People v. Messina

FILED
NOTICE 2022 IL App (4th) 200195-U January 13, 2022
This Order was filed under
Carla Bender
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
not precedent except in the NO. 4-20-0195 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Clark County
THOMAS C. MESSINA, ) No. 14CF21
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Tracy W. Resch,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant’s pro se
postconviction petition.
¶2 On March 17, 2020, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant Thomas C.
Messina’s postconviction petition during the first stage of proceedings under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-7 (West 2020)). Defendant appeals,
arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition because he stated the gist of a
constitutional claim his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) based on the facts in this case. We affirm the
summary dismissal of defendant’s petition.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On February 26, 2014, the State charged defendant with three counts of first
degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1),(2) (West 2014)), alleging he caused the death of Gregory
Scott Collins on January 14, 2014. On August 8, 2014, the State filed additional charges against
defendant, including aggravated arson (720 ILCS 5/20-1.1 (West 2014)), residential arson (720
ILCS 5/20-1(b) (West 2014)), unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a)
(West 2014)), and aggravated cruelty to animals (510 ILCS 70/3.02(a) (West 2014)). Defendant
was 19 years old at the time the charged offenses occurred. On January 9, 2015, when defendant
was 20 years old, he entered an open guilty plea to one count of first degree murder. Before
accepting the plea, the trial court asked about the terms of the plea. Defense counsel responded
the State had agreed to a sentencing range of between 20 to 60 years, noting:
“There are possibilities for extended term up to 100 years or life based on factors.
We are under the understanding that neither the aggravated factors nor the
extended term apply, and therefore, the range would be 20 to 60 years.”
The State told the court the extended term provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections were
not applicable. The State agreed the sentencing range on the open plea would be 20 to 60 years.
¶5 The trial court admonished defendant with regard to his open guilty plea, telling
defendant the court would sentence him to a term of imprisonment between 20 and 60 years
based on all relevant information presented to it at the sentencing hearing including evidence in
aggravation and mitigation, information in the presentence investigation report, any statement in
allocution defendant wished to make, arguments of both the State and defense counsel, and
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. The court told defendant the sentence imposed
might be more harsh or more lenient than the recommendations made by the State and/or defense
counsel. The court also informed defendant he would not be eligible for probation or conditional
discharge, would be required to serve 100% of his sentence, and would have to serve a three-year
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period of mandatory supervised release. Defendant makes no argument with regard to the
court’s admonishments and does not argue his plea was not knowing and voluntary.
¶6 The State indicated it would present evidence at trial defendant entered the home
of Gregory Scott Collins on January 14, 2014, and intentionally and without lawful justification
stabbed Collins multiple times with a knife causing Collins’s death. The trial court found a
factual basis existed for defendant’s plea. Further, the court found defendant’s plea was knowing
and voluntary. The court ordered the probation office to prepare a presentence investigation
report and set a sentencing hearing for April 10, 2015.
¶7 On April 9, 2015, defendant and the State informed the trial court they had
reached an agreement as to defendant’s sentence. Defendant agreed to a prison sentence of 45
years to be served in its entirety with credit for 408 days previously served. For the record, the
court indicated defendant previously entered an open guilty plea to one count of first degree
murder. The court also noted a presentence investigation report had been filed on March 2,
2015, and supplements to the report were filed on March 13, March 23, and March 24, 2015.
Further, the court indicated it had read the report and the supplements in preparation for the
scheduled sentencing hearing set for the next day. The court then explained to defendant what
would occur at a sentencing hearing if defendant did not enter into the agreement as to his
sentence. The court told defendant what the sentencing range would be if defendant chose to
have the court sentence him and told defendant he would have to serve the entire sentence
imposed by the court. Defendant stated he understood.
¶8 The trial court then stated the negotiated agreement would require defendant to
serve a fixed term of 45 years in prison with credit for 408 days previously served and defendant
would be responsible for $603 in court costs and $5104 in medical expenses incurred while in
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custody. Defendant indicated this was the agreement. The court found defendant was
knowingly and voluntarily entering into the sentencing agreement and waiving his right to
present mitigating evidence. In addition, the court found the sentencing agreement was
appropriate and concurred in the negotiation. The court sentenced defendant pursuant to the
agreed terms and admonished defendant of his appeal rights. Defense counsel then verified the
other charges pending against defendant were dismissed.
¶9 Defendant did not file a direct appeal.
