People v. Casler

2020 IL 125117IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 125117)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
RASHEED CASLER, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 28, 2020.
JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Garman, Theis, and Michael J. Burke
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Kilbride dissented, with opinion.
Justice Karmeier dissented, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Jackson County, defendant, Rasheed
Casler, was convicted of obstructing justice by furnishing false information (720
ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1) (West 2014)). The appellate court affirmed. 2019 IL App (5th)
160035. This court allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R.
315(a) (eff. July 1, 2018)). We now reverse the judgments of the appellate and
circuit courts and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant was charged in a three-count information with possessing less than
15 grams of cocaine (count I) and less than five grams of methamphetamine (count
II). Count III charged defendant with obstructing justice “in that the defendant
(Rasheed Casler) knowingly, with the intent to prevent his arrest on warrants,
provided false information to Sgt. Guy Draper in that he said his name was Jakuta
King Williams.” Only count III is at issue in this appeal.
¶4 Defendant was tried before a jury. The State’s case, as it pertained to the
obstructing justice charge, was essentially as follows. Carbondale police sergeant
Guy Draper testified that on March 6, 2015, he and Patrolman Blake Harsy were
both in uniform and on foot patrol at various hotels throughout Carbondale. At
12:45 a.m., they were on the second floor of the Quality Inn. As they approached
room 210, the door quickly opened, and defendant emerged, looked at Sergeant
Draper, and then went back into the room and slammed the door. Draper was not
sure who defendant was but remembered him as being someone with whom he had
dealings.
¶5 Sergeant Draper testified that when defendant slammed the door, Patrolman
Harsy smelled the odor of burnt cannabis emanating from the room. Sergeant
Draper approached the door and smelled it also. Draper knocked on the door, and
Brianna Wyatt opened it. Standing in the doorway, Draper smelled a stronger
cannabis odor. Draper saw two men whom he recognized and two women whom
he did not recognize. He called for backup. The four individuals wanted to leave
the room, but Draper did not allow them to do so.
¶6 Sergeant Draper testified that he did not see defendant in the room, and the
bathroom door was closed. Draper explained that he had experienced people in
hotel rooms hiding in bathrooms to evade apprehension and hide or destroy
evidence. Still standing in the doorway, Draper knocked on the hotel room door,
announced his office, and said, “Anybody in the bathroom, identify yourself.”
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¶7 Sergeant Draper testified that defendant responded essentially that he was
defecating. Sergeant Draper again commanded defendant to identify himself, and
defendant responded that his name was Jakuta King Williams. Draper asked
defendant for identification. Defendant responded that he had no identification and
said that he was from Virginia. Patrolman Harsy relayed the name to the dispatch
center, but no record of a person with that name was found. Draper testified that he
was initially fooled by the false name.
¶8 Sergeant Draper testified that he ordered defendant to open the door and said,
if defendant flushed the toilet, Draper would enter the bathroom and seize him.
Draper did not hear the toilet flush, and as far as he knew, defendant did not try to
destroy evidence in the bathroom.
¶9 Sergeant Draper testified that defendant eventually emerged from the bathroom.
Draper recognized defendant and remembered his name because he had previously
arrested him. Draper asked defendant whether he was Rasheed Casler, and
defendant did not respond. One of the officers relayed defendant’s name to the
dispatch center, which responded that defendant had an outstanding warrant.
Sergeant Draper arrested defendant. Nothing interfered with Draper’s ability to
arrest defendant. Defendant did not attempt to resist or flee from Draper.
¶ 10 Sergeant Draper testified that he observed toilet paper in the toilet but did not
see any human waste or contraband. During a postarrest search of the room, he and
other police officers discovered defendant’s green hoodie laying on a bed. They
found in the hoodie a wallet with an Illinois identification card bearing the name of
Rasheed Casler.
¶ 11 Patrolman Harsy testified. Both he and Sergeant Draper saw the hotel room
door open and saw defendant emerge from the room, look at Sergeant Draper, and
then reenter the room and shut the door. Harsy smelled the odor of burnt cannabis.
Sergeant Draper knocked on the door, and one of the occupants, Brianna Wyatt,
opened the door. Patrolman Harsy learned from Wyatt that the actual registered
guest to that room had left. Harsy went downstairs to the manager’s desk and spoke
with the manager on duty. Harsy learned the name of the room’s registered guest.
Harsy returned to the room less than 10 minutes later. Harsy saw several officers
standing in front of the door and heard a certain tone on the police radio, which
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indicated that a name submitted to a police database search has an outstanding
warrant. The officers then entered the room and took defendant into custody.
¶ 12 Shanique Lincoln testified as follows. She was one of the individuals with
defendant in the hotel room. She could not remember many details from the
investigation because she had been drinking tequila and smoking marijuana.
Lincoln testified that she signed a written statement that night. However, she further
testified that she “felt forced, pushed into it” because she was arrested that night for
possession of cannabis and she felt threatened and frightened. Over objection, her
statement was published to the jury. In the statement, Lincoln averred that
defendant “looked out the door and said wo [sic] and closed the door.”
¶ 13 The defense case consisted of defendant’s testimony. Defendant arrived at the
Quality Inn on that date shortly after midnight. He was drunk from tequila. He went
to room 210 because his friends were there. He continued drinking tequila in the
hotel room. He became nauseated and tried to find the bathroom. However, he
opened the wrong door into the hallway. He opened the door and shut it. He did not
step into the hallway and did not see any law enforcement in the hallway.
¶ 14 Defendant found the bathroom and began having diarrhea. Defendant heard
someone ask who was in there. Defendant thought it was one of his friends joking
with him, so he answered Jakuta King Williams. Defendant did not know there
were police officers outside the bathroom door when he shouted that he was Jakuta
King Williams. Defendant was not attempting to avoid being arrested by giving the
false name. Defendant did not enter the bathroom to avoid arrest and did not intend
to flush any contraband while in the bathroom. When defendant was told to open
the door, he realized that it was the police. Defendant opened the door while still
seated on the toilet. Defendant then recognized Sergeant Draper, who had arrested
him in 2013. Defendant finished using the bathroom and exited without flushing
the toilet.
¶ 15 At the close of trial, the jury acquitted defendant of the drug possession charges
and found him guilty of the obstructing justice charge. On January 20, 2016,
defendant was sentenced to 90 days in the Jackson County Jail, beginning that day,
and two years of probation.
