People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n

2014 IL 116642
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket Nos. 116642, 116696 cons.)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. LISA MADIGAN etc.,
Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed November 20, 2014.
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Burke, and Theis
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 At issue in this appeal is whether the appellate court erred when it dismissed the
State’s petition for direct review of an order by the Illinois Commerce Commission on
the grounds that the State’s notice of appeal was untimely and therefore insufficient to
invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction. 2013 IL App (1st) 122981-U. Although the
State complied with the 35-day filing period specified by section 10-201(a) of the
Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/10-201(a) (West 2010)), the appellate court believed
separation of powers considerations required that controlling effect be given instead to
Supreme Court Rule 335(i) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 335(i) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)), which incorporates
by reference Supreme Court Rule 303 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. June 4, 2008)). Under
Rule 303(a) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff. June 4, 2008)), the deadline for filing a notice of
appeal is only 30 days, a deadline the State did not meet. The State petitioned for leave
to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013)). The Illinois Commerce Commission
filed a separate petition to appeal as a matter of right (Ill. S. Ct. R. 317 (eff. July 1,
2006)) or, in the alternative for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2013)).
We allowed both parties’ petitions and consolidated the cases. We now reverse and
remand to the appellate court for further proceedings.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2009, the Illinois American Water Company (IAWC) petitioned the Illinois
Commerce Commission (Commission) pursuant to the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS
5/1-101 et seq. (West 2010)) for approval of its annual reconciliation of purchased
water and purchased sewage treatment surcharges. See 83 Ill. Adm. Code 655.50
(2001); 220 ILCS 5/9-220.2 (West 2010). The State sought and was granted leave to
intervene in the proceeding. By order dated July 31, 2012, the Commission approved
the reconciliation subject to certain modifications. The State asked for rehearing. The
Commission denied that request in an order entered by the Commission on September
11, 2012.
¶4 Under section 10-201(a) of the Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/10-201(a) (West
2010)), the State had 35 days from denial of rehearing to appeal the Commission’s
decision to the appellate court. That placed the deadline for filing the notice of appeal at
October 16. According to the record, the notice of appeal was duly filed on that date.
¶5 After the notice of appeal was filed, the case proceeded normally. The record was
filed, a briefing schedule was set, and briefs were filed. Once the briefs were in, the
appellate court determined that the matter could be disposed of without oral argument
on the grounds that no substantial question was presented. Ill. S. Ct. R. 352(a) (eff. Feb.
6, 2013). Shortly thereafter, it entered a summary order pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 23(c)(1) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(c)(1) (eff. July 1, 2011)), dismissing the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction on the grounds that the notice of appeal had not been timely filed.
Invoking two prior appellate court cases which had opined that the provisions of
section 10-201(a) of the Public Utilities Act were unconstitutional based on separation
of powers principles, the appellate court determined that under Supreme Court Rule
335(i)(1) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 335(i)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)), the notice of appeal should have
been filed, instead, within the shorter 30-day deadline set forth in Supreme Court Rule
303(a) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff. June 4, 2008)). Under that deadline, the State’s notice
of appeal came five days too late. See 2013 IL App (1st) 122981-U, ¶¶ 2-3.
-2-
¶6 The State and the Commission each petitioned for rehearing. When rehearing was
denied, they petitioned our court for review. We granted both parties’ petitions and
consolidated the proceedings for briefing, argument and decision.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 The standard of review is undisputed. Whether the appellate court erred in
dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that it was untimely and
whether section 10-201(a) of the Public Utilities Act is constitutional are both
questions of law which we review de novo. Board of Education of Roxana Community
School District No. 1 v. Pollution Control Board, 2013 IL 115473, ¶ 17; Irwin
Industrial Tool Co. v. Department of Revenue, 238 Ill. 2d 332, 340 (2010).
¶9 In undertaking our review, we begin with the provisions of the Illinois Constitution
itself. That document grants an appeal as a matter of right from all final judgments of
the circuit court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. It does not, however, confer any right to
judicial review of final administrative decisions. The courts of this state are only
empowered to review administrative actions “as provided by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VI, § 6 (appellate court), § 9 (circuit court); see ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control
Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 29 (2000).
¶ 10 When the legislature has, through law, prescribed procedures for obtaining judicial
review of an administrative decision, a court is said to exercise “special statutory
jurisdiction” when it reviews an administrative decision pursuant to the statutory
scheme. Id. at 30; People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 231 Ill. 2d
370, 387 (2008). Special statutory jurisdiction is limited to the language of the act
conferring it. Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 225
Ill. 2d 103, 122 (2007). A court has no powers from any other source. Collinsville
Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 218 Ill.
2d 175, 181-82 (2006). A party seeking to invoke a court’s special statutory jurisdiction
must therefore comply strictly with the procedures prescribed by the statute. Id. at 182;
Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 178 (2007). If the mode
of procedure prescribed by statute is not strictly pursued, no jurisdiction is conferred on
the court to review it. Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109
Ill. 2d 202, 210 (1985).
-3-
¶ 11 The procedures governing appeals from final administrative decisions and orders of
the Commission differ depending on the nature of the proceeding. When the decision
or order is entered by the Commission under the Electric Supplier Act (220 ILCS 30/1
et seq. (West 2010)) or the Illinois Commercial Relocation of Trespassing Vehicles
Law (625 ILCS 5/18a-100 et seq. (West 2010)), the appeal is “in accordance with the
Administrative Review Law” (735 ILCS 5/3-103 et seq. (West 2010)). If the appeal is
from a decision or order entered by the Commission pursuant to the Illinois
Commercial Transportation Law (625 ILCS 5/18c-1101 et seq. (West 2010)) or the
Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2010)), it is controlled instead by
the terms of those particular statutes. 83 Ill. Adm. Code 200.890(a) (1996).