¶ 10 On March 9, 2020, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. Defendant
indicated he pled guilty to the first degree murder charge in exchange for a sentence of 45 years
which he was required to serve in its entirety. According to his petition, he did not move to
withdraw his guilty plea because he was young, immature, and was ignorant of the law.
Defendant’s petition indicated he was 19 years old when he was arrested and 20 years old when
he entered his guilty plea.
¶ 11 In addition, defendant alleged he would not have entered into the guilty plea and
would have proceeded to a jury trial if he had received better representation in the trial court.
According to defendant, he was “rushed” into entering the guilty plea because the State’s initial
plea offer was for a minimum 52-year sentence and the State indicated it would seek consecutive
sentences if defendant was convicted of both first degree murder and aggravated arson. The
State then offered defendant the opportunity to plead guilty to one count of first degree murder in
exchange for the State dismissing the other pending charges.
¶ 12 According to the petition, defendant alleged he had many arguments and
disagreements with his appointed trial counsel, attempted to “fire” his trial counsel, and asked for
a different attorney. However, his request for new counsel was denied.
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¶ 13 Defendant also alleged he had acquired more knowledge of legal proceedings and
“found newly discovered evidence pertaining to juvenile and young adult cases.” Instead of
identifying any new evidence, defendant cited People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B,
142 N.E.3d 756; People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, 137 N.E.3d 763; and Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460 (2012). Defendant indicated he did not have a prior violent criminal history and was
taking prescription medication at the time of his plea, including Adderall and haloperidol.
Further, defendant alleged he was “at a loss of feeling” when he entered his guilty plea because
he believed his mother and grandmother would have testified against him if he went to trial.
Defendant noted he had a history of mental health and substance abuse issues.
¶ 14 On March 17, 2020, in a written order, the trial court summarily dismissed
defendant’s petition. The order indicated defendant entered an open guilty plea to first degree
murder on January 9, 2015, which had a statutory sentencing range of 20 to 60 years in prison
(730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2014)). On April 9, 2015, the court accepted a sentencing
agreement requiring defendant to serve a 45-year prison sentence in its entirety. Defendant filed
neither a motion to withdraw his fully negotiated plea nor a direct appeal.
¶ 15 Although recognizing the petition was not timely, the court indicated it would
consider the claims in defendant’s petition. The court noted defendant failed to attach any
supporting documents or explain why he did not as required by section 122-2 of the
Postconviction Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020)). With regard to defendant’s assertions
concerning his trial counsel’s representation, the court stated the petition did not contain
allegations that would support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Further, according to
the court, the record affirmatively showed defendant was not rushed into his plea.
¶ 16 As for defendant’s assertions regarding his lack of a violent criminal history, his
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emotional reaction when he learned his mother and grandmother would testify against him at
trial, his lack of legal knowledge and maturity at the time of his plea, his age at the time of the
plea (20), and his history of substance abuse and mental health issues, the trial court indicated
defendant did not allege a substantial denial of his constitutional rights. The court stated:
“The petition is devoid of any reference to a specific constitutional provision and
does not allege that any of these circumstances caused [defendant] to suffer a
violation of his constitutional rights. To the extent any of the foregoing
allegations might be construed to allege facts, if at all, no affidavits, records or
other evidence is offered in support of those allegations.”
¶ 17 With regard to defendant’s allegations about newly discovered evidence in
juvenile and young adult cases and his citations of House, Miller, and Buffer, the trial court
stated:
“Though the petition does not identify or argue a particular point of law, this court
will treat the claim as one based upon Miller v. Alabama, a historic ruling by the
U.S. Supreme Court which held that imposing on a juvenile offender a mandatory
sentence of life without the possibility of parole, without consideration of the
defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics violate the eighth amendment.
Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. [190] (2016).
People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, extended Miller’s holding barring
juveniles from mandatory natural life sentences to include mandatory de facto life
sentences. Mr. Messina was not sentenced to a mandatory natural life sentence
and, therefore, presumably seeks relief on a claim that his sentence is a mandatory
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de facto life sentence.
The eighth amendment prohibits, inter alia, ‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ and applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The
cases on which defendant’s petition relies are cases involving juveniles who
committed murder, and each case dealt with the applicability of the rule of law
that ‘children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing.’ These cases are distinguishable from the case-at-hand because
[defendant] was not a juvenile at the time he committed the offense of first degree
murder.
