Muldrow v. Barron

2021 IL App (1st) 210248FIRST DISTRICT
FIRST DIVISION
May 10, 2021
No. 1-21-0248
KENNETH MULDROW JR., ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Cook County
)
v. ) No. 2021 COEL 0013
)
WILLIAM BARRON, RONDAL JONES, and ) Honorable
THOMAS JACONETTY, in Their Capacities as ) James R. Carroll,
Members of the Markham Municipal Officers ) Judge Presiding.
Electoral Board; SANDRA CURTIS; and )
KAREN YARBROUGH, in Her Capacity as the )
Cook County Clerk, )
)
Respondents-Appellees. )
JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Walker and Justice Pierce concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In this election case, petitioner, Kenneth Muldrow Jr., appeals the Municipal Officers
Electoral Board for the City of Markham’s (Board) decision striking his name from the ballot as
an independent candidate for the office of mayor of the City of Markham (City) in the April 6,
2021, consolidated general election. On appeal, Muldrow claims that his name as an independent
candidate should appear on the ballot because there was no evidence of fraud, false swearing, and
total disregard for the mandatory requirements of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West
2018)) in his nomination papers. We affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 On December 21, 2020, Muldrow filed nomination papers to be included on the ballot as
an independent candidate for election to the office of mayor at the April 6, 2021, consolidated
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general election. Muldrow’s nomination papers included “45 pages of 15-line petition sheets
containing a potential of 675 signatures of purported qualified voters of the City.” To be included
on the April 6, 2021, ballot as a mayoral candidate, an independent candidate “must present
nominating petitions containing not less tha[n] 96 and no more than 154 signatures of duly
qualified and registered votes of the City.”
¶4 Sandra Curtis (objector) filed an “Objector’s Petition” against Muldrow’s nomination
papers, raising signature and circulator-based objections. As to the signature objections, she
alleged that the nomination papers contained forged signatures and included the names of
individuals who were not registered voters or did not reside in the City. As to the circulator-based
objections, she alleged that circulator affidavits were “false and constitute[d] a false swearing
because the purported circulator did not actually obtain, solicit, or witness the affixing of voters’
signatures to those sheets.”
¶5 On January 9, 2021, Muldrow filed a motion to recuse substitute chair Alderman William
Barron and member Alderman Rondal Jones and the Board’s law firm “based upon conflicts of
interest *** that create a bias that would not yield a fair and neutral decisions.” 1 Muldrow alleged
that the Board members were biased because they supported and made contributions to an
opposing candidate. He claimed that the Board’s law firm also supported the opposing candidate
and had previously represented and continued to represent that candidate.
¶6 At the January 13, 2021, public hearing, the Board ordered a “records examination” and
denied Muldrow’s motion to disqualify members of the Board and its law firm. During the next
public hearing on January 15, 2021, the Board granted the objector’s request for the issuance of
1
On January 7, 2021, the circuit court entered an order appointing Thomas Jaconetty “to serve as a
Public Member” on the Board “to conduct hearings with respect to objections filed by Sandra Curtis to the
nomination papers of Kenneth Muldrow Jr.” Jaconetty replaced a Board member who had submitted
candidate papers to run for the same office.
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subpoenas for witnesses to testify at the January 22, 2021, hearing. 2
¶7 The Board’s requested “records examination” revealed that Muldrow’s nomination papers
had 95 valid signatures, one less than the minimum signature requirement. Muldrow filed a
“Candidate’s Rule 8 Motion,” 3 objecting to the records examination results and seeking “further
review of the findings from the records exam.”
¶8 On Friday, January 22, 2021, at 6 p.m., the Board conducted a public evidentiary hearing
to address the objector’s petition and Muldrow’s Rule 8 motion. Muldrow offered affidavits to
rehabilitate individual signatures identified as invalid. The Board “determined that certain,
proposed affidavits were insufficient on their face and of little evidentiary weight and, therefore,
were excluded from the Electoral Board’s consideration.” However, based on the affidavits
admitted for the Board’s consideration, Muldrow succeeded in rehabilitating 2 signatures, bringing
the total number of valid signatures to 97, which was 1 above the required minimum of 96.
