People v. Smolley

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2022 IL App (3d) 190545-UOrder filed May 4, 2022
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Peoria County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-19-0545
v. ) Circuit No. 04-CF-613
)
MARTIZE M. SMOLLEY, ) Honorable
) Paul P. Gilfillan,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice O’Brien and Justice Daugherity concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s sentence does not violate the proportionate penalties clause.
¶2 Defendant, Martize M. Smolley, appeals from the Peoria County circuit court’s
imposition of his 40-year prison sentence. Defendant argues that the Truth-in-Sentencing Act
(Act) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(1),(2)(i) (West 2018)), and consecutive sentencing requirement (id.
§ 5-8-4(d)(1)) as applied to him, violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
Constitution. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The State charged defendant with four counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 2004)), and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (id. § 24-
3.1(a)(1)). Defendant was 15 years old at the time of the offenses. The court appointed counsel
and the matter proceeded to a bench trial.
¶5 The evidence adduced at trial showed that on the evening of June 14, 2004, Kelley
Houser and her daughter, Amy Allen, left their residence to buy ice cream. Before purchasing ice
cream, Houser stopped at an automated telling machine (ATM) to withdraw money. Defendant
was waiting near the ATM for someone to pull up. When Houser arrived, defendant approached
her vehicle. Defendant pointed a gun inside the open driver’s door window and Houser started
driving away. When the door frame hit defendant’s hand, it caused him to pull the trigger and
shoot the gun. The gunshot hit both Houser and Allen, causing their deaths. Defendant fled the
scene. Video surveillance from the ATM corroborated the sequence of events. Defendant told
police that he had been carrying the gun for protection and only intended to scare the driver with
the gun and rob her. Defendant indicated that the shooting was an accident. The court found
defendant guilty of counts I and II for first degree murder under the theory of felony murder and
count V, unlawful possession of a firearm.
¶6 The court sentenced defendant to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. On direct
appeal, defendant argued that his mandatory life sentence violated the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution. We affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence. People v.
Smolley, 375 Ill. App. 3d 167 (2007).
¶7 Defendant filed a postconviction petition challenging his mandatory life sentence under
the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The court granted the State’s
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motion to dismiss. On appeal, we allowed counsel to withdraw and affirmed defendant’s
convictions and sentence. People v. Smolley, No. 3-09-0673 (2010) (unpublished dispositional
order).
¶8 Defendant filed a successive postconviction petition, alleging an as-applied constitutional
challenge to his mandatory life sentence under the eighth amendment. Initially, the court denied
defendant’s motion for failure to request leave to file his successive postconviction petition.
Following defendant’s motion to reconsider the denial of his successive postconviction petition,
the court granted defendant leave and appointed the public defender. The State conceded that
under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional and
agreed that a new sentencing hearing was needed. The court ordered a presentence investigation
report (PSI). Following the sentencing hearing, the court resentenced defendant to 65 years’
imprisonment. On appeal, we vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded the matter for a new
sentencing hearing. People v. Smolley, 2018 IL App (3d) 150577. We found that the circuit court
failed to consider defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics before entering a de facto
life sentence. Id. ¶ 22.
¶9 On remand, the court ordered a revised PSI. The PSI showed that defendant had received
mental health and substance abuse counseling, obtained his general education diploma, and
completed several other certifications and programs during his incarceration.
¶ 10 In aggravation, the State played the ATM surveillance video that showed the shooting.
The State argued that defendant’s actions showed irreparable depravity and rejected defendant’s
claim that the discharge of the firearm was an accident.
¶ 11 Defense counsel argued that defendant had not intended to cause the victims’ death.
Further, defendant exhibited a lack of maturity, impulsivity, and reckless behavior. Counsel
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noted that defendant’s actions while in prison show that he can be rehabilitated and asked for the
minimum sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 12 In allocution, defendant stated that he was immature at the time of the offenses and had
shown he could mature in prison. Defendant regretted his actions and accepted responsibility.
