MidFirst Bank v. Riley

2018 IL App (1st) 171986FIRST DIVISION
August 20, 2018
No. 1-17-1986
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
MIDFIRST BANK, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 13 CH 16791
)
DENISE RILEY, ) Honorable
) Allen Price Walker,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Pierce and Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff-appellee, MidFirst Bank, initiated a foreclosure action on a piece of property
located at 14451 Arthur Court, Dolton, Illinois, after defendant-appellant, Denise Riley, failed to
make the required mortgage payments. After suit had been filed, defendant filed several
affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Defendant argued plaintiff lacked standing to bring the
foreclosure action, while also alleging violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/ et seq. (West 2016)), common law fraud,
and promissory estoppel. Plaintiff eventually filed for summary judgment. After briefing from
the parties, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. The
No. 1-17-1986
court also entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on all of defendant’s counterclaims. The subject
property was sold at auction, which the circuit court then approved.
¶2 Defendant timely appealed and raises several issues before this court: (1) the circuit court
erred in denying her motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion to reconsider, (2) the circuit
court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact as to defendant’s first affirmative defense
(lack of standing), (3) the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff,
(4) the circuit court erred in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff on the Consumer Fraud Act
claim and common law fraud claim, and (5) the circuit court erred in confirming the judicial sale.
¶3 For the reasons stated more fully below, we find no error with the proceedings below and
affirm the circuit court’s orders.
¶4 JURISDICTION
¶5 This foreclosure action commenced on July 15, 2013. On June 30, 2016, plaintiff moved
for summary judgment. On October 11, 2016, the circuit court granted the motion. On July 10,
2017, the circuit court approved the sale and order of possession. On August 9, 2017, defendant
filed her notice of appeal. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6), and Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and Rule 303 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015).
¶6 BACKGROUND
¶7 This appeal involves a loan given on March 5, 1999, from Anchor Mortgage Corporation
(Anchor) to defendant, Denise Riley, in the amount of $114,824. Defendant executed a note
promising to repay the loan, plus interest. The note was secured by a mortgage executed by
defendant against the property located at 14451 Arthur Court, Dolton, Illinois. Anchor
subsequently indorsed the note to Fleet Mortgage Corporation (Fleet). The transfer of the note
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from Anchor to Fleet was memorialized by an assignment of the mortgage that was recorded
with the Cook County Recorder of Deeds Office on March 16, 1999.
¶8 Fleet later merged with Washington Mutual Home Loans, Inc., who then merged into
Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. Before the merger, an indorsement was placed on the note by
Lynn McLeon, a document executing officer at Fleet. The word “VOID” appears over this
indorsement. On April 28, 2006, defendant and Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., entered into a
loan modification agreement that modified the payment terms on defendant’s loan. The loan
modification agreement was executed by defendant and Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., and
recorded with the Cook County Recorder of Deeds Office on June 8, 2006.
¶9 Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., changed names to Washington Mutual Bank
(Washington Mutual). Washington Mutual executed an allonge that was affixed to the note. The
allonge is executed by “WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK (fka Washington Mutual Bank, FA),
successor to Washington Mutual Home Loans, Inc., successor by merger to Fleet Mortgage
Corp.” The allonge is indorsed in blank. Washington Mutual transferred the note to plaintiff by
executing an assignment on October 26, 2006. This assignment was recorded with the Cook
County Recorder of Deeds Office on May 15, 2007. The assignment of the mortgage is executed
by “WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK (fka Washington Mutual Bank, FA), successor to
Washington Mutual Home Loans, Inc., successor by merger to Fleet Mortgage Corp.”
¶ 10 On April 27, 2007, plaintiff and defendant entered into a second loan modification
agreement that modified the payment terms of the loan. This loan modification agreement
identifies defendant as the “Borrower” and plaintiff as the “Lender.” It was executed by both
defendant and plaintiff and recorded with the Cook County Recorder of Deeds Office on June
20, 2007. After plaintiff and defendant agreed to a second loan modification, the record shows an
assignment by Washington Mutual, f/k/a Washington Mutual Bank, FA, to Mortgage Electronic
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Registration Systems, Inc. This assignment was recorded with the Cook County Recorder of
Deeds Office on June 27, 2007.
