DocketNumber: No. 24423. Judgment affirmed.
Judges: Jones, Wilson, Stone
Filed Date: 2/22/1939
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 543 The circuit court of Sangamon county awarded a writ of mandamus commanding the city of Springfield and its officers to pay relators and all the other members of its fire department a minimum salary of $175 per month under the provisions of an act of the legislature effective June 29, 1937, and to levy taxes for that purpose. (Laws of 1937, P. 344.) The act defines "fireman" as any member of a regularly constituted fire department appointed or commissioned to perform fire-fighting duties, including the fire chief, assistant fire chief, captain, engineer, driver, ladder man, hose man, pipe man, and any other member thereof. It provides that the salary to be paid a fireman shall not be less than $150 per month in cities, villages and incorporated towns having a population of 10,000, or more, but less than 25,000; $175 per month in municipalities having a population of 25,000, or more, but less than 150,000, and that the act shall not apply to special firemen temporarily employed.
The city of Springfield has a population of 71,900. At the time the act became effective, the first quarter of the city's fiscal year, beginning March 1, 1937, had expired. The amount appropriated in the appropriation ordinance passed during the first quarter of the fiscal year for paying members of the fire department was insufficient to pay each of them $175 per month for the whole of the fiscal year. The city had adopted the Fire Protection Tax act of 1929 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, chap. 24, par. 838a, et seq.) which enabled it to levy a tax at a rate not exceeding two mills for fire protection. Under its provisions, the city appropriated and levied for the fiscal year 1937 approximately one mill for new equipment and the maintenance thereof, and the maintenance of buildings; no part of the appropriation or levy under the Fire Protection Tax act was for paying the compensation of the members of the fire department of the city. *Page 545
The judgment awards a writ commanding appellants to pay relators and all other members of the city fire department, commencing July 1, 1937, a minimum salary of $175 per month; to levy on or before the third Tuesday of September, 1937, a sufficient tax in addition to the one-mill tax previously levied, not exceedings two mills in the aggregate, to pay such salaries until the close of the present fiscal year; to appropriate, in the 1938 appropriation ordinance, a sufficient amount from the funds collected by reason of such tax levy for the payment of all salaries due at the close of the 1937 fiscal year, and to include in the 1938 appropriation bill and tax levy, an amount which will be sufficient for the payment of the minimum salary of $175 per month to the members of the fire department of the city of Springfield.
The grounds urged for reversal are that the Firemen's Minimum Wage act is unconstitutional in that it is special legislation in contravention of section 22 of article 4 of the constitution, and creates a corporate debt of the city without its consent, in violation of section 10 of article 9; that the act is incomplete, and is in conflict with existing statutes and is, therefore, void; that the judgment invades the legislative field in violation of the due process clause of the constitution; that a prior appropriation by the city is a statutory condition precedent to the levy of the tax; that no appropriation has been made to pay the increase in the firemen's salaries; that the expenditure of funds by municipal officers, without an antecedent appropriation, is a criminal offense; and that a writ of mandamus cannot be lawfully issued to compel the performance of an unauthorized or illegal act. Appellees contend that neither the statute in controversy, nor the judgment, is subject to any of the claims urged. We cannot concern ourselves about the wisdom of the legislation but must inquire whether the act is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. By leave of court, several other cities within the terms of the *Page 546 act have filed a brief and argument, as amici curiæ, in support of the contentions of appellants.
It is a matter of common knowledge that ownership of property in any municipality, no matter how small, is seldom confined to the inhabitants, but in practically all municipalities some of the property is owned by non-residents. In many cases the stock of large buildings, banks, manufacturing and mercantile corporations located in a particular city is widely held. Hotels are continuously occupied by large numbers of people, both local and transient, who are always exposed to the possibility of disastrous fires. Schools, hospitals and other public buildings with their occupants, are exposed to the same risk. Thus, fire protection is a thing not only of local concern, but in which the general public has a vital interest. The owners of property and the general public are not the only ones affected by legislation for fire protection. There is a vast army of men employed in that occupation, which is obviously fraught with hazards uncommon to many other callings. Such hazards are, in a large degree, measured by the size of the municipality. In the interest of the public, as well as themselves, firemen are entitled to receive adequate compensation for their services, commensurate with such hazards. Otherwise, few men would seek that avenue for a livelihood. The protection of life and property from fire conserves the resources of the country, and is, therefore, a matter of public welfare. It is also a matter of common knowledge that it costs more to live in a city than it does in a hamlet, and that the cost varies with the size of the community. It is to the interest of the State that its citizenry be adequately housed and fed. Such a policy tends to prevent indigency, with its corresponding burdens on the public, and to maintain the strength and health of the citizens. This, too, adds to the resources of the country and is embraced within the public welfare. The physical welfare of the citizens is of so much importance to the *Page 547
State, and has such a direct relation to the general welfare, that laws tending to promote that object are proper under the police power which is inherent in the State. The legislature is vested with a large discretion in determining what measures are necessary to secure public welfare. Such statutes are upheld, if possible, and it is only when the legislature goes beyond its power that they are declared invalid. Chicago, Burlington andQuincy Railroad Co. v. Commerce Com.
