People v. Patterson

JUSTICE MORAN

delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Vincent Patterson, a prison inmate serving a natural life sentence for offenses unrelated to this case, was indicted for the unlawful possession of a weapon by a person confined in a correctional facility. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 24—1.1(b).) At trial, defendant moved to suppress statements he made to a prison official investigating the weapons incident, claiming that he had not been given Miranda warnings before the questioning. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.) The circuit court of Livingston County granted defendant’s motion to suppress. The appellate court affirmed the order of suppression, with one justice dissenting. (207 Ill. App. 3d 104.) This court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315). Briefs in support of the State’s position have been filed by amici curiae, the Lincoln Legal Foundation and the Illinois Department of Corrections.

This case presents the question of whether a prison inmate must be given Miranda warnings prior to interviews with prison officials who are investigating security matters within the prison. For the reasons below, we hold that, under the circumstances peculiar to this case, such warnings need not be given.

While serving a natural life sentence at the Pontiac Correctional Center in Pontiac, Illinois, defendant was placed in segregation for six months after two “shanks” (knife-like instruments) were found in his one-person cell during a routine shakedown on June 29, 1989. Segregation is imposed by correctional institutions as a disciplinary measure. It limits an inmate’s access to the general prison population, and is the most restrictive type of housing available in the institution. Inmates in segregation are locked in their cells 24 hours per day; are not permitted to attend classes or job assignments; are allowed limited opportunities to shower or exercise; are riot permitted to make telephone calls; and are escorted in restraints when removed from their cells.

On August 1, 1989, Richard C. Irvin, an internal investigator with the Department of Corrections (Department) at Pontiac, acting upon directions from his superiors, requested an interview with defendant to discuss his possession of the “shanks.” Irvin’s primary duty at Pontiac is to investigate incidents and prepare cases for prosecution. If defendant had refused to speak with Irvin, Irvin could not have disciplined him. However, if such were the case here, a uniformed correctional officer might have given defendant a ticket (disciplinary report). Defendant consented to the interview.

Although Irvin knew that defendant was in segregation, he did not know that the segregation had been imposed as punishment for the “shanks” incident. Defendant was handcuffed and escorted to Irvin’s office. Defendant’s handcuffs were not removed until he returned to his cell.

Irvin’s name and title were on the door of his office, which is in a group of offices connected to the cellhouse. The office contains a desk, three chairs, a credenza, and a filing cabinet. Irvin was dressed in civilian clothes, and was wearing a tag identifying him as an internal affairs official. No other prison personnel were in Irvin’s office during the ensuing conversation. The guard who had escorted defendant waited outside the office door during the 10-minute interview.

The purpose of Irvin’s interview was to discover whether defendant had possessed the shanks in order to protect himself from enemies within the prison, and in that case whether defendant wanted to be placed in protective custody. Further, Irvin wished to determine whether defendant would have grounds for a “necessity” defense at a possible criminal trial. No charges had been filed against defendant at the time of this interview, and he was not given Miranda warnings prior to his conversation with Irvin.

It is the policy of investigators at Pontiac, following instructions from the State’s Attorney of Livingston County, not to give Miranda warnings in interviews with inmates who have been found with “shanks” during a shakedown for weapons. The policy was put into effect after a prisoner brought a successful necessity defense to a charge of possession of a weapon while in the institution. Moreover, Irvin had found that inmates become “terrorized” after receiving Miranda warnings, and thus refuse to speak of their safety concerns.

During the interview, defendant declined protective custody, and stated that he had no enemies at Pontiac. Although he did not specifically mention a necessity defense, defendant did indicate that he would be inclined to possess a weapon because he had seen a friend stabbed at another prison. Irvin did not ask defendant whether he had a shank on the day of the shakedown, and defendant did not comment on the events of that day. After the interview, defendant was taken back to segregation.