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¶ 16 On July 1, 2019, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of conviction. The
sole issue on appeal was whether the State proved defendant guilty of the offense
of obstructing justice in that defendant, knowingly and with the intent to prevent
his arrest on warrants, provided false information to Draper by identifying himself
as Jakuta King Williams. 2019 IL App (5th) 160035, ¶¶ 23-25. Defendant
maintained that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had the requisite
intent to prevent his apprehension. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. Rejecting this contention, the
appellate court held that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove that
defendant intended to avoid apprehension and gave Draper the false name in an
effort to do so. Id. ¶¶ 28-33.
¶ 17 Defendant alternatively argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction of obstructing justice because his giving of the false name did not
materially impede the administration of justice. In support of his argument,
defendant cited People v. Taylor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110222, which in turn relied
on this court’s decision in People v. Comage, 241 Ill. 2d 139 (2011). 2019 IL App
(5th) 160035, ¶¶ 37-40. Rejecting this argument, the appellate court distinguished
this court’s decision in Comage and refused to follow Taylor. Id. ¶¶ 41-49. The
appellate court held that the State was not required to prove that the false name
furnished by defendant materially impeded his arrest. Id. ¶ 49.
¶ 18 Defendant appeals to this court. We note that defendant was sentenced in
January 2016. Therefore, he could already have served his sentence. “However, the
nullification of a conviction unquestionably may have important consequences to a
defendant, whether or not the attendant sentence has been served. In such
circumstances, the probability that a criminal defendant may suffer collateral legal
consequences from a sentence already served precludes a finding of mootness.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 33; see
People v. Jordan, 218 Ill. 2d 255, 263 (2006). Accordingly, because defendant may
suffer collateral legal consequences, we properly consider his appeal.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 Defendant asks this court to reverse his conviction of obstructing justice.
Defendant contends that a conviction for obstructing justice by furnishing false
information requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false
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information materially impeded the administration of justice. Defendant further
contends that the State did not prove that his conduct materially interfered with a
police investigation. Prior to considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
first determine whether the obstructing justice statute includes a material
impediment requirement.
¶ 21 A. Statute Includes Element of Material Impediment
¶ 22 Defendant argues that section 31-4(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012
(Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1) (West 2014)), which criminalizes
obstructing justice by furnishing false information, includes as an element of the
offense that the false information materially impeded the administration of justice.
However, the State argues that the statute does not include a material impediment
requirement. Resolution of this issue requires us to construe the relevant statutory
language. The construction of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed
de novo. People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 12; People v. Zimmerman, 239 Ill.
2d 491, 497 (2010).
¶ 23 1. Material Impediment Requirement Is Found in Statutory Language
¶ 24 The principles guiding our review are familiar. The primary objective of
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the
legislature. All other canons and rules of statutory construction are subordinate to
this cardinal principle. People v. Botruff, 212 Ill. 2d 166, 174 (2004); In re
Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307 (2002). The most reliable indicator of
legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning.
A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of
other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and
sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should
not be rendered superfluous. The court may consider the reason for the law, the
problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences
of construing the statute one way or another. Also, a court presumes that the
General Assembly did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice in enacting
legislation. In re Appointment of Special Prosecutor, 2019 IL 122949, ¶ 23;
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Zimmerman, 239 Ill. 2d at 497; Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 36; Botruff, 212 Ill. 2d
at 174-75.
¶ 25 Section 31-4 of the Criminal Code provides in pertinent part:
“(a) A person obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent the
apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person, he or she
knowingly commits any of the following acts:
(1) Destroys, alters, conceals, or disguises physical evidence, plants
false evidence, [or] furnishes false information[.]” (Emphasis added.) 720
ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1) (West 2014).
With an exception not pertinent here, obstructing justice is a Class 4 felony. Id.§ 31-4(b)(1). Further, we observe that section 31-4 “is a codification of several
unrelated provisions of the former statutes. [Citations.] *** Conspiracies or
attempts to obstruct justice would be separate offenses under sections 8-2 and 8-4,
respectively, of the [Criminal] Code.” 720 ILCS Ann. 5/31-4, Committee
Comments—1961, at 404 (Smith-Hurd 2010).
¶ 26 Both defendant and the State refer to the same definition of “furnish.” When
section 31-4 of the Criminal Code was adopted in 1961, Webster’s defined
“furnish” as “to provide or supply with what is needed, useful, or desirable.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 923 (1961).
¶ 27 Defendant argues that the plain meaning of the word “furnish” suggests reliance
on the information provided; that is, the false information was needed or useful to
prevent a person’s apprehension or obstruct a person’s defense or prosecution.
Therefore, according to defendant, if the false information was not relied upon or,
in other words, did not materially impede a police investigation, then the false
information was not “furnished” as section 31-4(a) provides.
¶ 28 However, the State argues that the plain meaning of the word “furnish” does
not include a material impediment requirement. The State maintains that a person
obstructs justice simply when he or she knowingly provides or supplies false
information.
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¶ 29 The State’s argument overlooks the complete definition of the word “furnish,”
which denotes necessity. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 923
(2002) (“to provide or supply with what is needed, useful, or desirable”); Webster’s
New World College Dictionary 547 (3d ed. 1997) (same); The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 534 (1978) (“To equip with what is needed
***.”). In providing synonyms, dictionaries explain that “furnish” “may apply to
anything supplied *** but is used typically with tangible more or less permanent
articles for use.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 924 (2002); see
Webster’s New World College Dictionary 547 (3d ed. 1997) (“furnish, as compared
here, implies the provision of all the things requisite for a particular service, action,
etc.”); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 534 (1978)
(“Furnish refers primarily to the provision of basic necessities.”).
¶ 30 To construe the word “furnish” as the State argues would ignore its clear
denotation of necessity. “We may not so construe any word of a statute as
superfluous or meaningless.” Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen’s Annuity
& Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 116 (1993); see, e.g., In re Detention of Stanbridge,
2012 IL 112337, ¶ 72; People v. Diggins, 235 Ill. 2d 48, 57 (2009).
¶ 31 In accord with this clear statutory language, we hold that a person obstructs
justice when he or she knowingly provides or supplies false information that is
necessary or useful to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or
defense of any person. In other words, the false information must constitute a
material impediment to the administration of justice.
¶ 32 2. Material Impediment Requirement Is Found in Illinois Case Law
¶ 33 This court’s case law has long established that section 31-4(a) of the Criminal
Code requires a showing of material impediment. In Comage, 241 Ill. 2d 139, police
officers saw the defendant remove a crack cocaine pipe from his pocket and throw
it over a fence while running from them. The officers knew where the evidence
was, it was out of their sight for only about 20 seconds, and they had no difficulty
in recovering it. The defendant was convicted of obstructing justice by concealing
evidence, and the appellate court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 140-43.
