an affidavit stating that, shortly after counsel left his office for the termination hearing,
Mother left him a voicemail message at the office stating, “she would not be able to attend the trial
because she did not have any ‘gas money, a ride, or nada.’” Further, Mother’s counsel attested
that, if he had received Mother’s message before the termination trial, he would have asked for a
continuance.
The magistrate court denied Mother’s motion to reopen the case and entered written
findings of fact and conclusions of law terminating her parental rights. The court concluded that
Mother abandoned the child by “failing to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child”
and neglected the child by “failing to provide proper parental care and control, subsistence, and
medical care necessary for the [child’s] well-being” and that terminating Mother’s parental rights
is in the child’s best interests. The court further concluded the Department met the ICWA
requirements for terminating parental rights, including that “the Department made active efforts
3
throughout the child protective case to avoid the breakup of the Indian family” and that “there is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the reunification would likely result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child.” Accordingly, the court entered the judgment terminating Mother’s
parental rights.2
Mother timely appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-
child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty
interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a
parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of Health &
Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at
652.
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
2
The magistrate court also terminated the parental rights of the child’s father. The father’s
rights, however, are not at issue in this appeal.
4
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court’s decision
must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the
parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five
factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between
the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities
for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e)
the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each
statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Neglect
Mother challenges the magistrate court’s conclusion that she neglected the child under I.C.
§ 16-2005(1)(b).3 In the court’s decision, it noted two, alternative definitions of neglect. First, a
parent neglects a child if the child “is without proper parental care and control or subsistence,
medical or other care or control necessary for his well-being because of the conduct or omission
of his parents.” I.C. § 16-1602(31)(a). Second, a parent neglects a child if the parent is “unable
to discharge [her] responsibilities to and for the child and, as a result of such inability, the child
lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety, or well-being.” I.C. § 16-1602(31)(b).
After noting these definitions of neglect, the magistrate court concluded that “Mother
neglected the [child] by failing to provide proper parental care and control, subsistence, and
medical care necessary for the [child’s] wellbeing since his birth.” In support, the court found that
Mother “has not played a consistent or active role in the case throughout its existence”; “has been
inconsistent in her visitation, drug testing, and treatment”; “has not bonded with the [child] and
has not demonstrated appropriate responses” when visiting the child; has “consistently refused to
3
Mother also argues substantial and competent evidence does not support the magistrate
court’s purported conclusion that “Mother was and will be unable to ‘discharge parental
responsibilities . . . for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be injurious to the health, morals
or well-being of the child,’” citing I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). The court, however, did not rely on this
statutory basis to terminate Mother’s parental rights, so we do not address this argument.
5
allow the Department access to her residence to evaluate it for appropriateness”; and “suffers from
the delusion that the [child] has a twin,” whom the Department is purportedly hiding from her,
demonstrating a lack of “capacity to apprehend reality to a degree necessary to care for the [child].”
Mother characterizes these findings as “conclusionary [sic] statements” which are not
supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree. A review of the record shows substantial and
competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s conclusion that Mother neglected the child.
For example, the addiction counselor testified that she had evaluated Mother twice and
recommended her for treatment but that she had not “followed through with any of her treatment.”
The Department case manager likewise testified that Mother had not engaged in substance abuse
or mental health treatment and had not demonstrated an ability to refrain from substance abuse.
Further, the case manager testified Mother had attended only “approximately 60 percent of her
visitation” with the child, failed to demonstrate “appropriate reactions to things during visits [with
the child regarding his] safety, well-being, and his development,” and does not share a bond with
the child.
The case manager also testified Mother refused to allow the case manager to enter Mother’s
home to determine its appropriateness for the child. Regarding this refusal, the Department case
management specialist testified she attempted an estimated “seven or eight times” to access
Mother’s home to determine its appropriateness for the child but was not allowed to enter the
home. Further, the case management specialist testified that Mother only attended approximately
half of the scheduled visits with the child, did not have a substantial connection with the child, and
had not taken advantage of mental health services that were offered.
Based on this testimony and other evidence, we hold that substantial and competent
evidence supports the magistrate court’s conclusion that Mother neglected the child. See, e.g.,
State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2019-32), 166 Idaho 173, 177-78, 457 P.3d 154, 158-59
(2020) (recognizing that, among other things, unstable housing and substance abuse support
finding of neglect). Although some of the testimony identified above relates to Mother’s failure
to comply with certain requirements in her case plan, her failure to comply with provisions in the
case plan supports a finding of neglect. See Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2011-02),
151 Idaho 356, 364, 256 P.3d 764, 772 (2011) (holding definitions of neglect in I.C. § 16-1602(31)
“are certainly broad enough to encompass the consideration of the parent’s compliance with a case
plan as evidence to support a finding of neglect”). Because we hold that substantial and competent
6
evidence supports the magistrate court’s conclusion that Mother neglected the child under I.C.
