People v. Woodrome

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
People v. Woodrome, 2013 IL App (4th) 130142
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Caption TIMOTHY RAY WOODROME, Defendant-Appellee.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-13-0142
Filed September 11, 2013
Held The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress the
(Note: This syllabus evidence discovered by the police while investigating an anonymous tip
constitutes no part of that a person at a certain address was burning plastic-encased copper
the opinion of the court wire, since the officers involved were in a place where they had a right to
but has been prepared be when they observed the evidence in plain view, after which they left
by the Reporter of the scene to obtain a warrant; therefore, no violation of the fourth
Decisions for the amendment occurred.
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jersey County, No. 11-CF-155; the
Review Hon. Eric S. Pistorius, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Counsel on Benjamin Goetten, State’s Attorney, of Jerseyville (Patrick Delfino,
Appeal Robert J. Biderman, and Perry L. Miller, all of State’s Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Ted E. Barylske, of Alton, for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Knecht and Holder White concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In September 2011, the State charged defendant, Timothy Ray Woodrome, with single
counts of theft and criminal damage to property. In March 2012, defendant filed a motion to
suppress evidence, which the trial court granted.
¶2 On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In September 2011, the State charged defendant by information with one count of theft
(720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2010)), alleging he knowingly exerted unauthorized control
over property of AT&T, being copper wire having a total value in excess of $500, with the
intent to permanently deprive AT&T of the use of the property. The State also charged
defendant with one count of criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a) (West
2010)), alleging he knowingly damaged property of AT&T, being telephone wire, with the
damage being in excess of $300 but not in excess of $10,000. Defendant pleaded not guilty.
¶5 In March 2012, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. Defendant claimed the
State intended to introduce into evidence items seized by police in the execution of a search
warrant pertaining to his residence at 10783 Chestnut Lane in Godfrey. Defendant stated the
affidavit and complaint for search warrant filed by Sheriff’s Deputy Mark Marshall set forth
three matters in support of the issuance of the warrant, including that (1) the police received
information regarding an individual burning plastic-encased copper wire at defendant’s
residence and no identity as to the informant and his/her reliability was provided; (2) the
police had knowledge of copper wire thefts within the same area in the previous three days;
and (3) the affiant, Deputy Marshall, while on defendant’s property earlier in the day in
question observed a small burn pile containing plastic-encased copper wire and several
sections of telephone cable on the floor of defendant’s detached garage. Defendant claimed
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Deputy Marshall did not have a warrant or defendant’s consent to search when he made the
observations prior to preparing his affidavit. Thus, the observations made by Deputy
Marshall in his affidavit and complaint for search warrant were a product of his prior
unlawful entry and insufficient for the issuance of a search warrant based upon probable
cause.
¶6 In May 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress. Deputy
Marshall testified to his affidavit and complaint for a search warrant, the search warrant, and
the evidence/property report. He agreed the affidavit did not indicate the identification of the
person who provided the information of an individual burning plastic-encased copper wire.
He arrived at defendant’s residence at 12:34 p.m. to investigate. From the roadway, he could
see smoke from the fire approximately 100 feet from his position but could not see what was
in the fire. Sergeant Tim Chappell arrived at the same time as Marshall. Defendant was out
in the yard and quickly went inside after Chappell called his name. Marshall proceeded to
the front door of the residence. Thereafter, “we went around the residence, knocking on the
doors, trying to get somebody to come back to the door, makin[g] sure he wasn’t climbing
out the back window.” During this check, Marshall observed telephone cable next to the
residence. Chappell then advised Marshall to look in the burn pile. Upon approaching the
fire, he could see copper wire therein. Marshall looked through an open door in the garage
and observed telephone cables that matched the description of the plastic-encased copper
wire. Marshall testified he later motioned an AT&T employee, who had been waiting down
the street, to defendant’s property to identify the wire. Marshall stated defendant never gave
his consent to allow anyone to be on the property. Marshall used the information obtained
from his observations to secure the search warrant.
¶7 On cross-examination, Deputy Marshall testified there had been several copper wire
thefts in the vicinity during that particular time period. He stated he saw the fire while off of
the premises. As he pulled into the driveway, he observed defendant turn away and go inside
the residence. Marshall eventually left the scene to take defendant to jail at 12:59 p.m. and
to secure the search warrant.