¶9 Regarding the objector’s claims, Muldrow was called to testify as an adverse witness.
Muldrow testified that he did not know a subpoena had been issued for certain named circulators,
including his nephew, personal friend David Walker, and other personal friends, and “absolutely
had no knowledge” that allegations were raised against those circulators that they engaged in
misconduct and a pattern of fraud related to the circulation of his petition sheets. Muldrow stated,
though, that he personally “asked them” to circulate petition sheets. He also testified that he was
2
“The purpose of the subpoena [was] to establish that such individuals engaged in the following
conduct: (i) filing of false circulator’s affidavit and continues a false swearing because the purported
circulator did not actually obtain, solicit or witness the affixing of voters’ signatures to those sheets in
violation of the Illinois Election Code; and (ii) engaging in a pattern of fraud and disregard of the Illinois
Election Code by the alleged circulators inclusion and submission of voters’ signatures which were not
signed by the voters in their own proper persons, but rather by one or a few individuals who simply printed
voters’ names or forged the voters’ signatures in a ‘roundtable’, printed or seriatim fashion. These actions
also include, without limitation, these circulators signing petitions as duly qualified voters multiple times
and the insertion of fake non-existent addresses alongside voter name.”
3
The “Rules of Procedure for the Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the City of Markham” were
adopted by the Board on January 7, 2021.
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“not sure” if someone checked the signatures and registrations, “did not know” who put his petition
sheets together, or who the identified circulators gave the petition sheets to that they circulated.
The Board found Muldrow’s “testimony to be incredible,” explaining that Muldrow, “a veteran
candidate, and experienced police officer does not reasonably have such little knowledge or
involvement with his own nominating petitions upon which his mayoral candidacy rests.”
¶ 10 At the conclusion of Muldrow’s testimony, the objector attempted to call circulator Walker
to testify and the following events transpired:
“CHAIR BARRON: Mr. Walker is here. He returned.
MR. LADUZINSKY [(OBJECTOR’S COUNSEL)]: Did he?
CHAIR BARRON: Yeah, he is here.
MR. FINKO [(MULDROW’S COUNSEL)]: He was not served to my knowledge.
CHAIR BARRON: Oh, so you are not here under subpoena?
MR. WALKER: No, I didn’t receive any. I’m just here for support.
***
MEMBER JACONETTY: All right. Wait a minute. Is the witness here who is under
subpoena?
MR. LADUZINSKY: Yes.
MR. FINKO: He is not under subpoena. He is not under subpoena. He has not been
served.
MR. JACONETTY: He was never served, but he was under subpoena. He was here
voluntarily.
CHAIR BARRON: And he just walked out on us.
***
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MEMBER JACONETTY: *** I’m saying that a witness who was under subpoena
who was in the objector’s petition who could not be served was here of his own volition in
this room and he can be called as a witness.
MR. SECLER [(BOARD’S COUNSEL)]: Absolutely.
MEMBER JACONETTY: So we would ask that, perhaps, the officer go and find
him.
***
MR. FINKO: I would object to that process. ***
MEMBER JACONETTY: The law does not favor evasion of process, and the
individual was here of his own free volition and was present in this hearing room. He has
exempted himself from here, and the officer can testify as to relevant facts concerning his
presence and leaving, and that is germane to the fact that the witness has decided not to
present himself when he knows he’s under subpoena.
***
MR. SECLER: Nor did he move to quash the subpoena.”
¶ 11 The City’s deputy chief of police Jack Genius testified as follows:
“Initially I was watching the proceedings as I was providing security, and I noticed
Mr. Walker come in. I know Mr. David Walker for several years. He sat down, and the
conversation proceeded. At one point the Board brought up that he was under subpoena,
and then he got up.
I was directed by the Board to ask him to come back and I walked out. I met him
outside the door as he was going to his car, and I explained to him, and he just said‒he
knew me and he said I got to go. And I’m saying that the Board is requesting him to come
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in and testify, that the Board has asked me to go and to ask him to come in. And the
gentleman over here, Mr. Price, told him: Please get in your car. Go home. Go home. Don’t
go in. *** Then he proceeded to go in his car and left.”
