People v. Reese

2017 IL 120011IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 120011)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v.
WILLIS REESE, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
Opinion filed October 19, 2017.
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, and Theis
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Burke concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The primary issue in this appeal is whether the offense of aggravated vehicular
hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3) (West 2006)) requires proof that the defendant
took actual physical possession of a vehicle from the driver. We hold that the
offense encompasses taking actual physical possession of a vehicle but may also be
committed when a defendant exercises control of the vehicle by use of force or
threat of force with the victim still present. Accordingly, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the appellate court’s judgment.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant Willis Reese was charged with several offenses, including
aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3) (West 2006)), vehicular
invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11.1 (West 2006)), attempted armed robbery (720 ILCS
5/8-4, 18-2 (West 2006)), and escape (720 ILCS 5/31-6 (West 2006)). The public
defender was appointed to represent defendant, but defendant subsequently
informed the trial court that he wished to proceed pro se.
¶4 The Cook County trial court admonished defendant about his right to appointed
counsel and the potential of nonextended and extended-term sentences for the
charged offenses. The trial court also informed defendant that some of his
sentences could run consecutively and that two of the charges alone carried a
potential maximum term of 160 years. The court summarized, “Basically, you are
looking at massive time if you are convicted.” The trial court did not admonish
defendant that any potential sentences would also be served consecutively to his
natural-life sentence for his unrelated first degree murder conviction. When asked
if he understood the potential penalties, defendant stated, “Perfectly, Your Honor,
perfectly.” After completing the admonishments, the trial court permitted
appointed counsel to withdraw and defendant to represent himself.
¶5 Prior to jury selection, defendant asked to have his leg shackles removed before
potential jurors entered the courtroom. The trial court told defendant that his hands
would be free and both counsel tables would be covered with drapes to block any
view of his leg shackles. Defendant expressed concern that the jurors would be able
to hear the shackles if he moved. He also asserted that he was there “to do a
thorough job” and he “[could] not work under these conditions.” The trial court told
defendant the decision on removing the shackles was within the discretion of the
Department of Corrections. When defendant continued to express concern, the trial
court stated, “You are preaching to the choir. All you have to do is talk to the men in
charge. If you can convince those three men that you don’t need leg shackles, you
don’t have to have them on.”
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¶6 Following a recess, defendant asked if he would be shackled “when trial
officially starts.” The trial court responded, “That’s up to the Illinois Department of
Corrections.” Defendant stated, “The only way they are going to come off is by
court order” and reiterated that he “cannot work under these conditions.” The court
asserted it would take the matter under advisement and make a decision the next
day.
¶7 During jury selection, defendant asked the court to consider an issue without
the jurors present. After the trial court removed the prospective jurors from the
courtroom, defendant stated he believed two of them saw his leg shackles through
an area of the counsel table left uncovered by the drapes. The trial court brought
those potential jurors into the courtroom separately. The first one stated she could
not see behind the drapes. Defendant, nevertheless, removed her with a peremptory
challenge. The second potential juror stated he saw “a little belt on [defendant’s]
strap between his feet,” but assured the court that what he saw would not affect his
ability to be fair. After questioning the prospective juror, defendant decided not to
challenge him for cause or exercise a peremptory challenge.
¶8 When the three remaining members of the panel were brought back into the
courtroom, the court asked if anything about defendant’s appearance “with this
drapery in front of him” would affect their ability to be fair. One of the potential
jurors responded, “No I guess” and asked if there was “something we should know
that we don’t know because now I am confused.” The trial court stated there was
nothing the jurors should know. The other two potential jurors did not respond to
the court’s inquiry. The parties then accepted the four-member panel.
¶9 After concluding voir dire, the trial court addressed the State’s motion to
introduce defendant’s prior murder conviction as evidence of his motive to escape
and for impeachment if defendant chose to testify. The State sought to present a
certified copy of the charging instrument from defendant’s prior murder case to
prove that he was found guilty three days before trying to escape and “to introduce
evidence of the potential sentence he was facing insofar as it relates to motive.” The
trial court ruled that evidence could not be presented in the State’s case-in-chief but
a certified copy of defendant’s prior murder conviction could be used for
impeachment if he chose to testify.
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¶ 10 The next day, the trial court ordered removal of defendant’s shackles during
trial. The State called Cook County sheriff’s Deputy Vito Zaccaro, who testified
that he was working in the external operations unit at John H. Stroger, Jr., Hospital
of Cook County (Stroger Hospital) when he met defendant at the front of the
hospital to accompany him to an appointment. Defendant was wearing a
Department of Corrections inmate uniform and was restrained with handcuffs and
leg shackles. Zaccaro transported defendant to the dermatology clinic on the second
floor. Defendant repeatedly asked to use the restroom during the appointment.
After the appointment, Zaccaro took defendant to a single-occupancy restroom and
allowed him to enter with his hands uncuffed but his legs still shackled. Zaccaro
waited in the hallway outside with the restroom door “open about a crack.”
¶ 11 When defendant came out after about 10 minutes, Officer Zaccaro asked him to
put his hands out, but defendant instead “jumped toward the one side with a silver
metal weapon, placed it to [Zaccaro’s] neck and said ‘move or I’ll cut you.’ ”
Zaccaro felt defendant’s hand going toward his handgun, and he threw up his arms
to prevent defendant from taking the gun. Defendant responded by stabbing
Zaccaro in the neck. Zaccaro struggled to detain defendant, but he tripped over
defendant’s shackles, and they both fell to the floor. When defendant got up and
began running, Zaccaro hit the “panic button” on his radio and chased defendant
through the hallways and down an emergency stairwell, exiting at the front of
Stroger Hospital.
¶ 12 Zaccaro followed defendant out of the hospital and saw him run onto a shuttle
bus nearby. Zaccaro tried to enter the bus, but the door slammed on him and the bus
began to travel around the circular driveway before it “just kind of stopped and
went into a wall.” Defendant ran out of the bus, and hospital police officers tackled
him. On cross-examination, Zaccaro acknowledged that defendant never made a
verbal demand for Zaccaro’s handgun and he also had keys to the handcuffs and leg
shackles on his belt.
¶ 13 James Rimmer testified that he was the driver of the shuttle bus and was making
runs between the Cook County juvenile court parking lot and Stroger Hospital. The
shuttle bus was parked near one of the main entrances to the hospital with the doors
open when defendant, wearing a jail inmate uniform, ran through the front door.
