Georgakopoulos v. Blake

2022 IL App (1st) 210668-UFIFTH DIVISION
Order filed: January 28, 2022
No. 1-21-0668
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
TOMAS GEORGAKOPOULOS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 2021M1701370
)
MATTHEW BLAKE A/K/A MATT BLAKE, BRIDGET )
GRAY AND ALL UNKNOWN OCCUPANTS, )
)
Defendants, ) Honorable
) Perla Tirado,
(Matt Blake and Bridget Gray, Defendants-Appellants.) ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cunningham and Connors concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We dismiss in part and affirm in part where: the defendant’s arguments regarding
possession of a coach house have been rendered moot because the defendants have
vacated the premises and a third party has taken possession; the court’s finding that
the eviction fell within an exception to the Governor’s eviction moratorium was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence; Gray, through her actions and
inactions, waived her right to a jury trial; and the defendants’ arguments regarding
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monetary damages lack substantive merit; and the defendants’ remaining
arguments been forfeited by a failure to raise them in the trial court.
¶2 Following a bench trial, the defendants, Matthew Blake and Bridget Gray, were ordered
evicted and ejected, respectively, from a coach house located on Wilson Avenue in Chicago,
Illinois. The defendants appeal, pro se, arguing the eviction violated the governor’s executive order
2020-72 (Executive Order) (Executive Order 2020-72, 44 Ill. Reg. 18802 (November 30, 2020)),
which created a moratorium on evictions; the eviction violated the Residential Landlord and
Tenant Ordinance (RLTO) of the city of Chicago (Chicago Municipal Code § 5-12-010 et seq.
(amended March 31, 2004)); and they were denied due process as provided by Article IX of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq. (West 2020)). The defendants asks this
court to award damages against the plaintiff for moving expenses. For the reasons that follow, we
dismiss in part and affirm in part.
¶3 On April 16, 2021, the plaintiff filed a verified complaint for eviction and ejectment against
the defendants. The complaint alleged the following facts. Blake and the plaintiff entered into a
lease for the coach house on September 23, 2020. The lease prohibited occupancy by anyone other
than Blake. In violation of the lease, Blake permitted Gray to occupy the premises without the
plaintiff’s consent. On March 29, 2021, the plaintiff gave Blake a 30-day notice terminating
Blake’s tenancy effective April 30, 2021. On March 30, 2021, the plaintiff received a voicemail
from Gray, in which Gray threatened to slit her wrists and throat and bleed all over the floors
making the coach house a “suicide house.” In response to the voicemail, the plaintiff issued and
served a 10-day notice terminating Blake’s tenancy for, inter alia, allowing Gray to move into the
premises without authorization. The defendants repeatedly called and texted the plaintiff and his
wife, making “thinly veiled threats,” such as “we found you and know where you really live.”
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Blake then failed to pay rent for the month of April. Instead, Blake sent a letter to the plaintiff
indicating that he had the ability to pay rent but was refusing to do so. A copy of the letter was
attached to the complaint and states “I am able to continue paying rent as agreed and until we reach
resolution will secure monthly payments in a separate savings account.” The letter also stated,
“Although not an attorney, Bridget Gray is my tenant rights’ advocate and looks forward to
speaking with you on how we can best work together to resolve this matter.”
¶4 The complaint also alleged that on April 2, 2021, Gray called the plaintiff’s attorney and
held herself out to be Blake’s legal representative. In response to this communication, and others,
the plaintiff’s attorney contacted the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC)
which opened an investigation into the potential unauthorized practice of law.
¶5 Count I of the complaint sought an order of eviction against all defendants and an award
of damages against Blake. Count II of the complaint sought an order of ejectment against Gray
and all unknown defendants.
¶6 On April 23, 2021, pro se appearances and jury demands were filed on behalf of both Gray
and Blake. Both appearances were filed electronically and bear a date and time stamp of
“4/23/2021 1:10 PM.” Each appearance sought a 12-person jury.
¶7 On April 26, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion, inter alia, to strike Blake’s jury demand.
