People v. Johnson

2019 IL 122956
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 122956)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
OCTAVIUS LORENZO JOHNSON, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 25, 2019.
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Burke, and
Neville concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In this case, we consider whether a defendant who enters into a negotiated plea
agreement may challenge a sentence that conforms to the plea agreement, on the
ground that the trial court relied on improper aggravating factors, without
withdrawing his guilty plea under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Dec. 11,
2014). The appellate court recognized a split of authority on the issue and held that
Rule 604(d) did not bar a defendant under these circumstances from challenging
the sentence. 2017 IL App (4th) 160920. For the following reasons, we reverse in
part and vacate in part the judgment of the appellate court.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 In October 2013, defendant Octavius Lorenzo Johnson was charged by
indictment in connection with several controlled drug incidents occurring on two
separate days. The charges included possession with intent to deliver between 1 and
15 grams of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church (720 ILCS
570/401(c), 407(b)(1) (West 2012)), a Class X felony; three counts of delivery of
less than 1 gram of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church (id.
§§ 401(d), 407(b)(2)), a Class 1 felony; and five counts of lesser-included offenses.
¶4 In November 2014, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement in
which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled
substance within 1000 feet of a church—a Class 1 felony with a sentencing range of
4 to 15 years. Id.; 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2012). 1 In exchange, the State
agreed to dismiss the seven remaining charges and to recommend a sentencing cap
of 13 years’ imprisonment.
¶5 After the McLean County circuit court delivered Illinois Supreme Court Rule
402 (eff. July 1, 2012) admonishments and received a factual basis for the pleas,
defendant acknowledged that he understood he was agreeing to a sentence of no
less than 4 years and no more than 13 years. The court accepted defendant’s guilty
pleas and entered findings of guilt.
¶6 At the sentencing hearing, the court was presented with defendant’s
presentence investigation report. Defendant’s prior convictions included resisting a
peace officer, criminal trespass to property, four counts of aggravated driving under
the influence involving two fatalities and two counts of great bodily harm,
operating an uninsured motor vehicle, and unlawful restraint. He was appearing
before the court for sentencing on his sixth felony and second driving under the
influence (DUI) conviction.
1
Defendant also pleaded guilty at that time to a separate charge of driving under the influence
with no agreement as to the sentence. That plea agreement is not at issue here.
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¶7 The State recommended that the court impose a 13-year sentence, citing
protection of the public and defendant’s extensive prior criminal history. The State
also informed the court that the current offenses were committed while defendant
was on probation for the offense of unlawful restraint and that the unlawful restraint
was committed while defendant was on “parole” from the DUI offense. There was
also a joint recommendation by both parties to terminate and discharge defendant
unsuccessfully from probation.
¶8 Defendant sought a six-year sentence, noting mitigating factors. Defense
counsel argued that “defendant caused no physical harm by his actions here,”
although “there may be said to be a potential for harm.” Counsel pointed out a
substantial history with alcohol abuse without any meaningful intervention,
defendant’s age of 31 years, his difficult childhood circumstances, and his poor
education. Counsel also noted defendant’s participation in a number of
rehabilitation programs while in pretrial custody. Defendant also made a statement
in allocution. He acknowledged his alcoholism and expressed his remorse and his
desire to be accountable and to apply what he has learned to better himself. He
stated that his “intentions and motives were never to hurt [anybody].”
¶9 The circuit court then made the following findings. In mitigation, the trial court
commended defendant’s actions taken toward rehabilitation while in custody but
disagreed with defendant’s assertion that there was a lack of harm or threat of harm.
The court explained the harm in “hurting others” that cared for him in his life and
the harm, “as you have pointed out to a lesser degree,” from
“preying, in essence, upon the addictions of others, and so when you are selling
drugs, in essence, to individuals who are addicted, you know that you’re not
helping them. It’s for profit; it’s for gain. It could, or might, cause serious
physical harm to them depending upon how they use or abuse those drugs, so
that isn’t a factor in mitigation.”
¶ 10 In aggravation, the trial court found, “the conduct threatened serious harm. You
did receive compensation, that being for committing the offense, that being of
selling drugs.” The court then referenced defendant’s “revolving door” criminal
history—this was defendant’s sixth felony, he was on “parole” for the offense of
aggravated DUI at the time he committed the unlawful restraint, and he was on
probation for the unlawful restraint at the time he committed the current drug
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offenses. The trial court further found, as defendant had acknowledged in
allocution, that there was a necessity to deter others from committing the same
types of crimes and the need to balance the factors in aggravation and mitigation.