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¶ 34 This court reversed the conviction. We stated at the outset that the specific issue
presented was the meaning of the “concealment” clause of the obstructing justice
statute. Id. at 140-41. The State argued that the defendant “concealed” the evidence
by throwing it over the fence and placing it out of sight of the police officers. Id. at
145. However, our survey of the law revealed the following: “Courts have
repeatedly rejected the proposition that temporarily removing contraband from the
sight of police officers during a pursuit or arrest is sufficient, by itself, to constitute
concealment for purposes of obstructing justice *** statutes.” Id. We agreed with
the case law surveyed and concluded as follows: “To construe the word ‘conceal’
as the State suggests would mean that essentially every possessory offense where
the contraband is not in plain view would also constitute the felony offense of
obstructing justice. We do not believe the legislature intended such a result.” Id. at
148.
¶ 35 We further explained that this construction of the concealment clause is
consistent with the purpose of the obstructing justice statute as a whole. We
reasoned as follows:
“Obstruction of justice is an attempt to interfere with the administration of the
courts, the judicial system, or law enforcement agencies. ‘The phrase
“obstructing justice” as used in connection with offenses arising out of such
conduct means impeding or obstructing those who seek justice in a court or
those who have duties or powers of administering justice in courts.’ [Citation.]”
Id. at 149.
We reasoned: “Thus, in enacting section 31-4, the legislature intended to
criminalize behavior that actually interferes with the administration of justice, i.e.,
conduct that ‘obstructs prosecution or defense of any person.’ ” (Emphasis in
original.) Id.; see also id. at 151 (Freeman, J., specially concurring) (agreeing that
material impediment “is a necessary component of Illinois’s obstructing justice
statute”).
¶ 36 The General Assembly can effectuate any change in statutory construction if it
desires so to do. Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan, 2015 IL 118170, ¶ 19; City of
Decatur v. Curry, 65 Ill. 2d 350, 359 (1976). However, we find that the legislature
has chosen not to amend section 31-4(a) contrary to Comage in the nearly 10 years
subsequent to that decision. “It is axiomatic that where a statute has been judicially
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construed and the construction has not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed
that the legislature has acquiesced in the court’s exposition of the legislative intent.”
People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 353 (1970) (collecting cases); see Heelan, 2015
IL 118170, ¶ 19 (collecting cases). Therefore, after this court has construed a
statute, that construction becomes a part of the statute until the legislature amends
it contrary to that interpretation. Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridge, 231 Ill. 2d 324, 343
(2008) (and cases cited therein).
¶ 37 After the decision in Comage, this court again examined, in a slightly different
context, the issue of whether a defendant’s false statement can interfere with the
administration of justice. People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, involved another
section of article 31 of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2006)), which
relates to interference with public officers. In Baskerville, the defendant’s wife,
Christine, drove past La Salle County Sheriff’s Deputy John Dyke, who recognized
her from previous contacts. The deputy believed that her driver’s license had been
suspended. While following the vehicle, the deputy received confirmation that
Christine’s license was suspended. Deputy Dyke followed the vehicle to Christine’s
home. He saw Christine exit the vehicle and walk toward her home. He asked
Christine to return to her vehicle, but she walked into her house, and he did not see
her again. The defendant emerged from the house. Deputy Dyke informed the
defendant that Christine had been driving on a suspended license and asked the
defendant to retrieve Christine. The defendant initially responded that he had been
driving the vehicle and Christine was not at home. Defendant went inside the house,
reemerged, and told Deputy Dyke that he did not know what was going on. The
defendant invited the deputy to enter the residence to search for Christine. Deputy
Dyke declined and told the defendant that he would send Christine a ticket in the
mail. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶¶ 4-7.
¶ 38 The defendant was charged with obstructing a police officer. Id. ¶ 13. Section
31-1(a) of the Criminal Code provides that “[a] person who knowingly resists or
obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer *** of
any authorized act within his or her official capacity commits a Class A
misdemeanor.” 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2006). The defendant conceded that he
provided false information to a law enforcement officer. “The point of contention
[was] whether providing false information can constitute obstruction under the
statute.” Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 17.
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¶ 39 After analyzing the meaning of the term “obstruct,” we held that knowingly
furnishing a false statement to an officer may constitute obstruction under section
31-1(a) where the statement interposes an obstacle that impedes or hinders the
officer and is relevant to the performance of his or her authorized duties. Id. ¶¶ 1,
29. We explained that the term “obstruct” includes “conduct the effect of which
impedes or hinders progress. Furnishing false information could thus be included
within that definition, as it can undoubtedly interfere with an officer’s progress.”
Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 40 Having concluded that furnishing false information may constitute obstructing
a peace officer when a material impediment is established, we next considered
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Id. ¶ 29.
We repeated that the defendant’s false statement “only has legal significance if it
*** actually impeded an act the officer was authorized to perform.” Id. ¶ 35. We
found that the defendant’s false statement did not hamper or impede the
performance of the law enforcement officer’s duties. Therefore, we held that the
defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating section 31-
1(a) of the Criminal Code. Id. ¶¶ 35-38.
¶ 41 In the course of our analysis, we found that sections 31-1 and 31-4 of the
Criminal Code, both obstruction statutes, were related in that section 31-1 targets
acts that obstruct police officers, while section 31-4 targets specific acts that
constitute obstructive conduct, one of which is furnishing false information. Id.
¶ 28. Construed together, Comage and Baskerville firmly establish that a
defendant’s acts must be a material impediment and must be proved in a
prosecution for obstructing justice.
¶ 42 The proposition that furnishing false information constitutes obstructing justice
only if the false information materially impedes the administration of justice has
been expressed by other authorities. “Giving a police officer a false identification
can impede, obstruct, or interfere with the performance of his or her official duties
although responding to a police officer’s request for identification with a false
name is not always a criminal offense.” (Emphasis added.) 58 Am. Jur. 2d
Obstructing Justice § 60, at 956 (2012) “Lying or intentionally misleading a police
officer in the lawful discharge of his or her duty can constitute verbal ‘obstruction’
although the officer must be actually hampered in some substantial way.”
