People v. James

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Appellate Court Date: 2017.06.28
10:28:50 -05'00'
People v. James, 2017 IL App (4th) 160256
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption THOMAS R. JAMES, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-16-0256
Filed May 3, 2017
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion County, No. 02-CF-141;
Review the Hon. Craig H. DeArmond, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Thomas R. James, of Pinckneyville, appellant pro se.
Appeal
Randall J. Brinegar, State’s Attorney, of Danville (Patrick Delfino,
David J. Robinson, and John M. Zimmerman, of State’s Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Steigmann and Pope concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Thomas R. James, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for
issuance of a certificate of good conduct under section 5-5.5-30 of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5.5-30 (West Supp. 2015)). We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In September 2002, a jury found defendant guilty of aggravated robbery (720 ILCS
5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2002)), a Class X felony. In December 2002, the trial court sentenced
defendant to 32 years’ imprisonment.
¶4 In January 2016, defendant filed a pro se petition for the issuance of a certificate of good
conduct under section 5-5.5-30 of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5.5-30 (West Supp. 2015)).
Defendant requested the trial court conduct a rehabilitation hearing, find him to be
rehabilitated, issue a certificate of good conduct, and serve the Director of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (DOC) with a copy of the certificate.
¶5 In February 2016, the trial court dismissed defendant’s petition. In a docket entry, the court
noted: “There is no legal basis for such a pleading.” Defendant filed a timely motion to
reconsider.
¶6 In March 2016, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider. In a docket entry,
the court noted:
“The [p]etitioner misinterprets the [c]ourt’s previous [dismissal]. There is a statutory
basis for a [c]ertificate of [g]ood [c]onduct found in [section 5-5.5-25 of the Unified
Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5.5-25 (West 2014))], however, the [p]etitioner has provided no
legal basis for the issuance thereof.”
Defendant appealed, and the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to
represent defendant.
¶7 In April 2016, OSAD filed a motion for leave to withdraw as appellate counsel, asserting
defendant’s appeal did not fall within the scope of its representation. That same month, this
court granted OSAD’s motion.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 Defendant, proceeding pro se, argues the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for the
issuance of a certificate of good conduct under section 5-5.5-30 of the Unified Code (730 ILCS
5/5-5.5-30 (West Supp. 2015)) violates (1) due process, (2) the plain-error doctrine, and (3)
Illinois Supreme Court Rules 18 and 19 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). The State contends the court’s
dismissal was proper as the relief requested is wholly inapplicable to defendant.
¶ 10 Whether the relief requested is applicable to defendant presents an issue of statutory
construction, which we review de novo. In re Commitment of Fields, 2014 IL 115542, ¶ 32, 10
N.E.3d 832. Our primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the legislature. Id. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of
the statute. Id. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute as
written, without resorting to other aids of statutory construction. Id.
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¶ 11 Section 5-5.5-25 of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5.5-25 (West 2014)) grants
individuals convicted of certain offenses the opportunity to apply for a “certificate of good
conduct” to assist with obtaining gainful employment, and section 5-5.5-30 of the Unified
Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5.5-30 (West Supp. 2015)) provides the process for the issuance thereof.
Specifically, subsection 5-5.5-25(a) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5.5-25(a) (West
2014)) provides:
“A certificate of good conduct may be granted as provided in this [s]ection to relieve an
eligible offender of any employment bar. The certificate may be limited to one or more
disabilities or bars or may relieve the individual of all disabilities and bars.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a certificate of good conduct does not
relieve an offender of any employment-related disability imposed by law by reason of
his or her conviction of a crime that would prevent his or her employment by the
[DOC] or the Department of Juvenile Justice, or any other law enforcement agency in
the State.”
See also 730 ILCS 5/5-5.5-5 (West Supp. 2015) (defining “[e]ligible offender”). Subsection
5-5.5-25(c) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5.5-25(c) (West 2014)) further provides:
“An employer is not civilly or criminally liable for an act or omission by an employee
who has been issued a certificate of good conduct, except for a willful or wanton act by
the employer in hiring the employee who has been issued a certificate of good
conduct.”
¶ 12 According to the DOC website, defendant is currently imprisoned, with a projected parole
date of March 8, 2033, and a projected discharge date of March 8, 2036. See
https://www.idoc.state.il.us/subsections/search/inms_print.asp?idoc=a10447 (last visited Apr.
18, 2017); see also People v. Peterson, 372 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1019, 868 N.E.2d 329, 336
(2007) (appellate court may take judicial notice of DOC records). At this time, defendant does
not face the hurdles of obtaining gainful employment with a criminal record and, therefore, is
not entitled to a certificate of good conduct. Because the relief requested is inapplicable to
defendant under the circumstances presented, the trial court properly dismissed defendant’s
petition.
¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 14 We affirm the trial court’s judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State its
statutory assessment of $50 against defendant as costs of this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a)
(West 2014).
¶ 15 Affirmed.
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