¶ 11 Although the court expressly stated that the State’s recommendation for a
13-year sentence was justified in this case, the trial court recognized that defendant
had utilized the resources available to him while in custody to try to better himself.
The court imposed concurrent prison terms of 11 years—2 years below the
maximum agreed-upon sentencing cap. The trial court then admonished defendant
with respect to his right to appeal and explained that, to preserve his right to appeal,
defendant must first file a motion to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment.
¶ 12 Thereafter, despite the admonishment, defendant filed a pro se motion to
reduce his sentence, arguing that the sentence was excessive in light of his
rehabilitative potential. At a hearing on the motion, where defendant was
represented by counsel, the court indicated that, because defendant’s sentence was
pursuant to a plea agreement, the court could not simply reconsider his sentence.
The court informed defendant that, if he wished to try to “go back to square one,”
he must move to withdraw his plea. The court explained that, if defendant’s motion
were granted, all nine charges would be reinstated, the court would no longer be
limited to a cap of 13 years, and defendant faced a potential penalty on the Class X
charge of 6 to 30 years in prison, if convicted. After discussing the matter with
counsel, defendant was granted leave to file an amended motion to withdraw his
plea.
¶ 13 At the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea, defendant argued that his
plea was not knowing and voluntary. He testified that his counsel was ineffective
because he did not inform him about all of the facts of his case, failed to sufficiently
argue his rehabilitative potential, and told him that, notwithstanding the
agreed-upon cap of 13 years, his sentence would not be double digits. He
acknowledged that he was informed by the court that any sentence imposed would
not be less than 4 years and would not be more than 13 years in the event the court
concurred in the agreement, and he indicated that he had understood that the State
was recommending the maximum 13-year sentence under the agreement at that
time.
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¶ 14 The circuit court denied the motion, finding no legal basis to allow the plea to
be withdrawn. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that the State had already
made certain concessions at the time of the plea agreement from a 15-year
maximum penalty to a 13-year maximum penalty and that the court specifically
took into consideration the rehabilitation offered by counsel in reducing the
sentence. The court continued to find that an 11-year sentence was appropriate.
¶ 15 On initial appeal, the appellate court remanded for counsel’s strict compliance
with the certificate requirement of Rule 604(d). On remand, defendant chose not to
file any new postplea motion or amend his motion. The court once again denied the
motion to withdraw the plea.
¶ 16 On appeal after remand, defendant abandoned any claim that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Instead, for the first time, he
argued that he need not withdraw his plea where the trial court erred in sentencing
him. He argued that the court improperly relied on two statutory aggravating
factors—that his conduct caused or threatened serious harm and that he received
compensation for committing the offenses—inherent in his drug offense. Although
he recognized that he never raised this argument in the circuit court, he requested
that the claim be reviewed for plain error.
¶ 17 The State did not refute the merits of defendant’s argument that the circuit court
relied on improper sentencing factors, nor did it respond to defendant’s request for
plain-error review. Rather, the State raised a threshold issue, contending that
defendant’s negotiated plea barred him from raising his sentencing challenge
pursuant to Rule 604(d).
¶ 18 After examining the applicable rules and the relevant case law, the appellate
court held that a defendant who enters into a partially negotiated plea agreement
need not withdraw his plea in order to challenge his sentence on the basis that the
trial court relied on improper sentencing factors. 2017 IL App (4th) 160920, ¶ 42.
¶ 19 In proceeding to reach the merits of defendant’s appeal, the court found that the
trial court did not “make any dismissive or emphatic comments” when it listed the
improper factors in aggravation and “did not specifically elaborate” on them,
“instead simply enumerating them among other aggravating factors.” Id. ¶ 50. The
court then found that, where the record was “unclear whether or how much weight
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was afforded to the improper aggravating factors,” the court committed reversible
error, which required a remand for a new sentencing hearing. Id. ¶¶ 51-52.
¶ 20 Despite the court’s finding that defendant failed to fully develop his plain-error
argument, the court was persuaded that the rules of forfeiture should be relaxed in
this particular case due to the lack of clarity with respect to defendant’s rights and
obligations under Rule 604(d). The court concluded that the errors rose to the level
of second-prong plain error because the error deprived him of a fair sentencing
hearing. Id. ¶¶ 55-56. We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct.
