Hoggan v. Clark

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 50055
RITA ELAINE HOGGAN, )
) Filed: May 10, 2023
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
COLE EZEKIAL CLARK, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Respondent. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bingham County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. Hon. Cleve B. Colson,
Magistrate.
Order of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court,
affirming in part and vacating in part judgment granting modification of child
custody and child support, affirmed.
Smith Woolf Anderson & Wilkinson, PLLC; Aaron J. Woolf, Idaho Falls, for
appellant.
Blaser, Oleson & Lloyd, Chartered; Justin B. Oleson, Blackfoot, for respondent.
________________________________________________
LORELLO, Chief Judge
Rita Elaine Hoggan appeals from the order of the district court, on intermediate appeal
from the magistrate court, affirming in part and vacating in part a judgment granting modification
of child custody and child support. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hoggan and Cole Ezekial Clark are the parents of the minor child in this action. Pursuant
to an agreement reached by the parties, the magistrate court entered a judgment granting the parties
joint legal and physical custody of the child. The judgment did not order either party to pay child
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support. Just over six months later, Hoggan filed a petition to modify the judgment seeking, in
part, to require Clark to pay child support.
The magistrate court held a hearing on Hoggan’s petition to modify. At the hearing,
Hoggan testified that she has a bachelor’s degree in applied physics and a master’s degree in
nuclear science and engineering. According to Hoggan, her annual salary had been around
$75,000 but dropped to $40,000 in May 2018 when she began working part-time. About four
months later, she left that employment. Hoggan testified that, in looking for new employment, she
applied on August 9, 2021, for a position as a “thermal properties research analyst.” When asked
what the salary was for that particular position, Hoggan replied that she did not know. Clark’s
counsel then asked Hoggan “what, in [her] experience, does that type of position pay if [she] were
to get that position?” Hoggan’s counsel objected based on hearsay, foundation, and relevance.
After the magistrate court overruled the objection, Hoggan testified that she thought “it would be,
like, between 65 and 85,000 dollars a year.”
After the hearing, the magistrate court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Relevant to this appeal, the magistrate court found that Hoggan “has neglected to utilize her work
experience and qualifications to obtain a job in her field” and “has recently sought work in her
field, but only in the last 4-5 months.” The magistrate court also found that “it is clear” that
Hoggan “has remained voluntarily underemployed for the last three years.” Based on her past
income and testimony regarding the expected pay for the position for which she recently applied,
the magistrate court imputed “a gross income of $65,000 per year” to Hoggan. The magistrate
court entered an amended judgment ordering Hoggan to pay child support to Clark.
Both parties moved for reconsideration, with Hoggan contending in part that her imputed
income should have been minimum wage rather than $65,000. After a hearing on both motions to
reconsider, the magistrate court further amended the judgment but did not alter its conclusion
imputing $65,000 to Hoggan in potential annual income. Hoggan appealed to the district court,
asserting, among other issues, that the magistrate court abused its discretion in imputing $65,000
in potential income and erred in finding that she “has applied for employment only the past four
to five months” and that “the most current job for which [she] applied had an income range of
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$65,000.00 to $85,000.00.”1 According to the district court, Hoggan also asserted that “her
testimony about what she could be paid” at the job she applied for “was hearsay.” The district
court vacated the amended judgment in part and remanded based on other issues Hoggan raised
(which are not relevant to this appeal) but affirmed the magistrate court’s findings regarding her
imputed income and conclusion that she should be imputed $65,000 of potential income. In
addition, the district court denied Hoggan’s request for attorney fees incurred on intermediate
appeal. Hoggan again appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the
magistrate court, we review the record to determine whether there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate court’s
conclusions of law follow from those findings. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.2d
214, 217-18 (2013). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal
will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. Id. Thus, we review the magistrate court’s
findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and
the basis therefor, and either affirm or reverse the district court.
III.
