People v. Elliott

2014 IL 115308IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 115308)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DAVID K.
ELLIOTT, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 24, 2014.
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis
concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, David Elliott, was convicted of driving on a suspended license (625
ILCS 5/6-303 (West 2008)). He appealed, arguing that the conviction was improper
because the statutory summary suspension upon which it was based had been
rescinded. The appellate court agreed and vacated defendant’s conviction. 2012 IL App
(5th) 100584. We now reverse the appellate court and reinstate the conviction.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 On August 26, 2009, defendant was arrested in Jackson County for driving under
the influence (625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2008)). In connection with that arrest,
defendant was also given notice of the statutory summary suspension of his driver’s
license (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2008)). On September 1, 2009, defendant filed a
petition to rescind the summary suspension.
¶4 On October 11, 2009, defendant’s statutory summary suspension commenced. Two
days later, on October 13, 2009, defendant was pulled over in Perry County and issued
a citation for driving on a suspended license (625 ILCS 5/6-303 (West 2008)).
¶5 On October 19, 2009, the circuit court of Jackson County entered an order granting
defendant’s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. Four days later, on
October 23, 2009, the Illinois Secretary of State entered a notice and order of
rescission, thereby removing the statutory summary suspension from defendant’s
driving record.
¶6 Thereafter, defendant filed a motion in the circuit court of Perry County seeking to
dismiss the pending citation for driving on a suspended license. In support, defendant
argued that, because the circuit court of Jackson County had rescinded the statutory
summary suspension upon which the driving on a suspended license citation was
based, that citation no longer had a valid legal basis and therefore had to be dismissed.
The circuit court of Perry County rejected defendant’s argument and denied the motion
to dismiss. A bench trial followed, and defendant was found guilty of driving on a
suspended license.
¶7 Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed. 2012 IL App (5th) 100584.
In doing so, the appellate court noted that, under section 2-118.1(b) of the Illinois
Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2008)), a trial court has only
two dispositional options when it comes to a statutory summary suspension-it may
“rescind” the suspension or it may “sustain” the suspension. 2012 IL App (5th) 100584,
¶ 15. From there, the appellate court explained that “[t]he act of rescinding is not
simply to terminate.” Id. ¶ 16. Rather, “[b]oth common usage and the operation of the
term in legal proceedings impute an intention to undo an action so that it never
existed.” Id. Consequently, when the circuit court of Jackson County rescinded
defendant’s statutory summary suspension in this case, that suspension did not simply
terminate going forward; rather, it became as though it never happened. And because
the statutory summary suspension never happened, there was no longer any valid basis
for charging defendant in Perry County with driving on a suspended license.
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the circuit court of Perry County’s judgment
and vacated defendant’s conviction. Id. ¶ 42.
¶8 The State appealed to this court, and we allowed the State’s petition for leave to
appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).
2
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Driving on a suspended license is committed when a person “drives or is in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such
person’s driver’s license *** is revoked or suspended as provided by [the Code].” 625
ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2008). Here, no one disputes that the statutory summary
suspension of defendant’s driver’s license commenced on October 11, 2009. Nor does
anyone dispute that, just two days later, and six days prior to the circuit court of
Jackson County’s order rescinding defendant’s statutory summary suspension,
defendant was pulled over in Perry County and charged with driving on a suspended
license. In other words, no one disputes that the charge in this case arises from conduct
that occurred after the commencement of but before the rescission of defendant’s
statutory summary suspension. The only issue, then, is whether the subsequent order of
rescission renders that charge invalid. We hold that it does not.
¶ 11 The issue before us is one of statutory construction. When construing a statute, this
court’s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent,
keeping in mind that the best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the statutory
language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510,
¶ 25. In determining the plain meaning of the statute, we consider both the subject the
statute addresses and the legislative purpose in enacting it. Id. Because the construction
of a statute is a question of law, our review is de novo. Id.¶ 12 As both parties recognize, the key to resolving the issue at hand is ascertaining what
the legislature intended when it deployed the term “rescind” in section 12-118.1 of the
Code. Unfortunately, the legislature provides us with little guidance on this question.
Though section 1 of the Code contains an extensive catalog of defined terms, “rescind”
is not among them. At the same time, “rescind” is a term that enjoys numerous
meanings both inside and outside the legal context, and consequently we cannot simply
presume that the legislature intended the term’s “commonly understood” meaning, as
such a meaning does not exist. We are therefore left no choice but to consider the range
of possible definitions for “rescind” and assess which of these definitions best
comports with the public policy purpose of the statutory summary suspension law, as
this court has understood it.