¶ 11 On February 23, 2010, plaintiff and defendant entered into a third loan modification
agreement that again modified the payment terms. The loan modification agreement identifies
defendant as the “Borrower” and plaintiff as the “Lender.” The third loan modification
agreement was executed by defendant and plaintiff and recorded with the Cook County Recorder
of Deeds Office on April 8, 2010.
¶ 12 Defendant failed to pay the October 2012 installment on the third loan modification
agreement and subsequently went into default. After the default, plaintiff initiated this mortgage
foreclosure action. In response to the complaint, defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss Complaint
to Foreclose Mortgage or in the Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement.” The motion to
dismiss was denied by the circuit court on October 6, 2014. On November 3, 2014, defendant
filed a motion to reconsider the denial of her motion to dismiss. On January 26, 2015, the circuit
court denied the motion to reconsider.
¶ 13 On February 17, 2015, defendant filed an answer to the complaint along with affirmative
defenses and counterclaims. Several of defendant’s counterclaims and affirmative defenses were
struck with prejudice, but she was given leave to replead others. Defendant refiled her standing
affirmative defense. On December 30, 2015, she refiled her counterclaims alleging violations of
the Consumer Fraud Act, common law fraud, and promissory estoppel. Plaintiff filed its response
to the counterclaims on February 29, 2016.
¶ 14 Plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment on June 30, 2016. After briefing from the
parties, the circuit court entered judgment of foreclosure in favor of plaintiff on October 11,
2016. At the same time, the circuit court also entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on
defendant’s counterclaims and affirmative defenses. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider on
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January 5, 2017. This was denied by the circuit court on March 22, 2017. A foreclosure sale was
held on March 23, 2017. The circuit court approved the foreclosure sale on July 10, 2017.
Defendant timely filed her notice of appeal on August 9, 2017.
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 In her first issue, defendant argues the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to
dismiss and the subsequent motion to reconsider. Defendant’s motion to dismiss states that it is
brought pursuant to section 2-619.1 (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016)), but it only raises an
argument that plaintiff lacks standing to bring the foreclosure action. We confine our review
accordingly.
¶ 17 The doctrine of standing is intended to prevent persons who have no interest in a
controversy from bringing suit and “assures that issues are raised only by those parties with a
real interest in the outcome of the controversy.” Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221
(1999). Lack of standing is an “affirmative matter” that is properly raised under a section 2­
619(a)(9). See Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 494 (1988)
(holding that lack of standing is an “affirmative” defense). Section 2-619(a)(9) permits
involuntary dismissal where “the claim asserted *** is barred by other affirmative matter
avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016). The
phrase “affirmative matter” refers to something in the nature of a defense that negates the cause
of action completely or refutes a crucial conclusion of law or conclusions of material fact
contained in or inferred from the complaint. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 486
(1994). An order granting or denying a motion to dismiss is given de novo review on appeal.
Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 220.
¶ 18 Under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (Foreclosure Law), a foreclosure action
may be brought by (1) the legal holder of an indebtedness secured by a mortgage, (2) any person
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designated or authorized to act on behalf of such holder, or (3) an agent or successor of a
mortgagee. 735 ILCS 5/15-1208, 15-1501 (West 2016); Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. v. Barnes, 406 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (2010). A prima facie case for foreclosure is
established if the complaint conforms to the requirements set forth in section 15-1504(a) of the
Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1504(a) (West 2016)) and the note and mortgage are attached.
Barnes, 406 Ill. App. 3d at 6. If this is done, the burden shifts to the mortgagor to prove lack of
standing. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶ 24.
¶ 19 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, persons entitled to enforce a note include its
holder or a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of the holder. See 810
ILCS 5/3-301 (West 2016). A negotiable instrument may be transferred by delivery to another
entity for the purpose of giving that entity the right to enforce the instrument. Id. § 5/3-203(a). If
a note is “indorsed in blank,” it becomes payable to the bearer and may be negotiated by transfer
of possession alone until it is specially indorsed. Id. § 5/3-205(b).
