People v. Boykins

2017 IL 121365IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 121365)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
BYRON BOYKINS, Appellant.
Opinion filed September 21, 2017.
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and
Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The issue presented in this appeal is whether the circuit court’s plea
admonishments regarding mandatory supervised release (MSR) were sufficient to
satisfy the due process rights of defendant, Byron Boykins. Defendant filed a pro se
postconviction petition in the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014)), alleging that
his due process rights were violated when the trial court failed to specifically
admonish him that he would be required to serve a 3-year term of MSR after
completing the 22-year prison sentence he negotiated in exchange for his plea. The
circuit court summarily dismissed the petition. The appellate court affirmed the
dismissal. 2016 IL App (1st) 142542-U. For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the appellate court.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2007, defendant was charged by indictment with six counts of first degree
murder and six counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS
5/24-1.6 (West 2006)). In March 2009, defendant entered into a negotiated plea in
which he agreed to plead guilty to first degree murder in exchange for 22 years’
imprisonment, the dismissal of the AUUW charges, and the dismissal of a separate
pending charge for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant was 20 years
old at the time of the plea hearing. Prior to accepting the plea, the following
exchange occurred:
“THE COURT: Mr. Boykins, you’re charged with the offense of first
degree murder. That event is alleged to have occurred on or about October the
16th of the year of 2006, in that you, without lawful justification, intentionally
or knowingly killed—shot and killed Carlos Mathis, M-a-t-h-i-s.
In the State of Illinois that’s referred to as—the sentencing for that case is
from 20 to 40—20 to 60 years in the Illinois State penitentiary. If I find that
you’ve been found guilty of the same or greater class felony in the last ten
years, the maximum penitentiary time in this case would be life.
Upon your release from the penitentiary, there is a period of three years
mandatory supervised release, sometimes referred to as parole.
Understanding the nature of the offense and its possible penalties, how do
you plead to this matter; guilty or not guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.”
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The trial court then confirmed that defendant was aware of the rights he would be
giving up by entering a guilty plea and confirmed that he was entering the plea of
his own free will. Additionally, the court reiterated the terms of the agreement that
“in this particular situation,” defendant was agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for
“a period of 22[ ]years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.” Defendant
indicated that he had no questions.
¶4 After finding that a factual basis existed for the plea, the court accepted the plea
and ratified the agreement. Defendant waived his right to a presentence
investigation report, but the court was informed that defendant had several juvenile
adjudications, that he was 17 years old at the time of the occurrence, and that he had
no prior adult arrests. The court then imposed a sentence of 22 years in prison.
Defendant again indicated that he had no questions about the sentence. The trial
court did not mention MSR during sentencing, and the sentencing order does not
refer to MSR.
¶5 In April 2014, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that his
constitutional due process rights were substantially violated because he was not
advised that he would be required to serve a 3-year term of MSR upon completion
of the 22-year prison sentence that he negotiated in exchange for his plea.
Consequently, defendant alleged that he did not receive the benefit of his bargain
because the total time he would be required to serve would exceed the term
specifically announced by the trial court. Defendant further asserted that he had not
been aware of the MSR term until he heard other inmates discussing it. As a
remedy, defendant requested that the trial court reduce his prison term by three
years or, alternatively, remove his obligation to serve the MSR term.
¶6 The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the record
contradicted defendant’s allegations. The court concluded that the trial court
sufficiently admonished defendant by advising him prior to imposing the sentence
that upon his release from prison there was a three-year period of MSR.
¶7 The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court’s admonishment
satisfied due process where it “conveyed the necessary warning regarding the
three-year term of MSR in no uncertain terms, such that an ordinary person in
defendant’s circumstances would understand it.” 2016 IL App (1st) 142542-U,
¶ 15. Although the court acknowledged disagreement among the appellate court
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districts on the sufficiency of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 1997)
admonitions, the court rejected defendant’s argument that due process required the
MSR admonishment to be specifically linked with the pronouncement of the
agreed-upon sentence. 2016 IL App (1st) 142542-U, ¶¶ 17-18. We allowed
defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Mar. 15, 2016).
¶8 ANALYSIS
¶9 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a method to challenge a conviction
or sentence based on a substantial violation of constitutional rights. 725 ILCS
5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2014). At the first stage of the proceedings, the circuit court
must independently determine whether the petition is “frivolous or is patently
without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2014). To be summarily dismissed
at the first stage as frivolous or patently without merit, the petition must have no
arguable basis either in law or in fact, relying instead on “an indisputably meritless
legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17
(2009). Meritless legal theories include those theories that are completely
contradicted by the record. Id. at 17. We review the summary dismissal of a
postconviction petition de novo. People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10.
¶ 10 Defendant contends that he has sufficiently alleged a substantial violation of his
due process rights because the trial court failed to adequately admonish him
regarding the statutorily required three-year term of MSR. He maintains that
although the court mentioned MSR when admonishing him about the possible
range of penalties he could receive, under the standards set forth in People v.
Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 (2005), and People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345 (2010), the
admonishments did not satisfy due process where the court did not “link” the
admonishment about the MSR term with his actual agreed-upon sentence to clearly
apprise defendant that MSR would apply to his bargained-for sentence. He argues
that an ordinary person in his circumstances would not understand that his sentence
included the three-year MSR term.
¶ 11 Section 5-8-1(d)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) requires that a
sentence for first degree murder must include a three-year MSR term in addition to
the term of imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(1) (West 2008). Since the MSR
term is statutorily mandated, it is not part of the plea bargain; the State cannot offer
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to exclude it as a part of a plea negotiation, and the court has no authority to
withhold it in imposing sentence. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 200-01.
¶ 12 The requirement that a defendant be informed of the statutorily required MSR
term arises from Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2), which mandates that in
hearings on pleas of guilty, the trial court must inform the defendant and determine
that he understands “the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law.” Ill.
S. Ct. R. 402(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 1997). In Whitfield, this court explained that
pursuant to Rule 402, “every defendant who enters a plea of guilty has a due
process right to be properly and fully admonished.” Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 188.
Thus, before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must substantially comply with
Rule 402(a)(2). Id. at 195.
¶ 13 To substantially comply with Rule 402 and due process where a defendant
enters into a negotiated plea for a specific sentence, the trial court must advise the
defendant, prior to accepting his plea, that a term of MSR will be added to the
sentence. Id. at 194-95. 1 Therefore, where Whitfield had bargained for a specific
sentence, and the trial court accepted his plea without advising him that an MSR
term would be added to the sentence, we held that Whitfield essentially received a
sentence that was more onerous than the sentence for which he bargained, which
violated due process notions of fundamental fairness. Id. at 201-02.
¶ 14 In Morris, we did not explicitly reach the due process issue presented here,
finding instead that Whitfield did not apply retroactively to the Morris defendants.
We sought to clarify, however, what information must be conveyed to ensure the
MSR admonishments given during a plea hearing comply with the requirements of
Rule 402 and due process after Whitfield. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 366. “Whitfield
requires that defendants be advised that a term of MSR will be added to the actual
sentence agreed upon in exchange for a guilty plea to the offense charged.” Id. at
367. “An admonition that uses the term ‘MSR’ without putting it in some relevant
context cannot serve to advise the defendant of the consequences of his guilty plea
1
A “negotiated plea of guilty is one in which the prosecution has bound itself to
recommend a specific sentence, or a specific range of sentence, or where the prosecution
has made concessions relating to the sentence to be imposed and not merely to the charge
or charges then pending.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2006).
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and cannot aid the defendant in making an informed decision about his case.” Id. at
366.
¶ 15 To ensure that defendants understand the consequences of their plea agreement
and to avoid prolonged litigation on the issue, we strongly encouraged trial court
judges to follow best practices in admonishments. We stated that, “[i]deally,” the
admonishment about MSR would (1) be explicitly linked to the sentence to which
defendant agreed in exchange for his negotiated plea, (2) be given when reviewing
the provisions of the plea agreement, and (3) be reiterated both at sentencing and in
the written judgment. Id. at 367-68.
¶ 16 Nevertheless, we recognized that “there is no precise formula in admonishing a
defendant of his MSR obligation” and that the admonition must be read in a
practical and realistic way. Id. at 366. Consequently, we held that to satisfy due
process, “ ‘[t]he admonition is sufficient if an ordinary person in the circumstances
of the accused would understand it to convey the required warning.’ ” Id. (quoting
People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 269 (1983)).
¶ 17 Here, the record reflects that prior to accepting defendant’s plea, the trial court
advised defendant of the range of possible penalties for the offense to which he was
pleading. Defendant was told that, for the offense of first degree murder, the
sentence required a term in prison ranging between 20 and 60 years and that the
maximum period of imprisonment could be life. He was then advised that “[u]pon
your release from the penitentiary, there is a period of three years mandatory
supervised release, sometimes referred to as parole.”
¶ 18 From this information, an ordinary person in defendant’s circumstances would
understand that the penalty for the offense to which he was pleading guilty required
a period of imprisonment in the range of at least 20 to 60 years and that any term he
served in prison would be followed by a 3-year period of MSR. Defendant does not
dispute, and the record reflects, that he understood the concept of MSR or parole.
Where defendant was informed that MSR was a required part of any sentence that
would be imposed upon his release from prison, a reasonable person would
understand that his negotiated prison sentence would be followed by a term of
MSR. When read in a practical and realistic manner and judged by an objective
standard, the record reveals that defendant’s due process rights were satisfied.