¶ 13 Beginning with the dictionary definitions, we see quickly that “rescind” can have
either prospective or retroactive meaning, depending upon the particular definition and
the context. Webster’s, for example, defines “rescind” as both “to do away with : take
3
away : REMOVE” and “to abrogate (a contract) by tendering back or restoring to the
opposite party what one has received from him.” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 1930 (2002). The first of these definitions clearly connotes an act with only
prospective effect, while the second of these definitions connotes an act with
retroactive effect. Similarly, Webster’s defines “rescission” as both “an act of cutting
off” and “an act of rescinding, annulling, or vacating or of cancelling or abrogating (as
by restoring to another party to a contract or transaction what one has received from
him).” Id. Again, the first of these definitions clearly connotes an act with only
prospective effect, while the second of these definitions connotes an act with
retroactive effect. Finally, we see that Black’s Law Dictionary defines “rescind” both
as “abrogate,” a term that suggests retroactive effect, and “cancel,” a term that suggests
prospective effect. Black’s Law Dictionary 1420 (9th ed. 2009). In short, rather than
resolve the issue at hand, the dictionaries simply underscore the problem.
¶ 14 In the same way, we see that the Illinois legislature is inconsistent in its use of the
term “rescind,” sometimes intending a retroactive meaning while other times intending
only a prospective meaning. For example, section 5(b) of the Life Care Facilities Act
provides that:
“any person entering into [a life care contract] shall have a period of 14 days
beginning with the first full calendar day following the execution of the
contract, or the payment of an initial sum of money as a deposit or application
fee, or receipt of the financial disclosure statement, whichever occurs last,
within which to rescind the life care contract without penalty or further
obligation. In the event of such rescission, all money or property paid or
transferred by such person shall be fully refunded.” 210 ILCS 40/5(b) (West
2008).
¶ 15 Clearly, in this context, “rescind” is meant to have a retroactive meaning, as the
consequence of a rescission is to undo the life care contract in its entirety and to restore
the parties to their previous positions as if the contract had never been executed. By
contrast, in section 108A-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS
5/108A-1 (West 2008)), the legislature uses the term “rescind” in a way that just as
clearly is meant to have only a prospective meaning. That section, which governs the
authorization for use of eavesdropping devices by law enforcement, states:
“The Chief Judge of the circuit may assign to associate judges the power to
issue orders authorizing or approving the use of eavesdropping devices by law
4
enforcement officers or agencies in accordance with this Article. After
assignment by the Chief Judge, an associate judge shall have plenary authority
to issue such orders without additional authorization for each specific
application made to him by the State’s Attorney until such time as the associate
judge’s power is rescinded by the Chief Judge.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS
5/108A-1(West 2008).
¶ 16 In this context, “rescind” is clearly meant to have only a prospective meaning, as the
legislature’s intent is not to retroactively strip a duly assigned associate judge of his or
her authority to issue eavesdropping orders, thereby invalidating any such orders that
were entered during the time that the judge possessed such authority. Rather, the
obvious intent of this provision is to remove that authority going forward, so that no
further eavesdropping orders are entered without the express approval and oversight of
the chief judge. 1
¶ 17 So once again we see that, depending upon the context, and even within the pages
of the Illinois Compiled Statutes itself, “rescind” can have either a retroactive meaning
or a prospective-only meaning. The challenge for us, then, is to determine which of
these two meanings the legislature intended in the context of statutory summary
suspensions—the retroactive one, as in section 5 of the Life Care Facilities Act, or the
prospective-only one, as in section 108A-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For
several reasons, we are convinced it is the prospective-only one.
¶ 18 To begin with, a prospective-only reading of “rescind” best comports with the
public policy that informs the statutory summary suspension statute, as previously
expressed by this court. Section 11-501.1 of the Code authorizes the Secretary of State
to summarily suspend the driver’s license of any motorist arrested for DUI who refuses
to submit to chemical testing, tests above the legal alcohol concentration limit, or tests
positive for an intoxicating substance. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(d) (West 2002). In People
v. McClure, 218 Ill. 2d 375, 379 (2006), this court explained that “the issuance of a
statutory summary suspension protects the public from impaired drivers and swiftly
removes them from our roadways” (emphasis added). See also People v. Moore, 138
Ill. 2d 162, 166-67 (1990) (statutory summary suspension “serve[s] the salutary
purpose of promptly removing impaired drivers from the road”). In other words, the
1
The dictionary entries cited above and provisions such as section 108A-1 undermine the sole
premise informing the appellate court’s analysis below, namely that “[b]oth common usage and the
operation of the term in legal proceedings impute an intention to undo an action so that it never existed.”