§ 16-2005(b), we do not reach the issue of whether Mother abandoned the child under I.C. § 16-
2005(a). When a trial court relies on alternative, statutory grounds to terminate parental rights,
this Court may disregard any error in relying on one ground if the Court can sustain the judgment
on the other ground. Doe v. Doe, 159 Idaho 461, 464, 362 P.3d 536, 539 (2015).
B. ICWA
Mother also argues the magistrate court erred by concluding the “ICWA requirements were
established beyond a reasonable doubt.” The ICWA addresses the concern that “an alarmingly
high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their
children from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage
of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions.” 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901(4). Accordingly, the ICWA requires the trial court to make additional findings beyond
those the CPA requires, including under 25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(d) and (f).4 Where an Indian child is
the subject of a termination proceeding, the court must find the parent’s continued custody of the
child is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child, which finding must
be supported by the testimony of an ICWA expert and evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 25
U.S.C. § 1912(f). Additionally, the party seeking to terminate the parental rights must “satisfy the
court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts proved unsuccessful.”
25 U.S.C. § 1912(d); see also Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 157 Idaho 920, 933, 342
P.3d 632, 635 (2015) (discussing ICWA requirements). “Whether the trial court correctly applied
ICWA to the facts of this case is a question of law and is subject to free review by this Court.”
Doe v. Roe, 127 Idaho 452, 456, 902 P.2d 477, 481 (1995). “[T]he trial court’s finding of adequate
4
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that provisions of the ICWA, including 25
U.S.C. § 1912(d) and (f), are unconstitutional. Brackeen v. Haaland, 994 F.3d 249, 268 (5th Cir.
2021) (en banc), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 1205 (Feb. 28, 2022). The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Brackeen and heard oral arguments in November 2022, but it
has not yet issued an opinion. The parties in this case, however, do not challenge either the
applicability or the constitutionality of any ICWA provision. For this reason, even assuming the
Supreme Court were to conclude provisions of the ICWA are unconstitutional, such a decision
would not affect this case’s resolution. Rather, it would only make Mother’s arguments under the
ICWA moot. Accordingly, staying this expedited case for the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brackeen is unnecessary.
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remedial efforts [required by the ICWA] must be supported by substantial and competent evidence
to endure on appeal.” Id. at 458, 902 P.2d at 483.
At the termination hearing in this case, the Department presented the testimony of an
ICWA expert, and the Tribes stipulated to her qualifications as an expert. The expert testified that
the Department engaged in efforts to reunite the family, including case planning; attempting to
connect the parents with the child; reaching out to the child’s other family members; and offering
services to Mother, including visitation, transportation, and mental health and substance abuse
services. The expert testified that the Department’s efforts were unsuccessful in reuniting the
family because of the parents’ “lack of participation.”5
Further, the ICWA expert opined that the “continued custody of the [child] in [Mother’s]
care is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damages.” In support, the expert identified
Mother’s drug and alcohol abuse, the “inconsistency of care” for herself, her home instability, and
the prior termination of her parental rights to other children. Based on this testimony “as well as
the testimony of other witnesses,” the magistrate court found that the Department “made efforts
throughout the child protective case to avoid the breakup of the Indian family” and that “there is
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the reunification would likely result in serious emotional
or physical damage to [the child].”
On appeal, Mother raises numerous challenges to these findings. First, Mother challenges
the ICWA’s expert testimony because the expert failed to “conduct[] any investigation of her own”
and instead “merely regurgitated the information provided by [the Department] and the Tribal
social services.” Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 703, however, an expert witness may rely on facts
and data in the case of which the expert is aware, including inadmissible evidence. See, e.g.,
Herrett v. St. Luke’s Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., Ltd., 164 Idaho 129, 136, 426 P.3d 480, 487
(2018) (noting rule permits expert to rely on records and consultation with others who reviewed
records). Mother fails to articulate how the ICWA expert’s reliance on the records in this case did
not comport with Rule 703.
5
Although Mother’s counsel chose not to cross-examine the ICWA expert because of
Mother’s absence from the termination hearing, counsel for the child’s father did cross-examine
the expert.