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(Emphasis added.) 58 Am. Jur. 2d Obstructing Justice § 58, at 954-55 (2012). See,
e.g., Burdess v. State, 724 So. 2d 604, 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
the defendant’s arrest for resisting an officer without violence, based on giving the
arresting officer a false name, was unlawful because “[t]here was no testimony that
the officer was impeded in any way by the giving of the original false
information”); Commonwealth v. Paquette, 62 N.E.3d 12, 21-22 (Mass. 2016)
(reversing defendant’s conviction of violating witness intimidation statute, holding
that statements are not misleading within the meaning of the statute “unless, given
the information known to police at the time the statements were made, the
statements reasonably could have led police to pursue a materially different course
of investigation. The Commonwealth presented no direct evidence, however, that
the defendant’s statements *** reasonably could have led police astray in this
manner.”); Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 388, 390 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)
(reversing conviction of obstruction of justice, holding that, although defendant’s
conflicting statements may have frustrated the police officer’s investigation, “the
statements did not oppose, impede, or resist [the officer’s] efforts to conduct an
investigation. Therefore, [the defendant] did not ‘obstruct’ [the officer] in the
performance of his duties.”).
¶ 43 Our appellate court in Taylor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110222, correctly applied these
principles as expressed in Comage and Baskerville. In Taylor, a police officer
recognized the defendant upon seeing him on a street. The officer not only knew
the defendant but also had a photograph of defendant in his squad car, along with
photographs of other individuals wanted on outstanding warrants. The officer
approached the defendant and asked for identification, although he knew
defendant’s identity. The defendant gave the officer a false name. The officer ran
the name through the police computer system, which indicated that the name was
false. Defendant was arrested for obstructing justice by furnishing false
information. At trial, the prosecution and the defense agreed that the entire
encounter lasted between 5 and 10 minutes. Id. ¶¶ 3-5.
¶ 44 Before the appellate court, the defendant sought to apply the reasoning of
Comage to his case. The defendant argued that his actions could not amount to
obstruction of justice because they did not materially impede the arresting officer’s
investigation. The defendant observed that the entire encounter with the arresting
officer lasted between 5 and 10 minutes, despite the initial false information
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regarding his identity. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. The State responded that Comage was
distinguishable because it involved a defendant’s attempted concealment of
evidence rather than the giving of false information to a police officer. Id. ¶ 12.
¶ 45 The appellate court in Taylor reversed the defendant’s conviction. The court
recognized that “the relevant inquiry under Comage is whether, and to what extent,
the defendant’s actions actually interfered with the police investigation.” Id. ¶ 14.
The court rejected the proposition that “false statements always rise to the level of
materially impeding a police investigation.” Id.
¶ 46 The Taylor court also discussed our Baskerville decision and recognized our
holding in Baskerville that false information could constitute obstruction of a peace
officer only if it actually impedes a law enforcement officer in the performance of
his or her official duties. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. The Taylor court viewed Baskerville as
confirming that a relevant issue in a prosecution for obstructing justice “is whether
the defendant’s conduct actually posed a material impediment to the administration
of justice.” Id. ¶ 17.
¶ 47 The Taylor court highlighted that the entire encounter between the defendant
and the police officer lasted between 5 and 10 minutes, the officer’s delay in
checking the defendant’s false name did not significantly delay defendant’s arrest,
and the defendant’s lies did not pose any material risk that the officer would have
mistakenly allowed the defendant to go free. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. “Thus, applying the same
standard used in Comage and Baskerville, Taylor’s false statements did not actually
interfere with or materially impede the police investigation.” Id. ¶ 17. The Taylor
court correctly recognized that this court had incorporated a material impediment
requirement into section 31-4(a) of the Criminal Code, which includes obstructing
justice by furnishing false information.
¶ 48 B. Material Impediment Requirement Applies in the Instant Case
¶ 49 In the case at bar, however, the appellate court distinguished this court’s
decisions in Comage and Baskerville and disagreed with Taylor. The appellate
court maintained that the Comage court limited its recognition of a material
impediment requirement to the concealment clause of section 31-4(a) of the
Criminal Code. 2019 IL App (5th) 160035, ¶¶ 41, 45. Similarly, the appellate court
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maintained that the Baskerville court limited its recognition of a material
impediment requirement to section 31-1 of the Criminal Code. Id. ¶¶ 43, 46. The
appellate court accused the Taylor court of improperly expanding the holdings of
Comage and Baskerville. Id. ¶¶ 45-46.
¶ 50 In support for its reasoning, the appellate court discussed People v. Davis, 409
Ill. App. 3d 457 (2011). The Davis court reviewed a conviction of obstructing
justice by furnishing false information. Citing Comage, the defendant argued that
she did not obstruct justice because her furnishing of false information did not
materially impede the police investigation. Id. at 461. The Davis court distinguished
its case from Comage, reasoning that Comage addressed the concealment clause,
while Davis involved furnishing false information. Id. at 462; see 2019 IL App (5th)
160035, ¶¶ 47-48.
¶ 51 In the case at bar, after discussing Davis, the appellate court concluded as
follows: “Despite the factual similarities between this case and Taylor, for the same
aforementioned reasons as the court in Davis, we refuse to follow Taylor, and we
decline to expand the Comage decision in the manner suggested by the defendant.”
2019 IL App (5th) 160035, ¶ 49. We disagree.
¶ 52 As we explained earlier in this opinion, the Comage court’s recognition of a
material impediment requirement applies to section 31-4(a) of the Criminal Code
and is not limited to the concealment clause. See 720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1) (West
2014) (“A person obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent the apprehension or
obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person, he or she knowingly commits
any of the following acts: (1) Destroys, alters, conceals, or disguises physical
evidence, plants false evidence, [or] furnishes false information[.]”). Lacking the
benefit of this court’s guidance in Baskerville, the Davis court erred in limiting the
holding in Comage to concealing evidence. Accordingly, People v. Davis, 409 Ill.
App. 3d 457 (2011), is hereby overruled on this point.
¶ 53 In this case, the appellate court expressly agreed with the reasoning of Davis in
upholding defendant’s conviction. Based on our analysis herein, we likewise reject
the analysis of the appellate court. We hold that, in a prosecution for obstructing
justice by furnishing false information, the State must prove that the false
information materially impeded the administration of justice. Therefore, we reverse
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defendant’s conviction and remand the cause for further proceedings.
¶ 54 C. Double Jeopardy: Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 55 Defendant contends that the evidence failed to establish that the giving of the
false name materially impeded the administration of justice. In response, the State
contends that, even if the obstructing justice statute does include a material
impediment requirement, defendant’s conduct actually did materially impede the
administration of justice. We must consider this issue to remove the risk of
subjecting defendant to double jeopardy. People v. McKown, 236 Ill. 2d 278, 311
(2010); Diggins, 235 Ill. 2d at 58.