The motion alleged that Gray had not appeared in the matter and was engaging in the unauthorized
practice of law by representing Blake.
¶8 On April 29, 2021, the defendants filed an answer. The defendants admitted Blake signed
the lease with the plaintiff. They admitted that Blake allowed Gray to move into the coach house.
The defendants admitted Blake received the 30-day notice terminating the tenancy. The defendants
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did not deny that Gray left the voicemail but responded with reasons why she left the voicemail.
Likewise, the defendants did not deny sending the text message but responded with an allegation
that “multiple claims made by [the] plaintiff do not match public records.” The defendants alleged
that the plaintiff was attempting to disguise his true address. The defendants did not deny receiving
the 10-day notice of termination but alleged instead that the notice was in violation of the Chicago
Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance. (RLTO). In response to the allegation that Blake
refused to pay rent, the defendants stated “Defendants deny and did not refuse; however instead
promised to secure rent in separate account until dispute resolution.” The answer did not include
a counterclaim.
¶9 Later on April 29, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion to strike
Blake’s jury demand. The court stated, “It looks like there’s two Jury demands.” The plaintiff’s
attorney responded “Well, my understanding Judge is there’s one Jury Demand. In the motion to
strike I attached that. It was filed on behalf of Mr. Blake by Mrs. Gray, which is the unauthorized
practice of law.” Attached to the motion as an exhibit was an e-mail notice of filing from the
“Odyssey” system which indicated that Blake’s jury demand had been filed by “Bridget Gray.”
After the plaintiff presented his arguments, Gray and Blake addressed the court. During their
argument, the following colloquy occurred between Gray and the court:
“THE COURT: Anything else?
DEFENDANT GRAY: Your Honor, if I can just respond briefly to the ARDC.
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Ms. Gray: Are you licensed to practice law in
Illinois?
DEFENDANT GRAY: No, and I did not ever intend --
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THE COURT: So you're not licensed to practice law in Illinois?
DEFENDANT GRAY: No. And I had been clear with Jose Zamora [the plaintiff’s previous
attorney] previous to that on five separate phone calls. So, I have spoken with the ARDC.
The letter that I received was not about criminal charges.”
¶ 10 After entertaining argument on the plaintiff’s motion, the circuit court entered an order,
granting the motion in part and striking Blake’s jury demand. The circuit court did not strike
Gray’s jury demand. The matter was continued to May 6, 2021, “for bench trial.”
¶ 11 On May 6, 2021, the defendants requested a continuance, which the court granted. Gray
did not raise the issue of her jury demand.
¶ 12 On May 10, 2021, the circuit court commenced a bench trial on the plaintiff’s complaint.
The defendants appeared pro se. Before starting the trial, the court asked the defendants if they
had anything they wanted to say. The following colloquy occurred:
“MS. GRAY: Well, Your Honor, we are actually prepared for judgment without
trial. We are prepared to request a Summary Judgment.
We don’t think it’s the Court’s best use of time in order proceeding with this trial.
We believe Mr. Georgakopoulos has perjured himself.
THE COURT: Okay. I’m going to stop you right there.
This motion for Summary Judgment, I know you are not an attorney, but this is not
applicable in this case. Okay. If you file Motion for Summary Judgment you have to file a
Written Motion with legal authority. So that’s not going to happen today. We are going to
have a trial.
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It’s your choice if you decide to put on testimony or not, that’s one thing. But we
are going to have a hearing, okay, because it is based on an exception to the Governor’s
Moratorium.
MS. GRAY: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. GRAY: We are prepared for that.”
¶ 13 During opening statements, the plaintiff asserted that the evidence would show that the
defendants posed a danger to the health and safety of “anyone related to the premises,” and
therefore, an emergency eviction order was appropriate. Gray stated that the defendants believed
the plaintiff had “provoked us in perjury [sic] himself and misled his attorneys in order to bring us
to eviction outside the Governor’s order.” Blake did not make an opening statement.