On October 2, 1989, defendant was indicted for the offense of unlawful possession of weapons by a person confined in a Department facility in violation of section 24—1.1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 24—1.1(b)). This is a Class 1 felony offense, and could result in additional incarceration for a term of 4 to 15 years or an extended term of 15 to 20 years. The State later filed a second charge against defendant, alleging possession of a weapon by a convicted felon in violation of section 24—1.1(a) of the Code. This charge is a Class 3 felony, carrying a potential prison term of 2 to 5 years, or an extended term of 5 to 10 years. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 24—1.1(a), (d), 1005—8—1(a)(6), 1005-8-2(a)(5).

On December 18, 1989, defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements made to Irvin, contending that their use was in violation of defendant’s fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination as defined in Miranda. The trial court heard evidence that defendant could have refused the interview with Irvin or could have terminated it at any time. However, the court was persuaded that Miranda-type warnings were required prior to the interview, because defendant had been identified as a primary suspect for an offense, and an investigation had focused on him. Thus, the court granted defendant’s motion to suppress. The State appealed.

On appeal, the appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed. The court found that defendant was interrogated while “in custody” for Miranda purposes. Consequently, the failure of prison authorities to give Miranda-type warnings rendered any statements by defendant inadmissible. The dissenting justice concluded that Miranda has no application to the interrogation of prison inmates.

We begin our analysis with a review of the standards set out in Miranda. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. (U.S. Const., amend. V; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726, 86 S. Ct. at 1630.) Procedural safeguards must be put into effect to protect the privilege; the individual must be warned prior to questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in court, that he has the right to an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be provided for him prior to questioning if he so desires. (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726, 86 S. Ct. at 1630.) In the absence of a Miranda warning or waiver, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against the individual. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726, 86 S. Ct. at 1630.

The Miranda safeguards arose out of a concern that individuals interrogated while in custody might incriminate themselves due to physical or psychological coercion. (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446-58, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 707-14, 86 S. Ct. at 1613-19.) The Miranda Court pointed out that the object of custodial interrogation is to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. The interrogation environment “carries its own badge of intimidation.” (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 714, 86 S. Ct. at 1619.) Thus, unless adequate protective measures are employed to dispel the coercion inherent in the custodial environment, no statement obtained from the individual can truly be the product of his free choice. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 714, 86 S. Ct. at 1619.

Miranda safeguards become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of movement is curtailed to a “ ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’ ” (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 440, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 335, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150, quoting California v. Beheler (1983), 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275, 1279, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520.) In Berkemer the Court determined that a traffic stop does not exert sufficient pressure upon a detained person so as to impair the free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination. The Court distinguished such a stop from a station house interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the person interrogated feels completely at the mercy of the police. “Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 333, 104 S. Ct. at 3148-49.

Miranda is particularly applicable to situations where persons whose freedom has previously not been limited are taken into a highly restricted environment for questioning. (Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492, 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719, 97 S. Ct. 711, 719.) However, the Supreme Court has also applied Miranda to situations where a prison inmate was questioned concerning a matter unrelated to the offense for which he was imprisoned.

In Mathis v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381, 88 S. Ct. 1503, the Court held that incriminating statements made to an Internal Revenue agent by a prison inmate were inadmissible. However, Federal courts interpreting Mathis have rejected the proposition that any interrogation during prison confinement constitutes custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes. To do so would “create a per se rule that *** could totally disrupt prison administration.” (Cervantes v. Walker (9th Cir. 1978), 589 F.2d 424, 427.) Such a rule would torture Miranda “to the illogical position of providing greater protection to a prisoner than to his nonimprisoned counterpart.” (Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 427.) In United States v. Conley (4th Cir. 1985), 779 F.2d 970, 973, the court emphasized that nothing in Miranda suggests that an inmate is “in custody” and thus entitled to Miranda warnings merely by virtue of his prisoner status. To interpret the Mathis decision in such a way “would seriously disrupt prison administration by requiring, as a prudential measure, formal warnings prior to many of the myriad informal conversations between inmates and prison guards which may touch on past or future criminal activity and which may yield potentially incriminating statements useful at trial.” Conley, 779 F.2d at 973.