¶ 12 Over Muldrow’s objection, the Board passed a motion to “take an adverse finding on the
petitions that were circulated by David Walker,” explaining that based on Walker’s actions that
“we all witnessed,” there was “a very strong indication that, had he been called to testify, it would
have been adverse to his interests” and Muldrow’s position. The Board then struck nomination
petition page six circulated by Walker.
¶ 13 On January 27, 2021, the Board issued a unanimous written decision during an open
session ordering that Muldrow’s name “shall not appear on the ballot for the April 6, 2021
consolidated election.” In its written decision, the Board stated that it “ ‘cannot close its eyes and
ears’ to such an unusual and overt act to avoid having to testify about the petition circulation
process as demonstrated by David Walker” and to “ignore these facts would undermine the
integrity of the electoral process and cripple the ability of the Electoral Board to properly complete
its duties.” The Board explained that it found Muldrow had control over Walker 4 and it was entitled
to draw a negative inference from Walker’s failure to testify. Specifically, the Board found that:
“based on David Walker’s overt action to avoid testifying and the active fleeing of the
proceedings instead of complying with the subpoena issued for his testimony, that had Mr.
Walker testified, his testimony would have revealed a pervasive and systematic pattern of
fraud and false swearing in total disregard for the mandatory requirements of the Illinois
Election Code that would justify the striking of all petition sheets he circulated. This further
4
In reaching that conclusion, the Board relied, in part, on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil,
No. 5.01 (approved Dec. 8, 2011), which permits a jury to draw a negative inference from a party’s failure
to offer evidence or produce a witness within his or her control and ability to produce with the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
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bolstered by the Candidate’s own evasive, non-communicative, and incredible testimony.
Therefore, the Electoral Board SUSTAINS (3-0) the objections made in Paragraphs 13
through 15 of the Objector’s Petition with respect to the circulator, David Walker. The
Electoral Board finds that the Candidate’s nominating petitions contain not more than 91
valid signatures, which is 5 below the statutorily required minimum and, therefore, the
Electoral Board finds that Candidate’s Nomination Papers are INVALID.” (Emphases in
original.)
¶ 14 Muldrow filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision, which the circuit court
denied. This court granted Muldrow’s motion to expedite the appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 311(b) (eff. July 1, 2018). On March 15, 2021, Muldrow filed nominating papers as a
write-in candidate.
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Before turning to the merits, we must first address the objector’s claim that Muldrow’s
appeal is moot because he filed nomination papers to be included on the ballot as a write-in
candidate.
¶ 17 “A case on appeal becomes moot where the issues presented in the trial court no longer
exist because events subsequent to the filing of the appeal render it impossible for the reviewing
court to grant the complaining party effectual relief.” Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners,
2012 IL 111928, ¶ 28. “It is well established under Illinois law that the conclusion of an election
cycle normally moots an election contest.” Id. ¶ 36.
¶ 18 Here, filing nominating papers as an independent write-in candidate while litigation
concerning his candidacy as an independent was pending did not render Muldrow’s appeal moot
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because, as a write-in candidate, his name did not appear on the ballot. 5 See generally 10 ILCS
5/17-16.1 (West 2018) (“A candidate seeking election to an office for which candidates are
nominated at a primary election on a nonpartisan basis and who is defeated for his or her
nomination at the primary election is ineligible to file a declaration of intent to be a write-in
candidate for election in that general or consolidated election.”). Although the election has passed,
which generally renders an election contest moot, this case falls within the public interest exception
to the mootness doctrine. The public interest exception requires that (1) the question is of a public
nature, (2) an authoritative resolution will guide public officers, and (3) the question is likely to
recur. Bettis v. Marsaglia, 2014 IL 117050, ¶ 9. The issues raised in this appeal concern the
admissibility of affidavits for the purpose of rehabilitating signatures found to be invalid during a
records examination: whether it is permissible to draw a negative inference against a candidate for
failing to produce a circulator witness to testify before the Board and whether the Board has
standing to participate in judicial review proceedings. Questions relating to election law are
inherently a matter of public concern. Id. ¶ 11. In addition, since these issues are likely to recur,
an authoritative resolution is desirable to guide public officers.