¶ 14 The plaintiff called Blake as an adverse witness. Blake admitted that his lease for the
premises ended on April 30, 2021. He also admitted that he received a nonrenewal notice on March
30 and a ten-day notice on April 1, 2021, which required any residents not specified in the lease
to move out in ten days. Blake admitted that Gray was still living in the coach house. He also
admitted that he had not paid rent for the months of April and May, even though he had the funds
to do so. Blake added “But I notated it’s in the savings account until we figure this out.”
¶ 15 The plaintiff testified that, after he asked Blake about a “walk through” on March 24, 2021,
Blake “barraged” him with phone calls. The plaintiff then decided not to renew Blake’s lease. He
testified that he received the “threatening” voicemail from Gray that had been included in the
complaint. He also testified that he received the text that indicated the defendants knew where he
lived. He stated that he felt threatened by those conversations and other communications with the
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No. 1-21-0668
defendants and that he believed their continued occupancy posed a risk to the health and safety of
himself and anyone else at the property.
¶ 16 Michelle Georgakopoulos, the plaintiff’s wife, also testified. Her description of the
communications between her, her husband, and the defendants was consistent with the plaintiff’s
testimony.
¶ 17 The plaintiff called Bridget Gray as a witness. Gray admitted leaving the voicemail. Gray
also admitted receiving and answering the complaint. Gray admitted that, in response to the
complaint, she did not deny paragraph 28 which indicated “Plaintiff believes that defendants
continued occupancy of the building constitutes a health and safety risk of others.”
¶ 18 When asked if she had anything to offer in response to the plaintiff’s questions, Gray
responded:
“Simply we did respond in our answer that at this point we were simply trying to
understand what was going on here and why these people felt the need to suddenly attack
us in this way.”
¶ 19 The plaintiff rested, and the court asked the defendants if they wished to testify. Gray
responded, “I don’t believe we are interested in testify [sic] Your Honor.” However, she added
that the ARDC complaint against her had been closed. Blake responded:
“Yeah.
I just don’t – I don’t understand this. We have – what we have here now is a – prior
to March 21st there was zero issues, I paid early, I shoveled snow, I did all this stuff.
I even said, okay fine we’ll put an extra person on the lease. And he says, okay.
And a walk through tells me meth. I just think this is absurd. You got people out there who
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are thousands and thousands and thousands of dollars who owe rent. You got witch craft,
gunshot.
There is no imminent threat. Also stated in an Affidavit by our neighbor that clearly
states there is no imminent threat.”
¶ 20 The court heard closing arguments. The plaintiff argued that he was afraid to go to his
property to do maintenance because of the defendants’ threats. He requested a judgment instanter
for immediate enforcement by the sheriff and a monetary judgement in an amount equal to two
months unpaid rent and court costs. Gray argued that there was no good faith effort to resolve the
matter before bringing it to court. Blake argued the following: “We never had to come here. This
is absurd. That is all your honor.”
¶ 21 Following argument, the circuit court entered an order for eviction effective May 15, 2021.
The court held that, because Gray had made threats to herself or other people, the eviction should
be treated as an exception to the Executive Order. The court noted:
“And the fact that because they choose not to renew, that then brought on these
multiple calls and text messages and harassment, basically. The Court finds that all very
troubling.”
¶ 22 The court held that a money judgment would be subject to the Executive Order and
continued the matter for a hearing on the issue. The court’s written order was prepared on a form
provided by the Illinois Supreme Court to which the court appended a typed page, prepared by the
plaintiff’s attorney, which included a finding that “This case involves threats made to the Plaintiff
and his family.” The appended page ordered, inter alia, that the Cook County Sheriff enforce the
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order despite the Executive Order because “Defendants continued occupancy of the subject
premises constitutes a direct threat to the health and safety of others.”
¶ 23 On June 3, 2021, the sheriff enforced the eviction order and the plaintiff regained
possession. On June 9, 2021, following a hearing, the circuit court entered judgment in the
uncontested amount of $3,996.75 against Blake, which included two months unpaid rent, filing
fees, and costs of service. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 24 On appeal, the defendants raise three arguments: (1) the court erred in its interpretation of
the Executive Order on evictions; (2) the court improperly applied the RLTO; and (3) the court
violated the defendants’ due process rights according to the eviction procedures set forth in Article
IX of the Code. The plaintiff argues that: (1) the appeal is moot because the trial court issued an
order for eviction and ejectment and the defendants have been evicted from the premises; (2) the
defendants’ arguments related to the Executive Order, the RLTO, and the Code are forfeited
because they failed to raise them in the trial court; and (3) the defendants forfeited their arguments
on appeal by failing to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) and
their brief should be stricken.