R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 21 ANALYSIS
¶ 22 The sole issue before this court is whether the appellate court erroneously
reached the merits of defendant’s sentencing challenge. That determination turns
on the proper application of Rule 604(d), which is a question of law, reviewed
de novo. People v. Cole, 2017 IL 120997, ¶ 20.
¶ 23 I. Historical Development of Rule 604(d)
¶ 24 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) governs the procedures to be followed
where a defendant seeks to challenge a judgment entered after pleading guilty. The
rule, in its original form, provided that “[n]o appeal from a judgment entered upon a
plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant *** files in the trial court a motion
to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.” 58 Ill. 2d R. 604(d) (eff.
July 1, 1975).
¶ 25 In 1992, this court amended Rule 604(d) to provide that
“[n]o appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless
the defendant *** files in the trial court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if
only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.” 145 Ill. 2d R.
604(d) (eff. Aug. 1, 1992).
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¶ 26 In several subsequent decisions by this court, we examined the contours of the
amended rule. In People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 332 (1996), we held that a
defendant may not unilaterally seek to reduce his sentence by filing a motion for
sentence reconsideration under Rule 604(d) where he pleads guilty to certain
charges in exchange for an agreement to dismiss charges and recommend a specific
sentence—a plea arrangement characterized as “negotiated.” In that situation, a
defendant must move to withdraw the plea and vacate the judgment and show that
the granting of the motion is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Id.
¶ 27 Our rationale for this conclusion was dictated by the nature of the plea
agreement and the application of contract law principles. We explained that a
defendant who seeks to reduce the agreed-upon sentence seeks “to hold the State to
its part of the bargain while unilaterally modifying the sentence[ ] to which they
had earlier agreed.” Id. at 327. Such a practice would violate contract principles
because, in a negotiated plea agreement, “the guilty plea and the sentence ‘go hand
in hand’ as material elements of the plea bargain.” Id. at 332.
¶ 28 Thereafter, in People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67 (1999), we applied the same
contract law principles with equal force where a defendant agreed to plead guilty in
exchange for a recommended sentencing cap. Again, we highlighted the
significance of the plea bargaining process. Under this type of negotiated plea, we
reasoned that, “[b]y agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a recommended
sentencing cap, a defendant is, in effect, agreeing not to challenge any sentence
imposed below that cap on the grounds that it is excessive.” Id. at 74. We explained
that under these circumstances, allowing a defendant to move to reconsider his
sentence without withdrawing his plea “unfairly binds the State to the terms of the
plea agreement while giving the defendant the opportunity to avoid or modify those
terms.” Id. Thus, we held these types of negotiated agreements raised the same
concerns that were present in Evans. Id.
¶ 29 The special concurrence highlighted that the State’s sentencing concession was
a material component of the bargain and, by virtue of this type of agreement, the
State “forgoes or limits its ability at sentencing to seek a sentence from the full
range of penalties set forth in the Code of Corrections.” Id. at 80 (Freeman, C.J.
specially concurring).
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¶ 30 In contrast to the circumstances presented in Evans and Linder, in People v.
Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d 182, 187 (2000), we held that, where absolutely no agreement
existed between the parties as to the defendant’s sentence, a defendant is not
required to withdraw his plea in order to challenge his sentence. Under this type of
plea, no contract principles were violated, and the “sentence did not go ‘hand in
hand’ with the plea” because the State “did not make any facet of sentencing an
element of its bargain with defendant.” Id. at 189 (Freeman, J., specially
concurring).
¶ 31 Thereafter, in People v. Diaz, 192 Ill. 2d 211, 225 (2000), we summarized that
under Rule 604(d) a defendant is not required to move to withdraw his guilty plea in
order to challenge his sentence where the plea bargain is silent as to sentencing.
However, we reiterated that, where the plea agreement between a defendant and the
State concerns both the charging and sentencing aspects of the defendant’s case, the
defendant must move to withdraw the plea. Id. Our rationale was again animated by
the nature of the plea and contract principles because the sentence is premised upon
the plea.
“The existence of a sentencing concession by the State activates the application
of the Evans rule, as the sentence is thereby made a part of the bargain between
the parties. Therefore, if a plea agreement limits or forecloses the State from
arguing for a sentence from the full range of penalties available under law, in
order to challenge his sentence, a defendant must first move to withdraw his
plea in the trial court. If the court grants the motion, both parties are then
returned to the status quo as it existed prior to the acceptance of the plea.” Id.
