DocketNumber: No. 20742. Dissenting opinion.
Citation Numbers: 179 N.E. 186, 346 Ill. 311
Filed Date: 10/23/1931
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
I regret that I am unable to concur in the judgment of the majority opinion. While under ordinary circumstances I regard a dissenting opinion as a useless and wasteful undertaking, yet in this case I feel bound to express my reasons for differing with the opinion of the majority of the court.
In this case the sole question was whether Malcolm Webster Cash, an adopted child of H. Paul Cash, deceased, was included within the term "children" in the testator's will. It was not necessary to explore the hidden recesses of the testator's mind or to examine into the circumstances surrounding him when he made his will to determine this question, *Page 312
as the language used by him was clear, unambiguous and certain in its meaning. By the sixth paragraph of his will he devised to his son, H. Paul Cash, 280 acres of land, he "to have and to hold the same so long as he may live and at his death the same to descend to his children." This court has repeatedly held that where the language of a will has a settled legal meaning the intention of the testator must be drawn from the will itself. (Wingard v. Harrison,
The opinion seeks to justify the conclusion reached by explaining that the testator used the language distinguishing the devises to his daughters from those to his sons because a child born to a daughter was born of her body, while such an expression would seem unnatural to a layman in referring to the child of a son. Whatever may have been the reason for this particular language, the fact remains that it is there. No court should tamper with nor attempt to construe such plain language against its ordinary, accepted meaning. To argue that the testator did not intend *Page 314 the word "children," when used without qualifying words, to also include an adopted child of one of his sons is only to contradict the express language of the will. Any other conclusion contrary to the well-known meaning of the plain language used is simply the result of speculation and surmise and wholly unwarranted by the facts involved in this case. There is no good reason why the word "child" or "children" when used in the Adoption statute should have any different meaning than the same words when used in a will. By all the rules of construction the testator is presumed to have had the statutory meaning in mind when he used these words in his will. The testator by paragraph 6 of his will made no restrictions which would exclude an adopted child of his son from taking the same portion as a natural child might have taken. The decree of the circuit court, which held that the word "children" as used in the will included the adopted child of H. Paul Cash was, in my judgment, correct and should have been affirmed.
Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE, also dissenting.