Rimmer testified that defendant “stood over me, left hand, I guess, behind my seat,
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and right hand in front of my face. I seen an object in his hand, and he ordered me to
drive. He said, ‘*** [D]rive. If you stop, I’m gonna stab you in the neck.’ ” Rimmer
closed the door to the bus and began driving. After driving a short distance,
Rimmer opened the door, causing the bus to stop suddenly. When defendant
stumbled forward, Rimmer grabbed his arm and tried to hold him until police
arrived. As they wrestled, defendant stabbed Rimmer twice in the face and once in
the chest with a downward motion. Defendant then broke free, ran through the front
door of the bus, and was tackled by police officers. On cross-examination, Rimmer
testified that defendant never got behind the wheel of the bus or gave directions on
where to drive. Rimmer nonetheless thought he was a hostage during the incident.
¶ 14 Sergeant Gregory Hardin of the Cook County hospital police testified that he
received a radio call about an escaped prisoner and ran toward the main entrance
with two or three other officers. Upon arriving at the entrance, they were directed to
the shuttle bus. They ran to the bus as it stopped and observed defendant striking
the driver with a downward motion. Sergeant Hardin entered the bus through the
rear door and ordered defendant to stop and get down. Defendant turned toward the
front door of the bus and was arrested by the other officers.
¶ 15 After denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial court
admonished defendant about his right to testify and reminded him that his prior
murder conviction could be used to impeach his credibility if he chose to testify.
Defendant asked, “How far does that play out?” The court responded that the State
could not talk about the facts of that case but would be able to introduce evidence
that defendant was convicted of first degree murder and the date of the conviction.
The court also advised defendant that if he testified about a necessity defense,
claiming he tried to escape because he had been beaten by jail guards, the State
would be allowed to rebut that claim of motive with his murder conviction.
¶ 16 Defendant decided to testify. He first discussed his prior murder conviction and
maintained he did not commit that offense. He stated that prior to his escape
attempt he had spent 4½ years in the Cook County jail. Defendant described the
conditions in the jail as “terrible” and “appalling” and asserted that he only tried to
escape because he was suffering, his health was failing, and he had been beaten by
jail guards about one year before his murder trial. Defendant stated he was
hospitalized for three days following the attack, recovering from bruising, cuts, and
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severe injuries to his eye. Defendant testified one of the guards threatened to beat
him again. After he was found guilty of murder, defendant knew he had to escape to
save himself and others who were also suffering in the jail. Defendant testified that
he tried to escape because he felt his life was in danger and he also wanted to alert
the authorities to help others suffering in the jail. Defendant realized he was “going
to be one of these guys who sits in prison for 30 years, you know, on something that
he didn’t do.”
¶ 17 Defendant denied trying to take Officer Zaccaro’s handgun, explaining that he
was only trying to take the keys to unlock his leg shackles. Defendant testified he
jumped on the bus and asked the driver for help. The bus driver agreed and began
driving, but when defendant saw the officers approaching the bus he “knew the gig
was up” and told the driver to open the door. As defendant turned to exit the bus,
the driver attacked him, a “physical altercation” ensued, and “during the process
*** [defendant] accidentally hit him with the knife.” Defendant then surrendered to
the police officers and was arrested.
¶ 18 On cross-examination, the State asked if the alleged beating by the guards
occurred while defendant was in jail “[o]n the charges, among other things of first
degree murder.” Defendant agreed and also acknowledged that a jury had found
him guilty of that offense. The State further asked whether the jury found defendant
personally discharged a firearm that caused the victim’s death. Defendant
responded, “Oh, yeah. And when they did that, when they did that, sir.” The State
asked, “Is that what they found?” and defendant replied, “Not that I know of. *** I
thought it was something different than that.”
¶ 19 The prosecutor then asked, “[A]fter being found guilty of first degree murder
three days before your escape and with the additional finding that you shot your
victim to death, you were looking at a potential sentence of 45 years to the rest of
natural life in prison?” After the trial court overruled defendant’s objection, he
responded that he was found guilty of a crime he did not commit. Defendant
acknowledged that he knew the potential sentence but claimed it “didn’t mean
anything” to him, and he intended to escape only to avoid being beaten again. The
State subsequently asked defendant if he was “charged with a felony murder among
other things,” and defendant responded that he was “charged with murder.”
Defendant denied attempting to force the bus driver to drive away. Rather, he asked
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the driver, and the driver agreed. Defendant stated he never threatened the bus
driver with the knife but was only holding it because he had tried to remove his
shackles with it.
¶ 20 In rebuttal, the trial court granted the State’s motion to admit into evidence a
certified statement of conviction and disposition indicating that defendant was
found guilty of first degree murder on March 19, 2007. In discussing the evidence
to give to the jury, the prosecutor subsequently asserted, “I believe we were going
to send back all our exhibits except for the grand jury transcript and the certified
copy.” The trial court stated, “Right. The grand jury transcript doesn’t go back,
everything else does.”
¶ 21 The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated vehicular hijacking, unlawful
vehicular invasion, attempted armed robbery, and escape. Defendant was sentenced
to concurrent extended-term sentences of 50 years for aggravated vehicular
hijacking, 30 years for vehicular invasion, 30 years for attempted armed robbery,
and 14 years for escape. The trial court ordered those sentences to run
consecutively to defendant’s sentence for murder.
¶ 22 On appeal, defendant maintained, among other things, that his aggravated
vehicular hijacking conviction must be reversed because he did not “take” the bus
within the meaning of the aggravated vehicular hijacking statute. Defendant argued
the statute requires proof that he actually dispossessed the shuttle bus from the
driver. Defendant contended that merely forcing the driver to drive the bus was
insufficient.
¶ 23 The appellate court agreed with defendant, holding that the taking element of
aggravated vehicular hijacking is established only when a defendant “ ‘ “cause[s]
the victim to part with possession or custody of [the vehicle] against his will.” ’ ”
2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 58 (quoting People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489, 526
(1992), quoting People v. Smith, 78 Ill. 2d 298, 303 (1980)). While defendant may
have deprived the driver of a measure of control over the vehicle, there was no
evidence that he took possession of the bus or removed it from the driver’s custody.