¶ 12 Because this was a proceeding under the Public Utilities Act, the appeal was
governed by section 10-201 of that statute (220 ILCS 5/10-201 (West 2010)). Section
10-201(a) expressly provides that any person or corporation affected by a rule,
regulation, order or decision of the Commission may appeal to the appellate court
“[w]ithin 35 days from the date that a copy of the order or decision sought to be
reviewed was served upon the party affected by any order or decision of the
Commission refusing an application for a rehearing of any rule, regulation, order or
decision of the Commission, including any order granting or denying interim rate
relief, or within 35 days from the date that a copy of the order or decision sought to be
reviewed was served upon the party affected by any final order or decision of the
Commission upon and after a rehearing of any rule, regulation, order or decision of the
Commission, including any order granting or denying interim rate relief.” 220 ILCS
5/10-201(a) (West 2010). Under the precedent of this court set forth above governing
special statutory jurisdiction, this 35-day statutory period was controlling. There is no
dispute that the State filed its appeal within the statutory period. The appeal was
therefore timely.
¶ 13 In reaching a contrary conclusion, the appellate court took the view that separation
of powers principles required that the statutory appeal period yield to the shorter appeal
period specified in Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff. June 4, 2008)),
which is among the general appeal rules incorporated by reference into Supreme Court
Rule 335 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 335 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)) governing direct review of
administrative orders by the appellate court. The appellate court was mistaken. It is true
our court has concurrent constitutional authority with the General Assembly to
promulgate rules concerning direct appellate court review of administrative decisions.
It is also the case that the rules of our court control appellate court review of
administrative decisions in the absence of an explicit exercise of rulemaking authority
-4-
by the legislature or in those situations were a rule enacted by the legislature is in direct
conflict with a rule promulgated by our court. County of Cook, Cermak Health Services
v. Illinois State Local Labor Relations Board, 144 Ill. 2d 326, 334-35 (1991). We have
never suggested, however, that Supreme Court Rule 335 requires courts to give
controlling effect to the 30-day appeal period in Supreme Court Rule 303(a) whenever
review of administrative orders lies with the appellate court.
¶ 14 Supreme Court Rule 335(i)(1) provides simply that certain Supreme Court rules,
including Rule 303(a)’s 30-day filing period (Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff. June 4, 2008)),
apply to administrative review by the appellate court “[i]nsofar as appropriate.” Ill. S.
Ct. R. 335(i)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). We have found it appropriate for courts to apply the
30-day deadline set forth in Rule 303(a) when the legislature has failed to explicitly
state a time within which administrative review in the appellate court must be
commenced. County of Cook, Cermak Health Services, 144 Ill. 2d at 334-35; Central
City Education Ass’n v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496,
533 (1992). At the same time, however, we have made clear that if the legislature
wished to enact its own time period for seeking appeal of administrative decisions by
the appellate court, it had the authority to do so. Id. We could not conclude otherwise
without running afoul of the principles of special statutory jurisdiction.
¶ 15 As noted earlier in this opinion, and as we pointed out in County of Cook, Cermak
Health Services, 144 Ill. 2d at 334, the Public Utilities Act is one of the statutes where
the General Assembly has elected to take that course and explicitly state the period for
seeking direct appellate review. Because of this explicit statement, we do not have a
situation where resort to the general deadline specified in Rule 303(a) is necessary or
appropriate within the meaning of Rule 335. The statutory period set forth in section
10-201(a) of the Public Utilities Act controls and should have been given effect by the
appellate court.
¶ 16 Consumers Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 144 Ill. App. 3d 229 (1986),
one of the two appellate court cases on which the appellate court here relied, does not
support a contrary position. In Consumers Gas Co., a panel of the Fifth District
Appellate Court did declare section 10-201 of the Public Utilities Act to be invalid to
the extent that it conflicted with Supreme Court Rule 335. Id. at 236. It is important to
note, however, that the point of contention in that case pertained to differences with
respect to where a notice of appeal should be filed in administrative review cases and
on whom the notice be served. The validity of section 10-201’s 35-day statutory
deadline for filing appeals was not at issue. Indeed, it could not have been at issue
-5-
because, at the time, the deadline imposed by the statute was identical to one set forth in
our rules: 30 days. Id. at 234. We note, moreover, that in formulating its analysis, the
appellate court completely overlooked the principles of special statutory jurisdiction
which apply where, as here, review is sought of administrative action.
¶ 17 Kreutzer v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 404 Ill. App. 3d 791 (2010), the second
appellate court opinion on which the appellate court here relied, is similarly inapposite.
Although the version of the Public Utilities Act involved in that case included the same
35-day filing deadline as the current law, the validity of that deadline was not at issue
and, as in Consumers Gas Co., 144 Ill. App. 3d 229, principles of special statutory
jurisdiction were not taken into account.
¶ 18 CONCLUSION
¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, the appellate court erred when it concluded that
separation of powers principles required the timeliness of the State’s notice of appeal to
be judged by the 30-day period set forth in Supreme Court Rule 303(a) rather than the
longer 35-day appeal period specified by the legislature in section 10-201(a) of the
Public Utilities Act. Section 10-201(a) controlled, and the deadline imposed by that
provision was met. The judgment of the appellate court dismissing the State’s appeal
for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that it was untimely is therefore reversed, and the
cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 20 Reversed and remanded.
-6-