¶ 32 In 2000, consistent with the development of our case law, this court amended
Rule 604(d). The rule now includes the following pertinent language:
“No appeal shall be taken upon a negotiated plea of guilty challenging the
sentence as excessive unless the defendant, within 30 days of the imposition of
sentence, files a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.
For purposes of this rule, a negotiated plea of guilty is one in which the
prosecution has bound itself to recommend a specific sentence, or a specific
range of sentence, or where the prosecution has made concessions relating to
the sentence to be imposed and not merely to the charge or charges then
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pending.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Nov. 1, 2000).
¶ 33 II. Application of Rule 604(d) to Defendant’s Challenge
¶ 34 The State maintains that Rule 604(d) precludes a defendant who entered into a
negotiated guilty plea from challenging a sentence that was statutorily authorized
and within the terms of the plea agreement. The State argues that pursuant to Rule
604(d) defendant’s recourse is to seek to withdraw the plea and vacate the
judgment. In support, the State argues that the current version of the rule is a logical
codification of the Evans-Linder-Diaz line of cases and that the historical evolution
of the rule rebuts defendant’s assertions.
¶ 35 The State notes that this court has exempted the application of Rule 604(d) to
negotiated pleas in two narrow instances: (1) where a defendant challenged his
sentence as not authorized by statute (People v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 331 (1997);
People v. Wilson, 181 Ill. 2d 409 (1998)) and (2) where a defendant challenged the
statute under which he was sentenced as facially unconstitutional and void ab initio
(People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533 (2005)). The State asserts that defendant’s
sentencing challenge does not fall within either instance.
¶ 36 Defendant acknowledges that he does not wish to withdraw his “favorable”
plea. Rather, in an attempt to preclude the application of the rule to his claim on
appeal, defendant maintains there is a distinction between a challenge to a sentence
as being “excessive” and the challenge he now makes—a challenge to a sentence
because the court improperly relied on certain statutory aggravating factors. He
maintains that the distinction lies in the fact that his challenge is one of
constitutional dimension that implicates due process and fundamental fairness.
¶ 37 The Second and Fourth Districts have drawn a distinction between an
“excessive” sentencing challenge and an “improper” sentencing challenge, finding
the latter challenge not barred by Rule 604(d). See, e.g., 2017 IL App (4th) 160920;
People v. Palmer-Smith, 2015 IL App (4th) 130451; People v. Martell, 2015 IL
App (2d) 141202. The Third District rejected this argument, finding it would
reduce the withdrawal requirement of Rule 604(d) to “nothingness” and would
deny the State the benefit of its bargain in negotiated pleas. People v. Rademacher,
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2016 IL App (3d) 130881, ¶¶ 58-60. Thus, to resolve this split in authority, we
consider the nature of defendant’s challenge.
¶ 38 Defendant contends that the circuit court considered improper aggravating
factors in sentencing that were inherent in the offense. The aggravating factors that
may be applied by the circuit court in sentencing are creatures of statute. See 730
ILCS 5/5-5-3.2 (West 2014). The prohibition against dual use of an aggravating
factor, referred to as “double enhancement,” is “based on the assumption that, in
designating the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the
legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.” People v.
Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2004). Thus, when a defendant contends the court
improperly considered a statutory aggravating factor that was implicit in the
offense, the defendant is asserting that the court imposed a “ ‘harsher sentence than
might otherwise have been imposed’ ” had the court not considered the improper
statutory factor. Id. (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84 (1992)).
¶ 39 Thus, defendant’s argument is essentially that, had the trial court not erred in its
application of the statute and had it not erroneously considered those statutory
factors, he would have gotten a lower sentence than the 11-year sentence that was
imposed. Stated another way, defendant contends the court imposed an excessive
sentence.
¶ 40 Notably, this argument has been indeed characterized in our case law as an
excessive sentence challenge. See, e.g., People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 265-66
(1986) (“defendant contends in this court that his sentence is excessive because a
material element of the offense was the primary aggravating factor on which the
circuit court relied in imposing sentence”); People v. Reed, 2018 IL App (1st)
160609, ¶ 54 (“defendant argues his 50-year sentence *** is excessive because the
trial court improperly considered elements of those crimes as aggravating factors in
sentencing”).