8
Second, despite Mother’s challenge to the ICWA expert’s reliance on Department records,
Mother conversely challenges the expert for not reviewing the Department’s visitation and
monthly narrative notes, which Mother contends “detail” her “regular and consistent contact” with
the child. In asserting this challenge, however, Mother fails to cite to anything in the record
supporting her assertion that the expert failed to review this information.6 See Idaho Appellate
Rule 35(a)(6) (requiring appellant to cite record relied upon); Hausladen v. Knoche, 159 Idaho
358, 363, 360 P.3d 367, 372 (Ct. App. 2015) (declining to consider argument not supported by
record citation). Regardless, the notes are in the appellate record and support the magistrate court’s
finding that Mother “has been inconsistent in her visitation,” “has not bonded with [the child],”
and “has not demonstrated appropriate responses” when visiting the child.
Third, Mother argues the ICWA expert “failed to identify with particularity the nature and
scope of remedial services provided to Mother.” Contrary to this argument, however, the expert
did specifically identify the categories of services the Department attempted to provide Mother, as
described above. Further, other evidence in the record explained the nature and scope of those
services including, for example, the addiction counselor’s testimony.
Finally, Mother contends that the ICWA expert “failed to identify with specificity” how
“the prior termination of [Mother’s] parental rights to three other children, lack of self-care, and
[her] delusions about the existence of [the child’s] twin sister” impact Mother’s parental rights in
this case. Although the expert’s testimony did reference these factors and the magistrate court’s
decision notes this testimony, the court’s decision does not indicate the court exclusively relied on
these factors to conclude the Department met the ICWA requirements. To the contrary, the court
expressly noted it relied on both the testimony of the ICWA expert and also of other witnesses to
conclude the Department met the ICWA requirements. Moreover, a court may consider past
conduct, such as the prior termination of parental rights, when determining whether grounds exist
for terminating parental rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 959, 277
P.3d 400, 406 (Ct. App. 2012).
6
Contrary to Mother’s assertion that the ICWA expert did not review the Department’s
visitation and monthly narrative notes, the expert’s testimony suggests she actually did review at
least some of those notes: “Q. You didn’t review the notes of the department related to those
visits, did you? A. It’s a possibility not all of them.” (Emphasis added.)
9
Mother’s challenges to the magistrate court’s findings and conclusions related to the ICWA
fail. The court correctly applied the ICWA to the facts of this case. See Doe, 127 Idaho at 456,
902 P.2d at 481 (noting whether court correctly applied ICWA is subject to free review). Further,
substantial and competent evidence supports the court’s findings that “there is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the reunification would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage
to the child” and that “the Department made active efforts throughout the child protective case to
avoid the breakup of the Indian family.”7 See id. at 458, 902 P.2d at 483 (noting substantial and
competent evidence must support findings required by ICWA).
C. Best Interests
Mother also challenges the magistrate court’s conclusion that terminating her parental
rights is in the child’s best interests. Once a statutory ground for termination has been established,
the trial court must next determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the
parent-child relationship. Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818
P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the
trial court may consider, among other facts, the parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability
and permanency of the home, the unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the
parent to the child’s care, and the parent’s efforts to improve her situation. Doe (2015-03) v. Doe,
159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 156 Idaho
103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests of the child to
terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Doe, 152 Idaho at 956-57,
277 P.3d at 403-04.
On appeal, Mother asserts the evidence does not support the magistrate court’s finding of
best interests. Specifically, she argues that “there is insufficient evidence to support [that the
7
Mother argues the magistrate court failed to find “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the
Department’s “active efforts were documented in the record.” The ICWA, however, only requires
the court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the parent’s continued custody is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child; it does not require a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Department has made active efforts to reunite the family. Compare 25
U.S.C. § 1912(d) (regarding active efforts) with 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (regarding serious emotional
or physical damage). Mother cites no authority to the contrary. See Idaho Dep’t of Health &
Welfare v. Doe (2018-24), 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2018) (ruling appellate court
does not address issues not supported by cogent argument and citation to legal authority, even in
case terminating parental rights). Regardless, the evidence supports a finding, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the Department made active efforts to reunite the family.
10
Department] engaged in active efforts to reunify the Mother with her child” and that the ICWA
expert’s testimony is insufficient to support a finding of best interests, including “that reunification
with Mother would be adverse” to the child. For the reasons discussed above, however, substantial
and competent evidence--including both the ICWA expert’s testimony and other evidence--
supports the findings and conclusions that the Department engaged in active efforts to reunify
Mother with the child and that Mother’s continued care of the child would likely result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.
The only other factor Mother identifies as purportedly contradicting the magistrate court’s
best interest finding is “the goal of maintaining the Indian family due to cultural, familial history,
and societal factors.” Mother, however, acknowledges the child’s “proposed adoptive
parent/family is an Indian family.” The evidence shows this permanent, approved adoptive
placement with a member of the Tribes supports the child’s cultural integration into the Tribes.