2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 59. The appellate court, therefore, concluded that
defendant’s aggravated vehicular hijacking conviction must be reversed because
the State failed to prove the taking element of that offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 59. The appellate court also held that
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defendant’s sentence for escape must be reduced to a nonextended term of seven
years’ imprisonment but otherwise affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 2015 IL
App (1st) 120654, ¶¶ 130, 132.
¶ 24 Justice Palmer dissented in part, asserting that a defendant can “take” a vehicle
within the meaning of the aggravated vehicular hijacking statute without physically
dispossessing the vehicle from the victim. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 156
(Palmer, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to the
partial dissent, the majority’s narrow construction of the statute produced an absurd
result because it failed to include the circumstances of this case where defendant
obtained control of the vehicle. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶¶ 156-57 (Palmer, J.,
specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). The partial dissent would have
held the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant took the vehicle within
the meaning of the aggravated vehicular hijacking statute. 2015 IL App (1st)
120654, ¶ 157 (Palmer, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part).
¶ 25 We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1,
2015)).
¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 A. Construction of the Aggravated Vehicular Hijacking Statute
¶ 28 On appeal to this court, the State contends that the appellate court construed the
aggravated vehicular hijacking statute far too narrowly. The State maintains that
the statutory language does not require an offender to remove a vehicle from the
driver’s possession but may also be satisfied when, as here, the defendant exercises
control over the vehicle by use of force. The State contends the appellate court
ignored the plain meaning and purpose of the statute. Further, its decision excludes
the most dangerous conduct from the statute’s scope because the greatest risk of
harm occurs when a victim remains in the vehicle with the assailant during the
offense. The State contends that defendant’s actions fall squarely within the
conduct prohibited by the statute when construed properly.
¶ 29 Defendant responds that the phrase “takes from” in the vehicular hijacking
statute plainly requires physical dispossession of the vehicle from the driver. In
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Strickland, this court held that robbery of a vehicle occurred only when the
defendant removed the vehicle from the victim’s actual possession. Strickland, 154
Ill. 2d at 526. The legislature subsequently used the language from the robbery
statute in enacting the vehicular hijacking statute. Defendant concludes that
because the legislature used the language from the robbery statute in creating the
vehicular hijacking offense, this court’s construction of that language in Strickland
controls the interpretation of the vehicular hijacking statute.
¶ 30 This issue presents a question of statutory construction subject to de novo
review. People v. Grant, 2016 IL 119162, ¶ 20. The fundamental objective of
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.
People v. Pearse, 2017 IL 121072, ¶ 41. The most reliable indicator of legislative
intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v.
Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 13. In discerning legislative intent, we may consider the
purpose of the statute, the problems to be remedied, and the consequences of
interpreting the statute one way or another. People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674,
¶ 15. A reviewing court may also consider the circumstances existing when the
statute was enacted, contemporaneous conditions, and the goals sought to be
achieved. People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 15. We presume that the
legislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. People v.
Williams, 2016 IL 118375, ¶ 15. The rule of lenity requires that any ambiguity in a
criminal statute must be resolved in a manner favoring the accused, but that rule
must not be stretched to defeat the legislature’s intent. Pearse, 2017 IL 121072,
¶ 39.
¶ 31 The offense of vehicular hijacking is committed when a person “takes a motor
vehicle from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or
by threatening the imminent use of force.” 720 ILCS 5/18-3(a) (West 2006).
Vehicular hijacking is a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/18-3(c) (West 2006)). The
offense is enhanced to aggravated vehicular hijacking, a Class X felony with a
minimum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment, if committed while the offender
is armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3), (b)
(West 2006)).
¶ 32 As defendant points out, in Strickland this court addressed similar language in
the robbery statute. In that case, the defendant and his brother encountered a man
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parked in front of a house in Buffalo Grove and ordered him at gunpoint to drive
them to California. The man drove instead to the downtown area of Chicago and
stopped in front of a marked police car at an intersection. When the man got out of
the car to alert the police officer, the defendant and his brother fled on foot and were
later apprehended. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 499-500. The defendant was charged
with several offenses, including armed robbery of a vehicle. The robbery statute in
effect at the time provided that “ ‘[a] person commits robbery when he takes
property from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by
threatening the imminent use of force.’ ” Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 523 (quoting Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 18-1(a)). The offense was enhanced to armed robbery
when committed while armed with a dangerous weapon. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at
523 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 18-2(a)).
¶ 33 The defendant contended there was no evidence that he took the vehicle from
the driver as required to sustain the offense of armed robbery because the driver
operated the vehicle at all times during the incident. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 525.
This court agreed, asserting that “ ‘[t]he taking by force or the threat of force is the
gist of the offense’ ” of armed robbery. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 525-26 (quoting
Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, ¶ 18-1, Committee Comments, at 113 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992)). “[T]he offense ‘is complete when force or threat of force causes the victim
to part with possession or custody of property against his will [citation].’ ”
Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 526 (quoting Smith, 78 Ill. 2d at 303). Although the
defendant deprived the driver of a large measure of control over his vehicle, there
was no evidence that the vehicle was ever taken from the driver or removed from
his actual possession. This court, therefore, reversed the defendant’s conviction of
armed robbery because the evidence was insufficient to establish the taking
element of that offense. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 526.
¶ 34 The vehicular hijacking statute became effective in 1993 (Pub. Act 88-351, § 5
(eff. Aug. 13, 1993)), less than one year after this court issued its decision in
Strickland. At the same time, the legislature amended the robbery statute to exclude
motor vehicles from its scope. The amended robbery statute provided that “[a]
person commits robbery when he or she takes property, except a motor vehicle
covered by Section 18-3 or 18-4, from the person or presence of another by the use
of force or by threatening the imminent use of force.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS
5/18-1 (West 2006).
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¶ 35 Subsequently, in People v. McCarter, 2011 IL App (1st) 092864, the appellate
court relied on Strickland in construing the vehicular hijacking statute. The
appellate court observed that, under Strickland, taking a large measure of control
over a vehicle is insufficient to establish the offense of armed robbery. McCarter,
2011 IL App (1st) 092864, ¶ 77. The appellate court held that, as with armed
robbery, the vehicular hijacking statute also requires a defendant to dispossess the
vehicle from the victim. McCarter, 2011 IL App (1st) 092864, ¶¶ 77-78. Although
the defendant forced the victim to drive his vehicle at gunpoint, the evidence did
not establish that the victim was ever dispossessed of his car. McCarter, 2011 IL
App (1st) 092864, ¶ 78. Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the State
failed to prove the offense of vehicular hijacking. McCarter, 2011 IL App (1st)
092864, ¶ 79.