[Defendant] was born May 26, 1994 (according to the mittimus). At the
time of the offense (January 14, 2014), he was 19 years, 7 months[,] and 19 days
old. He was sentenced to 45 years[’] incarceration. The cases cited by
[defendant] govern sentences imposed on juveniles. [Defendant] was not a
juvenile at the time of the offense; he was an adult. The case law cited in the
petition does not support defendant’s claim that, as an adult offender, the sentence
of 45 years’ incarceration constitutes a substantial denial of his constitutional
rights.
It is not the court’s role in a post-conviction proceeding to construct, on
defendant’s behalf, an argument with facts in support of a claim that the statute
under which he was sentenced is unconstitutional. The defendant bears the
burden of alleging and presenting facts to support a claim of a substantial denial
of his rights under the U.S. Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both.
[Defendant] has wholly failed to do that.
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The court finds that the 45[-]year sentence imposed on defendant for a
crime he committed when he was 19 years old did not violate the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution.”
As a result, the court found the petition was “ ‘frivolous or is patently without merit’ ” and
summarily dismissed the petition.
¶ 18 This appeal followed.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his
postconviction petition during the first stage of proceedings under the Postconviction Act (725
ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-7 (West 2020)). The Postconviction Act provides a collateral path for a
defendant to challenge his conviction or sentence based on a federal or state constitutional
violation. People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140, 143, 809 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (2004). The trial court
in this case dismissed defendant’s petition during the first stage of postconviction proceedings.
At the first stage, the trial court must determine whether the petition is frivolous or patently
without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020). “A post-conviction petition is considered
frivolous or patently without merit only if the allegations in the petition, taken as true and
liberally construed, fail to present the ‘gist of a constitutional claim.’ ” People v. Edwards, 197
Ill. 2d 239, 244, 757 N.E.2d 442, 445 (2001). A petition may also be summarily dismissed when
the record completely contradicts the defendant’s claim. People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175, 185,
923 N.E.2d 748, 754 (2010).
¶ 21 We apply a de novo standard when reviewing a trial court’s decision to summarily
dismiss a postconviction petition. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106
(1996). We may affirm a trial court’s order dismissing a postconviction petition based on any
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reason supported by the record if the court’s judgment is correct. People v. Green, 2012 IL App
(4th) 101034, ¶ 30, 970 N.E.2d 101.
¶ 22 Defendant argues his postconviction petition stated the gist of a constitutional
claim his 45-year prison sentence, which he had to serve in its entirety, violated the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) based on the facts and
circumstances of this case. The State asserts defendant did not make this particular argument in
his petition.
¶ 23 While defendant acknowledges his petition did not specifically mention the
proportionate penalties clause, he argues the trial court should have realized he was making a
proportionate penalties argument pursuant to our state constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11)
because he cited Miller, Buffer, and House. Based on the particular facts in this case and
liberally construing defendant’s petition, we reject the State’s argument we should affirm
because defendant did not specifically mention the proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, § 11). The trial court realized defendant was arguing his sentence was not
constitutional based on the line of cases following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Miller. However, it appears the trial court may not have realized House involved an adult
defendant who was making an argument his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause
of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). While we will construe defendant’s
citation to House as a proportionate penalties clause argument, we stress our generous
construction here is unique to the particular facts and circumstances in this case and should not
be interpreted to permit a postconviction petitioner to meet his pleading requirements by simply
citing cases without explanation.
¶ 24 We next turn to whether defendant’s claim is frivolous or patently without merit
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based on the record. The trial court determined defendant’s 45-year sentence did not violate the
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution because defendant was sentenced for a crime
he committed when he was 19 years old.
¶ 25 In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has held the eighth
amendment to the federal constitution prohibits defendants who commit crimes while a juvenile
from receiving a death sentence (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005)), mandatory
life sentences without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide offenses (Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)), and mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for
homicide (Miller, 567 U.S. at 489). The Supreme Court held “children are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
¶ 26 Our supreme court in People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40, 91 N.E.3d 849,
held Miller applied to discretionary life sentences without the possibility of parole for crimes
committed by a juvenile. In People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 9-10, 63 N.E.3d 889, our
supreme court also said Miller applied to a mandatory term of years sentence that was the
functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole—a de facto life sentence. In Buffer,
2019 IL 122327, ¶ 40, our supreme court found a sentence of more than 40 years for a crime
committed by a juvenile constitutes a de facto life sentence.
