DocketNumber: No. 27929. Reversed and remanded.
Citation Numbers: 56 N.E.2d 786, 387 Ill. 484
Judges: Wilson
Filed Date: 9/19/1944
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/8/2024
John P. McGill, Jr., by Sarah McGill, his mother and next friend, filed an application for the adjustment of compensation with the Industrial Commission, charging that he suffered an accidental injury caused by a stroke of lightning on May 22, 1941, while employed as a caddy by the Illinois Country Club, Inc. The arbitrator denied compensation on the ground that the accidental injury did not arise out of and in the course of McGill's employment. The Industrial Commission, on review, set aside the finding of the arbitrator, decided that McGill's accidental injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, and awarded him compensation for temporary total disability. The circuit court of Cook county confirmed the decision of the commission. We have granted the petition of the employer for a writ of error, and the record is submitted for a further review.
The facts and circumstances attending the injury are not in dispute. Nor is the employment relationship challenged. May 22, 1941, a church holiday, McGill, then sixteen years of age, a student at Foreman High School, Chicago, worked as a caddy on the golf course of the Illinois Country Club. He had served as a caddy at this club during previous summers and on holidays during the current school year. About 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, McGill was caddying for a patron of the club, Martin Ward, who was playing golf with two other persons, and they, in turn, were accompanied by caddies. A storm arose while Ward and his companions were on the fourth hole. According to McGill, "It was not lightning yet and he played a few more holes." He testified further that when they arrived at the sixth hole it started lightning and "I went out where Martin (Ward) was and got struck." Other testimony on direct as well as on cross-examination indicates that McGill was under a tree at the time he was struck. On cross-examination, he stated that "when the storm started to *Page 487 come up," the golfers continued their game, played the fifth and sixth holes and were going to the seventh tee. He added that immediately before being struck he was holding two golf bags in which there were about thirty clubs, made partly of wood and partly of steel, and that he happened to be holding the two bags because another caddy was holding an umbrella over four members of the group who were standing under a tree. In either event, whether McGill, when struck, was on the fairway or sheltered under a tree, he lost consciousness and, upon reviving shortly afterwards, ran towards the club house where he fainted. A member administered first aid, and he was taken to a hospital where he remained four days.
Other facts and circumstances merit mention. McGill, when struck, was wearing a belt with a metal stud. He suffered a mark or burn on his right arm at the elbow and a ring of burns above the belt line of his abdomen. Testimony with respect to the extent and effect of the injuries sustained need not be recounted. So far as the record discloses, no other person in the group of players or caddies nor any other person on the golf course was struck by lightning during the storm. Likewise, evidence is wanting that any tree, the golf clubs, or any other objects were struck.
Since the facts are not in controversy, the decisive issue as to whether the employee's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment is a question of law. (Farley v. IndustrialCom.
In the light of the law applicable to the uncontroverted facts, the employer contends that an injury resulting from lightning is not compensable, in the absence of evidence of the position of the injured employee being more hazardous than that of others in the same community, thereby rendering the risk to the employee greater. On the other hand, McGill maintains that his injury arose out of his employment because evidence was adduced of a special or greater risk to him arising from the employment relationship than to the other members of the general public in the general vicinity. Injuries resulting from exposure to weather conditions, such as lightning, are generally deemed risks to which the general public is exposed and not within the contemplation of workmen's compensation acts, although the injured person, at the time he suffered his injury, may have been performing duties incident to and in the course of his employment. Where, however, an employee, because of his duties, is exposed to a special or peculiar danger from the elements, namely, a danger greater than that to which other persons in the community are subjected, and an unexpected injury is sustained by reason of the elements, the injury constitutes an accident arising out, as well as in the course, of employment. In short, if the character of employment intensifies the risks arising from extraordinary natural causes, an accident under such circumstances is one arising out of the employment. But if, instead, the accident, under the circumstances of the employment, was merely a consequence of the severity of the elements, to which persons in the locality, whether so employed or not, were equally exposed, it is not compensable. National Ice and Fuel Co.
v. Industrial Com. ante, p. 31; Consumers Co. v. Industrial Com.