¶ 36 The McCarter court viewed Strickland as controlling the construction of the
vehicular hijacking statute. We believe Strickland is distinguishable, however, for
the simple reason that in Strickland we construed the armed robbery statute, not the
vehicular hijacking statute. The vehicular hijacking statute was not even enacted
until approximately one year after Strickland.
¶ 37 Our construction of the armed robbery statute in Strickland was based largely
on the common-law understanding of that offense. This court discussed the use of
force or threat of force in taking property as “the gist of the offense.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 525. This court has previously
stated that “[t]he gist of the offense of robbery, both at common law and under the
statute of this State” is the force or intimidation used in taking property against a
person’s will. People v. Casey, 399 Ill. 374, 377 (1948) (citing People v. Kubish,
357 Ill. 531 (1934)); People v. Stathas, 356 Ill. 313 (1934)). The common-law
understanding of the offense of robbery as requiring the defendant to remove
property from the victim’s possession through the use of force or the threat of force
is specific to that offense. The vehicular hijacking offense is not derived from the
common law but was newly enacted in 1993. Accordingly, we find the analysis in
Strickland is inapposite to the proper construction of the vehicular hijacking
statute.
¶ 38 Ultimately, we must determine what the legislature intended in enacting the
new, separate offense of vehicular hijacking. Defendant contends that by creating
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the vehicular hijacking offense, the legislature intended to punish the taking of a
motor vehicle more harshly than the taking of other property. Defendant observes
that robbery is generally a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 5/18-1(b) (West 2006)) while
vehicular hijacking is a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/18-3(c) (West 2006)).
Defendant therefore concludes that vehicular hijacking is simply robbery of a
vehicle with a harsher penalty than for robbery of other property. We disagree.
¶ 39 If the legislature had intended only to punish robbery of a motor vehicle more
harshly, it could have simply included an enhanced punishment for that offense
within the robbery statute. The robbery statute in effect at the time of this offense
enhanced the penalty to a Class 1 felony if the victim was 60 years of age or over or
was physically handicapped or when the offense was committed in a school or a
place of worship. 720 ILCS 5/18-1(b) (West 2006). The legislature could have
added robbery of a motor vehicle to that list if its intention was to treat that offense
more harshly. Instead, the legislature removed motor vehicles from the robbery
statute and created an entirely new offense entitled “vehicular hijacking.” Because
the legislature created a new offense, we necessarily reject defendant’s argument
that it only intended to punish robbery of a motor vehicle more harshly.
¶ 40 Rather, in creating the new offense of vehicular hijacking, the legislature
plainly intended to address criminal conduct distinct from robbery of a motor
vehicle. We believe the legislature not only intended to encompass situations when
a victim is actually dispossessed of a vehicle but also intended more broadly to
include circumstances when the defendant takes a vehicle by exercising control. In
the context of vehicular hijacking, exercising control over a vehicle by directing the
driver through the use of force or the threat of force falls within the plain statutory
language requiring the offender to “take[ ] a motor vehicle from the person or the
immediate presence of another.” 720 ILCS 5/18-3(a) (West 2006).
¶ 41 The consequences of interpreting the statute one way or another also support
our construction. See Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 15. Undoubtedly, a victim may
be subject to greater risk of violence if he or she remains in the vehicle with the
offender. See United States v. DeLaCorte, 113 F.3d 154, 156 (9th Cir. 1997) (a
victim who is forced to stay in a car and is subjected to the assailant’s continuing
threats and possible violence will often be placed in greater danger than a victim
who is released immediately). Given the greater risk of harm, we do not believe the
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legislature intended to exclude from the scope of the vehicular hijacking statute the
forceful taking of a vehicle while the driver remains inside.
¶ 42 In sum, we conclude that the legislature did not intend merely to enact a
separate statute for robbery of a motor vehicle. The legislature also intended to
criminalize taking control of a vehicle by force or threat of force, including when
the victim remains inside the vehicle. Accordingly, the appellate court’s decision to
the contrary in McCarter must be overruled.
¶ 43 Defendant’s actions of threatening the shuttle bus driver with a knife and
ordering him to drive fall squarely within the conduct prohibited by the vehicular
hijacking statute. Defendant took control of the bus from the driver by the threat of
force. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish the offense of
aggravated vehicular hijacking. Accordingly, the appellate court’s judgment is
reversed on that point.
¶ 44 B. Shackling During Jury Selection
¶ 45 In his cross-appeal, defendant renews several issues he raised in the appellate
court. First, defendant argues he was deprived of due process by being shackled
during jury selection. Defendant contends the appellate court erred in finding the
violation of his right to due process harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because
the shackles interfered with his self-representation and prejudiced him in the eyes
of the jury. The State concedes that the trial court erred in allowing defendant to be
shackled during jury selection without first making an express determination that
restraints were necessary but contends that defendant was not prejudiced by the
error.
¶ 46 This court has long held that the use of physical restraints in court is warranted
only when there has been a showing of manifest need for the restraints. People v.
Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 347 (2006) (citing People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 265-66
(1977)). Physical restraints should be avoided whenever possible because they tend
to prejudice the jury against the defendant, hinder the defendant’s ability to assist
counsel, and offend the dignity of the judicial process. In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33, 36
(1977) (citing Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265-66). A defendant may be shackled when
there is reason to believe that he or she may try to escape, that he or she may pose a
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threat to the safety of people in the courtroom, or when necessary to maintain order
during the trial. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266.
¶ 47 The decision on whether and how to restrain a defendant is left to the trial
court’s discretion. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 348. The trial court should state on the record
the reasons for allowing the defendant to remain shackled, and the defendant’s
attorney should be given an opportunity to present reasons why the defendant
should not be restrained. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266. A defendant may not be tried in
shackles in either a bench trial or a jury trial absent a showing that restraints are
necessary. In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 38. The showing of manifest need for restraints
must be established clearly on the record. In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 38.