¶ 25 We turn first to the plaintiff’s argument that the appeal is moot with respect to the issue of
possession of the coach house.
¶ 26 The question of whether a case is moot is a matter of law that we review de novo. Maday
v. Township High School District 211, 2018 IL App (1st) 180294, ¶ 44. “A case must remain a
legal controversy from the time it is filed in the appellate court until the moment of disposition.”
Id. ¶ 45 (citing Davis v. City of Country Club Hills, 2013 IL App (1st) 123634, ¶ 10). It is well-
established that a case may become moot when, during the pendency of the appeal, events occur
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which render it impossible to grant effectual relief. Mount Carmel High School v. Illinois High
School Ass’n, 279 Ill. App. 3d 122, 124-25 (1996). For example, an appeal is moot if a specific
property, the possession of which is sought on appeal, has been conveyed to third parties. See
Circle Management, LLC v. Oliver, 378 Ill. App. 3d 601, 607 (2007) (holding that a forcible entry
and detainer action was moot where the trial court had entered a possession order but applying the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.) Moreover, where a lease has expired by its
own terms before an appeal is decided the issue of possession becomes moot. Poulos v. Reda, 165
Ill. App. 3d 793, 798 (1987).
¶ 27 The plaintiff argues that it is impossible to grant the defendants relief on the issue of the
eviction order because, as the defendants admit in their brief, the defendants have been evicted
from the coach house. See Circle Management, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 607. In their opening brief, the
defendants do not request restoration of possession, arguing instead that they are entitled to
damages from the plaintiff for moving expenses. In their reply brief, the defendants argue that the
issue of possession is not moot because the money judgment is “directly dependent” on the eviction
order. The defendants also argue in reply “many aspects of this case impact the public interest
further rendering not moot.” However, we find these generalized arguments unsupported by
citation to authority insufficient to invoke an exception to the mootness doctrine. Accordingly, we
dismiss, in part, the appeal to the extent that it involves possession of the subject premises.
¶ 28 The defendants raise three issues on appeal; (1) violation of the Executive Order on
evictions; (2) violations of the RLTO; and (3) denial of due process under Article IX of the Code.
We will address these issues in turn.
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¶ 29 First, with regard to the Executive Order. The defendants argued that the plaintiff had
perjured himself and misled his own attorneys to improperly bring this case within an exception
to the Executive Order. The plaintiff argued that this case should proceed as an exception to the
Executive Order because the defendants posed a risk to the health and safety of others on the
property. Section 2 of the Executive Order provided that no person may commence a residential
eviction action against a tenant under Article IX of the Code unless “that person poses a direct
threat to the health and safety of other tenants or an immediate and severe risk to property.”
Executive Order 2020-72 (44 Ill. Reg. 18802 (November 30, 2020)). The plaintiff presented
evidence that Gray made threats to harm herself and damage the property by “bleeding out” and
making the coach house a “suicide house.” The plaintiff also presented evidence that the
defendants made phone calls he found harassing and threatening including veiled threats such as
“we know where you live.” The trial court found the defendants behavior “very troubling,” and
made a written finding that the case involved threats made to the plaintiff and the defendants’
continued occupancy constituted a “direct threat” to the safety of others. Based upon the record
before us, we conclude that the circuit court’s finding that the defendants’ behavior brought them
within the exception to the Executive Order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
See Teton, Tack and Feed, LLC v. Jimenez, 2016 IL App (1st) 150584, ¶ 11 (Appeals arising from
a final judgment in an action under Article IX of the Code are reviewed using the manifest-weight
-of-the-evidence standard.)
