People v. Coats

2018 IL 121926IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 121926)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
LESHAWN COATS, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 19, 2018.
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and
Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Leshawn
Coats was convicted of several offenses, including being an armed habitual
criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2012)) and armed violence (id. § 33A-2(a)).
The trial court sentenced him to 7 years in prison on the armed habitual criminal
count, consecutive to a term of 15 years in prison on the armed violence count.
Defendant appealed, contending that his convictions were predicated on the same
physical act of gun possession in violation of the one-act, one-crime rule. The
appellate court concluded that the one-act, one-crime rule did not prohibit the
multiple convictions. 2016 IL App (1st) 142028-U. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 In June 2013, Chicago police officer Edwin Utreras was part of a team
executing a search warrant at a two-flat basement apartment in Chicago. After
forcing entry into the apartment and detaining four individuals, Utreras and his
team approached a locked, rear room. They knocked on the door and heard people
shuffling around inside the room, but nobody answered the door. Utreras’s partner
then forced entry into the room, where Utreras saw defendant holding a handgun in
his left hand and two plastic bags in his right hand, which he was placing on a
window ledge.
¶4 Utreras recovered a .45-caliber handgun loaded with nine live rounds of
ammunition, as well as both bags. Inside one bag was a clear bag containing 53
smaller bags of suspected crack cocaine and one “knotted bag” containing
suspected crack cocaine. Inside the other bag was a clear plastic bag containing 92
bags of suspected heroin. Drugs were also recovered in other areas of the room,
including suspected heroin recovered from the refrigerator. The police also
recovered cash currency, ammunition, and narcotics packaging materials. The
contents of the plastic bags were tested. The parties stipulated that a chemist
verified the contents of the plastic bags defendant was holding, which contained
over 15 grams of heroin. The parties also stipulated to defendant’s prior convictions
for robbery and aggravated robbery.
¶5 The trial court found defendant guilty of being an armed habitual criminal,
armed violence, and two counts of possession of a controlled substance (heroin)
with intent to deliver. The possession counts merged into the armed violence count.
Defendant was sentenced to 7 years in prison on the armed habitual criminal count
to run consecutively to a term of 15 years in prison on the armed violence count. 1
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Consecutive sentences were mandated under section 5-8-4(d)(3) of the Unified Code of
Corrections where defendant was convicted of armed violence based upon the predicate offense of a
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¶6 On appeal, defendant argued for the first time that his convictions for both
armed violence and armed habitual criminal violated the one-act, one-crime rule
because they were predicated on the same physical act of gun possession. After
reviewing the claim under the second prong of the plain error doctrine, the
appellate court affirmed, finding that the offenses did not result from precisely the
same physical act and that neither offense was a lesser-included offense of the
other. 2016 IL App (1st) 142028-U, ¶¶ 27-29.
¶7 In reaching its conclusion that the multiple convictions did not violate the
one-act, one-crime rule, the court recognized a conflict between the Second District
decision in People v. Williams, 302 Ill. App. 3d 975 (1999), and the Fourth
District’s decision in People v. White, 311 Ill. App. 3d 374 (2000). 2016 IL App
(1st) 142028-U, ¶¶ 25-27. The appellate court found White to be more persuasive.
Id. ¶ 27. We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff.
Mar. 15, 2016).
¶8 ANALYSIS
¶9 Initially, defendant recognizes that he has forfeited his one-act, one-crime
argument by failing to raise it before the trial court, but he seeks review under the
plain error doctrine. The plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider
an unpreserved error “(1) when ‘a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence
is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice
against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,’ or (2) when ‘a
clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the
fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process,
regardless of the closeness of the evidence.’ ” People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445,
¶ 48 (quoting People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007)).
¶ 10 The State maintains that defendant has forfeited his plain error argument
because he failed to show that the claimed error was clear or obvious. We disagree.
This court has previously explained that one-act, one-crime violations fall within
the second prong of the plain error doctrine as an obvious error so serious that it
violation of subsection (a) of section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS
570/401 (West 2012)). 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(3) (West 2012).
