DocketNumber: No. 16761. Judgment reversed.
Citation Numbers: 149 N.E. 271, 318 Ill. 380
Judges: Farmer
Filed Date: 10/28/1925
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/8/2024
Andy Buffo, plaintiff in error, (hereafter called defendant,) was convicted of a second violation of the Illinois Prohibition statute, in Vermilion county, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary and to pay a fine of $500 and costs of suit. There were four counts in the indictment. The second and third were nollied and no finding was made by the jury as to the fourth. The jury found defendant guilty of possessing intoxicating liquor in manner and form as charged in the first count and that he had been previously convicted of a violation of the Prohibition statute in manner and form as charged in the first count of the indictment.
The assignment of errors alleges the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict and judgment; that the indictment was bad; that the court erred in admitting and excluding evidence and in giving and refusing instructions; and that improper and prejudicial remarks were made during the trial by the court and the State's attorney.
The first count of the indictment, under which defendant was found guilty in this case, sets out in hc verba the indictment returned against defendant and under which he was convicted at a former trial of the Vermilion county circuit court. That indictment charged the defendant "unlawfully did then and there sell intoxicating liquor to one *Page 382 J.W. Bobbit in violation of a certain act entitled," setting out the title of the Prohibition act of 1921. The first count alleged defendant was tried under said indictment by a jury, was convicted, sentenced to jail ninety days and to pay a fine of $400 and costs and to stand committed until the fine and costs were paid. No objection was made to the sufficiency of the charge of the crime committed by the defendant in this case, but it is contended the indictment was insufficient to sustain a conviction for a second offense as the former indictment shows on its face it did not charge defendant with any crime, and that the court had no jurisdiction to render the judgment and sentence in that case under that indictment. A motion was made by defendant, before plea entered, to quash the indictment under which defendant was tried and convicted in this case, but the motion was overruled. After verdict defendant made a motion in arrest and for a new trial, both of which motions were overruled.
When the former indictment and record of conviction were offered in evidence by the State, defendant objected because the indictment did not charge the defendant with a crime. The objection was overruled and the indictment and record of the conviction were admitted in evidence. It is contended by defendant the court erred in overruling the motion to quash, in admitting the former indictment and record of conviction in evidence, and in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment.
The former indictment was set out in hc verba, as we have stated, as part of the indictment in this case, and defendant insists the sufficiency of the indictment was directly attacked by the motion to quash; also that the record of the former indictment and conviction was subject to collateral attack because the former indictment showed on its face that the court had no jurisdiction to render the judgment. In People v. Martin,
If the former indictment did not charge defendant with any crime it would seem necessarily to follow the court had no jurisdiction to try and convict him of a crime. Among other cases cited by the State is Kelly v. People,
To give a court jurisdiction of the subject matter in a criminal case it is essential that the accused be charged with a crime. If that is not done, a plea of guilty in manner and form as charged does not authorize the court to render a judgment of conviction for some criminal offense, and if a judgment is so rendered it is void and may be attacked collaterally. This court has decided in the several cases referred to, that an indictment or information in substantially the identical language of the former indictment against the defendant did not charge the commission of a crime, and that the question of its sufficiency might be raised on motion to quash or motion in arrest. Inasmuch as the defendant was not charged in the former indictment with a violation of any criminal law the court had no jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence him for the commission of a criminal offense. The former judgment was void and subject to collateral attack.
The admission in evidence of the first indictment, and the record of conviction under it, was erroneous and highly prejudicial to defendant.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded. *Page 385
People v. Edge , 406 Ill. 490 ( 1950 )
The People v. Rukavina , 338 Ill. 128 ( 1930 )
The People v. Nickols , 391 Ill. 565 ( 1945 )
The PEOPLE v. Greer , 30 Ill. 2d 415 ( 1964 )
Cozart v. State , 42 Ala. App. 535 ( 1964 )
The People v. Vaughn , 390 Ill. 360 ( 1945 )
People v. Wallace , 57 Ill. 2d 285 ( 1974 )