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¶ 19 Additionally, as required by Rule 402, defendant was made aware that the
minimum possible penalty for the offense to which he was pleading guilty was 20
years in prison plus a 3-year term of MSR, which is a total period of 23 years. Thus,
an ordinary person in defendant’s circumstances would understand that the
minimum possible penalty was 23 years. Therefore, defendant’s allegation—that
his understanding was that the full extent of his penalty was 22 years—is
contradicted by the record.
¶ 20 Consistent with our conclusion, several post-Morris appellate court cases have
found admonitions similar to those presented here satisfied due process. People v.
Lee, 2012 IL App (4th) 110403, ¶¶ 4, 23 (admonition sufficient where the
defendant was informed that “ ‘[a]ny term in prison would be followed by a period
of mandatory, supervised release of at least three years’ ”); People v. Hunter, 2011
IL App (1st) 093023, ¶¶ 4, 19 (admonishment that “ ‘[a]ny period of incarceration
would be followed by a period of mandatory supervised release of two years
following your discharge from the Department of Corrections’ ” satisfied due
process); People v. Dorsey, 404 Ill. App. 3d 829, 831, 836-38 (2010) (affirming
first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition where the trial court admonished
the defendant that “ ‘[i]f you’re sent to prison, there’s a period of mandatory
supervised release of three years’ ”); People v. Davis, 403 Ill. App. 3d 461, 465,
466 (2010) (admonition sufficient where the trial court advised the defendant that if
he pleaded guilty the court was required to sentence him to between 6 and 30 years
in the penitentiary and that he “ ‘would have to serve at least three years mandatory
supervised release’ ” (emphasis omitted)); People v. Andrews, 403 Ill. App. 3d 654,
656 (2010) (defendant received all of the notice and due process to which he was
entitled regarding MSR where the trial court advised him that “ ‘[i]f convicted and
sentenced to prison, there would then be 1 year [of MSR], or what used to be known
as parole’ ” (emphasis omitted)); People v. Thomas, 402 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1133-34
(2010) (admonition sufficient where trial court advised the defendant of the range
of penalties for each offense without the benefit of a negotiated plea and told him
that any sentence of imprisonment would carry with it a period of MSR upon
release from prison).
¶ 21 Those cases that have found a violation of due process are cases in which the
MSR admonitions did not convey unconditionally that an MSR term would follow
those bargained-for sentences. For example, in People v. Burns, 405 Ill. App. 3d
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40, 42 (2010), the defendant was advised that a conviction “ ‘could result’ ” in a
prison sentence for a period of time and that there was a “ ‘potential’ ” fine “ ‘with
a period of three years mandatory supervised release.’ ” The court held that due
process was not satisfied where the admonition “could have fostered a reasonable
belief that MSR attached only to a particular contingency that might or might not
happen.” Id. at 44-45; see also People v. Daniels, 388 Ill. App. 3d 952, 959 (2009)
(admonition failed to satisfy Rule 402 and due process where it linked MSR “only
to the maximum sentences authorized by law” (emphasis omitted)); People v.
Company, 376 Ill. App. 3d 846, 850 (2007) (admonition was insufficient where the
MSR term was phrased as a contingency); People v. Smith, 386 Ill. App. 3d 473,
482 (2008) (insufficient admonishment where defendant was only advised that he
could be sentenced to 20 to 60 years, he could be fined, and he could be subject to
MSR). Moreover, to the extent that these cases have been interpreted to hold that
Morris established a bright-line rule that to satisfy due process the admonishments
must expressly link MSR during the pronouncement of the agreed-upon sentence,
we reject such a rigid interpretation as inconsistent with our decision in Morris. To
the extent that the foregoing cases applied a bright-line rule requiring a link of MSR
to the pronouncement of the agreed-upon sentence, we expressly overrule them.
¶ 22 Our conclusion is not altered by United States ex rel. Miller v. McGinnis, 774
F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1985), on which defendant additionally relies. There, the trial
court informed the defendant that an MSR term could be added to the sentences for
his crimes other than murder. Id. at 820. The court then sentenced him to 20 years
for the murder to run concurrently with other lesser sentences for his other crimes.
Id. at 823. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the defendant’s due process rights
were violated because he was told he would receive a maximum sentence of 20
years, when in fact his sentence included the additional 3-year MSR period. Id. at
823-24. In contrast, here the trial judge told defendant that a sentence for murder
necessarily included a three-year term of MSR.
¶ 23 Finally, we recognize that in this case the trial court did not have the benefit of
our guidance in Morris when it provided the Rule 402 admonishments. We trust
that going forward the trial court will seek to follow the guidelines set forth in
Morris to avoid any potential for confusion in the future and to insulate the plea
from subsequent attack. Additionally, we note that the Code now requires judges to
include MSR in their written sentencing orders. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2012).
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¶ 24 CONCLUSION
¶ 25 In sum, we hold that the summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction
petition was proper where the record refutes his claim that the trial court’s
admonishment regarding the requisite statutory MSR term fell short of
constitutional due process requirements. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the appellate court.
¶ 26 Affirmed.
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