¶ 56 The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy.” U.S. Const., amend. V; see Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S.
33, 38 (1988) (double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment (U.S. Const., amend XIV)). The Illinois Constitution likewise provides
that no person shall “be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, § 10. Constitutional double jeopardy analysis distinguishes between
judgments that reverse convictions based on trial error and judgments reversing
convictions based on evidentiary insufficiency. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
14-15 (1978); People v. Drake, 2019 IL 123734, ¶ 20; People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d
163, 173 (1990).
¶ 57 The double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a defendant whose
conviction is overturned because of an error in the trial proceedings leading to the
conviction. Nelson, 488 U.S. at 38; Burks, 437 U.S. at 14; Mink, 141 Ill. 2d at 173.
The United States Supreme Court has described “trial error” as follows:
“[R]eversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does
not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its
case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted
through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e. g.,
incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial
misconduct.” Burks, 437 U.S. at 15.
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Pertinent here, a second trial is permitted when a conviction is reversed because of
a posttrial change in law. Such a reversal is analogous to one for procedural error
and therefore does not bar retrial. United States v. Ford, 703 F.3d 708, 710 (4th Cir.
2013); Osborne v. District of Columbia, 169 A.3d 876, 887 n.12 (D.C. 2017) (retrial
is allowed “where a post-trial change in the law has altered the elements of proof”);
6 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 25.4(b), at 837-38 (4th ed. 2015) (“An
appellate court’s decision to reverse a conviction due to its finding that the court
applied the wrong legal standard or misinstructed the jury will also allow retrial
under the correct legal standard.”).
¶ 58 In Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 352 (2016),
Justice Ginsburg, speaking for a unanimous Court, explained the rule allowing
retrial to correct trial error as follows:
“When a conviction is overturned on appeal, [t]he general rule is that the
[Double Jeopardy] Clause does not bar reprosecution. [Citation.] The ordinary
consequences of vacatur, if the Government so elects, is a new trial shorn of the
error that infected the first trial. This ‘continuing jeopardy’ rule neither gives
effect to the vacated judgment nor offends double jeopardy principles. Rather,
it reflects the reality that the criminal proceedings against an accused have not
run their full course. [Citation.] And by permitting a new trial post vacatur, the
continuing-jeopardy rule serves both society’s and criminal defendants’
interests in the fair administration of justice. It would be a high price indeed for
society to pay, we have recognized, were every accused granted immunity from
punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the
proceedings leading to conviction. [Citation.] And the rights of criminal
defendants would suffer too, for it is at least doubtful that appellate courts
would be as zealous as they now are in protecting against the effects of
improprieties at the trial or pretrial stage if they knew that reversal of a
conviction would put the accused irrevocably beyond the reach of further
prosecution.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 363.
Accord Nelson, 488 U.S. at 38-39.
¶ 59 In contrast, United States Supreme Court case law has “recognized an exception
to the general rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the retrial of a
defendant who has succeeded in getting his conviction set aside for error in the
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proceedings below.” Id. at 39. When a reviewing court reverses a defendant’s
conviction on the sole ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s
verdict, the double jeopardy clause bars a retrial on the same charge, and the only
proper remedy is a judgment of acquittal. Id.; Burks, 437 U.S. at 18; Mink, 141 Ill.
2d at 173-74.
¶ 60 Where a criminal conviction is challenged based on insufficient evidence, a
reviewing court, considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278-79
(2004) (noting adoption of Jackson formulation). In the context of double jeopardy,
if the totality of the evidence presented at a defendant’s first trial was sufficient for
any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, no double jeopardy violation is created on retrial. However, if no
rational trier of fact could so find, then the defendant may not be subjected to a
second trial. McKown, 236 Ill. 2d at 311.
¶ 61 In the case at bar, we unequivocally construe section 31-4(a)(1) of the Criminal
Code to include a material impediment requirement. Therefore, to prove a
defendant guilty of the offense of obstructing justice by furnishing false
information, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the false
information must have materially impeded the administration of justice. See 720
ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1) (West 2014).
¶ 62 However, the record in this case plainly shows that the trial court categorically
excluded any evidence relating to the essential element of a material impediment.
Defendant was charged with obstructing justice by knowingly (1) providing false
information to Sergeant Draper (2) with the intent to prevent his arrest on warrants.
Correspondingly, the jury was instructed that it should find defendant guilty of
obstructing justice if those two elements had been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. The charge and the jury instructions did not identify and include as an
element of the offense that the false information furnished by defendant materially
impeded the administration of justice. The jury found defendant guilty of
obstructing justice without ever considering whether defendant’s furnishing of a
false name materially impeded the administration of justice.
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¶ 63 At defendant’s trial, while defense counsel was cross-examining Patrolman
Harsy, the following colloquy took place:
“Q. Did Officer Draper indicate there was any doubt in his mind that the
man in the bathroom was Rasheed Casler?
A. When he originally saw him, he said he thought he might know him.
Q. But did he indicate to you that there was any doubt as to Mr. Casler’s
identity?
A. Once he remembered his name, no.
Q. Okay. So Officer Draper’s ability to arrest Mr. Casler was not impeded
upon; is that correct?
MS. BLOMER [(PROSECUTOR)]: Objection. It’s irrelevant.
MR. WEPSIEC [(DEFENSE COUNSEL)]: No, Judge—
THE COURT: Wait a minute. You don’t get to argue. She gets to state her
objection. Your objection, Ms. Blomer?
MS. BLOMER: It’s irrelevant to the charges for which the defendant is
charged. There is no requirement that—
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. WEPSIEC: Judge—
THE COURT: Next question.”
¶ 64 The aforementioned colloquy clearly shows that (1) defense counsel attempted
to elicit testimony that defendant’s furnishing the false name did not materially
impede the administration of justice, (2) the prosecutor objected and stated that the
evidence was irrelevant because there was no material impediment requirement in
the obstructing justice statute, and (3) the court sustained the prosecutor’s
objection. Once the prosecutor’s objection was sustained, evidence of material
impediment was excluded from the trial, and the jury was never instructed on the
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material impediment requirement. Based on the absence of evidence of material
impediment, defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to convict him.
¶ 65 We determine that the evidence was sufficient under the instruction that was
given, rather than the instruction that would otherwise be given on remand. United
States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 669-70 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Wacker,
72 F.3d 1453, 1464-65 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 530-
31 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the State had no reason to introduce evidence regarding a
material impediment requirement because, at the time of trial, this court had not yet
held that the government was required to prove that element with regard to the
furnishing of false information. See United States v. Pearl, 324 F.3d 1210, 1214
(10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F.3d 311, 323 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1465); Weems, 49 F.3d at 531.