¶ 20 After reviewing the complaint, we agree with the circuit court that plaintiff’s complaint
establishes a prima facie case that plaintiff has standing to bring the foreclosure action. In
bringing this foreclosure action, the plaintiff produced the original note between Anchor and
defendant. Another document shows an assignment of the note from Anchor to Fleet. Fleet did
indorse the assignment in blank, but the word “VOID” is written across it. An allonge is affixed
to the note executed by “WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK (fka Washington Mutual Bank,
FA), successor to Washington Mutual Home Loans, Inc. successor by merger to Fleet Mortgage
Corp.” and contains an indorsement in blank. The presentation of documentation showing a
chain from Anchor to Fleet to Washington Mutual, coupled with the allonge with a blank
indorsement, is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of standing.
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¶ 21 The complaint also complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 113. Rule 113(b)
provides, “[i]n addition to the documents listed in section 15-1504 of the Illinois Mortgage
Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1504), a copy of the note, as it currently exists, including all
indorsements and allonges, shall be attached to the mortgage foreclosure complaint at the time of
filing.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 113(b) (eff. May 1, 2013). Plaintiff attached to the complaint the note,
mortgage, assignments, and allonge containing the blank indorsement in order to demonstrate
how Washington Mutual became a holder. Plaintiff also attached the assignment from
Washington Mutual to plaintiff, MidFirst Bank. This assignment, which occurred in October
2006, demonstrated how plaintiff became the current holder. Plaintiff also attached the three loan
modifications. The first loan modification is between defendant and Washington Mutual. The
second and third loan modifications are between plaintiff and defendant. Both the second and
third modifications postdate the assignment from Washington Mutual to plaintiff. Taken
together, all the attached exhibits establish plaintiff did not violate Rule 113(b) when it filed the
foreclosure action.
¶ 22 Defendant’s attacks on the complaint are unpersuasive. Defendant argues “a dispute
exists regarding the validity of the allonge itself because the complaint exhibits are awash with
inconsistencies.” Defendant specifically points to the fact that plaintiff failed to attach any
merger documents demonstrating Fleet’s merger into Washington Mutual Home Loans, Inc. She
also argues that the blank indorsement by Fleet containing the word “VOID” written across it
demonstrates an intent by Fleet to negotiate the instrument to a person named Void.
¶ 23 These are procedurally improper arguments to make when bringing a motion to dismiss.
When ruling on the section 2-619(a)(9) motion, the court construes the pleadings “in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party” and should only grant the motion “if the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts that would support a cause of action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 31. The documents
indicate that Fleet merged with Washington Mutual, and for the purposes of a motion to dismiss,
we must accept that this is true. Moreover, for purposes of a motion to dismiss we accept as true
that the note and mortgage were transferred from Washington Mutual to plaintiff and not an
individual named Void.
¶ 24 Plaintiff’s complaint made an initial showing that it had standing to bring the foreclosure
action and complied with Rule 113(b). Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss. 1
¶ 25 In her next issue, defendant argues the circuit court erred in entering judgment in favor of
plaintiff on defendant’s first affirmative defense—lack of standing. The order of October 11,
2016, entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. While not explicitly stated in the order,
the parties acknowledge that this order also resulted in judgment for plaintiff on defendant’s
affirmative defenses and counterclaims.
¶ 26 Section 2-1005 allows parties to receive judgment in their favor “if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016). If a reasonable person could draw divergent
inferences from undisputed facts, summary judgment should be denied. Adams v. Northern
Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 42-43 (2004). To survive this motion, the nonmoving party need
not prove its case, but must present some evidentiary facts that would arguably entitle it to
judgment. Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 212 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2004). In an appeal from a grant of
1
Defendant does not raise a separate argument as to her motion to reconsider the denial of her
motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the issue is forfeited, and we do not review the circuit court’s denial of it.
Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
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summary judgment, our review is de novo. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992).
¶ 27 Defendant takes issues with the assignment from Washington Mutual to plaintiff.
Defendant argues there is no indorsement from Fleet to Washington Mutual that would later
allow Washington Mutual to execute a blank indorsement on the allonge. While defendant is
correct that for the purposes of summary judgment the existence of a merger is a question of fact,
defendant completely ignores that plaintiff attached the merger document from the South
Carolina Secretary of State demonstrating a merger between Fleet and Washington Mutual on
June 1, 2001. This is sufficient to show Washington Mutual could attach the allonge and indorse
it in blank. See Standard Bank & Trust Co. v. Madonia, 2011 IL App (1st) 103516, ¶ 20.
¶ 28 At the time of summary judgment, plaintiff produced documents demonstrating it had
standing to foreclose. Plaintiff attached (1) the original note with Anchor, (2) Anchor’s
assignment of the note to Fleet, (3) Fleet’s merger with Washington Mutual on June 1, 2001,
(4) Washington Mutual’s allonge indorsed in blank, and (5) the assignment from Washington
Mutual to plaintiff, MidFirst Bank, on October 26, 2006.
¶ 29 Defendant argues the blank indorsement from Fleet with the word “VOID” written across
it indicates Fleet meant to transfer the note to an individual named Void. This argument has zero
merit as defendant presents no evidence other than her own assertion that Void is a person and
Fleet meant to transfer the note to him or her. In opposing summary judgment a party must
present some evidentiary facts that would arguably entitle it to judgment. Horwitz, 212 Ill. 2d at
8. Defendant presented no evidence to support her assertion, and the circuit court did not err in
rejecting it.
¶ 30 Defendant also points out that there is an assignment in the record from Washington
Mutual to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). This argument is
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unpersuasive as well. The record shows Washington Mutual assigned the mortgage and note to
plaintiff on October 26, 2006. The assignment to MERS allegedly occurred on May 11, 2007. At
this time, Washington Mutual no longer had the right to transfer the note and mortgage. Its
transfer to MERS was outside the chain of title and ineffective. This assignment has no effect on
plaintiff’s standing.
¶ 31 Based on the above, defendant’s arguments in opposing summary judgment lack any
evidentiary support. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in finding no genuine issue of
material fact and granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. 2
¶ 32 In the next issue, defendant argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment
in favor of plaintiff on her counterclaims for violations of the Consumer Fraud Act and common
law fraud.
¶ 33 The Consumer Fraud Act is a regulatory and remedial statute intended to protect
consumers, borrowers, and business people against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and
other unfair and deceptive business practices. Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill. 2d
403, 416-17 (2002). In order to state a claim under the Consumer Fraud Act, a party must allege
and prove “(1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intent that the
plaintiff rely on the deception; and (3) the occurrence of the deception during a course of conduct
involving trade or commerce.” Id. at 417. Defendant’s consumer fraud claim revolves around
plaintiff’s failure to comply with Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) guidelines.
¶ 34 After reviewing the record, we agree with the circuit court that there were no genuine
issues of material fact related to defendant’s consumer fraud claim and plaintiff was entitled to
summary judgment on this count as a matter of law. “[F]acts contained in an affidavit in support
2
Defendant does not raise a separate argument concerning her motion to reconsider the grant of
summary judgment. Accordingly, the argument related to the motion to reconsider has been forfeited, and
we do not review the circuit court’s denial of it. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
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of a motion for summary judgment which are not contradicted by counteraffidavit are admitted
and must be taken as true for purposes of the motion.” Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 241
(1986). Attached to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was the affidavit of Brian Corgan,
plaintiff’s vice president. The affidavit avers that plaintiff reviewed defendant’s loan for a
possible HAMP modification in October 2009, January 2011, and April 2012. On each occasion
defendant failed to meet the requisite qualifications. It also avers that she declined to enter into a
different loss mitigation option. Defendant filed no counteraffidavit to dispute the claims made
by Corgan. While defendant claims she “was eligible for loss mitigation through the HAMP
because [she] met the HAMP eligibility guidelines,” she fails to point to any evidence in the
record to support her contention that she qualified for a modification under HAMP at any point
in time. Based on the Corgan affidavit and the lack of contrary evidence in the record,
defendant’s claim that plaintiff committed a deceptive act by failing to consider her for HAMP
must fail.