ANALYSIS
Hoggan asserts the magistrate court erred in finding that she only recently began looking
for work in her field.2 She further asserts that the magistrate court erred by overruling her hearsay
objection, in finding the salary for the job she applied for ranged between $65,000 to $85,000, and
in imputing $65,000 in potential income to her. Hoggan also asserts the district court erred by
1
These are the issues as described by the district court. The record in this appeal does not
contain the parties’ briefing to the district court on intermediate appeal.
2
Some of Hoggan’s arguments on appeal implicate the magistrate court’s decision on her
motion to reconsider. The standard of review for a trial court’s decision on a motion for
reconsideration of a decision is the same standard of review that applies to the trial court’s original
decision. See Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton Cnty., 168 Idaho 442, 452, 483 P.3d 985, 995 (2020).
Because the standards of review are the same, our analysis does not distinguish between the
magistrate court’s two decisions.
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failing to award her attorney fees on intermediate appeal. Clark responds that the finding that
Hoggan recently began looking for work was a credibility determination by the magistrate court,
that the objected-to testimony was not hearsay, that substantial evidence supports the finding
regarding the expected salary range of the job for which Hoggan applied, and that the magistrate
court did not abuse its discretion by imputing $65,000 in potential income to Hoggan. Clark further
responds that the district court did not err by denying Hoggan’s request for attorney fees incurred
on intermediate appeal. Finally, both parties request attorney fees incurred in this appeal. We
hold that Hoggan has failed to show error. Because we conclude that Hoggan’s appeal is frivolous,
we award attorney fees incurred in this appeal to Clark.
A. Finding that Hoggan Only Recently Began Looking for Work in Her Field
Hoggan asserts that there is not substantial and competent evidence for the magistrate
court’s finding that she “has recently sought work in her field, but only in the last 4-5 months.”
Clark responds that the magistrate court “was in the best position to assess [Hoggan’s] credibility
with regard to her efforts to seek employment.” Clark further responds that the magistrate court’s
“finding as to when [Hoggan] began to seek employment has little, if any, bearing on the amount
of potential income imputed” to Hoggan.
Hoggan asserts the magistrate court’s finding lacks support from substantial and competent
evidence because “the only evidence regarding [her] job search was that [she] had regularly sought
employment from the time she left her employment in October 2018.” Hoggan also asserts that
she “had been applying nearly every Tuesday for employment [at the place she previously worked]
since the Spring of 2020.” Hoggan, however, fails to provide supporting citations to the record in
this section of her brief to support these assertions. Such citations are required to make any
argument. I.A.R. 35(a)(6); Groveland Water & Sewer, Dist. v. City of Blackfoot, 169 Idaho 936,
941-42, 505 P.3d 722, 727-28 (2022). This Court will not search the record on appeal for error. Kelly
v. Kelly, 165 Idaho 716, 732, 451 P.3d 429, 445 (2019). We note that Hoggan cites to the record in
her statement of the case and that some of these citations could support the assertions she makes
in the argument section of her brief, but this does not comply with I.A.R. 35(a). Citations to the
record are not required in the statement of the case, I.A.R. 35(a)(3), but are required in the
argument section of the brief, I.A.R. 35(a)(6). An appellant forfeits an argument by failing to
support the argument in compliance with the Idaho Appellate Rules. Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho
4372, 375, 234 P.3d 696, 699 (2010). Thus, the citations to the record provided in Hoggan’s
statement of the case do not cure her failure to provide relevant supporting citations to the record
in the argument section of her brief.
Even if Hoggan had provided proper citations to the record to support her assertions, her
argument fails on the merits. As the district court observed, the magistrate court had the “discretion
to weigh the strength and credibility of the evidence,” which “include[d] rejecting testimony which
[the magistrate court] found lacking in credibility.” On appeal, Hoggan asserts that the district
court erred because the magistrate court “did not ever make a factual finding that [Hoggan’s]
testimony regarding her efforts to find employment lacked credibility.” But factual findings can
be implicit as well as express. See Ziegler v. Ziegler, 107 Idaho 527, 535, 691 P.2d 773, 781 (Ct.
App. 1985). We will not disturb implicit findings that are supported by substantial and competent
evidence. City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 444, 299 P.3d 232, 251 (2013).