¶ 66 More fundamentally, the error that manifested at defendant’s trial is, despite the
nomenclature employed by the parties, more akin to trial error than to the
sufficiency of the evidence. Gonzalez, 93 F.3d at 323. Any insufficiency in proof
was caused by the subsequent change in the law and not the State’s failure to present
sufficient evidence. United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 533 (4th Cir. 2003).
Courts considering this issue agree that where a reviewing court determines that the
evidence presented at trial has been rendered insufficient only by a posttrial change
in the law, double jeopardy concerns do not preclude the government from retrying
the defendant. United States v. Davies, 942 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2019); Ford,
703 F.3d at 711; Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1465; Weems, 49 F.3d at 530-31.
¶ 67 Therefore, we remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
However, we note that nothing in this opinion should be construed as a finding of
defendant’s guilt that would be binding upon remand. See, e.g., McKown, 236 Ill.
2d at 314; Diggins, 235 Ill. 2d at 58.
¶ 68 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 69 We unequivocally construe section 31-4(a)(1) of the Criminal Code to include
a material impediment requirement. Therefore, to prove a defendant guilty of the
offense of obstructing justice, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as
pertinent here, that (1) the defendant knowingly furnished false information, (2) the
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defendant did so with the intent to prevent the apprehension of any person, and
(3) the false information must have materially impeded the administration of
justice. See 720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1) (West 2014). Here, the trial court sustained the
prosecutor’s objection and excluded any evidence relating to the essential element
of a material impediment, which prevented the jury from being instructed on that
issue. For this reason, defendant’s conviction of obstructing justice must be
reversed. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit
court of Jackson County and remand the cause to the circuit court for further
proceedings.
¶ 70 Judgments reversed.
¶ 71 Cause remanded.
¶ 72 JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
¶ 73 Here, defendant was charged with, and convicted by a jury of, obstructing
justice “in that the defendant (Rasheed Casler) with the intent to prevent his arrest
on warrants, provided false information to [a police officer] in that he said his name
was Jakuta King Williams.” The appellate court affirmed his conviction. 2019 IL
App (5th) 160035, ¶ 49.
¶ 74 Defendant’s petition for leave to appeal asked this court “to resolve a simple
issue that has caused [an appellate court] district split: must a material impediment
be proven in a conviction for obstruction of justice for furnishing false
information.” As the parties’ arguments demonstrate, this appeal fundamentally
asks whether this court’s holding in People v. Comage, 241 Ill. 2d 139, 150 (2011),
that a material impediment must be proven to obstruct justice by concealing
evidence, should be extended to the obstruction of justice by furnishing false
information. The Fourth and Fifth Districts of the Appellate Court answered that
question in the negative, concluding that Comage’s rationale applies only to
obstruction by concealment of evidence. 2019 IL App (5th) 160035, ¶¶ 44-45;
People v. Gordon, 2019 IL App (5th) 160455, ¶ 27; People v. Davis, 409 Ill. App.
3d 457, 458 (4th Dist. 2011). In contrast, the Appellate Court, Second District,
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extended Comage to obstruction charges based on the furnishing of false
information. People v. Taylor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110222, ¶¶ 17-19.
¶ 75 Here, the majority effectively adopts the minority position of the Second
District, extends Comage, and holds that, “in a prosecution for obstructing justice
by furnishing false information, the State must prove that the false information
materially impeded the administration of justice.” Supra ¶ 75. Because the Illinois
obstruction statute contains no express requirement for material impediment and
Comage’s narrow holding applies to a different part of that statute, I cannot agree.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 76 In relevant part, section 31-4 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code)
provides that an individual commits the offense of obstruction of justice “when,
with intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution of or defense of
any person, he or she knowingly *** furnishes false information.” 720 ILCS 5/31-
4(a)(1) (West 2014).
¶ 77 As the State correctly observes, the “furnishes false information” prong of the
obstruction statute contains no material impediment requirement. In fact, those
words appear nowhere in the applicable statutory language. Typically, this absence
would end the statutory analysis. See In re Andrew B., 237 Ill. 2d 340, 352 (2010)
(recognizing “the fundamental principle of statutory construction that this court
cannot read into the statute additional elements not intended by the legislature”)
¶ 78 The majority here, however, discerns a material impediment requirement after
reviewing dictionary definitions and synonyms of the word “furnish” (supra ¶¶ 29-
30) and concluding that those sources demonstrate a “clear denotation of necessity”
(supra ¶ 30). In turn, the majority opines that this implied necessity means that the
false information must be “necessary or useful” to prevent the apprehension or
obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person. Supra ¶ 31.
¶ 79 In my opinion, the majority needlessly complicates a simple statutory provision
and misconstrues its straightforward language. Contrary to the majority’s analysis,
the statutory term “furnishes” refers to the false information and not the
apprehension, prosecution, or defense of another person. The only thing
“necessary” for purposes of committing obstruction of justice under that provision
is the knowing provision of false information. As the State asserts, a person
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obstructs justice when, with the requisite intent, he or she knowingly provides or
supplies false information.
¶ 80 The majority next turns to the core dispute in this case and the source of
disagreement in the appellate court—whether our decision in Comage should be
extended to the “furnishes false information” prong of the Illinois obstruction
statute. Notably, Comage concluded that “a defendant who places evidence out of
sight during an arrest or pursuit has ‘concealed’ the evidence for purposes of the
obstructing justice statute if, in doing so, the defendant actually interferes with the
administration of justice, i.e., materially impedes the police officers’ investigation.”
Comage, 241 Ill. 2d at 150.
¶ 81 In that case, Comage was charged with obstruction of justice under the
“conceals evidence” prong of the obstruction statute based on his conduct of
throwing a crack pipe and push rod over a fence while being pursued by police
officers. The officers saw Comage throw those items and were able to walk around
the fence and recover them within approximately 20 seconds after he discarded
them. Before this court, Comage argued that he did not “conceal” the crack pipe
and push rod within the meaning of the obstruction statute. Accordingly, this court
began its analysis in Comage explaining that “we must first determine the meaning
of the word ‘conceal’ as it is used in the obstructing justice statute.” Comage, 241
Ill. 2d at 143-44.