¶ 48 This court has codified the holdings in Boose and Allen in Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 430 (eff. July 1, 2010). Rule 430 states that after becoming aware of
restraints, the trial court must conduct a separate hearing to investigate whether
they are necessary. The trial court must allow the defendant to be heard and must
make specific findings on enumerated factors before permitting the use of
restraints.
¶ 49 In this case, the trial court did not conduct a hearing or articulate any reason for
shackling defendant during jury selection. Rather, the trial court deferred to the
judgment of the Department of Corrections. When considering similar
circumstances in Allen, this court stated, “this abdication of the trial court’s
responsibility is not acceptable.” Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 348-49. Here, the trial court
clearly abused its discretion in allowing defendant to be shackled during jury
selection without making a determination of manifest need for the restraints. The
trial court’s failure to follow the procedure established in Boose and subsequently
codified in Rule 430 resulted in a violation of defendant’s right to due process.
Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 349.
¶ 50 Citing Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005), defendant contends that the
shackling error cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In Deck,
the Supreme Court stated that shackling is inherently prejudicial and will often
have negative effects that are not apparent from the trial transcript. Deck, 544 U.S.
at 635. To establish that the due process violation was harmless, “[t]he State must
prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not
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contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Deck, 544 U.S. at 635 (quoting Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
¶ 51 We recognize that physical restraints affect several interests, including the
defendant’s presumption of innocence, the ability to assist counsel, and the dignity
of the court proceedings. Deck, 544 U.S. at 630-32; In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 36;
Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265. We believe the impact of the shackling error on those
interests was mitigated, however, by the specific facts of this case.
¶ 52 First, we note that the trial court ordered removal of the shackles following jury
selection and defendant represented himself without any physical restraints
throughout the remainder of the trial. During jury selection, the trial court placed
skirting around both counsel tables to block the view of the shackles. The record
shows that one prospective juror saw the shackles under the table, but there is no
showing that any of the remaining jurors were aware of the shackles. Upon
questioning by the trial court and defendant, the prospective juror who saw the
shackles stated it would not affect his ability to be fair. After questioning the juror,
defendant did not challenge him for cause or exercise a peremptory challenge.
Thus, defendant was apparently satisfied that the juror could remain impartial. In
this case, we believe the limited use of the shackles and the effort to block them
from view reduced the impact of the error on defendant’s presumption of
innocence.
¶ 53 While defendant complained about the impact of the shackles on his ability to
represent himself, stating he “[could] not work under these conditions,” the record
shows he questioned the prospective jurors extensively during voir dire and made
peremptory challenges. A review of the record indicates defendant was not
hindered in protecting his rights during jury selection despite the presence of the
shackles.
¶ 54 As for the dignity of the court proceedings, that interest includes respectful
treatment of defendants, reflecting the importance of the determination of a
defendant’s guilt or innocence. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631. The routine use of shackles
in the presence of juries undermines those interests. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631. Here,
however, the shackles were not generally visible to observers in the courtroom. We
find that the trial court’s placement of skirting around both counsel tables at least
reduced the impact of the shackling error on the dignity of the court proceedings.
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¶ 55 Finally, we consider the evidence presented against defendant. Defendant was
caught in the act of trying to escape from custody by hijacking the shuttle bus. He
injured several people during his escape attempt. Although a necessity defense may
be available when an inmate escapes to avoid injury while in custody (People v.
Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 340-41 (1977)), defendant’s necessity defense depended on
convincing the jury that he had to escape to avoid the jail conditions he had already
endured for 4½ years. The alleged beating by jail guards that defendant claimed
motivated his escape attempt occurred one year before he tried to escape. The State
rebutted defendant’s necessity defense with proof that he was just convicted of first
degree murder and was facing at least 45 years’ imprisonment, thus providing a
more plausible motive for his escape attempt. We conclude that the State presented
overwhelming evidence against defendant.
¶ 56 The shackling error in this case was unquestionably serious. The trial court’s
failure to follow the procedure established in Boose and later codified in Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 430 resulted in a due process violation. Given the specific
facts of this case, however, we are convinced that the shackling error did not
contribute to defendant’s convictions. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 635. Accordingly, we
agree with the appellate court that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
¶ 57 C. Defendant’s Waiver of Counsel
¶ 58 Next, defendant contends that his waiver of counsel was invalid because the
trial court did not inform him that any sentence in this case would be served
consecutively to his sentence for murder, as required by Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984). Defendant contends the failure to comply with Rule
401(a) requires reversal of his convictions and remand for a new trial.
¶ 59 The State responds that defendant forfeited this claim by failing to include it in
his motion for a new trial and he is not entitled to relief under the plain error rule.
The State further contends that Rule 401(a) only requires substantial compliance
and the trial court met that standard by adequately advising defendant of the
consequences of waiving counsel.
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¶ 60 Defendant did not raise this issue in his motion for a new trial. To preserve an
issue for review, a defendant must object at trial and raise the alleged error in a
written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). A reviewing
court may, however, address a forfeited claim under the plain error doctrine when
“(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced
that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,
regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error
occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless
of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565
(2007) (citing People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87 (2005)).
In applying the plain error doctrine, it is appropriate to first determine whether a
clear or obvious error occurred. People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 39.
¶ 61 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) governs the trial court’s acceptance of a
defendant’s waiver of counsel. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 235 (1996). Rule
401(a) provides:
“(a) Waiver of Counsel. Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The
court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense
punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant
personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands
the following:
(1) the nature of the charge;
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including,
when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected
because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and
(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel
appointed for him by the court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984).
¶ 62 The purpose of the rule is “ ‘to ensure that a waiver of counsel is knowingly and
intelligently made.’ ” People v. Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80, 84 (2006) (quoting
Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 241). Strict, technical compliance with the rule is not always
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required, however. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236. Substantial compliance is sufficient
for a valid waiver of counsel if the record indicates the waiver was made knowingly
and intelligently and the trial court’s admonishment did not prejudice the
defendant’s rights. People v. Kidd, 178 Ill. 2d 92, 113 (1997) (citing Haynes, 174
Ill. 2d at 236, People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 333 (1989), and People v.
Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 132 (1987)). Each waiver of counsel must be assessed on
its own particular facts. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 242.
¶ 63 After defendant moved to discharge his appointed attorney, the trial court
admonished him about his right to counsel and the potential nonextended and
extended-term sentences for the charged offenses. Defendant was also informed
that some of his sentences could run consecutively. The trial court told defendant
that two of the charges alone carried a potential maximum penalty of 160 years.