¶ 30 With regard to any other arguments the defendants may have based on the Executive Order,
we find that they are forfeited because the defendants failed to raise them at trial and adequately
argue them on appeal. Issues not raised with the trial court are forfeited on review. See Forest
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Preserve District of Cook County v. Royalty Properties, LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 181323, ¶ 38.
The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to raise issues in the trial court, thus
ensuring both that the trial court is given an opportunity to correct any errors prior to appeal and
that a party does not obtain reversal through his or her own inaction. 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n v.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 14. Moreover, it is impossible to accurately
determine what other issues based upon the Executive Order the defendants intended to raise
because their arguments are vague and unsupported by citation to authority. See Hall v. Naper
Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 12. We find the defendants’ generalized
references to the Executive Order in their opening brief are insufficient to raise any arguments
before this court other than the moratorium issue. See Il. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff, Oct. 1, 2020).
Therefore, we reject the defendants’ arguments based on the Executive Order.
¶ 31 The defendants also argue that the plaintiff violated the RLTO by: serving a 10-day notice
that failed to provide for the right to cure any lease violation; failing to provide landlord/manager
information on the lease for the subject premises; providing an “inaccurate” receipt for a security
deposit; refusing to provide a “legitimate” reason for demanding a walkthrough of the subject
premises; and retaliating against Blake for his taking offense to “meth” comments. However, the
defendants did not properly raise any of these alleged violations of the RLTO as affirmative
defenses during trial. The failure to raise such affirmative defenses below results in their forfeiture
on appeal. Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996). Therefore, we conclude that
the defendants’ arguments based upon violations of the RLTO are forfeited.
¶ 32 In addition to asserting alleged violations of the RLTO for the first time on appeal, the
defendants also argue for the first time before this court that the RLTO provides monetary remedies
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in favor of a tenant for a landlord’s violations of the ordinance. In their brief, the defendants
request an award of $35,000 in damages.
¶ 33 Section 2-608 of the Code provides that any claim by a defendant against a plaintiff may
be asserted as a counterclaim which must be pleaded in the same manner and with the same
particularity as a complaint and shall be complete in itself. 735 ILCS 5/2-608 (West 2020). Blake
never pled a counterclaim against the plaintiff seeking damages for his alleged violations of the
RLTO. A defendant is not entitled to any award of damages in the absence to a pleading raising
the claim. See Clay v. Pepper Construction Company, 205 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1022 (1990).
Consequently, the defendants are not entitled to any award of damages by this court.
¶ 34 Finally, the defendants raise four issues related to the application of Article IX of the Code.
We address each argument in turn.
¶ 35 First, the defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of
section 9-106.2 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/9-106.2 (West 2020)). The defendants’ argument in this
regard is misplaced. Section 9-106.2 creates an affirmative defense for certain victims of domestic
violence in eviction actions. Initially, we note that there was no evidence presented that would
cause this case to fall within the affirmative defense created by this section. More importantly, the
defendants did not raise this as an affirmative defense at the trial level, and therefore, it is waived
on appeal. See Fox v. Seiden, 2016 IL App (1st) 141984, ¶ 51.
¶ 36 Second, the defendants argue that, because section 9-108 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/9-108
(2020) guarantees the right to a jury trial, the trial court erred in striking Blake’s jury demand and
conducting a bench trial. The circuit court held that Blake’s jury demand was invalid because its
filing constituted the unauthorized practice of law by Gray. See, e.g., Holloway v. Chicago Heart
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& Vascular Consultants, Ltd., 2017 IL App (1st) 160315, ¶ 22. Generally, under the “nullity rule”
a filing by a person not authorized to practice law is considered a nullity. Id. The defendants have
asserted no argument on appeal as to why the trial court erred in striking Blake’s jury demand as
the product of the unauthorized practice of law by Gray, and we find no basis in the record to
disturb the trial court’s decision on that issue.