¶ 82 We next reviewed the dictionary definition of the word “conceal” and also
observed that “[c]ourts have repeatedly rejected the proposition that temporarily
removing contraband from the sight of police officers during a pursuit or arrest is
sufficient, by itself, to constitute concealment for purposes of obstructing justice or
tampering with evidence statutes.” Comage, 241 Ill. 2d at 144-45. We explained
our concern with allowing an obstruction of justice conviction in instances when
an offender is being pursued by arresting officers and places contraband out of sight
because it “leads to harsh and absurd results that cannot reasonably be within the
ambit of legislative intent.” Comage, 241 Ill. 2d at 147.
¶ 83 We also rejected the notion that every instance of concealing evidence, by itself,
was sufficient to sustain a conviction because it “would mean that essentially every
possessory offense where the contraband is not in plain view would also constitute
the felony offense of obstructing justice.” Comage, 241 Ill. 2d at 148. Consistent
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with these concerns, we concluded in Comage that, “[b]ecause defendant did not
‘conceal’ the crack pipe and push rod within the meaning of the obstructing justice
statute, the State failed to prove him guilty of that offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Comage, 241 Ill. 2d at 151.
¶ 84 None of the justifications or concerns this court relied on in Comage to require
proof of a material impediment in a concealing-evidence obstruction case support
extending its holding to the furnishing of false information in this case. As the
Appellate Court, Fifth District, determined, Comage “was decided within the
parameters of the supreme court’s sole mission to determine the meaning of the
word ‘conceal’ as provided in the obstructing justice statute.” Gordon, 2019 IL App
(5th) 160455, ¶ 24. In stark contrast to the circumstances in Comage, when an
offender is charged with obstruction by furnishing a false name, there is no
possibility of an additional felony charge for possessing contraband.
¶ 85 I also agree with the Fourth District’s conclusion that there is an additional
reason not to extend Comage’s material impediment requirement to the “furnishes
false information” prong of the obstruction statute. As that court explained, “when,
as here, the defendant furnishes false information, the potential that the
investigation will be compromised is exceedingly high, which is why such a crime
may be completed in a very short period of time—indeed, it may be completed at
the moment such false information is provided.” Davis, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 462.
¶ 86 Unlike in Comage, when it was clear that the contraband thrown over the fence
and out of police officers’ sight for approximately 20 seconds did not materially
impede the criminal investigation, knowingly providing false information to law
enforcement will often be detrimental to the investigation. This is particularly true
when, as the evidence demonstrated here, the offender knowingly provides a false
name with the intent to avoid an arrest on an outstanding warrant.
¶ 87 The majority also relies on our decision in People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL
111056. Supra ¶¶ 37-41. I note, however, that Baskerville did not cite, let alone
analyze, our decision in Comage. In fact, Baskerville was tasked with deciding
whether a different offense, the Class A misdemeanor of knowingly obstructing or
resisting the performance of a police officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2006)),
required proof of a physical act. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶¶ 16-20. That is not
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the question presented in this appeal. In other words, Baskerville is inapplicable
because it considered a completely different statutory-construction issue.
¶ 88 I am concerned that the majority’s holding may negatively impact criminal
investigations by reducing, if not eliminating, the deterrence associated with a
criminal penalty for providing false information during an investigation. Under the
majority’s construction of section 31-4(a) of the Criminal Code, there is no penalty
or deterrence for intentionally obstructing a criminal investigation by knowingly
supplying false information to the investigators unless it can also be proven that the
falsehood “materially impedes” the administration of justice. Adding more
uncertainty, the majority leaves unanswered what constitutes material impediment
sufficient to support a conviction for obstruction by furnishing false information.
This outcome cannot be what the legislature intended when it chose under section
31-4(a) to criminalize, quite simply, the knowing furnishing of false information
with the requisite intent. See People v. Clark, 2019 IL 122891, ¶ 22 (noting that
“[t]he legislature has the power to declare and define conduct constituting a crime
and to determine the nature and extent of punishment for it”).
¶ 89 Ultimately, I agree with the appellate court’s analysis. I would affirm its
judgment that affirmed defendant’s conviction for obstruction of justice based on
his knowing provision of a false name to a police officer with the intent to avoid
his arrest on outstanding warrants. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 90 JUSTICE KARMEIER, dissenting:
¶ 91 In 2011, in People v. Comage, 421 Ill. 2d 139 (2011), a majority of this court
said that material impediment is an essential element of obstruction of justice, the
offense described in section 31-4(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal
Code) (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)(1) West 2014)). I adhere to the dissenting position in
Comage. The plain and unambiguous language of section 31-4 does not support the
judicial grafting of an additional element—material impediment—onto that statute.
Once this defendant, with the intent to prevent his apprehension or obstruct his
prosecution, furnished a false name to the investigating officers, the offense was
completed. However, if it is as the majority would have it and material impediment
is an essential element of this offense, then the State failed to prove that element,
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and double jeopardy prevents defendant’s retrial. On those bases, I respectfully
dissent.
¶ 92 Section 31-4(a)(1) of the Criminal Code provides in pertinent part:
“A person obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent the apprehension or
obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person, he or she knowingly commits
any of the following acts:
(1) Destroys, alters, conceals or disguises physical evidence, plants
false evidence, [or] furnishes false information[.]” Id. 1
¶ 93 In this case, the majority relies on Comage, as holding that “material
impediment” is an element of the offense defined in section 31-4(a)(1). However,
the holding in Comage was actually narrower, as the following excerpts suggest:
“[I]n defendant’s view, because both the existence and location of the evidence
were fully known to the officers the evidence was not concealed. Comage, 241
Ill. 2d at 144-45.
The Comage majority concluded:
“Because defendant did not ‘conceal’ the crack pipe and push rod within
the meaning of the obstructing justice statute, the State failed to prove him
guilty of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 151.
Once the majority in Comage found there was no concealment, which was an
element the State had to prove, it need not have gone further to add the element of
“material impediment” to the offense. That additional language is merely dicta,
entirely unnecessary after the determination that there was no concealment. I would
1
Unlike the general, misdemeanor offense defined in section 31-1 of the Criminal Code (720
ILCS 5/31-1 (West 2014)), the legislature chose to target, in section 31-4’s felony provision, specific
acts that, performed with the requisite “intent,” complete the offense, irrespective of the fortuity of
actual obstruction. Given the interpretation of the Comage majority, defendants who commit
identical qualifying acts listed under section 31-4, with the requisite “intent,” may experience vastly
different outcomes—a felony conviction versus no criminal liability—based upon mere chance in
an ensuing investigation.
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limit the holding in Comage to be what it actually held: no concealment, no
conviction.