The court stated, “Basically, you are looking at massive time if you are convicted.”
When asked if he understood the potential penalties, defendant stated, “Perfectly,
Your Honor, perfectly.”
¶ 64 Defendant contends that the trial court failed to provide a sufficient admonition
that his sentences would run consecutively to his existing natural-life sentence for
murder, but there is no indication in the record that the trial court’s failure to
admonish defendant on that point affected his decision to waive his right to
counsel. Defendant was informed that he was facing “massive time” if convicted of
even some of the charged offenses in this case. The trial court told defendant that
the maximum sentence was 160 years’ imprisonment on two of the charges alone.
The trial court’s admonition surely impressed upon defendant the gravity of the
potential punishments. We fail to see how informing defendant that the potential
160-year sentence in this case would also be served consecutively to his natural-life
sentence for murder could have affected his decision on whether to waive counsel
and proceed pro se.
¶ 65 The record here shows that defendant’s waiver of counsel was made knowingly
and intelligently and the admonitions did not prejudice his rights. See Kidd, 178 Ill.
2d at 113 (citing Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236, Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d at 333, and
Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 132). The trial court carefully admonished defendant about
the charges, the possible punishments, and his right to counsel. We do not believe
any error in the admonishment on consecutive sentencing could have misled
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defendant or caused him to waive his right to counsel unknowingly. Based on the
record, including the trial court’s detailed admonishments under Rule 401(a), we
conclude that defendant’s waiver of counsel was valid. Defendant has not
established a clear or obvious error required for relief under the plain error doctrine.
Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to reversal of his convictions on this ground.
¶ 66 D. Details About Prior Murder Conviction
¶ 67 Defendant argues that the certified copy of conviction introduced by the State
contains excessive and irrelevant details about his prior murder conviction.
Defendant contends the jury was given the certified copy of conviction revealing
that he faced additional charges, was ordered to complete fitness examinations, was
found guilty on seven counts of murder even though there was only one victim, was
sentenced to life in prison, and filed an unsuccessful appeal and postconviction
petition. Defendant further contends that on cross-examination, the prosecutor
elicited that he faced other charges in addition to murder and asked if he personally
discharged a firearm causing the victim’s death. In closing argument, the
prosecutor stated that defendant personally discharged the firearm. Defendant
argues he is entitled to a new trial because he was prejudiced by this “irrelevant
surplusage.”
¶ 68 As noted previously, to preserve an issue for appeal a defendant must make a
contemporaneous objection at trial and raise the issue in a written posttrial motion.
Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186. Defendant concedes that he did not object at trial to the
challenged evidence, other than to one of the prosecutor’s questions about
discharging the firearm. Defendant also acknowledges that he did not include any
of these issues in his motion for a new trial. Defendant has, therefore, forfeited his
claims.
¶ 69 A reviewing court may address a forfeited issue under the plain error rule when
“(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced
that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,
regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error
occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless
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of the closeness of the evidence.” Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565 (citing Herron,
215 Ill. 2d at 186-87).
The defendant bears the burden of persuasion under both prongs of the plain error
doctrine. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). The defendant must first
establish that a clear or obvious error occurred. People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478,
497-98 (2009).
¶ 70 Initially, we observe that the fact of defendant’s prior murder conviction and
the potential sentence he faced for that offense were introduced to rebut
defendant’s necessity defense. Defendant testified that he only tried to escape
because he was suffering, had been beaten by jail guards, and believed his life was
in danger. Before he testified, the trial court advised defendant that the prior murder
conviction would be admissible to rebut his claim of motive if he testified to a
necessity defense. The evidence that defendant was found guilty of murder just
three days before the escape attempt and that he was facing a potential natural-life
sentence was clearly relevant to defendant’s motive to escape. We conclude that
evidence was properly offered to rebut defendant’s testimony. See People v. Hood,
213 Ill. 2d 244, 259-61 (2004) (testimony tending to explain, contradict, or
disprove the defendant’s evidence is generally admissible in rebuttal); People v.
Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 434-35 (1989).
¶ 71 As for the additional details of the murder case contained in the certified copy
of conviction, the appellate court held that the record failed to support defendant’s
claim that the jury was given the certified copy. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 116.
While discussing the evidence to give to the jury, the prosecutor stated, “ ‘I believe
we were going to send back all our exhibits except for the grand jury transcript and
the certified copy.’ ” The trial court responded, “ ‘Right. The grand jury transcript
doesn’t go back, everything else does.’ ” The appellate court concluded that
reading the trial court’s response with the prosecutor’s comment revealed “that the
State did not give the jury the certified copy of conviction.” 2015 IL App (1st)
120654, ¶ 116. The appellate court declined to speculate that the certified copy was
actually brought to the jury room. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 116.
¶ 72 We agree with the appellate court that the record is ambiguous on whether the
certified copy was actually given to the jury. The plain error doctrine is a narrow
and limited exception to forfeiture. People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 65 (2008).
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On plain error review, the defendant has the burden of establishing a clear or
obvious error. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d at 497-98. “ ‘[T]he plain error exception will
be invoked only where the record clearly shows that an alleged error affecting
substantial rights was committed.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at
549 (quoting People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 102 (1992)). We cannot find a
clear or obvious error occurred without a showing that the certified copy of
conviction was actually submitted to the jury.
¶ 73 Defendant’s remaining claims are based on the State’s cross-examination and
closing argument. The State elicited from defendant on cross-examination that he
was facing charges of first degree murder, “among other things.” The State also
asked defendant if the jury found he personally discharged a firearm causing death,
and the prosecutor repeated that claim in closing argument. Defendant contends the
complained-of statements are prejudicial and irrelevant to either impeachment or
his motive to escape.
¶ 74 In response, the State argues that defendant presented detailed testimony about
the murder and repeatedly asserted he did not commit that crime. Given
defendant’s wide-ranging testimony about the murder, the State contends that it
was entitled to ask about the details of that offense on cross-examination.
¶ 75 The trial court overruled one objection made by defendant to a question on
whether the jury found he personally discharged the firearm. The trial court was not
given an opportunity to rule on the other points because defendant failed to object.
