State v. Edghill

Judge SCHWARTZMAN,

concurs in part and dissents in part.

I respectfully dissent with Part IIB. of the Court’s decision effectively holding that I.C. § 18-4007(3)(d) authorizes a lifetime suspension of all driving privileges. In my opinion, such a draconian penalty requires explicit legislative authorization over and above the more benign language of “for a time determined by the court.” Simple principles of “lenity” in construing criminal statutory language would dictate such a result.

Moreover, the Court’s interpretation converts a “suspension” into a lifetime “revocation.” See and compare I.C. §§ 49-325, - 326. The word “suspension” connotes an interruption, postponement, or temporary discontinuance, but with an expectation of resumption. See Black’s Law Dictionary, 1446-1447 (6th ed.1990) (defining suspend and suspension). I agree with defendant’s position that the maximum period of suspension authorized under the statute would be ten years, which is the maximum period of incarceration authorized by law for vehicular manslaughter.