¶ 94 In People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, this court construed a different statute
with a different requisite mental state and an actus reus that requires actual,
effective resistance or obstruction. Section 31-1(a) of the Criminal Code provides
in pertinent part:
“A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known
to the person to be a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional institution
employee of any authorized act within his or her official capacity commits a
Class A misdemeanor.” 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2014).
The resistance or obstruction required by section 31-1 can be equated to material
impediment, i.e., if there is no effective act of resistance or obstruction, there is no
material impediment.
¶ 95 Again, in my view, section 31-4 does not require material impediment. In this
case, the State charged defendant, pursuant to section 31-4, with obstructing justice
“in that the defendant (Rasheed Casler) knowingly, with the intent to prevent his
arrest on warrants, provided false information to Sgt. Guy Draper.” (Emphasis
added.) As charged, the requisite elements to be proven are (1) an intent to prevent
apprehension or obstruct prosecution and (2) the furnishing of false information.
The State adduced evidence establishing those two elements. That is sufficient to
support defendant’s 2015 felony conviction for obstruction of justice.
¶ 96 As the majority acknowledges, the State—which had the burden of proof—
successfully resisted defense counsel’s attempt to address material impediment, a
judicially created element, arising out of the Comage dicta, which the majority now
considers a requisite for conviction. As I see it, the State either adduced sufficient
evidence to support defendant’s conviction—and I believe it did, given my view of
the statutory elements—or it did not. If proof of material impairment is required, as
the majority would have it, the State did not prove its case, and defendant should
be acquitted. The State already had the opportunity to prove the defendant violated
section 31-4(a)(1). The majority’s remand will give the State another, unwarranted
opportunity to elicit evidence—though there does not seem to be any more—on an
element it deemed irrelevant, on a topic to which it objected.
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¶ 97 Although the trial court, pursuant to the State’s objection, prohibited defense
counsel from exploring lack of material impediment in his questioning of the
officer, the trial court did nothing to inhibit the State’s elicitation of evidence
addressing material impediment. In fact, the majority states there is enough in that
regard to support a conviction and put defendant through a second trial. 2 Yet, it is
clear from the testimony already of record that no other evidence, one way or the
other, is forthcoming. We have all the evidence there will be. It is simple and
straightforward. What remains to be said?
¶ 98 The analytical sleight of hand the majority employs, to avoid a definitive
evaluation of the evidence and to allow retrial of defendant a second time, is
blatantly inconsistent.
¶ 99 It goes, sequentially, like this:
“Construed together, Comage and Baskerville firmly establish that a
defendant’s acts must be a material impediment and must be proved in a
prosecution for obstructing justice.” 3 (Emphasis added.) Supra ¶ 41.
¶ 100 As I have noted previously, this court’s decision in Comage was rendered in
2011; Baskerville was decided in 2012. Defendant was tried and convicted in
2015—three years after those decisions “firmly established” the material
impediment requirement. The majority’s suggestion that the evidence presented at
trial has been rendered insufficient only by a “posttrial change” in the law (supra
¶ 66) is disingenuous and baseless. In its double jeopardy analysis, the majority
concludes:
2
If the majority finds the evidence so convincing in that regard, it could simply find the element
established, whether or not that element was submitted for the jury’s consideration. See People v.
Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 369 (2003); People v. Rivera, 227 Ill. 2d 1, 20-22 (2007).
3
As noted, the misdemeanor statute at issue in Baskerville requires a lesser mental state than
the felony provision here at issue—knowing that one’s actions obstruct, as opposed to a specific
intent to obstruct by the commission of certain specified acts that are apparently deemed particularly
problematic by the legislature. If the suggestion is that the misdemeanor statute at issue in
Baskerville should be construed to have the same elements as the felony provision in this case, there
would, of course, be a proportionate penalties challenge at defendant’s disposal. See generally
People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 521-22 (2005).
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“Any insufficiency in proof was caused by the subsequent change in the law
and not the State’s failure to present sufficient evidence.” Supra ¶ 66.
What change in the law? We were told that Comage and Baskerville firmly
established the law.
¶ 101 The majority subsequently attempts to reinforce the contradictory notion that
the law was somehow unsettled with this statement:
“In the case at bar, we unequivocally construe section 31-4(a)(1) of the
Criminal Code to include a material impediment requirement.” (Emphasis
added.) Supra ¶ 61.
“Firmly establish” in 2012? “Unequivocally construe” in 2020? The majority fails
to acknowledge this contradiction. If there was something equivocal before the
majority’s disposition in this case, what was it? Is that a suggestion that some
component of section 31-4(a)(1) warrants different treatment from another?
Concealment of evidence (Comage) as opposed to the furnishing of false
information (this case)? 4
¶ 102 In any event, the State’s evidence in this case—adduced on an element the State
did not know it had to prove—is insufficient to prove material impediment.
Sergeant Draper himself testified that nothing interfered with his ability to arrest
defendant. He testified that he remembered defendant’s name upon his emergence
from the bathroom and that defendant did not attempt to run away or fight. Also, at
the beginning of his investigation, Sergeant Draper called for backup, which arrived
less than 10 minutes later. The entire investigation lasted 24 minutes. The State
simply failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a material
impediment. It should not be given another opportunity to do so.
¶ 103 It is axiomatic that “the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the
offense of which the defendant is charged.” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
210 (1977); accord People v. Murray, 2019 IL 123289, ¶ 28; People v. Lucas, 231
4
The defendant in Comage did not successfully conceal evidence; the defendant in this case,
without a doubt, furnished false information.
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Ill. 2d 169, 178 (2008). “Such burden rests on the State throughout the entire trial
and never shifts to the defendant. [Citation.] Therefore, the defendant is under no
obligation to produce any evidence, and the burden of proof never shifts to the
defendant but remains the responsibility of the State throughout the trial.” Murray,
2019 IL 123289, ¶ 28.
¶ 104 In this case, there was an entire failure of proof upon an element judicially
grafted onto section 31-4(a)(1), i.e., that defendant’s furnishing of the false name
materially impeded the administration of justice. The trial court, at the instance of
the State, categorically excluded any evidence relating to the element of material
impediment, and the evidence that was admitted at trial was insufficient to establish
this element beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, applying the majority’s
elemental criteria, defendant’s conviction is based on insufficient evidence. The
result should be acquittal.
¶ 105 In sum, in my view, the State proved defendant guilty of obstruction of justice
based on proof of two elements: his intent to prevent his apprehension or obstruct
his prosecution and the furnishing of false information to that end. If proof of
material impediment is required, the State did not prove its case, and defendant
should be acquitted. The State should not be given another opportunity to try
defendant.
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