¶8 On redirect examination, Marshall stated he went to the front door of the residence but
had not observed any copper wire. As he walked around the side of the house to make sure
no one was attempting to exit, he observed copper wire. After he looked in the burn pile, he
looked in the open door of the garage and observed copper wire in plain view.
¶9 Sergeant Tim Chappell testified he received a phone call from someone wishing to
remain anonymous who was aware of copper wire having been stolen in the area and seeing
the type of telephone cable that was stolen. Looking to investigate the copper wire thefts,
Chappell arrived at defendant’s residence at approximately 12:30 p.m. and observed him
walk toward the residence. Knowing defendant from prior law-enforcement contacts,
Chappell called out “Hey, Tim,” but defendant entered the residence without acknowledging
the statement. Chappell knocked on the front door but did not receive a response. He
proceeded to the side of the house and knocked on another door. He observed telephone wire
and asked Deputy Marshall to look in the burn pile, which was approximately 25 to 30 yards
from the house. He later told Marshall to transport defendant and then secure a search
warrant. Chappell called the AT&T employee, who had been servicing the area involved with
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the stolen wire, and asked him to come to the property and look at the wire.
¶ 10 In December 2012, the trial court issued its written order and found, in part, as follows:
“Based upon the anonymous phone call, Deputies Marshall and Chappell traveled to
defendant’s property where smoke could be seen from a fire, which was approximately
100 feet from the roadway, but the material that was being burned could not be identified
from that location. Officer Marshall stated that it was only when he was within 20 feet
of the fire that he could tell it was plastic encased copper wire. Finally, the Sheriff’s
department deputies were aware that there had been reports of stolen plastic encased
telephone wire in the area within three days prior to the arrest.
The question before this court is whether those three facts (anonymous call, smoke
from a fire seen from the roadway and knowledge of plastic encased copper wire thefts
in area) are sufficient for the officers to conduct a warrantless search of the defendant’s
property. Illinois law recognizes that probable cause can be based on an anonymous tip
which is sufficiently detailed to establish the reliability of the informant’s basis of
knowledge and it was sufficiently corroborated to demonstrate his veracity. People v.
Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981). Under the facts of this case, the court does
not believe that there was sufficient detail in the information provided by the informant
to permit a warrantless search based solely on the information given.
This finding, however, does not end the discussion. Illinois courts have gone on to
note that an insufficient informant’s tip may be cured by independent partial
corroboration by the officers investigating the allegations contained in the informant’s
tip. (People v. Smith, 101 Ill. App. 3d 772, 428 N.E.2d 641 (4th Dist. 1981). As noted in
People v. Smith ‘Where all the information in a tip has been independently verified,
independent corroboration may establish the basis of knowledge. There is no perilous
reliance on ‘an amalgam of underworld rumor and barroom gossip (19 Md. App. 507,
531, 313 A.2d 847, 862), if all facts have been verified.’
In People v. Smith, the officers, ‘Acting on a tip indicating where the perpetrators of
a recent burglary and their bounty could be found, the police went to investigate. The
defendant was found at the specified location, standing in front of an open storage bay
containing an air compressor generally matching the description of the one stolen.’ While
these facts appear to be similar to the facts in the case before us, there is one significant
difference; as noted by the Appellate Court in the Smith case, the arresting officer
observed the compressor from the property of a private enterprise which was open to the
public. In the words of the Appellate Court, ‘he was in a place where he had a right to
be.’ (People v. Smith, at 428 N.E.2d 645) Under the facts of this case, while the officers
in question observed smoke from the roadway, which was approximately 100 feet from
the fire, they could not determine what was the source of the fire until they entered on the
defendant’s property and got within 20 feet of the fire.
As such, the officer’s corroboration and therefore the establishment of probable cause
occurred only after they entered upon his property without unlawful [sic] authority.”
The court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
¶ 11 In January 2013, the State filed a motion to reconsider, claiming exigent circumstances
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existed to justify a warrantless entry. In February 2013, the trial court held a hearing and
denied the motion. Thereafter, the State filed a certificate of impairment. See Ill. S. Ct. R.