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challenges the integrity of the judicial process. People v. Nunez, 236 Ill. 2d 488,
493 (2010); see also People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 168 (2009) (protections
afforded to defendants by the one-act, one-crime rule are integral to maintaining the
integrity of the judicial process); In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 378-79 (2009)
(a one-act, one-crime violation “satisf[ies] the second prong of the plain-error
test”). Thus, despite the forfeiture, we will address defendant’s argument under the
second prong of the plain error doctrine.
¶ 11 We first consider whether a one-act, one-crime error occurred. In People v.
King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977), this court held that a criminal defendant may not
be convicted of multiple offenses when those offenses are all based on precisely the
same physical act. Although this rule is not derived from the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy, we have continued to reaffirm and adhere to it
over the last four decades based on the prejudice that results when there are
multiple convictions for precisely the same criminal conduct. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d at
164-68.
¶ 12 Whether a violation of the rule has occurred is a question of law, which we
review de novo. People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 105 (2008). In making that
determination, this court has long followed a two-step analysis. People v.
Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 186 (1996). First, the court ascertains whether the
defendant’s conduct consisted of a single physical act or separate acts. Id. If it is
determined that the defendant committed multiple acts, the court then moves to the
second step and determines whether any of the offenses are lesser-included
offenses. Id. If none of the offenses are lesser-included offenses, then multiple
convictions are proper. Id.¶ 13 A. One Act or Several Acts
¶ 14 We must first determine whether defendant’s conduct consisted of separate
physical acts or a single physical act. Defendant maintains that his armed violence
conviction was carved from precisely the same physical act as his armed habitual
criminal conviction because they both arose from his act of possessing the
handgun. We disagree.
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¶ 15 The definition of an “act,” as stated in King, is “any overt or outward
manifestation which will support a different offense.” King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566.
Although defendant is correct that both offenses shared the common act of
possessing the handgun, under the definition outlined in King, “ ‘[a] person can be
guilty of two offenses when a common act is part of both offenses’ ” (Rodriguez,
169 Ill. 2d at 188 (quoting People v. Lobdell, 121 Ill. App. 3d 248, 252 (1983))) “or
part of one offense and the only act of the other offense” (Lobdell, 121 Ill. App. 3d
at 252).
¶ 16 Several examples illustrate this application of King. Most notably, in
Rodriguez, the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and
home invasion. Although both offenses shared the common act of the defendant
threatening the victim with a gun, the defendant’s unlawful entry into the victim’s
bedroom was a separate act that supported the home invasion offense. Rodriguez,
169 Ill. 2d at 188-89. We explained that, “ ‘[a]s long as there are multiple acts as
defined in King, their interrelationship does not preclude multiple convictions.’ ”
(Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 189 (quoting People v. Myers, 85 Ill. 2d 281, 288
(1981)); see also People v. McLaurin, 184 Ill. 2d 58, 105 (1998) (holding that
multiple convictions for intentional murder and home invasion were proper
because, although both involved the same physical act of setting a fire, the physical
act of entering the dwelling of the victim was a separate act that supported the home
invasion offense); People v. Marston, 353 Ill. App. 3d 513, 519 (2004) (holding
that multiple convictions for home invasion and aggravated battery were proper
despite the common act of striking the victim with a pole where the defendant’s
entry into the home was a separate act that supported the home invasion
conviction); Lobdell, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 252 (holding that multiple convictions for
residential burglary and home invasion were proper because, despite the one act of
entry into the victim’s home which served as the basis for both convictions, the
home invasion offense involved an additional act of intentional injury and,
therefore, the two offenses were not carved from precisely the same physical act);
People v. Tate, 106 Ill. App. 3d 774, 778-79 (1982) (holding that multiple
convictions for home invasion and aggravated battery were proper despite the
common act of stabbing the victim where the unlawful entry was a separate act
applicable only to the home invasion offense).
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¶ 17 The facts of this case reveal that defendant’s conduct consisted of two physical
acts: possession of the handgun and possession of the drugs. Although the two
offenses shared the common act of possession of the handgun, which served as a
basis for both convictions, defendant’s armed violence conviction involved a
separate act, possessing the drugs. That act was applicable only to the armed
violence offense. Since the possession of the handgun was only part of the conduct
which formed the basis for the separate armed violence conviction, the two
offenses were not carved from precisely the same physical act.