For example, the ICWA expert testified that this placement is providing for the child’s “cultural
needs,” including “regular activities [with the] tribal people, powwows, walks, and recreation for
[the] children.”
Finally, numerous witnesses testified that terminating Mother’s parental rights is in the
child’s best interests. For example, the case manager, the case management specialist, and ICWA
expert all testified Mother has no bond with the child; Mother failed to show she has a stable home
for the child; and Mother has not addressed her substance abuse issues. Further, the child’s
guardian ad litem testified that the child is “doing quite well” in foster care, does not have any
“outstanding needs,” is bonded with his foster parent, needs a permanent home, and is “very happy
where he is.” Accordingly, substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s
conclusion that terminating Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
D. Motion to Reopen
Mother asserts the magistrate court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to
reopen the case. A district court may reopen a case before final judgment on a party’s motion or
on the court’s own motion. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 743, 9 P.3d
1204, 1209 (2000); see also Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(3) (providing in case tried without
jury, court may open case to take additional testimony). A party seeking to reopen a case after
trial to submit evidence must show some reasonable excuse, such as an oversight, an inability to
produce the evidence, or ignorance of the evidence. Idaho Power, 134 Idaho at 744, 9 P.3d at
11
1210. The decision whether to reopen a case and receive additional evidence before the entry of
a final judgment involves an exercise of discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Id.Challenging the magistrate court’s denial of Mother’s motion to reopen the case, she argues
that the court ruled “without the indication of any law, argument, reasoning and the process by
which it reached its decision” and that her counsel’s affidavit established “good cause” for granting
the motion. We disagree, however, that Mother presented admissible evidence of “some
reasonable excuse” for failing to appear at the termination hearing. Rather, the only indication of
Mother’s failure to appear is her unsworn, hearsay statement in her counsel’s affidavit that Mother
was unable to attend the hearing because she did not have “gas money, a ride, or nada.” Moreover,
Mother’s excuse is not a reasonable excuse of the nature justifying a reopening of the case. See,
e.g., State v. Smith, 170 Idaho 800, 812, 516 P.3d 1071, 1083 (2022) (affirming decision to reopen
case before submission to jury where defense proposed untimely instruction on theory state “was
unlikely to anticipate”); Idaho Power, 134 Idaho at 744, 9 P.3d at 1210 (affirming decision to
reopen case after close of evidence based on confusion surrounding evidence already in record
before remand); Smith v. Smith, 95 Idaho 477, 482, 511 P.2d 294, 299 (1973) (concluding trial
court abused discretion by not reopening case for newly discovered evidence); Davison’s Air
Service, Inc., v. Montierth, 119 Idaho 991, 994, 812 P.2d 298, 301 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming
decision to reopen case prior to judgment where law unclear regarding burden of proof).
Mother’s reliance on State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 164 P.3d 814 (2007), in support of her
argument that the magistrate court abused its discretion by denying her motion to reopen is
misplaced. In that case, the magistrate court terminated the father’s parental rights by applying a
rebuttable presumption that terminating parental rights was in the child’s best interests because the
child had been in the State’s custody for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months. Id. at 536,
164 P.3d at 816. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded, holding
that the State’s custody of a child for fifteen of twenty-two months merely creates a presumption
in favor of the Department initiating a termination petition. Id.Unlike the magistrate court in Doe, the court in this case did not presume the child’s best
interests. Rather, the Department proved by substantial and competent evidence that terminating
Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests. That Mother did not challenge this evidence
does not mean the court presumed the child’s best interests in terminating Mother’s parental rights.
12
Finally, we disagree with Mother’s assertion the magistrate court’s denial of her motion to
reopen the case violated her fundamental rights. Contrary to this assertion, Mother received
adequate notice of the termination hearing and her counsel represented that Mother was aware of
the hearing date and that counsel was prepared for the hearing if Mother had attended. We also
disagree with Mother’s assertion that reopening the case would not prejudice the other parties.
Mother’s request to reopen the case to permit her “to defend, [to] present testimony, to cross-
examine testimony, and [to] submit evidence and documentation” would necessarily require a
substantial retrial. Further, the representation in counsel’s affidavit that “the witnesses who
testified are still available to reappear” for such a retrial is unsupported. Accordingly, the
magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion to reopen the case.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s conclusions that
Mother neglected the child; terminating Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests;
and the Department met the requirements of the ICWA. Further, the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Mother’s motion to reopen the case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.
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