¶ 27 Here, defendant was not a juvenile when he committed the murder for which he
agreed to receive a 45-year sentence to be served in its entirety. As a result, his sentence did not
violate the eighth amendment because the United States Supreme Court has drawn the line for an
eighth amendment Miller claim at 18 years of age. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 60 (quoting Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005)). Nonetheless, some Illinois Appellate Court districts
have interpreted our supreme court’s opinions in People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 1, 43
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N.E.3d 984, and People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 1, 120 N.E.3d 900, as allowing a young
adult under 21 years of age when the offense was committed to rely on the reasoning in Miller
and its progeny to argue a sentence violates the Illinois proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, § 11). We note the defendants in Thompson and Harris neither entered a guilty plea
nor agreed to a specific sentence. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 5-7; Harris, 2018 IL 121932,
¶¶ 3-16.
¶ 28 In House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶ 64, the First District found the
mandatory natural life sentence a defendant received for a crime he committed when he was 19
years old violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, § 11) based on the circumstances of his case, the reasoning behind the Miller decision, and
other recent changes in statutory and case law. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶ 64. Like
the defendants in Thompson and Harris, the defendant in House neither entered a guilty plea nor
agreed to a specific sentence.
¶ 29 Our supreme court recently reversed the First District’s decision and remanded
the case for further postconviction proceedings. People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 3.
According to our supreme court, the First District erred by holding the defendant’s mandatory
natural life sentence imposed pursuant to section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1992)) violated the proportionate penalties
clause as applied to the circumstance in the defendant’s case because the defendant did not
develop the evidentiary record to establish the alleged violation and the trial court made no
factual findings on the as-applied constitutional challenge. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 31.
Because the supreme court determined the record required further development, the court
remanded the case to the circuit court for second-stage postconviction proceedings. House, 2021
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IL 125124, ¶ 32.
¶ 30 We acknowledge the supreme court in House did not address its recent opinion in
People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010. In Dorsey, our supreme court held a juvenile’s sentence of
more than 40 years is not a de facto life sentence if the defendant has the opportunity to earn
enough credit against his sentence to be released from prison before serving more than 40 years.
Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 63. Once again, the defendant in Dorsey neither entered a guilty plea
nor agreed to the sentence he received.
¶ 31 Citing the United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Jones v. Mississippi,
593 U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2021), our supreme court noted a sentence of more
than 40 years for a juvenile does not constitute an unconstitutional life sentence under the eighth
amendment if the trial court had the discretion to sentence the defendant to prison for a term of
40 or fewer years. Our supreme court explained:
“[T]he defendant’s eighth amendment argument that ‘the sentencer must make a
finding of permanent incorrigibility’ before imposing a discretionary life without
parole sentence ‘is inconsistent with the [Supreme] Court’s precedents.’
[Citation.] Instead, the [Supreme] Court found that the eighth amendment allows
juvenile offenders to be sentenced to life without parole as long as the sentence is
not mandatory and the sentencing court had discretion to consider youth and
attendant characteristics but that no factfinding by the sentencer is required.
[Citation.] The [Supreme] Court noted that Miller and Montgomery squarely
rejected the idea that the eighth amendment ‘requires more than just a
discretionary sentencing procedure’ [citation] and that Montgomery stated that
‘ “Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement” and that “a finding of
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fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility *** is not required.” [Citation.]’ ” Dorsey,
2021 IL 123010, ¶ 40 (quoting Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1311-16).
Our supreme court stated its holding in Holman “that Miller and Montgomery apply to
discretionary life without parole sentences” is questionable after Jones. (Emphasis added.)
Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 41. Again, unlike in this case, the defendant in Holman did not enter
a guilty plea or agree to the sentence he received. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 6-17.
¶ 32 We recognize defendant in the instant case is not arguing his sentence violated the
eighth amendment. Instead, defendant is arguing his 45-year sentence, which he agreed to
receive, violated our state proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) because he
was under 21 years of age when he committed the offense for which he was being sentenced.
However, unlike the supreme court cases we have previously discussed, defendant in this case
both entered a guilty plea and agreed to the fully negotiated 45-year prison sentence he received.
¶ 33 In motions for leave to cite supplemental authority, which we granted, defendant
asked this court to consider People v. Chambers, 2021 IL App (4th) 190151, and People v.
Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, 163 N.E.3d 1216. We find Chambers and the instant case
factually distinguishable. Unlike the case sub judice, the defendant in Chambers did not agree to
a specific sentence. Pursuant to the plea in Chambers, the defendant was subject to the normal
sentencing range of 20 to 60 years for first degree murder. Chambers, 2021 IL App (4th)
190151, ¶ 6. Further, again unlike this case, the defendant in Chambers presented evidence
regarding his background, and defense counsel recommended a sentence of 30 years’
imprisonment at the sentencing hearing. Chambers, 2021 IL App (4th) 190151, ¶¶ 25-33. The
trial court exercised its discretion when it sentenced the defendant to a term of 42 years’
imprisonment to be served in its entirety. Chambers, 2021 IL App (4th) 190151, ¶ 40. Because
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Chambers is factually distinguishable from our case, we need not address it further.