Numerous cases involving claims for compensation for injuries caused by lightning are reviewed in Alzina Construction Co. v.Industrial Com.
We reached the same conclusion in Abell Chevrolet Co. v.Industrial Com.
The conclusion is irresistible that McGill's injury bore no reasonable relation to the nature of and did not arise out of his employment, within the purview of our Workmen's *Page 491
Compensation Act. His testimony, and it is the only testimony in this regard, fails to disclose a special or greater risk to him of being struck by lightning arising from his employment as a caddy, than to other members of the general public on and in the vicinity of the golf course when the electrical storm occurred. Risk of being struck by lightning is one to which every person in the same neighborhood was similarly subjected. In short, the danger to McGill of being struck by lightning was precisely the same as to other persons on and in the vicinity of the golf course. His employment did not expose him to a risk, in this respect, to a greater degree than if he had not been employed. The Workmen's Compensation Act does not intend that the employer who comes within its provisions shall be an insurer of the safety of its employees at all times during the period of the employment. (Mt. Olive Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Com.
The judgment of the circuit court of Cook county is reversed and the cause is remanded, with directions to set aside the award of the Industrial Commission.
Reversed and remanded, with directions. *Page 492
Mazursky v. Industrial Commission , 364 Ill. 445 ( 1936 )
Abell Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Commission , 371 Ill. 76 ( 1939 )
Consumers Co. v. Industrial Commission , 324 Ill. 152 ( 1926 )
Payne & Dolan v. Industrial Commission , 382 Ill. 177 ( 1943 )
Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Industrial Commission , 378 Ill. 195 ( 1941 )
Abell Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Commission , 370 Ill. 460 ( 1939 )
Ervin v. Industrial Commission , 364 Ill. 56 ( 1936 )
Mt. Olive & Staunton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission , 374 Ill. 461 ( 1940 )
Puttkammer v. Industrial Commission , 371 Ill. 497 ( 1939 )
Klug v. Industrial Commission , 381 Ill. 608 ( 1943 )
Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Industrial Commission , 351 Ill. 444 ( 1933 )
Borgeson v. Industrial Commission , 368 Ill. 188 ( 1938 )
Farley v. Industrial Commission , 378 Ill. 234 ( 1941 )
City of Chicago v. Industrial Commission , 376 Ill. 207 ( 1941 )
Great American Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission , 367 Ill. 241 ( 1937 )
Gov. Com. of Cook Cty. Hosp. v. Ind. Com. , 62 Ill. 2d 28 ( 1975 )
Urbas v. Saintco, Inc. , 264 Ill. App. 3d 111 ( 1994 )
Eriksen v. Nez Perce County , 72 Idaho 1 ( 1951 )
Chicago Hardware Foundry Co. v. Industrial Commission , 393 Ill. 294 ( 1946 )
Board of Education v. Industrial Commission , 392 Ill. 261 ( 1945 )
Container Corp. of America v. Industrial Commission , 401 Ill. 129 ( 1948 )
American Brake Shoe Co. v. Industrial Commission , 20 Ill. 2d 132 ( 1960 )
E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Co. v. Lilly , 226 Ind. 267 ( 1948 )
Huddleston v. Industrial Commission , 27 Ill. 2d 446 ( 1963 )
Fischer v. Industrial Commission , 408 Ill. 115 ( 1951 )
Brewster Motor Co. v. Industrial Commission , 36 Ill. 2d 443 ( 1967 )
Burger Chef Systems, Inc. v. Wilson , 147 Ind. App. 556 ( 1970 )
Thurber v. Industrial Commission , 49 Ill. 2d 561 ( 1971 )
Sjostrom v. Sproule , 34 Ill. App. 2d 338 ( 1962 )
Loyola University v. Industrial Commission , 408 Ill. 139 ( 1951 )
Math Igler's Casino, Inc. v. Industrial Commission , 394 Ill. 330 ( 1946 )
Ceisel v. Industrial Commission , 400 Ill. 574 ( 1948 )
Brady v. Louis Ruffolo & Sons Construction Co. , 143 Ill. 2d 542 ( 1991 )