¶ 18 Defendant recognizes our holding in Rodriguez but, nevertheless, maintains
that the King analysis implicitly requires a determination of whether the offenses
share a “crucial” act. He articulates the rule as follows: If the two offenses share a
common act that formed the “crux” or “essence” of the crime, multiple convictions
cannot stand. Defendant cites decisions from this court that he argues cannot
otherwise be reconciled without applying this rule, particularly our decision in
McLaurin. Under defendant’s construction of King, he asserts that the possession
of the handgun was the “crux” of both offenses and, therefore, both convictions
cannot stand. We need not consider whether possession was the “crux” of both
offenses because we reject defendant’s construction of King.
¶ 19 In the four decades since King was decided, we have never applied the one-act,
one-crime rule in the manner defendant urges here. Further, our decision in
McLaurin, 184 Ill. 2d 58, does not support the adoption of defendant’s “crux”
theory. In that case, the defendant’s conduct involved entering the victim’s house,
tying him up, and setting him on fire. The defendant was convicted of several
offenses including, inter alia, first degree murder, home invasion, aggravated
arson, and residential burglary. He made several one-act, one-crime assertions
involving the four convictions. As previously explained, his convictions for murder
and home invasion could both stand because, although the murder and home
invasion offenses shared the common act of setting the fire, the additional physical
act of unlawfully entering the dwelling of the victim supported the home invasion
conviction. Id. at 105.
¶ 20 The defendant then argued that his conviction for residential burglary must be
vacated because it was predicated on the same unauthorized entry that established
the conviction for home invasion. We agreed. Although not expressly stated, our
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reasoning was not based on any determination of the “crux” or “essence” of the
crimes. Instead, our rationale is evident from reviewing the defendant’s conduct in
relation to all of the convictions. Under the circumstances, not only did the offense
of residential burglary share the common act of unlawful entry, there was no
additional act that could support a separate offense because the act of setting the
fire had already been attributed to the murder conviction. Id. at 105-06. Similarly,
the aggravated arson conviction and the murder conviction were both carved from
precisely the same physical act of setting the fire, and there was no additional
physical act that could support the separate aggravated arson offense. Accordingly,
under one-act, one-crime principles, the defendant was properly convicted of two
offenses for two separate physical acts—the unlawful entry and the setting of the
fire. Contrary to defendant’s contention, the result in McLaurin is indeed consistent
with this court’s construction of King and our decision in Rodriguez.
¶ 21 Next, defendant asserts that King’s application here is irreconcilable with the
notion that one cannot be convicted of both intentional and felony murder of the
same victim despite the fact that felony murder involves a separate act in addition
to the acts which caused the death—namely, the predicate felony. Defendant
maintains that the only way to reconcile the inconsistency is to consider the “crux”
of the crime, which he characterizes as the act or acts which caused the death.
Again, we need not consider the “crux” of the offenses in one-act, one-crime
analysis to reconcile King in the felony murder context with its application here.
¶ 22 The offense of first degree murder is set forth in section 9-1(a) of the Criminal
Code of 2012. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2016). In that statute, the Illinois General
Assembly provided for three ways to commit one offense: intentional, knowing,
and felony murder. Id. As we have previously explained, the different theories
embodied in the murder statute are merely different ways to commit the same
offense. Id.; People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2009).
¶ 23 Although felony murder involves an additional physical act beyond the acts that
cause the death, the legislature has determined that there is only one offense of
murder. Under King, felony murder is not a separate offense but, rather, a separate
theory of the same offense. See King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566. Accordingly, a defendant
cannot be convicted of both the intentional murder and felony murder of the same
victim.
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¶ 24 Defendant is correct that in certain circumstances convictions for multiple
counts of the same offense can be proper. In those cases, the question for the court
would be to determine the legislative intent behind the statute and to determine
whether there is evidence to support multiple violations of the statute. See, e.g.,
People v. Butler, 64 Ill. 2d 485, 489 (1976) (upholding two convictions for armed
robbery where the defendant threatened the use of force against two people and the
statute defined the criminal act as being directed against the person); People v.