604(a)(1) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). This appeal followed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 The State argues the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress. The
State contends the police officers had probable cause to enter upon defendant’s property,
their entry on the property was lawful based on exigent circumstances, and the evidence
discovered on the property would have been inevitably discovered.
¶ 14 A. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof
¶ 15 On review of a motion to suppress, this court is presented with mixed questions of law
and fact. People v. McQuown, 407 Ill. App. 3d 1138, 1143, 943 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (2011).
“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we will accord great
deference to the trial court’s factual findings and will reverse those findings only if they
are against the manifest weight of the evidence; but we will review de novo the court’s
ultimate decision to grant or deny the motion.” People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 504, 939
N.E.2d 463, 467 (2010).
¶ 16 On a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant has the burden of proving the search and
seizure were unlawful. 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West 2012); People v. Barker, 369 Ill. App.
3d 670, 673, 867 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (2007). “The burden of producing evidence, or the
burden of production, rests with the defendant.” People v. Mott, 389 Ill. App. 3d 539, 542,
906 N.E.2d 159, 163 (2009). “ ‘However, once the defendant makes a prima facie showing
of an illegal search and seizure, the burden shifts to the State to produce evidence justifying
the intrusion.’ ” People v. Reatherford, 345 Ill. App. 3d 327, 334, 802 N.E.2d 340, 347
(2003) (quoting People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (2000)).
¶ 17 B. The Fourth Amendment
¶ 18 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. Similarly, the Illinois Constitution affords
citizens with “the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers[,] and other possessions
against unreasonable searches [and] seizures.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. Our supreme court
has interpreted the search-and-seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution in a manner
consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s fourth-amendment jurisprudence. See
People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 335-36, 851 N.E.2d 26, 57 (2006).
¶ 19 The general rule is that searches and seizures are unreasonable unless conducted pursuant
to a judicial warrant issued by a neutral magistrate after a finding of probable cause. Illinois
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001). However, if there is no unreasonable government
intrusion, “there is no search and seizure subject to the warrant clause of the [fourth]
amendment.” People v. Neal, 109 Ill. 2d 216, 221, 486 N.E.2d 898, 901 (1985).
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¶ 20 In the case sub judice, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress, finding the
information provided by the anonymous caller was not sufficiently detailed to permit a
warrantless search and the corroboration of the call by the officers was invalid because they
entered upon defendant’s property without lawful authority. We disagree with the court’s
decision because the officers were conducting a lawful investigation and no violation of the
fourth amendment occurred as no warrantless search took place.
¶ 21 Police may stop a person to investigate possible criminal behavior based on an
informant’s tip where the information received has some indicia of reliability and establishes
the necessary quantum of suspicion. People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 487, 828 N.E.2d 237, 246
(2005). Where police obtain corroboration of the information, it establishes the informant’s
veracity and supports the inference that the informant obtained his information reliably.
People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 210, 588 N.E.2d 983, 995 (1991).
¶ 22 We find the reliability of the anonymous caller is of little relevance in this case because
no suspicionless stop or arrest was made and no warrantless search or seizure occurred based
on the tip. See People v. Scott, 249 Ill. App. 3d 597, 602, 619 N.E.2d 809, 814 (1993)
(finding the reliability of the tip was irrelevant in the fourth-amendment analysis where there
was no initial stop of the defendant based on the tip). Here, an anonymous caller reported the
theft of copper wire and that an individual was unlawfully burning plastic-encased copper
wire at 10783 Chestnut Lane. Police officers were also aware of copper wire thefts in the
vicinity. While these two facts alone would not have been sufficient to secure a search
warrant, the officers were not prevented from conducting their investigation at the address
in question. As they approached the subject property on a public road, the deputies saw
defendant outside near a burn pile. While this observation would not have given officers the
authority to arrest defendant or search the property, it did corroborate the caller’s tip and
allow for further investigation.
¶ 23 “An officer may lawfully approach the front door of a residence to conduct an
investigation–referred to by many courts as a ‘knock and talk’–so long as the officer enters
an area impliedly open to the public.” People v. Redman, 386 Ill. App. 3d 409, 418, 900
N.E.2d 1146, 1155 (2008); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409,
1416 (2013) (stating “a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and
knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do’ ” (quoting
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011))); United States v.
Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that “ ‘[a]bsent express orders from
the person in possession,’ an officer may ‘walk up the steps and knock on the front door of
any man’s “castle,” with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof’ ”
(quoting Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964))). Moreover, “[a]n officer
may go beyond the front door to investigate by approaching the back door of a
residence–either when no one answers a knock on the front door or where a legitimate reason
is shown for approaching the back door.” Redman, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 418, 900 N.E.2d at
1156.
¶ 24 In this case, the officers left the roadway and turned into defendant’s driveway. See Scott,
249 Ill. App. 3d at 603, 619 N.E.2d at 815 (stating “a driveway on private property, like the
entrance to a private home, can be considered a public place”). Defendant started walking
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away from the burn pile as he removed his gloves. As defendant walked toward the house,
Sergeant Chappell exited his car and called out, “Hey, Tim.” Defendant did not acknowledge
Chappell and went inside. The officers then went to the front door and knocked. As this
action was in furtherance of the investigation, it was a legitimate reason for approaching the
front door. See Taylor, 458 F.3d at 1204 (finding no fourth-amendment violation where “the
officer entered the property, proceeded down the driveway that provided access to the house,
went to the front door and knocked on it in order to investigate the suspicious and troubling
911 calls”). Deputy Marshall also went around to the back of the residence to knock on doors
and to make sure defendant “wasn’t climbing out the back window.” These were also
legitimate reasons for approaching the rear of the house. See Redman, 386 Ill. App. 3d at
418, 900 N.E.2d at 1156.
¶ 25 “Once an officer is legitimately on the property, he or she may properly observe any
‘evidence lying about in the open.’ [Citation.] A search does not occur when officers observe
what is in open view.” Redman, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 419, 900 N.E.2d at 1156; see also People
v. Berg, 67 Ill. 2d 65, 68, 364 N.E.2d 880, 881-82 (1977) (“it is not a search to observe that
which is in open view”); United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2003)
(“ ‘[W]hen the police come on to private property to conduct an investigation ... and restrict
their movements to places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways,
porches), observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth
Amendment.’ ” (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 506-08 (3d ed.
1996))).
¶ 26 Here, the officers were aware of recent copper wire thefts in the area. Marshall stated he
saw multiple sections of telephone cables next to the residence. When Chappell was on the
side of the house to knock on the side door, he saw telephone wire. After being asked to do
so, Marshall looked in the burn pile and saw burnt copper wire. At some point in time, he
looked in the open door of the garage and saw copper wire in plain view.
¶ 27 The evidence indicates the officers’ decision to enter the property and approach the
house, as well as the manner in which they did so, constituted reasonable police actions in
the midst of a criminal investigation. Proceeding around the house to knock on doors and/or
to make sure defendant did not attempt to flee were also reasonable and proper actions.
While the officers were in a place where they had a lawful right to be, they observed in plain
view telephone cable that matched the description of the stolen copper wire. Officers did not
have to look in any containers or open any doors to do so. Cf. People v. Payton, 317 Ill. App.
3d 909, 914, 741 N.E.2d 302, 306 (2000) (finding a fourth-amendment violation where an
officer discovered cocaine and cannabis after lifting the lid of a barbecue grill located on the
front porch). Moreover, no argument can be made based on the evidence presented that
simply looking in the burn pile constituted an unreasonable government intrusion since the
officers were lawfully on the property and had already observed suspected stolen copper
wire. See People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 283, 718 N.E.2d 131, 140 (1999) (finding a burn
pile located outside a trailer’s curtilage was “protected by neither the United States
Constitution nor the Illinois Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures”); see
also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (holding “an individual has no
legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion by
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government officers”). On a final note, the officers’ request to have the AT&T employee
come to defendant’s property is of no consequence because the evidence indicated the
employee did nothing more than identify the wire.
¶ 28 Here, no fourth-amendment violation occurred. The officers were in a place where they
lawfully had a right to be and they observed evidence of a crime in plain view. Even then,
the officers did not seize the evidence but secured a search warrant based on the information
known to them. As the officers were not on the property unlawfully and they did not conduct
a warrantless search, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress.
¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 30 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
¶ 31 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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