We first address whether the magistrate court made an implicit finding. At the hearing on
Hoggan’s motion to reconsider, she asserted that her testimony showed she had “applied
continuously” since 2018 to “obtain additional employment” at the place where she worked
previously and “at other places.” Despite this argument, the magistrate court did not alter its
finding that Hoggan had only recently begun to look for work in her field. This shows that the
magistrate court implicitly held that a portion of Hoggan’s testimony was not credible. On appeal,
this Court liberally construes a trial court’s credibility finding because the trial court’s province is
to determine the witnesses’ credibility, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences
to be drawn from the evidence. Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 645, 289 P.3d 43, 47 (2012).
There is evidence supporting this implicit credibility finding. At the hearing on the petition
to modify the judgment, Hoggan testified as follows:
[Clark’s counsel]: Okay. And when is the last time, other than yesterday, that
you applied for one of those positions?
[Hoggan]: The day before, and I--I usually--like, every Tuesday, I apply
for jobs.
[Clark’s counsel]: Every Tuesday for how long?
[Hoggan]: Like, do you mean, like, how long in the day does it take me
to apply for a job, or, like, when did I start doing that?
[Clark’s counsel]: Yeah, you said every Tuesday you apply. So have you done
that for the last month, the last couple of weeks?
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[Hoggan]: Oh, I started doing that, like, last spring. I mean, it doesn’t
happen every Tuesday, but, like, that’s what I, like, try to do.
Hoggan gave this testimony in August 2021. This testimony, considered by itself, indicates that
Hoggan did not begin her practice of applying for work on Tuesdays until the spring of 2021. This
testimony would support the magistrate court’s finding that Hoggan “has recently sought work in
her field, but only in the last 4-5 months.” Although Hoggan later tried to clarify her testimony
by saying she started applying for jobs before she quit, the magistrate court was not obligated to
credit her clarification.
In addition, other evidence in the record supports the magistrate court’s implicit credibility
finding. For instance, Hoggan testified that, after leaving her employment in 2018, she earned
money working as a rideshare driver. She also testified that she earned $11,000 helping her father
feed elk. This employment indicates that Hoggan had not been looking for work relevant to her
bachelor’s degree in applied physics or her master’s degree in nuclear science and engineering.
Notably, the magistrate court did not find that Hoggan had not been looking for employment at
all, but that she had not been looking for employment “in her field.” In addition, Hoggan testified
that she received $100,000 from Clark in exchange for her interest in a home they had owned
together and that she had been living off that amount (plus the money received from feeding the
elk) for the year prior to her testimony in August 2021, indicating a potential disincentive to look
for full-time employment in her field. The foregoing evidence supports the magistrate court’s
implicit finding that Hoggan’s testimony regarding when she started looking for work in her field
was not credible. We will not disturb this credibility finding on appeal. Hoggan has failed to show
that the magistrate court erred in finding that she had only begun recently to look for work in her
field.
Even if Hoggan had established error, she has failed to show the error prejudiced one of
her substantial rights. The Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure provide that, “at every stage of
the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any
party’s substantial rights.” I.R.F.L.P. 806. Even where a finding of fact is erroneous, this Court
will disregard the error unless it affects a party’s substantial rights. See id. On appeal, Hoggan
asserts that the finding that she only recently began looking for work in her field “was a significant
issue in [the magistrate court’s] ultimate decision.” Hoggan also asserts that the magistrate court
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“was extremely concerned and bothered by the fact that [the magistrate court] had only thought
[Hoggan] had recently started applying for jobs.” Finally, Hoggan asserts that “it is clear that this
factual finding by the magistrate [court] was a significant issue in [the magistrate court’s] ultimate
decision to impute income to [Hoggan] at the amount of $65,000.00 per year.” Hoggan, however,
does not elucidate further on why this finding was significant to the magistrate court’s decision.