¶ 41 Ultimately, we find the nature of defendant’s challenge to be a distinction
without a difference for purposes of Rule 604(d). To find otherwise would allow
almost every sentencing challenge in a criminal case to be restated in a
constitutional due process framework as a way to avoid the rule. This type of
exception would result in making Rule 604(d)’s requirements superfluous.
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¶ 42 Rather, we find Diaz to be ample support for our conclusion that the nature of
the plea agreement and contract principles bar defendant from moving to
reconsider his sentence. In Diaz, the defendant entered into a negotiated plea in
which he agreed to plead guilty to certain charges in exchange for the State’s
agreement to certain sentencing concessions, which resulted in a recommendation
to cap his sentence at 30 years. The defendant received a sentence of 20 years, well
within the bargain, but sought to challenge his sentence on appeal because the trial
court improperly allowed certain evidence to be introduced during the sentencing
proceedings. As a result of the evidentiary errors committed by the circuit court,
defendant argued he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. The State contended
that the plea agreement was analogous to the agreement in Linder and, therefore,
defendant’s recourse was to move to withdraw his plea. We agreed.
¶ 43 We first reconfirmed that the nature of the plea was one in which the State made
sentencing concessions, which meant that defendant’s “guilty plea and sentence
‘[went] hand in hand’ as material elements of the plea bargain.” Diaz, 192 Ill. 2d at
224. The plea agreement specifically limited the State from arguing for a sentence
from the full range of penalties available under the law. Id. Therefore, based on the
nature of his plea agreement and contract law principles, defendant was required to
move to withdraw his plea under Rule 604(d). Id. at 225.
¶ 44 Additionally, this court in Diaz specifically rejected the defendant’s assertion
that the nature of the error in his case—the court improperly allowing certain
evidence at the sentencing hearing—was more akin to the types of sentencing
challenges allowed in Williams and Wilson, where the sentences did not conform
with the statute. We held that the defendant’s reliance on those cases was misplaced
because he was not asserting that his sentence was not authorized by statute. Id. at
225-26.
¶ 45 Similarly, in this case, defendant entered into a negotiated plea in which he
pleaded guilty in exchange for not only dismissal of certain charges, including a
Class X offense, but also sentencing concessions by the State. Defendant’s plea
was entered with the full knowledge that he could receive a sentence within the
cap—that is, any sentence within the 4- to 13-year range. Defendant received a
sentence two years below the maximum sentence of 13 years to which he knew he
could be sentenced. Under the agreement, defendant avoided a potential
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punishment beyond that which he deemed to be fair and received the certainty of a
lower sentencing range. The sentence imposed was within the terms of the bargain
and was well within the permissible sentencing range for that offense.
¶ 46 Like the defendant in Diaz, defendant now seeks to retain the State’s
concession while freely challenging his sentence. As in Diaz, “by virtue of its
agreement with defendant, the State ‘limited its ability to argue at sentencing from
the full panoply of penalties contained in the Code of Corrections.’ ” Id. at 224
(quoting Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 79 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring)). In other
words, in this case, the State was foreclosed from urging the circuit court to impose
a 15-year sentence. As a result, the sentence cap and plea went together as material
elements of the plea bargain. Defendant has received a sentencing benefit from the
agreement not to seek a sentence above the cap and has received the certainty of a
lower sentencing range. To “allow defendant to unilaterally modify his agreement
under these circumstances while holding the State to its end of the bargain” would
violate contract principles. Id.
¶ 47 Consistent with our precedent, defendant’s recourse under Rule 604(d) was to
seek to withdraw the plea and return the parties to the status quo as it existed prior
to the acceptance of the plea. Defendant followed that course of action but failed to
show the plea was not voluntary or knowing or that the granting of his motion was
necessary to correct a manifest injustice. See Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. He has now
chosen to abandon any argument on appeal with respect to the withdrawal of his
plea.
¶ 48 Contrary to defendant’s contention, neither Williams nor Wilson requires a
different conclusion here. At the outset, those cases were premised upon the
“void-sentence rule”—that a sentence that was not authorized by statute was void
and could be corrected at any time. People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). In
People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶¶ 11-18, we abolished that rule as
unconstitutionally unsound.