¶ 19 Standards of Review
¶ 20 “As in any election dispute, we are mindful of the fact that ‘ballot [access] is a substantial
right and not to be lightly denied.’ ” Solomon v. Scholefield, 2015 IL App (1st) 150685, ¶ 16
(quoting Siegel v. Lake County Officers Electoral Board, 385 Ill. App. 3d 452, 460-61 (2008)).
Where a circuit court has reviewed an electoral board’s decision, we review the board’s decision
and not the decision of the circuit court. Burns v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board of the Village
of Elk Grove Village, 2020 IL 125714, ¶ 10.
5
The objector’s motion to dismiss the appeal taken with this case is denied.
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¶ 21 An electoral board is viewed as an administrative agency, and the applicable standard of
review depends on the type of question being reviewed. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal
Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 210 (2008). An electoral board’s “findings and
conclusions on questions of fact are deemed prima facie true and correct,” and we will not overturn
such findings on appeal unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Harned v.
Evanston Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 2020 IL App (1st) 200314, ¶ 12. A factual finding
is “against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.”
Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 210. A mixed question of fact and law is subject to the clearly erroneous
standard of review and is one in which “the historical facts are admitted or established, the
controlling rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory
standard.” Cunningham v. Schaeflein, 2012 IL App (1st) 120529, ¶ 19. A finding is “clearly
erroneous” “only where the reviewing court, on the entire record, is ‘left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of
Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395 (2001) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
¶ 22 Admission of Affidavits
¶ 23 Turning to the merits, Muldrow first argues that “[b]y denying Candidate the ability to
offer affidavits into evidence, and present argument based upon those affidavits, the Electoral
Board denied Candidate a meaningful opportunity to be heard, as allowed under the Electoral
Board’s Rule 8.”
¶ 24 Here, Board Rule 12 governs the admissibility of evidence, which provides that:
“The Board will consider such admissible evidence as may be submitted, including,
but not limited to, properly authenticated public records, affidavits, other documentary
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evidence, and oral testimony. In view of the fact, however, that the Board must hear and
pass upon objections within a limited time, extended examination and cross examination
of witnesses will not be permitted and is subject to the discretion of the Board.
The Board will, where practicable and appropriate, follow, but will not be bound
by, rules of evidence, procedure, and practice that prevail in Illinois courts of law including
the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure and the Rules of the Illinois Supreme Court.”
(Emphasis added.)
Although Muldrow argues that the excluded affidavits were relevant and the “Illinois Rules of
Evidence govern the admissibility of sworn testimony,” the Board was “not [ ] bound by” those
rules in determining admissibility of the affidavits. See Bergman v. Vachata, 347 Ill. App. 3d 339,
348 (2004) (electoral board rules “govern the admissibility of evidence before the Electoral
Board”). Muldrow also argues that the affidavits were in “substantial compliance” and admissible
to rehabilitate signatures, but the Board determined that the “proposed affidavits were insufficient
on their face and of little evidentiary weight,” noting that “[m]any of the proffered affidavits d[id]
not have anything written or printed by the affiant (or otherwise)” to provide an example of how
the voters printed and signed their names. Nothing in this record demonstrates that the Board’s
decision to exclude the identified affidavits offered to rehabilitate signatures was either against the
manifest weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous. See id. (the fact that a reviewing court would
rule differently on the validity of a signature did not justify reversal of the Board’s factual
findings).
¶ 25 Evidence of Fraud in Petition Papers
¶ 26 Muldrow also argues that the objector did not meet her burden of proof regarding the
allegations of fraud because she pled “conclusory allegations, without a single fact in support.” He
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claims that because there was “no clear and convincing evidence of fraud by any circulator
anywhere,” “it was improper for the Electoral Board to assume fraud” and it erred in “strik[ing] a
sheet from [his] petitions.”