The manifest purpose of the act in controversy is to insure reasonable living conditions to firemen in municipalities having a population between 10,000 and 150,000. For the reasons above set out, it is obvious that such purpose is directly connected with and is a part of the general welfare. While arbitrary legislative classification of municipalities and other political subdivisions, based only on difference in population, cannot be sustained under section 22 of article 4 of the constitution, they may be classified for purposes of legislation on the basis of population, if such basis has some reasonable relation to the purpose and object of the legislation, and in some rational degree accounts for the variant provisions of the enactment.(Mathews v. City of Chicago,
The next contention of appellants is that the act violates section 10 of article 9 of the constitution, prohibiting the legislature from imposing taxes upon a municipality for corporate purposes. The respective functions and powers of the State and of municipalities under the constitution have long been settled. The legislature possesses every power not delegated to some other department or to the Federal government or not denied to it by the constitution of the State or of the United States. (FenskeBros. v. Upholsterers International Union,
In Taylor v. Thompson,
This court has never held or indicated that delegating a governmental function to a municipality converts it into a local corporate purpose within the purview of the constitution. Nor could there be any justification for such a holding. The exercise and control of local corporate functions, when delegated to a municipality, are committed exclusively to the municipality. The legislature may not interfere except by withdrawing or modifying the function delegated. To say a governmental function becomes exclusively local when delegated, would deprive the legislature of the *Page 551
right to exercise the police power, a function of which it cannot be divested, and which it cannot delegate exclusively. (People v.Gill, supra.) If exclusively delegated, the only way in which the legislature could exercise a governmental power would be by withdrawing it from municipalities, a result not to be contemplated. The local administration by a municipality of a delegated governmental function, is, in a limited sense, exercising a corporate function, in that one of the purposes of a municipal corporation is the administration, as an agency of the State, of delegated governmental functions. It is in that limited sense, only, that it may be said to be a corporate purpose. Expressions in People v. Salomon,
Appellants insist that these holdings, in cases where a county or other political subdivision of the State created in invitum
was a party, are not applicable to a voluntary municipal corporation, because the first class named is merely a part of the State to which the sections of the constitution in controversy are not applicable. While it is true that inWetherell v. Devine, supra, followed by Raymond v. Hartford FireIns. Co.
Lovingston v. Wider,
People v. Mayor,
The ground upon which municipal corporations are exempted from liability for torts in the performance of governmental functions is stated in Roumbos v. City of Chicago,
In the Roumbos case, supra, we said the fire department maintained by a municipal corporation is also regarded as belonging to the public or governmental branch of the municipality so as to relieve the municipality of liability for injuries to persons or property resulting from the negligence of officers or employees connected with the maintenance and operation of the department. The opinion cites and quotes with approval from Wilcox v. City of Chicago, supra. The Wilcox case was a suit against the city of Chicago to recover damages sustained in a collision between the plaintiff's carriage and a hook and ladder wagon of the city, through the alleged negligence of the driver of the ladder wagon. In denying a recovery, we quoted from Dillon on Municipal Corporations (1st ed. sec. 774) as follows: "So, although a municipal corporation has power to extinguish fires, to establish a fire department, to appoint and remove its officers, and to make regulations in respect to their government *Page 556 and the management of fires, it is not liable for the negligence of the firemen appointed and paid by it, who, when engaged in the line of their duty, upon an alarm of fire ran over the plaintiff, in drawing a hose reel belonging to the city, on their way to the fire; nor for injuries to the plaintiff caused by the bursting of the hose of one of the engines of the corporation, through the negligence of a member of the fire department. The exemption from liability is placed upon the ground that the service is performed by the corporation in obedience to an act of the legislature — is one in which the corporation has no particular interest, and from which it derives no special benefit in its corporate capacity; that the members of the fire department, although appointed by the city corporation, are not agents and servants of the city, for whose conduct it is liable, but they act rather as officers of the city, charged with a public service, for whose negligence in the discharge of official duty no action lies against the city without being expressly given, and the maximrespondeat superior has, therefore, no application."