A trial court’s decisions on the admissibility of evidence and the scope of
cross-examination on an appropriate subject of inquiry are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. People v. Chambers, 2016 IL 117911, ¶ 75. We agree with the appellate
court that the additional information about defendant’s prior murder case may have
been relevant to rebut his testimony about the details of that conviction, including
his repeated claims that he did not commit that crime. Acting pro se, defendant
offered wide-ranging testimony in narrative form on direct examination. The
prosecutor’s questions about whether the jury found defendant personally
discharged the firearm could have been relevant to rebut his repeated claims of
innocence. See People v. Harris, 231 Ill. 2d 582, 588-89 (2008) (“[t]here is no
question that a defendant can open the door to the admission of evidence that, under
ordinary circumstances, would be inadmissible”). We cannot say the trial court
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abused its discretion in overruling the objection to the State’s questioning on that
point.
¶ 76 We also agree with the appellate court that the reference to defendant being
charged with murder, “among other things,” was a brief, passing remark. Even if
improper, the reference cannot be viewed as particularly prejudicial. In sum, we
conclude that even if any of the complained-of evidence or closing argument was
improper, defendant has not satisfied his burden of establishing plain error under
either prong of the plain error doctrine. Accordingly, defendant’s forfeiture of these
challenges cannot be excused.
¶ 77 E. Vehicular Invasion Conviction
¶ 78 Defendant raises two separate challenges to his vehicular invasion conviction.
First, he claims the State failed to prove him guilty of that offense because there
was no evidence that he entered the shuttle bus by force. Defendant also contends
that if this court affirms his conviction of aggravated vehicular hijacking, the
separate conviction of vehicular invasion must be vacated under the one-act,
one-crime rule. The State concedes that, in the event the aggravated vehicular
hijacking conviction is sustained, defendant’s conviction of vehicular invasion
must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule.
¶ 79 Under the one-act, one-crime rule, a court must first determine whether the
defendant’s conduct involved a single act or multiple acts. Multiple convictions are
improper if they are based on the same physical act. People v. Miller, 238 Ill. 2d
161, 165 (2010) (citing People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 186 (1996)). If the
defendant’s conduct involved multiple acts, the court must decide whether any of
the offenses are lesser-included offenses. Multiple convictions are also improper if
an offense is a lesser-included offense. Miller, 238 Ill. 2d at 165 (citing Rodriguez,
169 Ill. 2d at 186).
¶ 80 As explained above, we have affirmed defendant’s conviction of aggravated
vehicular hijacking. The aggravated vehicular hijacking and vehicular invasion
charges are based on the same physical act. The State concedes that defendant’s
conduct was not apportioned into two separate acts either in the indictment or in the
arguments at trial. See In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 377-78 (2009) (findings
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of guilt for multiple offenses can only be sustained if the charging instrument
reflects the State’s intent to apportion the defendant’s conduct and prosecute for
multiple crimes). We therefore agree with the parties that defendant’s vehicular
invasion conviction must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule.
Accordingly, we need not address defendant’s alternative argument that the State
failed to prove the “force” element of that offense.
¶ 81 F. Extended-Term Sentences
¶ 82 Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing extended-term
sentences for offenses not included in the most serious class of felony. The State
concedes error on this point.
¶ 83 Section 5-8-2(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections authorizes extended-term
sentences based on certain aggravating factors. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 2006).
The imposition of extended-term sentences is limited, however, to offenses within
the most serious classification. People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 205-06 (1984).
An exception to that rule applies when extended-term sentences are imposed “on
separately charged, differing class offenses that arise from unrelated courses of
conduct.” People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (1995).
¶ 84 In this case, the parties agreed, and the appellate court found, that the offenses
were committed in a single course of conduct. We agree and, therefore, conclude
that an extended-term sentence may be imposed only on offenses within the most
serious class of felony. Defendant was sentenced to an extended term of 50 years’
imprisonment for aggravated vehicular hijacking, a Class X felony. The trial court
also imposed extended-term sentences on the remaining convictions for Class 1 and
Class 2 felonies. The extended-term sentences for the Class 1 and Class 2 felonies
were improper.
¶ 85 The parties further agree that the appropriate remedy in this case is to affirm the
extended-term sentence on the most serious offense and reduce the sentences on the
lesser class felonies to the maximum nonextended term. See People v. Ware, 2014
IL App (1st) 120485, ¶ 32 (when a trial court imposes an extended-term sentence
improperly, but the record establishes that the court intended to impose the
maximum sentence available, a reviewing court may exercise its power under
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Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) and reduce the sentence to the maximum
nonextended term). Here, the trial court imposed the maximum extended-term
sentences for the Class 1 and Class 2 felonies. Thus, the trial court clearly intended
to sentence defendant to the maximum term available for those offenses.
Accordingly, we reduce defendant’s sentence for attempted armed robbery, a Class
1 felony, to the maximum nonextended term of 15 years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 2006)), and we reduce defendant’s sentence for escape, a Class
2 felony, to the maximum nonextended term of 7 years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(a)(5) (West 2006)). Defendant’s extended-term sentence for aggravated
vehicular hijacking is affirmed.
¶ 86 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 87 For the above reasons, we reverse the appellate court’s judgment reversing
defendant’s conviction of aggravated vehicular hijacking. Defendant’s conviction
of vehicular invasion is vacated. Defendant’s extended-term sentence for
aggravated vehicular hijacking is affirmed, and his sentences for attempted armed
robbery and escape are reduced to the maximum nonextended terms. The appellate
court’s judgment is otherwise affirmed.
¶ 88 Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
¶ 89 JUSTICE BURKE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶ 90 The majority reverses the appellate court judgment, which reversed defendant’s
conviction for aggravated vehicular hijacking. 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(3) (West 2006).
Reinstating this conviction, the majority now holds that the offense of vehicular
hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-3(a) (West 2006)) may be committed when a person
commandeers or takes control over a vehicle by use of force or threat of force, even
though the victim is not dispossessed of the vehicle. I disagree with the majority’s
interpretation of the vehicular hijacking statute and, therefore, respectfully dissent.
¶ 91 Section 18-3(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 defines the offense of vehicular
hijacking and provides that the offense is committed when a person “takes a motor
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vehicle from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or
by threatening the imminent use of force.” 720 ILCS 5/18-3(a) (West 2006).
Relying on our decision in People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489 (1992), the
appellate court held that the “taking” element of the offense of vehicular hijacking
is not satisfied where, as here, the defendant has not taken actual physical
possession of the vehicle away from the person or presence of the owner or driver
of the vehicle. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 67. I would affirm that holding.