¶ 27 Section 7-10 of the Election Code requires nomination papers to include a circulator’s
signed, sworn statement certifying “that the signatures on this sheet were signed in my presence,
and are genuine, and that to the best of my knowledge and belief the persons so signing were at
the time of signing the petitions qualified voters.” 10 ILCS 5/7-10 (West 2018); Cunningham,
2012 IL App (1st) 120529, ¶ 22. “The affidavit requirement is a mandatory requirement of the
Election Code,” and petition papers that fail to comply are invalid. Cunningham, 2012 IL App
(1st) 120529, ¶ 23; Crossman v. Board of Election Commissioners, 2012 IL App (1st) 120291,
¶ 11. The Board is entrusted to decide whether “the certificate of nomination *** or petitions on
file are valid or whether the objections thereto should be sustained.” 10 ILCS 5/10-10 (West 2018).
¶ 28 To begin with, the objector’s allegations of fraud and false swearing in her petition were
plead with specificity and were not conclusory or generic. 6 As to whether the allegations of fraud
and false swearing were proved by clear and convincing evidence, the Board found Muldrow’s
“testimony to be incredible” and that finding was “bolstered” by Walker’s “unusual and overt act
to avoid having to testify about the petition circulation process.” Despite having actual knowledge
that the Board had issued a subpoena for him to appear and testify, Walker abruptly left the hearing
room. When directed by the security officer to return to testify, he departed the premises at the
6
The objector pled, in part, that the nomination papers (1) “contain the names of persons who did
not sign said papers in their own persons, and said signatures [were] not genuine and [were] forgeries,”
(2) include the affidavits of six identified circulators that were “false and constitute[d] a false swearing
because the purported circulator did not actually obtain, solicit or witness the affixing of voters’ signatures,”
and (3) “demonstrate a pattern of fraud and disregard of the Election Code containing a high percentage of
not registered, not genuine signatures, out of district, incomplete addresses and duplicate signatures, to such
a degree that every sheet circulated by said individuals [was] invalid, and should be invalidated in order to
protect the integrity of the electoral process.” Attached to the petition was an appendix supporting the
objector’s allegations.
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behest of a Muldrow ally. See Canter v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 170 Ill. App. 3d
364, 370 (1988) (negative inference from subpoenaed circulator’s refusal to testify upheld). Based
on these events, the Board permissibly drew a negative inference against Muldrow.
¶ 29 We will not substitute our judgment for that of the Board on its credibility assessment of
Muldrow’s testimony and determination of the weight of the evidence. Crossman, 2012 IL App
(1st) 120291, ¶ 14; Bergman, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 347-48. Moreover, this court has previously
recognized that the Board “ ‘cannot close its eyes and ears if evidence is relevant to the protection
of the electoral process,’ ” which is particularly relevant in this case where the Board witnessed
“explicit conduct demonstrating utter and contemptuous disregard for the law.” Fortas v. Dixon,
122 Ill. App. 3d 697, 701 (1984); see Canter, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 368 (circulator’s refusal to “testify
supports the board’s finding that improper methods were used to collect the signatures”); Daniel
v. Daly, 2015 IL App (1st) 150544, ¶ 33 (“the Board permissibly drew a negative inference that
petitioner’s failure to appear and testify was because petitioner would have offered testimony
detrimental to the success of his objection”).
¶ 30 Based on this record, the Board’s finding that petition sheet number six, circulated by
Walker, evidenced “a pattern of fraud, false swearing, and total disregard for the requirements” of
the Election Code was not error under any standard of review. See Crossman, 2012 IL App (1st)
120291, ¶ 11 (“Where the signature sheets of a nominating petition submitted by a circulator
evidence a pattern of fraud, false swearing, and total disregard for the requirements of the Code,
the sheets circulated by that individual should be stricken in their entirety.”); Harmon v. Town of
Cicero Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1111, 1116 (2007) (the Board may
refuse to count signatures witnessed by the circulator where there was evidence questioning the
circulator’s honesty); Huskey v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the Village of Oak Lawn,
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156 Ill. App. 3d 201, 205 (1987) (circulator’s pattern of disregard for the mandatory requirements
of the Election Code that affected the integrity of the political process denied candidate’s place on
the ballot). Therefore, the evidence in the record supports the Board’s finding that Muldrow’s
nomination papers were invalid, resulting in his name being stricken from the election ballot.
¶ 31 Board Member Recusal
¶ 32 Muldrow argues that reversal of the Board’s decision is warranted because the “Board
denied [him] due process by denying his request to recuse and appoint three public members.”