In State of Nebraska v. City of Omaha (
In Luhrs v. City of Phoenix, 83 P.2d (Ariz.) 283, the Supreme Court of Arizona upheld acts of the legislature providing for police pensions and fixing minimum salaries for city policemen and firemen. Under the provisions of the Arizona constitution the city of Phoenix adopted what is known as a "Freehold Charter." The constitution provides for approval of such charters by the Governor, when not in conflict with the constitution or laws of the State, and upon such approval the charter becomes the organic law of the city. The Arizona court held that such a freeholders' charter was intended to give its possessor rights and privileges in matters of local concern and municipal affairs, free from legislative interference. This is comparable with the provisions of our constitution. The court held that the pensioning of policemen and fixing a minimum wage for policemen and firemen is of Statewide concern, and the statutes were valid on the ground they concerned governmental functions subject to the control of the legislature. The same doctrine prevails in Wisconsin, Missouri and Tennessee. VanGilder v. City of Madison,
The fire department maintained by a municipal corporation is regarded as belonging to the public or governmental branch of the municipality. (Roumbos v. City of Chicago, supra; Wilcox v. Cityof Chicago, supra.) The purpose of the act being clearly not local, but directly related to the general welfare and to the governmental functions of the *Page 558 municipalities affected, its provisions do not come within the inhibition of the constitution invoked by appellants.
The claims that the act is incomplete, in conflict with the existing statutory scheme, that the legislature failed to provide means for the lawful discharge or payment of the obligation created, and that the judgment invades the legislative field, cannot be sustained. The language of the act is clear and unmistakable. It has no ambiguity and there is no room for questioning the meaning of its terms. Cases cited by appellants where the terms of a statute were susceptible of different constructions, because vague or indefinite, have no application here. Two methods of complying with the act are available, under existing statutes, which are in no way in conflict with its terms. The salaries may be paid from the general revenue of the municipalities, or, if a municipality should find that method inexpedient because of curtailing other corporate functions, the Fire Protection Tax act may be adopted. Having delegated to municipalities the right to use either of the two methods, it was unnecessary for the legislature to specify which of the two should be used. The evident purpose of the Fire Protection Tax act is to enable municipalities to avail themselves of it when the local conditions make it expedient to do so.
The question raised as to the duty of the city to levy the tax for the year 1937 without a previous appropriation having become moot, need not be discussed. The statute is not invalid for any of the reasons assigned by appellants, and the judgment of the circuit court is, accordingly, affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Mathews v. City of Chicago ( 1930 )
C., B. Q. R. R. Co. v. Commerce Com. ( 1936 )
People Ex Rel. Soble v. Gill ( 1934 )
People Ex Rel. City of Chicago v. Board of County ... ( 1934 )
Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers International Union of North ... ( 1934 )
People Ex Rel. Cannon v. City of Chicago ( 1933 )
The People v. Borgeson ( 1929 )
The People v. City of Chicago ( 1932 )
People Ex Rel. McDonough v. Mills Novelty Co. ( 1934 )
Roumbos v. City of Chicago ( 1928 )
Alexander v. City of Chicago ( 1958 )
Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett ( 1960 )
Morgan v. City of Rockford ( 1940 )
People Ex Rel. Bielfeldt v. Gannon ( 1941 )
Kennedy v. City of Joliet ( 1942 )
City of Huntington v. State Water Commission ( 1953 )
People Ex Rel. Honefenger v. Burris ( 1950 )
People Ex Rel. Gramlich v. City of Peoria ( 1940 )
People Ex Rel. Curren v. Wood ( 1945 )
People Ex Rel. Sanitary District v. Schlaeger ( 1945 )
City of Geneseo v. Illinois Northern Utilities Co. ( 1941 )
Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority ( 1948 )
Huff v. Mayor and City Council of Colorado Springs ( 1973 )
ILL. ASSOC. OF FIRE FIGHTERS v. Waukegan ( 1967 )
The PEOPLE v. Francis ( 1968 )
Gaca v. City of Chicago ( 1952 )