Angarola, 387 Ill. App. 3d 732, 740 (2009) (noting that under the forgery statute,
the legislature recognized that a defendant can be properly charged based on each
stage of the process, allowing a defendant to be convicted for both the act of
making the forged document and the act of delivering the forged document). In this
case, multiple counts of the same offense are not at issue. Thus, those types of
legislative considerations are not applicable here.
¶ 25 Lastly, we are asked to reconcile the two conflicting outcomes in the appellate
court cases of Williams and White. Again, we need not apply defendant’s “crux”
theory to analyze these cases. In both cases, the defendants were convicted of
armed violence predicated on being armed while in possession of a controlled
substance (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1996)) and unlawful possession of a weapon
by a felon (id. § 24-1.1(a)). In Williams, the officer found a gun and a bag of
cocaine in a car where defendant had been sitting. The court held that the
simultaneous possession of the gun and drugs was a common act that could not
support convictions for both offenses. Williams, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 978. In White,
the defendant was arrested while in possession of a gun and cocaine. The court
disagreed with Williams, concluding that the possession of the gun and the drugs
were separate acts. White, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 386.
¶ 26 Defendant initially maintained before this court that Williams was correctly
reasoned, but he acknowledged at oral argument that the holding in Williams is
erroneous. Two separate acts, possession of the gun and possession of the drugs, do
not become one common act solely by virtue of being proximate in time. People v.
Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 48 (stating that although defendant’s possession of two
separate and distinct items of contraband was simultaneous, “that factor alone does
not render his conduct a ‘single act’ for purposes of the one-act, one-crime rule”).
Additionally, as we explained in Rodriguez, a defendant can be convicted of two
offenses even when they share a common act, as long as there is an additional act
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that can support a separate offense. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 189. As the court in
White concluded, the defendant’s possession of the gun was an act distinct from the
defendant’s possession of the drugs which could support the separate offense of
armed violence. Consequently, based on this court’s precedent, Williams
misapplied the one-act, one-crime rule. We therefore expressly overrule it.
¶ 27 We acknowledge that in White, the court appears to have created some
confusion in ascertaining what conduct constitutes an “act” under King. The court
reasoned that “[a]lthough both offenses shared the common act of possession of a
weapon, armed violence required the additional act of possession of the drugs, and
unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon required the additional element of
status as a felon.” (Emphasis added.) White, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 386. A felon’s
status is not an “act” but, rather, a state of being. To clarify, a defendant’s status is
not factored into the first part of the King analysis to determine whether a
defendant’s conduct consists of one act or several acts. Nevertheless, the holding in
White is ultimately correct because the gun possession and the drug possession
were separate acts.
¶ 28 In sum, under the first step in the one-act, one-crime analysis, defendant’s
conduct consisted of multiple acts. We next consider the second step.
¶ 29 B. Lesser-Included Offenses
¶ 30 Under the second step in the one-act, one-crime analysis the court determines
whether any of the offenses are lesser-included ones. The appellate court, applying
the charging instrument approach, found that the offenses here were not lesser
included where each charging instrument did not set out the main outline for the
other offense. 2016 IL App (1st) 142028-U, ¶ 29. Defendant does not challenge
that finding here. However, in the interest of maintaining a sound body of
precedent, we note that the appellate court erroneously applied the charging
instrument approach to that determination, relying on People v. Pena, 317 Ill. App.
3d 312, 323 (2000). As we have explained, when the issue of lesser-included
offenses arises in the context of a one-act, one-crime issue where the defendant was
convicted of both offenses, we apply the abstract elements approach as opposed to
determining whether an uncharged offense is a lesser-included offense to a charged
offense using the charging instrument approach. People v. Miller, 238 Ill. 2d 161,
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166 (2010). Nevertheless, employing that approach would not have changed the
result in this case. Compare 720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 2012), with id.§ 24-1.7(a)(1).
¶ 31 CONCLUSION
¶ 32 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that defendant’s convictions were
proper under the one-act, one-crime rule. Accordingly, because we find no error,
there is no plain error. We affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 33 Affirmed.
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