¶ 13 Following arguments, the court found that the offenses resulted from an accidental
discharge of a firearm. The court considered the statutory factors, including defendant’s present
character, attitude, and maturity. The court also noted defendant’s youth and its attendant
characteristics at the time of the offenses. The court found that defendant’s actions did not
involve irretrievable depravity. The court accepted defendant’s claim of remorse and sentenced
defendant to the minimum sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment, comprised of 20 years for each
count of first degree murder to be served consecutively.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues that application of the Act, which requires him to serve
100% of his two consecutive 20-year sentences, violates the proportionate penalties clause of the
Illinois Constitution. Specifically, the Act forecloses the opportunity for defendant to obtain
release based on his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation and removes the court’s discretion
when sentencing.
¶ 16 We begin by reviewing the statute that defendant argues is unconstitutional as applied to
him. The Act is “designed to encourage rehabilitation and enable an offender to be released after
he serves half of the determinate sentence” in certain circumstances. People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL
123010, ¶ 52. The Act limits the credit in other instances, such as first degree murder, requiring a
defendant to serve 100% of his sentence. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(1)(2)(i) (West 2018). In the
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context of this case, the Act requires that defendant serve 100% of his two 20-year sentences for
first degree murder for a total of 40 years’ imprisonment. See also id. § 5-8-4(d)(1).
¶ 17 Turning to defendant’s constitutional challenge, we note that in Miller, the Supreme
Court found that a life sentence without the possibility of parole “poses too great a risk of
disproportionate punishment” to juvenile offenders under the eighth amendment. Miller, 567
U.S. at 479. As a result, Miller outlined several factors that a court must contemplate to ensure
consideration of a juvenile’s youth and its attendant characteristic before imposing a life
sentence. Id. Our supreme court has extended Miller to require sentencing courts to consider
youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing a de facto life sentence. People v. Reyes,
2016 IL 119271, ¶¶ 7-8. In People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41, our supreme court defined a
de facto life sentence as a sentence of more than 40 years’ imprisonment. Additionally, the
supreme court explained that a sentence below a de facto life provides a meaningful opportunity
for rehabilitation, and therefore, does not violate the eighth amendment. Id. Thus, to prevail on a
Miller claim, “a defendant sentenced for an offense committed while a juvenile must show that
(1) the defendant was subject to a life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto,
and (2) the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing
the sentence.” Id. ¶ 27.
¶ 18 We note that defendant does not raise and would not prevail on a strict Miller claim
because the court did not impose a de facto life sentence. Rather, the court imposed a 40-year
sentence comprised of two consecutive minimum sentences of 20 years’ imprisonment. See 730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a)(1) (West 2018) (first degree murder carries a sentencing range of 20 to 60
years’ imprisonment); id. § 5-8-4(d)(1), 3-6-3(a)(1)(2)(i).
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¶ 19 Instead, defendant argues that Buffer does not preclude his argument because he raises his
challenge under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution and is challenging
the requirement of the Act that he serve 100% of the sentence. The proportionate penalties clause
requires that a punishment serve the purpose of restoring an offender to society. Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, § 11. Our supreme court has indicated that the proportionate penalties clause provides
greater protection against excessive punishment than the eighth amendment. People v. Clemons,
2012 IL 107821, ¶ 40. A sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause when the
punishment is “cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the
moral sense of the community.” People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002).
¶ 20 However, our supreme court in Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 64, foreclosed even a
proportionate penalties challenge to a sentence of less than 40 years where it held
“the more-than-40-years mark in Buffer is meant to be the line for a de facto life
sentence where there is no opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation and obtain
release short of serving more than 40 years in prison. In other words, a judicially
imposed sentence that is more than 40 years but offers day-for-day, good-conduct
sentencing credit does not cross the Buffer line if it offers the opportunity to
demonstrate maturity and obtain release with 40 years or less of incarceration.”
The appellate court has interpreted this to mean “a juvenile defendant’s sentence (whether served
at 100%, 85%, or 50%) may be subject to a constitutional challenge only if it will keep the
juvenile in prison for more than 40 years.” People v. Brakes, 2021 IL App (1st) 181737, ¶ 42.
¶ 21 Here, defendant is required to serve 40 years’ imprisonment, and therefore, after Dorsey
and Buffer, he cannot mount a proportionate penalties challenge.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
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