¶ 37 As to Gray’s jury demand, we find that she has waived any argument that the court
erroneously conducted a bench trial in derogation of her jury demand. A party may, by his or her
conduct, waived a demand for a jury trial. Installco Inc. v. Whiting Corp.¸ 336 Ill. App. 3d 776,
786 There is no question that the circuit court conducted a bench trial despite Gray’s demand for
a jury trial. However, Gray was given the chance to speak at the hearing on the plaintiff’s motion
to strike Blake’s jury demand. At that time, Gray did not attempt to correct the court’s order setting
the matter for a bench trial, address any confusion created by the plaintiff’s counsel’s erroneous
statement regarding the number of jury demands, or assert her separate demand for a jury trial.
The matter was set for trial before a different judge, and Gray was again given a chance to speak.
Gray did not, at that time, assert her demand for a jury trial, stating instead that she believed no
trial was necessary. When informed that a trial would occur, Gray responded “we are prepared for
that,” but did not assert her demand for a jury trial. We conclude that, by allowing the case to
proceed to a bench trial without asserting her right to a jury, Gray forfeited her right to argue that
the procedure deprived her of right to a jury trial. See Installco, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 786-87 (“[A
litigant] cannot sit by silently, allowing a full bench trial to proceed and then, unhappy with the
result, argue on appeal that the matter should have been heard by a jury.”) Therefore, we find that
Gray, by her actions and inactions, waived her right to a jury trial.
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¶ 38 Third, the defendants argued in their opening brief that the trial court erred when it allowed
the plaintiff’s attorney to modify the standardized from order for evictions in violation of section
109.6 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/9-109.6 (West 2020)). The plaintiff argues that the circuit court
used an authorized form, and that additional information was necessary to explain why the eviction
fell outside the Executive Order. The defendants concede this point in their reply brief, stating
“Defendants do not argue wrong form eviction order used.” Section 109.6 mandates the use of a
standardized form, as determined by the supreme court, for all evictions in the State. The trial court
did not err when it appended a page with more detailed findings of fact and a detailed order to the
standardized form.
¶ 39 Fourth, the defendants argue that the circuit court erred because it failed to follow the
emergency housing eviction procedures contained in sections 9-118, 9-119 or 9-120 of the Code
(735 ILCS 5/9-118, 9-119, 9-120 (West 2020)). Section 9-118 provides a process for plaintiffs to
seek emergency proceedings when it is alleged that the leased premises are being used for, inter
alia, the unlawful possession of cannabis, methamphetamine, narcotics, controlled substances or
certain crimes of violence including murder, attempted murder, kidnapping or sexual assault.
Section 9-119 provides a process for plaintiffs to use when the leased premises are subsidized and
the occupant refuses to allow inspection. Section 9-120 provides a procedure to void a lease and
bring an eviction action when the leased premises have been used to facilitate the commission of
a felony or Class A misdemeanor. The plaintiff’s complaint did not allege any acts by defendant’s
falling within the parameters of section 9-118, 9-119 or 9-120, and the record fails to reflect that
the plaintiff sought to avail himself of the procedures set forth in those sections. Therefore, we
find the procedures in these sections irrelevant to the issues in this case. To the extent that the
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defendants are arguing that these are the only procedures available to bring an “emergency”
eviction, we disagree. The plaintiff and the circuit court may have used the word emergency to
describe the proceedings and the exception to the Executive Order, but simply using the word did
not invoke the requirements of sections 9-118, 9-119, or 9-120. Accordingly we reject the
defendants’ arguments on this issue.
¶ 40 In their reply brief, the defendants argue, without citation, that “Multiple rejection of SRL
[self-represented litigants] arguments and the expedited nature of the case did not allow
Defendants the opportunity to litigate fully the arguments we now bring on appeal.” The
defendants were given ample opportunity to raise their arguments in the circuit court. The
defendants filed an answer to the plaintiff’s complaint. They were present at trial, and given the
opportunity to speak, testify, and present witnesses. It is well-established that self-represented
litigants are held to the same standards as one represented by counsel. See In re Estate of Pellico,
394 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2009). We therefore reject the defendants’ contention that they should
be held to a lower standard because they elected to represent themselves in these proceedings.
¶ 41 For these reasons, we dismiss that portion of this appeal addressed to the circuit court’s
order of eviction and affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County in all other respects.
¶ 42 Dismissed in part and affirmed in part.
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