¶ 92 In Strickland, the defendant and his brother approached a man who was sitting
in a parked car. They got into the car and ordered the man, at gunpoint, to drive
them to California. The man drove instead to Chicago, where the two defendants
were subsequently arrested and charged with several offenses, including armed
robbery. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at 499-500. The robbery statute, at that time,
provided that “[a] person commits robbery when he takes property from the person
or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of
force.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, ¶ 18-1(a). The term “property” included motor
vehicles, and absent certain special circumstances, the offense was designated a
Class 2 felony.
¶ 93 The defendant was convicted, and on appeal, he argued that he was not guilty of
armed robbery because the vehicle was never taken from the driver’s possession.
We agreed and reversed the defendant’s conviction. Interpreting the phrase “takes
*** from the person or presence of another,” we held that the offense required
proof that the owner was dispossessed of his property. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d at
525-26. We acknowledged that “the Stricklands’ actions certainly denied [the
vehicle owner] a large measure of control over his vehicle.” Id. at 526.
Nevertheless, we held that this was insufficient to establish the “taking element” of
the offense. Id.¶ 94 In 1993, approximately one year after Strickland was decided, the legislature
amended article 18 of the Criminal Code of 1961. Section 18-1, the general robbery
statute, was amended to exclude motor vehicles from its scope, providing that “[a]
person commits robbery when he or she takes property, except a motor vehicle
covered by Section 18-3 or 18-4, from the person or presence of another by the use
of force or by threatening the imminent use of force.” Pub. Act 88-351 (eff. Aug.
13, 1993) (amending 720 ILCS 5/18-1). At the same time, sections 18-3 and 18-4
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were added to Article 18, creating the new offenses of vehicular hijacking and
aggravated vehicular hijacking (id. (adding 720 ILCS 5/18-3, 18-4)) and increasing
the penalty for vehicular hijacking to a Class 1 felony (id. (amending 720 ILCS
5/18-3(c)). Importantly, however, the legislature continued to use the exact same
terminology in the vehicular hijacking statute as was contained in the general
robbery statute. Section 18-3(a) provided that the offense of vehicular hijacking is
committed “when [a person] takes a motor vehicle from the person or the
immediate presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent
use of force.” 720 ILCS 5/18-3(a) (West 1994).
¶ 95 The fact that the identical language was used is significant because the
legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial decisions interpreting legislation.
Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 48. Thus, if the legislature amends a statute or
enacts new legislation after a judicial decision is published, it must be presumed
that the legislature acted with knowledge of our interpretation. Morris v. William L.
Dawson Nursing Center, Inc., 187 Ill. 2d 494, 499 (1999); People v. Hickman, 163
Ill. 2d 250, 262 (1994). Moreover, if the legislature reenacts a statute without
modification it is assumed that any construction of the statutory language by this
court will continue to be in effect. Williams v. Crickman, 81 Ill. 2d 105, 111 (1980);
People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 316 Ill. App. 3d 770, 782 (2000).
Furthermore, considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory
construction, especially where the legislature is free to change court interpretations
of its legislation. Williams, 81 Ill. 2d at 111.
¶ 96 Here, we must presume that the legislature was aware of our interpretation of
the “taking” language in Strickland when it created the new offense of vehicular
hijacking and used the identical language that was interpreted in Strickland.
Applying the well-established principles of statutory construction set forth above,
we must find the legislature’s choice to repeat the identical language used in the
robbery statute, when it defined vehicular hijacking, signified its intention to give
the vehicular hijacking statute the same meaning. For this reason, the meaning of
the statutory language at issue here is unambiguous. It means exactly what we held
in Strickland.
¶ 97 Today, however, the majority interprets the vehicular hijacking statute and
holds that the statutory language “plainly” means something else. Supra ¶¶ 40-41.
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The majority rejects our plain language interpretation of the statutory phrase “takes
*** from the person or presence of another,” which we adopted 25 years ago in
Strickland, and now expands the meaning of “takes” to include taking control over
or commandeering a vehicle—the exact interpretation we rejected in Strickland.
The majority’s only explanation for rejecting the settled meaning of the statutory
language is that the legislature “removed motor vehicles from the [general] robbery
statute and created an entirely new offense entitled ‘vehicular hijacking.’ ” Supra
¶ 39. In other words, according to the majority, the title of the statute has changed
the plain meaning of the substantive text. Because this conclusion is contrary to
well-established principles of statutory construction, I cannot agree.
¶ 98 An offense is defined not by its title but by the substantive language of the
statute that constitutes the elements of the offense. As the appellate court below
recognized, the title or heading of a statute cannot alter the plain meaning of the
text. 2015 IL App (1st) 120654, ¶ 79 (citing Michigan Avenue National Bank v.
County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 505-06 (2000)). The title of a statute can only be
used to shed light on an ambiguous word or phrase. Id. Here, there is no ambiguity.
The meaning of the text within the vehicular hijacking statute was already settled
when the statute was enacted. Giving the statute the name “vehicular hijacking”
does not change the plain and established meaning of the text within. By reaching
the conclusion it does, the majority calls into question the continued validity of
established rules of construction.
¶ 99 I am well aware that the word “hijacking” has a certain connotation, and
therefore, the temptation to attach an expanded meaning to the statute is
understandable. However, it is this court’s obligation to interpret statutes in accord
with legislative intent. It is not our job to rewrite statutes. Based on the analysis
above, I believe we are bound by our rules of construction and stare decisis to
interpret the vehicular hijacking statute in accord with the longstanding
interpretation of the language contained therein. To interpret the vehicular
hijacking statute as the majority does is not only to read into the statutory language
a meaning that is not there but to affirmatively adopt a meaning that previously was
expressly rejected. In short, we cannot conclude that the legislature “plainly
intended” something different than what we said in Strickland simply because the
statute is titled “vehicular hijacking.”
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¶ 100 Because I would affirm the appellate court’s reversal of defendant’s aggravated
vehicular hijacking conviction, I would also find that defendant’s conviction for
vehicular invasion may stand. Therefore, I also dissent from the majority’s decision
to vacate that conviction. In all other respects, I agree with the majority and,
therefore, would affirm the appellate court judgment on the remaining issues.
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