In Baxter v. Palmigiano (1976), 425 U.S. 308, 47 L. Ed. 2d 810, 96 S. Ct. 1551, the Court rejected the contention that, under Miranda, counsel must be provided at prison disciplinary hearings which are not part of a criminal prosecution. And, in a more recent ruling which further limits Miranda, the Court determined that a law enforcement officer posing as a fellow inmate was not required to give Miranda warnings to a suspect before asking questions that might have led to an incriminating response. (Illinois v. Perkins (1990), 496 U.S. 292, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243, 110 S. Ct. 2394.) In reaching its decision, the Court pointed out that the inmate had no reason to feel that the undercover agent had any legal authority to force him to answer questions or that the agent could affect the inmate’s future treatment. Parenthetically, the Court remarked that “[tjhe bare fact of custody may not in every instance require a warning even when the suspect is aware that he is speaking to an official, but we do not have occasion to explore that issue here.” Perkins, 496 U.S. at 299, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 252, 110 S. Ct. at 2398.

The State contends that defendant was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes. Since a prisoner is never free to leave, to apply Miranda standards would be tantamount to a per se finding of custody for prison inmates. (Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 427.) The coercive effects that Miranda found to be associated with custodial interrogation arise in the prison context only if an inmate’s liberty is limited beyond the usual conditions of his confinement. Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 427.

Defendant asserts that he was in custody when speaking with Irvin, as he had experienced a change of circumstances which further limited his freedom of movement. Thus, we first address the question of whether defendant, while in Irvin’s office, was “in custody,” within the meaning of Miranda.

Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been deprived of his freedom in any significant way. (People v. Brown (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 116, 124, citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723, 86 S. Ct. at 1627-28.) Federal courts have found that incarceration is not in itself custody. (Cervantes, 589 F.2d 424; United States v. Cooper (4th Cir. 1986), 800 F.2d 412; Leviston v. Black (8th Cir. 1988), 843 F.2d 302; United States v. Rogers (10th Cir. 1990), 899 F.2d 917.) The test in identifying police custody is whether there is a restraint on the defendant’s freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Brown, 136 Ill. 2d at 124, citing California v. Beheler (1983), 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275, 1279, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520.

The determination of whether an interrogation is custodial requires an examination of all the circumstances surrounding the questioning. Among the factors to be considered are: the location, length, mood and mode of the interrogation; the number of police officers present; any evidence of restraint; and the intentions of the officers and focus of their investigation. (People v. Lucas (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 399, 417.) No single factor is determinative. (People v. Fasse (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 457, 461.) The trial court must examine and weigh these factors and then make an objective determination as to what a reasonable man would perceive if he were in the defendant’s position. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d at 417-18.

Defendant points out that his placement in segregation had limited his freedom of movement to the greatest extent possible within the prison. He was put in restraints whenever leaving his cell, and his handcuffs were not removed during the interview with Irvin.

Defendant’s argument assumes that the limitation of freedom imposed on him by his segregation was a particular limitation on him at the time of his interview with Irvin. However, defendant had been in segregation for the two previous months. Thus, when he was taken to Irvin’s office, defendant’s freedom of movement was increased rather than further limited.

Defendant notes that inmates refer to their cells as their “homes.” The inference is that, by being taken from his familiar cell to Irvin’s unfamiliar office, defendant’s freedom had been further limited, as is the case when a free man is taken from his home to the station house for questioning. However, defendant fails to consider that he could have requested to leave Irvin’s office; he could not have requested to leave his cell had the questioning taken place there. Thus, in that sense, defendant’s freedom was greater in the office than in his own cell.

Although defendant was escorted to the interview in restraints, his handcuffs did not place any greater burden on his freedom at that time than when he was taken in handcuffs to shower or exercise. The only factor relating to defendant’s questioning which further limited his freedom of movement was that he remained in handcuffs during the interview. Irvin has testified that handcuffs are sometimes removed from prisoners whom he questions in his office. Defendant has not alleged, in response, that he asked for his handcuffs to be removed during the interview. In light of all the circumstances related above, we conclude that defendant’s freedom of movement was not more severely restricted during the interview than it had been previously. Moreover, even where an individual is taken into custody, it is only when he is subjected to interrogation that Miranda protection must be provided. Rhode Island v. Innis (1979), 446 U.S. 291, 300, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 307, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689.