Reviewing the magistrate court’s conclusions of law, we cannot conclude that any error in
the finding regarding the timing of Hoggan’s efforts to obtain work in her field prejudiced one of
her substantial rights. In its conclusions of law, the magistrate court noted that Hoggan “has
recently begun to seek employment in her field within the last 4 to 5 months, but it is clear to [the
magistrate court] that [she] has remained voluntarily underemployed for the last three years.” This
indicates the magistrate court relied on the challenged finding to conclude that Hoggan was
voluntarily underemployed. On appeal, however, Hoggan makes it “clear that she has not
challenged the [magistrate court’s] finding that she is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.”
Hoggan’s waiver forecloses her from asserting prejudice to a substantial right via undermining the
finding that she was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Although Hoggan is “challenging
the amount of the potential or imputed income which the magistrate [court] attributed to her,” the
magistrate court did not reference the challenged finding in concluding that Hoggan should be
imputed $65,000 in potential income. Consequently, Hoggan has failed to show that any error in
the magistrate court’s finding that she had only recently begun looking for work in her field
prejudiced one of her substantial rights.
B. Potential Income
When a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, a magistrate court must
calculate child support based on the parent’s “gross potential income.” I.R.F.L.P. 120(e)(3)(A).
In determining a parent’s potential income, a magistrate court may “[d]etermine employment
potential and probable earnings level based on the parent’s work history, qualifications, and job
opportunities and earnings levels in the community.” I.R.F.L.P. 120(e)(3)(A)(i). Whether to
impute potential income to a parent, and what amount to impute, are questions committed to the
magistrate court’s discretion. Valentine v. Valentine, 169 Idaho 621, 627-28, 500 P.3d 514, 520-21
(2021). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
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issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194
(2018).
Hoggan advances several reasons why the magistrate court erred in imputing $65,000 in
potential income to her. First, she asserts the magistrate court erred in overruling her hearsay
objection to her own testimony regarding the expected salary range of the job to which she applied.
Second, she asserts that the magistrate court erred in finding that the expected salary for the job
was $65,000 to $85,000 because her testimony was “based upon speculation and assumption.”
Third, she asserts that the magistrate court abused its discretion in imputing $65,000 in potential
income because, according to Hoggan, she “clearly has absolutely no ability to actually earn
$65,000.00 per year.” We address each argument in turn.
1. Hearsay objection
Hoggan asserts that her testimony regarding the expected salary range at the job for which
she applied was hearsay and that no exception to the hearsay rule applies. Clark responds that
Hoggan’s testimony was not hearsay because she “did not testify as to what someone else told her
the salary range would be” but, instead, “testified as to her own understanding of the expected
range, having previously worked for the same employer doing the same type of work.”
Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. I.R.E. 801(c).
Hearsay is inadmissible unless otherwise provided by an exception in the Idaho Rules of Evidence
or other rules of the Idaho Supreme Court. I.R.E. 802. The trial court has broad discretion in
determining the admissibility of testimonial evidence. A decision to admit or deny such evidence
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Mac Tools, Inc.
v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193, 199, 879 P.2d 1126, 1132 (1994).
At the hearing on Hoggan’s petition to modify, she testified that the day prior she had
applied for a position as a “thermal properties research analyst” at the place where she was
previously employed. The following dialogue then ensued:
[Clark’s counsel]: Okay. And what was the pay on that position you applied
for?
[Hoggan]: I--it didn’t say, so I don’t know.
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[Clark’s counsel]: Okay, so what, in your experience, does that type of position
pay if you were to get that position?
[Hoggan’s counsel]: Objection, hearsay, foundation, relevance. She doesn’t have
the job.
[Magistrate court]: She can testify if she understands what the range would be
with respect to that type of position, if she knows.
So overruled.
Go ahead, [Hoggan].
[Hoggan]: Yeah, I think it would be, like between 65 and 85,000 dollars
a year.
[Clark’s counsel]: So, approximately, the same type of income you had when
you worked out at [that employer’s business] before, right?
[Hoggan]: I think so, yes.
[Clark’s counsel]: Okay, and I don’t remember what you call it,
thermos-something. Is that what you did when you were out
at [the employer’s business] before?