2012 IL App (5th) 100584, ¶ 16.
5
purpose of statutory summary suspension is to ensure that drivers charged with DUI are
removed from the roads not just hopefully or eventually, but certainly and swiftly. A
prospective-only reading of “rescind” accomplishes this purpose far better than a
retroactive one. This is because, under a prospective-only reading, a person who drives
on a suspended license is subject to criminal penalties irrespective of whether the
suspension is subsequently rescinded. In other words, under a prospective-only
reading, the illegality of driving on a suspended license is certain. By contrast, under a
retroactive reading, a person who drives on a suspended license is subject to criminal
penalties only if the suspension is subsequently sustained. In other words, under a
retroactive reading, the illegality of driving on a suspended license is contingent. The
question therefore becomes, if the public policy that informs statutory summary
suspension is to remove affected drivers from the roads as swiftly and as effectively as
possible, which of the two readings of “rescind” is more likely to bring this about—the
one that makes criminal culpability for driving on a suspended license certain, or the
one that makes it merely possible? Clearly, it is the reading that makes criminal
culpability certain, as drivers who know that driving on a suspended license is a crime
irrespective of any future rescission are less likely to drive on a suspended license than
are those who believe there is a chance of escaping criminal culpability for such
conduct via rescission.
¶ 19 Second, a prospective-only reading of “rescind” best comports with other
provisions of the Code relating to statutory summary suspensions. For example, section
2-118.1 of the Code states, inter alia, that a pending petition to rescind “shall not stay
or delay the statutory summary suspension.” 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2008). As
our appellate court has correctly recognized, “[t]his section implies a general
legislative intent that suspensions shall remain in full force and effect until proven to be
invalid.” (Emphasis added.) See People v. Focia, 287 Ill. App. 3d 767, 769 (1997).
Similarly, the driving on a suspended license statute makes it a crime for a person to
“drive[ ] or [be] in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this
State at a time when such person’s driver’s license *** is revoked or suspended as
provided by this Code or the law of another state.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS
5/6-303 (West 2008). The legislature’s use of the phrase “at a time when” suggests that
the dispositive fact in determining whether this offense has occurred is not the ultimate
validity of the underlying suspension but rather the existing status of the driver’s
license at the time of the arrest. This, too, supports a reading of “rescind” that is
prospective-only.
6
¶ 20 Third, a prospective-only reading of “rescind” best comports with this court’s
long-standing presumption that, when enacting a statute, the legislature does not intend
to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 2011 IL
110615, ¶ 15. Again, in section 11-501.1 of the Code, the legislature created a
mechanism for summarily suspending the driver’s license of a person charged with
DUI. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2008). And in section 6-303 of the Code, the
legislature then made it a crime for any person to drive or be in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle “at a time when” such person’s driver’s license is suspended. 625
ILCS 5/6-303 (West 2008). A prospective-only reading of “rescind” makes this
legislative scheme very easy and very convenient to enforce, as there is only one
question to ask–what was the actual status of the driver’s license at the time of the
arrest, valid or suspended? The answer to this question will never change and will be
readily available to the driver, to the officer on the scene, and to the court charged with
adjudicating the offense. In other words, a prospective-only reading of “rescind” builds
certainty and efficiency into the system. By contrast, a retroactive reading of “rescind”
introduces both inefficiency and uncertainty into the system, thereby making the
enforcement and administration of this very same legislative scheme highly
inconvenient. Consider a driver such as defendant in this case, who is pulled over for
driving while his statutory summary suspension is in effect and charged with driving on
a suspended license. And then consider that this same driver’s petition to rescind is
granted by the circuit court, that the circuit court is then reversed on appeal 18 months
later by the appellate court, which is then reversed two years later by this court. Under
a retroactive reading of “rescind,” how is this driver’s driving on a suspended license
charge possibly adjudicated with any degree of economy, certainty, or convenience, as
the facts underlying that charge remain in a perpetual state of flux and are nothing short
of a judicial moving target? No, the far better policy flows from the conclusion we
already have reached, namely, that in relation to the crime of driving on a suspended
license, the rescission of a statutory summary suspension is of prospective effect only.
¶ 21 Finally, we note that a prospective-only reading of the term “rescind” is consistent
with the way this court has characterized the statutory summary suspension scheme in
previous decisions. In McClure, this court explained the process by which a driver
challenges a statutory summary suspension and, in doing so, stated that a driver seeking
to have the statutory summary suspension rescinded must file a petition “stat[ing]
grounds upon which the summary suspension should be lifted.” (Emphasis added.)
McClure, 218 Ill. 2d at 380. Now admittedly, in McClure, this court was not
adjudicating whether, for purposes of statutory summary suspension, the term
7
“rescind” should be given a retroactive meaning or a prospective-only meaning.
Nevertheless, this court’s use of the term “lifted” in this context betrays an assumption
that the legal consequences of rescission would be prospective-only and would not
reach back to the time of arrest. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1011 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining “lift” as “[t]o stop or put an end to”). This assumption was correct, and what
we assumed in McClure we now confirm today.
¶ 22 CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that, in relation to the crime of driving
on a suspended license, the rescission of a statutory summary suspension is of
prospective effect only. Defendant’s conviction for that crime in this case was proper,
and we therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of
the circuit court.
¶ 24 Appellate court judgment reversed.
¶ 25 Circuit court judgment affirmed.
8