“ ‘Interrogation,’ as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” (Innis, 446 U.S. at 300, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 307, 100 S. Ct. at 1689.) “Interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning but also to any words or actions on the part of police officers that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90.

Defendant contends that Irvin, acting as an agent of the police, attempted to elicit incriminating statements from him as to whether defendant could mount a necessity defense to potential weapons charges. However, Irvin did not know at the time that any such charges were contemplated. Defendant acknowledges that the questions posed by Irvin were also designed to determine whether defendant wished or needed to be placed in protective custody. Nevertheless, defendant asserts that Irvin’s motives were not benign.

Defendant’s arguments are similar to those brought by the defendant in Minnesota v. Murphy (1984), 465 U.S. 420, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409, 104 S. Ct. 1136. Murphy was concerned with the admissibility in a subsequent criminal prosecution of statements made by a probationer to his probation officer. The Court found that the mere fact that the probation officer could compel the probationer’s attendance and truthful answers did not transform a routine interview into an inherently coercive setting. (Murphy, 465 U.S. at 431, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 422, 104 S. Ct. at 1144.) In answer to the probationer’s objection that the probation officer consciously sought incriminating evidence, the Court emphasized that this factor does not give rise to a self-executing privilege; police officers questioning persons suspected of crimes often seek incriminating statements. (Murphy, 465 U.S. at 431, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 422, 104 S. Ct. at 1144.) When the probationer protested that he was unprepared for the officer's questions and should have been represented by counsel, the Court likened the situation to the questioning of grand jury witnesses who are unaware of the scope of an investigation or of the fact that they are considered potential defendants. A reasonable person should have expected that his answers could incriminate him. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 432, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 422, 104 S. Ct. at 1144-45.

Here, defendant, like the probationer in Murphy, does not deny that Irvin’s questions were legitimately related to defendant’s needs. Moreover, defendant, like the probationer, was not led to believe that his questioning would continue until some sort of confession was obtained. The Supreme Court found that the probationer’s statements were not coerced. Applying the Court’s criteria to this case, we find that defendant similarly was not coerced in making his statements to Irvin.

The purpose of Irvin’s questioning was to determine whether defendant’s possession of the shanks was in response to fear of an attack by fellow inmates. Thus, Irvin restricted his questioning to inquiries about defendant’s safety concerns. He did not try to elicit any incriminating response from defendant. That defendant’s answers were later released to the State’s Attorney for use at trial does not in itself demonstrate that the questioning was within the scope of Miranda protection.

Further, Irvin’s office was not an inherently coercive environment. No police officers were present during the interview, and Irvin was not wearing a uniform. Although defendant could have received a ticket for refusing to speak with Irvin, as he could have been given a ticket for any refusal to comply with orders given by a guard, Irvin himself had no power to impose such a disciplinary measure. Moreover, there is no indication in the record that tickets had ever been "written in similar circumstances.

Irvin spoke with defendant for only 10 minutes. During the 10-minute interview, Irvin put no physical or psychological pressure on defendant to answer in one way or another. A reasonable man in defendant’s position would not have thought that his will was being subjugated to that of his questioner.

After examining all the factors noted above, we find that defendant was not “in custody,” and was not coerced into incriminating himself during his interview with Irvin. Because there was no coercion, the concerns underlying Miranda are not implicated in this case. Thus, defendant’s statements should have been admitted at trial.

A court of review should leave in place the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress unless it is manifestly erroneous. (People v. Brown (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 116, 125.) Here, the trial court found that defendant was entitled to Miranda warnings because he was the primary suspect and an investigation had focused on him. It is the element of coercion rather than the mere focus of an investigation that calls Miranda safeguards into play. (Beckwith v. United States (1976), 425 U.S. 341, 347, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1, 8, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 1616.) Thus, finding the circuit court’s ruling to be manifestly erroneous, we reverse.

The appellate court rejected the reasoning of the circuit court, but affirmed its ruling on the grounds that defendant was interrogated while in custody. Because we find that defendant did not experience the sort of custodial interrogation contemplated by Miranda, we reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts, and remand the cause to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellate court reversed; circuit court reversed; cause remanded.