Essentially, he claims that his nominating papers were not considered by a fair and impartial
tribunal.
¶ 33 Under section 10-9 of the Election Code, “municipal officers electoral board *** hear and
pass upon objections to the nomination of candidates for officers of municipalities.” 10 ILCS 5/10-
9(3) (West 2018).“[I]t is indeed a well-settled principle of law that concepts of due process apply
to administrative hearings, and the parties are guaranteed the right to a fair and impartial tribunal.”
Girot v. Keith, 212 Ill. 2d 372, 380 (2004). Generally, a board member is subject to disqualification
and substitution where he or she (1) is a “candidate for the office with relation to which the
objector’s petition is filed” (10 ILCS 5/10-9 (West 2018)), (2) would be a necessary witness at the
objection hearing and subject to assessing his or her own credibility (Girot, 212 Ill. 2d at 379-80),
or (3) holds “a pecuniary/financial interest in the outcome” (Zurek v. Franklin Park Officers
Electoral Board, 2014 IL App (1st) 142618, ¶¶ 87 (citing Anderson v. McHenry Township, 289
Ill. App. 3d 830, 833 (1997))). Muldrow raised none of these reasons as a basis for recusal.
¶ 34 Here, Muldrow moved to disqualify Board members 7 based upon allegations of political
bias. This case is analogous to Ryan v. Landek, 159 Ill. App. 3d 10, 13 (1987), and In re Objection
7
On appeal, Muldrow’s arguments for disqualification did not include the Board’s law firm.
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of Cook, 122 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1072 (1984), where this court rejected the candidate-objector’s
claim that “the board refused to afford him a fair, impartial and unbiased hearing” raising grounds
of political bias. Landek, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 12. The Landek court adopted Cook’s reasoning that
a candidate-objector did not have an implied right to substitute board members whenever a
candidate-objector feels a conflict was present and instead was limited to the relief provided by
the statute. See id. at 13 (“[t]he statutory provisions allowing substitution under particular
circumstances and judicial review adequately insure an objector a fair hearing”). Similar to Landek
and Cook, Muldrow failed to overcome a presumption of honesty of the Board members based on
political bias. See also Ayers v. Martin, 223 Ill. App. 3d 397, 400 (1991); see Girot, 212 Ill. 2d at
380-81 (“ ‘[t]o prove bias, the plaintiff must overcome a presumption of honesty by showing in
the record that the administrative proceedings were either tainted by dishonesty or contained an
unacceptable risk of bias’ ” (emphasis in original)). Therefore, reversal of the Board’s findings
was not warranted on this basis.
¶ 35 Board’s Brief
¶ 36 In his final claim, Muldrow argues that the Board “as an entity has no standing to
participate in the petition for judicial review, or this appeal.”
¶ 37 We will not address Muldrow’s claim that the Board was not entitled to file a memorandum
during the judicial review proceedings because, in this administrative review action, we review the
Board proceedings and not the trial court proceedings. As to the proceedings in this court, we
granted the Board’s request to join the objector’s brief because Alderman Barron, Alderman Jones,
and Jaconetty were each named and served in their official capacities as members of the Board.
See Zurek, 2014 IL App (1st) 142618, ¶ 55 (the Board as a nominal defendant “should have
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standing to file a brief”); Muldrow v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Markham,
2019 IL App (1st) 190345, ¶ 14. The Board did not file a separate brief in this matter.
¶ 38 CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Board’s decision that Muldrow’s name “shall not
appear on the ballot for the April 6, 2021 Consolidated Election.”
¶ 40 Affirmed.
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No. 1-21-0248
Cite as: Muldrow v. Barron, 2021 IL App (1st) 210248Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2021-COEL-
0013; the Hon. James R. Carroll, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Andrew Finko, of Chicago, for appellant.
for
Appellant:
Attorneys Steven M. Laduzinsky and Natalie Wilkins, of Laduzinsky &
for Associates, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee Sandra Curtis.
Appellee:
Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Marie
D. Spicuzza, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel),
for appellee Karen Yarbrough.
Burton S. Odelson and Ross D. Secler, of Odelson, Sterk,
Murphey, Frazier & McGrath, Ltd., of Evergreen Park, for other
appellees.
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