¶ 34 On the other hand, the trial court in Daniels, like the trial court in this case,
imposed a negotiated sentence on the defendant. However, the First District in Daniels found
the defendant was not barred from challenging his sentence pursuant to our state proportionate
penalties clause. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶¶ 5-6.
¶ 35 In Daniels, the defendant raised his state proportionate penalties clause argument
in a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st)
171738, ¶ 9. The circuit court denied his motion. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 10. On
appeal, the State argued Daniels was barred from raising an as-applied challenge to a sentence he
agreed to as part of a negotiated guilty plea. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 15. The First
District disagreed, stating:
“Mr. Daniels did not and could not have known at the time of his guilty plea that
he could argue his natural-life sentence—a sentence he submitted to in order to
avoid execution—was constitutionally disproportionate as applied to him. Our
supreme court would not recognize the potential viability of youth-based claims
made by young-adult offenders for another 20 years.”
Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 18. However, the First District in Daniels did not have the
benefit of our supreme court’s analysis in Dorsey and People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 26,
regarding the state proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) and negotiated
guilty pleas, respectively.
¶ 36 Pursuant to Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 73, Daniels’s proportionate penalties
clause argument would not have been a novel claim that did not exist when defendant agreed to a
natural life sentence. Dorsey held “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the
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eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the
proportionate penalties clause” in a successive postconviction petition because “Illinois courts
have long recognized the differences between persons of mature age and those who are minors
for purposes of sentencing.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74. The supreme court cited with
approval People v. LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 59, 127 N.E.3d 131, which held
“Miller’s nonexistence did not prevent defendant from contending that the trial court’s alleged
failure to consider his youth as a factor in mitigation violated the proportionate-penalties clause.”
¶ 37 Jones was decided after oral argument in this case. Although the sentence
imposed in Jones was challenged as violative of the eighth amendment, it seemingly controls our
decision here. While noting the juvenile defendant entered a plea to avoid a potential sentence,
our supreme court ruled a juvenile defendant’s “knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any
constitutional challenge based on subsequent changes in the applicable law.” Jones, 2021 IL
126432, ¶ 26. Further, the supreme court indicated the trial court exercised discretion by
accepting the parties’ fully negotiated plea. According to the supreme court:
“If the judge had found the factual predicate for the plea insufficient, found the
defendant’s entry of his plea to be involuntary or unintelligent, or determined that
the stipulated 50-year sentence was excessive under the facts and circumstances
of the case, he could have declined to accept the plea. Because the trial court had
the option to accept or reject the plea agreement offered by the parties, its
decision necessarily constituted an exercise of its discretion. The trial court’s
decision to accept the plea agreement and enter a judgment consistent with it,
thereby convicting petitioner, in relevant part, of one count of first degree murder
and imposing the parties’ agreed-on 50-year prison sentence, was not compelled
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by the statutory sentencing scheme that applied at the time or by any other legal
authority. We therefore reject petitioner’s Miller challenge.
Miller’s additional protections for juvenile offenders apply only when a
trial court lacks, or refuses to use, discretion in sentencing a juvenile offender to a
life, or de facto life, sentence. The trial court in this case did not fail to exercise its
discretion in deciding to accept the parties’ plea agreement and entering
petitioner’s convictions and 50-year sentence accordingly. Because petitioner
failed to make constitutional claims that were cognizable under Miller, it was not
error to deny his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition.”
Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶¶ 27-28.
¶ 38 Based on our supreme court’s reasoning in Dorsey and Jones, we see no reason to
conclude our supreme court would find it appropriate to allow a young adult defendant to pursue
a postconviction claim the sentence he agreed to accept after pleading guilty violated our state
proportionate penalties clause. We conclude the trial court did not err in summarily dismissing
defendant’s postconviction petition. After agreeing to the 45-year sentence he received,
defendant cannot now argue his agreed upon sentence violates our state proportionate penalties
clause. Pursuant to Dorsey and Jones, defendant should have known he was waiving a
proportionate penalties challenge when he agreed to the 45-year sentence.
¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 40 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s
postconviction petition.
¶ 41 Affirmed.
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