[Hoggan]: It was a small part of what I did.
On appeal, Hoggan asserts that “the question asked by [Clark’s] counsel sought an out-of-court
statement about what [Hoggan] could be paid if she were to obtain” the position for which she
applied. This misrepresents the record. Hoggan’s earlier testimony was that the position “didn’t
say” what the salary would be and, thus, her later testimony was not premised on an out-of-court
statement. Instead, as the record makes clear, Hoggan was asked what such a position would pay
“in her experience.” As her subsequent responses indicated, her testimony was based on her
experience working in a related field for that particular employer, including her prior income while
working there. In short, the question did not call for hearsay; and Hoggan’s response did not
contain hearsay, making the rule against hearsay inapplicable. Consequently, Hoggan has failed
to show that the magistrate court erred in overruling her hearsay objection.
2. Finding regarding expected salary
Next, Hoggan asserts that the magistrate court’s finding that the job she applied for had a
salary range of $65,000 to $85,000 “was not based upon substantial and competent evidence.”
Hoggan asserts that “the only testimony regarding this issue came from” her and that this portion
of her testimony was “based upon speculation and conjecture.” Clark responds that Hoggan’s
testimony provided substantial and competent evidence for the magistrate court’s finding.
Testimony that amounts to speculation or conjecture is not relevant and therefore not admissible.
See Slack v. Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 923, 104 P.3d 958, 965 (2004) (noting that evidence must
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be relevant to be admissible and holding that the trial court did not err by excluding speculative
evidence).
Hoggan notes that, after giving her estimation of the salary range for the job to which she
applied, she testified that she had a “handful of interviews” previously. When asked if “most of
the positions [paid] between 65 to 85,000 a year,” Hoggan responded, “Like, the pay was never
discussed. So I don’t actually know, but I am assuming that.”3 On appeal, Hoggan asserts that
this shows that her earlier testimony regarding the salary range “was a guess.” We disagree.
Hoggan’s testimony was an estimation, not a guess, based on her prior work experience for that
particular employer in a related field and on her prior salary while working there. We note that,
in a related scenario, an owner of property is generally permitted to testify to the property’s value.
Taysom v. Taysom, 82 Idaho 58, 64, 349 P.2d 556, 560 (1960). Following the same logic, a
person’s testimony regarding the expected salary in a field where the person has prior work
experience is generally competent evidence of what the expected salary would be. Hoggan’s
testimony provided substantial and competent evidence for the magistrate court’s finding that the
job she applied for had a salary range of $65,000 to $85,000. Consequently, Hoggan has failed to
show error in this finding.
3. Decision to impute $65,000 in potential income
Hoggan asserts that, even if there is “substantial and competent evidence to support the
factual finding that [she] should have income imputed to her at $65,000.00, the ultimate decision
to do so was an abuse of discretion.” According to Hoggan, the magistrate court abused its
discretion in imputing $65,000 in potential income because “there is no evidence that she can
actually earn $65,000 per year.” Clark responds that Hoggan has failed to show an abuse of
discretion because her “work history” shows “that she can earn $65,000 per year or more.”
A magistrate court abuses its discretion by imputing an amount of potential income to a
parent if there is no evidence that a parent would be able to obtain employment with that amount
of income. See Humberger v. Humberger, 134 Idaho 39, 44, 995 P.2d 809, 814 (2000). As is
evident from the above discussion, there is more than sufficient evidence that Hoggan could earn
3
Following this testimony, Hoggan remarked, “Or more,” without prompting from Clark’s
counsel. Her unprompted remark indicates that she believed the jobs she applied for could have
had a salary range in excess of $85,000.
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$65,000. As noted by the district court, “it would not have been outside of [the magistrate court’s]
bounds of discretion to figure [Hoggan’s] imputed income based solely upon her former salary at
[her prior place of employment], given [her] history there and her qualifications.”