¶ 49 We need not consider whether Williams and Wilson survive Castleberry
because those cases are simply factually inapposite. Although, in both Williams and
Wilson, we distinguished the defendants’ arguments from excessive sentence
challenges, the sentences imposed violated the allowable statutory penalty for the
defendants’ particular crime. In Williams, the court improperly imposed two
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consecutive sentences for a single offense. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d at 336. In Wilson,
one of the sentences violated the statutory requirement that it be imposed
consecutively and not concurrently, and another sentence exceeded the maximum
authorized extended-term sentence allowable for the offense charged. Wilson, 181
Ill. 2d at 414.
¶ 50 In contrast, here, defendant does not contend that his sentence exceeded the
permissible statutory penalty for the offense charged. Nor does defendant claim
that a sentence of 11 years is unconstitutional. Rather, he seeks to enforce the
“favorable” agreement while seeking reconsideration of the sentence.
¶ 51 Defendant’s reliance on our decision in People v. Heider, 231 Ill. 2d 1 (2008),
fares no better. Initially, as the State points out, the court in Heider was neither
asked to consider nor addressed the application of Rule 604(d) to the defendant’s
sentencing challenge. Accordingly, Heider cannot be interpreted to express any
view by this court as to the implications of Rule 604(d) to the circumstances of this
case. Furthermore, the case was factually distinguishable where, unlike the present
case, the trial court did not accept the sentence according to the recommended
agreement. Rather, the defendant received a sentence more onerous than the State
had recommended. Accordingly, defendant’s reliance on Heider is misplaced.
¶ 52 Despite the nature of the plea agreement and the contract principles at issue,
defendant maintains that his challenge is distinct because it implicates the integrity
of the judicial system. He also contends that he is otherwise left with a Hobson’s
choice to accept the court’s erroneous sentence or withdraw a favorable plea.
¶ 53 Again, we find the nature of defendant’s challenge no different than the
challenge in Diaz for purposes of applying Rule 604(d), where the defendant
similarly argued he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because the trial court
allowed improper evidence to be introduced at the hearing. Despite that fact, the
defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement to a sentence that was
authorized by statute and was within the terms of the agreement. To hold that under
these circumstances a defendant’s recourse is to seek to withdraw the plea and
return the parties to the status quo does not undermine judicial integrity.
¶ 54 Nor do we find a different conclusion is warranted by the United States
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Class v. United States, 583 U.S. ___, 138 S.
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Ct. 798 (2018), and Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1897
(2018). In Class, 583 U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 801-02, the Supreme Court held that
a guilty plea does not “bar a criminal defendant from later appealing his conviction
on the ground that the statute of conviction violates the Constitution.” The claims at
issue in Class challenged “the Government’s power to criminalize [the
defendant’s] (admitted) conduct.” Id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 805. We do not disagree
that the claims at issue in Class are distinct, as we previously explained in Guevara,
216 Ill. 2d 533, where we concluded that Rule 604(d) did not bar a sentencing
challenge by the defendant on direct appeal contending that the statute under which
he was sentenced was facially unconstitutional and void ab initio.
¶ 55 Rosales-Mireles involved whether a federal circuit court’s error in calculating a
defendant’s sentencing range under the federal sentencing guidelines warranted
relief under the fourth prong of the federal plain-error test when raised for the first
time on appeal. Rosales-Mireles, 585 U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 1908. Although the
defendant pleaded guilty, there was no agreement as to sentencing. The facts before
the Court were akin to an open plea in Illinois, which we have already explained
does not implicate the same contract principles present in this case. Id. at ___, 138
S. Ct. at 1905. The Court was neither asked to consider nor addressed the
applicability of plain-error review of the claim in relation to the type of negotiated
plea agreement presented here.
¶ 56 CONCLUSION
¶ 57 In sum, after considering the language of the rule and this court’s precedent, we
hold that a defendant who enters into a negotiated plea agreement may not
challenge his sentence on the basis that the court relied on improper statutory
sentencing factors. This type of sentencing challenge is an excessive sentence
challenge. Under Rule 604(d), a defendant’s recourse is to seek to withdraw the
guilty plea and return the parties to the status quo before the plea.
¶ 58 Accordingly, the appellate court erred in addressing the merits of defendant’s
sentencing challenge. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse, in part, and vacate, in
part, the judgment of the appellate court, which remanded for a new sentencing
hearing.
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¶ 59 Appellate court judgment reversed in part and vacated in part.
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