¶ 35 Defendant’s brief does not contain a separate section for her common law fraud count.
Instead, the second to last paragraph of her consumer fraud section argues plaintiff committed
common law fraud for the same reasons it committed consumer fraud under the Act. The same
reasoning above applies, and the circuit court correctly entered summary judgment on this claim
as well.
¶ 36 In her last issue, defendant claims the circuit court erred in confirming the judicial sale.
She argues the sale should not have been confirmed because plaintiff violated section 15­
1508(b)(iv) of the Foreclosure Law (735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b)(iv) (West 2016)) when it failed to
consider her “loss mitigation requests and failed to abide by HAMP.” Next, she argues that
plaintiff did review and offer her a HAMP loan modification, but the offer did not comply with
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HAMP terms. Because the offer did not comply with HAMP, she argues, pursuant to section 15­
1508(d-5) (id. § 5-1508(d-5)), the foreclosure sale must be set aside.
¶ 37 A circuit court’s decision to confirm or reject a judicial sale under section 15-1508 of the
Foreclosure Law will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Household Bank, FSB v.
Lewis, 229 Ill. 2d 173, 178 (2008). A court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily without
the employment of conscientious judgment or if its decision exceeds the bounds of reason and
ignores principles of law such that substantial prejudice has resulted. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Hansen, 2016 IL App (1st) 143720, ¶ 14.
¶ 38 Our supreme court has noted that “[w]hat constitutes an injustice under section 15­
1508(b)(iv) is not expressly defined in the statute. *** [I]t appears to merely codify the long­
standing discretion of the courts of equity to refuse to confirm a judicial sale.” Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 19. The court went on to state that “[a]fter a motion
to confirm the sale has been filed, it is not sufficient under section 15-1508(b)(iv) to merely raise
a meritorious defense to the complaint.” Id. ¶ 26. Based on McCluskey, the circuit court’s
rejection of defendant’s contention that the foreclosure sale could not be approved because
plaintiff failed to consider loss mitigation requests and abide by HAMP was not an abuse of
discretion. These arguments were already rejected as part of her defense to the foreclosure action
and, pursuant to McCluskey, cannot be raised again under section 15-1508(b)(iv) as a reason for
not confirming the sale.
¶ 39 Like section 15-1508(b), section 15-1508(d-5) provides a statutory remedy under which
a court must set aside a judicial sale if all statutory requirements are met. CitiMortgage, Inc. v.
Johnson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120719, ¶ 33. In order to obtain relief under this section, a defendant
must file a motion before confirmation of the sale and prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that “the defendant applied for assistance under the [Make Home Affordable Program
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(MHAP)] and that the sale took place in material violation of the [MHAP’s] requirements, i.e.,
the HAMP guidelines, for proceeding to a judicial sale.” (Emphasis in original). Id. “[I]n order to
‘apply for assistance under MHAP’ pursuant to section 15-1508(d-5) of the Foreclosure Law the
borrower must submit the documentation required by the servicer to determine the borrower’s
eligibility and verify his or her income.” CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Bermudez, 2014 IL App (1st)
122824, ¶ 66.
¶ 40 In this case, defendant did not attach any documentation demonstrating what she
submitted to plaintiff. Even before this court, defendant does not cite to anything in the record to
substantiate her claim or otherwise demonstrate she applied for assistance under MHAP/HAMP.
Pursuant to section 15-1508(d-5), defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence she
applied for assistance under MHAP/HAMP. She has failed to make such a showing.
¶ 41 Based on this record, we cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion in granting
plaintiff’s motion to confirm the judicial sale.
¶ 42 CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the reasons stated above, the orders appealed are affirmed.
¶ 44 Affirmed.
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