On appeal, Hoggan has not challenged the magistrate court’s finding that she “was working
as a nuclear scientist, making $80,000 when she was full time and $40,000 when she was part
time,” in 2018 when she left her employment. Hoggan’s earnings of more than $65,000
previously, coupled with the absence of any reason indicating she could no longer work in the field
of her expertise, is sufficient--by itself--to support the magistrate court’s discretionary decision to
impute $65,000 in potential income to her. Hoggan’s testimony that the job she applied for had a
salary range of $65,000 to $85,000 only further supports the magistrate court’s decision. We also
note that Hoggan testified that she was qualified for the position she applied for and that, if she did
not get the position, it would be because “that particular position didn’t require a master’s degree,
so [the potential employer] might want someone less educated.” In other words, Hoggan believed
she was overqualified for a job that, in her estimation, would pay up to $85,000. This indicates
that Hoggan’s qualifications could allow her to earn more than $85,000. For these reasons, the
magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in imputing $65,000 in potential income to Hoggan.
Finally, we note that Hoggan asserts that, “despite all of [her] best efforts, she had not been
offered a job,” which, according to her, indicates that she cannot actually earn $65,000. The
magistrate court, however, found that Hoggan was voluntarily underemployed--a finding that she
expressly disavows challenging on appeal. Hoggan cannot waive a challenge to the finding that
she was voluntarily underemployed and then assert that she made “best efforts” to obtain
employment. A person who is voluntarily underemployed has, by definition, chosen not to make
efforts towards employment that may have been successful.
C. Attorney Fees: Intermediate Appeal
On intermediate appeal, Hoggan requested attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. The
district court denied Hoggan’s request because it determined that “both parties prevailed in part”
and that Clark had not defended the intermediate appeal “frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation.” Hoggan asks this Court to “remand the issue of attorney fees back to the district court
to determine whether she should be awarded attorney fees” incurred on intermediate appeal “if
this Court overturns the district court’s decisions related to the potential income issues” Hoggan
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asserts in this appeal. Because we conclude that Hoggan has failed to establish error in the district
court’s decisions concerning potential income, the district court did not err by denying her request
for attorney fees incurred on intermediate appeal.
D. Attorney Fees: This Appeal
Both Hoggan and Clark request attorney fees on appeal to this Court under I.C. § 12-121.
An award of attorney fees may be granted under I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 to the prevailing
party, and such an award is appropriate when the Court finds that the appeal has been brought or
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Because Hoggan did not prevail on
the issues she brought on appeal to this Court, she is not entitled to attorney fees under I.C. §
12-121.
As the prevailing party, Clark is potentially entitled to attorney fees. A party can act
frivolously by “merely retread[ing] arguments made without success below” and asking an
appellate court to “second-guess decisions that were properly made by the magistrate judge and
upheld by the district judge.” Pelayo, 154 Idaho at 866, 303 P.3d at 225. Here, we conclude that
Hoggan pursued this appeal frivolously and without foundation. Hoggan’s arguments to this Court
appear to have largely reiterated her unsuccessful arguments to the district court. In addition,
Hoggan failed to comply with I.A.R. 35(a)’s requirement to provide supporting citations to the
record in the argument section of her brief and failed to adequately articulate how any error in the
magistrate court’s finding regarding when she began looking for work in her field prejudiced one
of her substantial rights. Finally, Hoggan’s appeal focuses on challenging her own testimony
regarding facts and an estimation of salary clearly within her own knowledge and experience.
Accordingly, Clark is entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 for this appeal.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Hoggan has failed to show error in the district court’s intermediate appellate decision
affirming the magistrate court’s finding that she only recently began looking for work in her field,
finding that the salary range for the job she applied for was $65,000 to $85,000 per year, and
determining that she should be imputed $65,000 in potential income. Hoggan has also failed to
show that the magistrate court erred in overruling her hearsay objection or that the district court
erred by denying her request for attorney fees incurred on intermediate appeal. Consequently, the
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district court’s order, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, affirming in part and
vacating in part the judgment granting modification of child custody and child support, is affirmed.
Costs and attorney fees on appeal are awarded to Clark.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD, CONCUR.
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