People v. Hadden

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Appellate Court Date: 2016.01.22 11:19:13
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People v. Hadden, 2015 IL App (4th) 140226
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption JONATHON D. HADDEN, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket Nos. 4-14-0226, 4-15-0133 cons.
Filed December 21, 2015
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 12-CF-554; the
Review Hon. Robert L. Freitag, Judge, presiding.
Judgment No. 4-14-0226, Affirmed.
No. 4-15-0133, Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and Joel C. Wessol
Appeal (argued), all of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for
appellant.
Jason Chambers, State’s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino,
David J. Robinson, and David E. Mannchen (argued), Assistant
State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Harris and Appleton concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In June 2012, the State charged defendant with solicitation of murder for hire (720 ILCS
5/8-1.2(a) (West 2010)). At defendant’s February 2014 jury trial, the State introduced into
evidence two audio-recordings of surreptitiously recorded conversations between defendant
and two other people in which defendant spoke about killing his codefendant in another case.
The jury found defendant guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to 25 years in prison.
¶2 On appeal, defendant argues that the (1) evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of solicitation of murder for hire and (2) trial court failed to inquire
into defendant’s posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In June 2012, the State charged defendant with solicitation of murder for hire, alleging that
he procured Nathan Luster, who was an Illinois State Police undercover special agent, to
commit first degree murder pursuant to an agreement whereby Luster would kill Michael
Anderson–defendant’s codefendant in a pending burglary case–in exchange for United States
currency.
¶5 The following evidence was presented at defendant’s February 2014 jury trial. In
December 2012, defendant and Anderson were arrested and detained in the McLean County
jail for a burglary that occurred at Bloomington Cycle and Fitness. In April 2013, Nidrell
Lyons, an inmate and barber at the jail, contacted McLean County sheriff’s detective Dave
Fritts. The details of the conversation between Lyons and Fritts are not apparent in the record,
but after talking with Lyons, Fritts set up a recorded overhear conversation between defendant
and Lyons. The conversation took place on April 23, 2013, as Lyons cut defendant’s hair in the
jail’s recreation room. The jury was permitted to hear the recording of the conversation.
¶6 The recording contained, in part, the following discussion between defendant and Lyons.
Defendant blamed Anderson for his burglary arrest and stated that he wanted Anderson
“gone.” Defendant told Lyons that Anderson should be bonding out of jail the following day.
Lyons said he would talk to his cousin, who could do “what you’re trying to do” for $500, with
the requirement that $250 be paid up front. Defendant responded that he could provide the full
$500 up front. Later in the conversation, defendant said that he would pay Lyons’ cousin
$1,000, of which $500 would be provided up front. Defendant gave Lyons a phone number for
defendant’s girlfriend, whom Lyons’ cousin could call after defendant had bonded out of jail.
At the end of the conversation, Lyons asked, “You want him gone, right?” Defendant
responded, “If that what he’s willing to do–yeah.”
¶7 Luster testified that he was contacted by the McLean County sheriff’s office to participate
in a surreptitiously recorded conversation with defendant. On May 9, 2013, Luster pretended
to be a hit man during a conversation with defendant in the visiting area of the jail. Luster
entered the jail as a regular citizen and wore plain clothes and a hidden audio-recording device.
The jury was permitted to hear that audio recording.
¶8 The recording contained, in relevant part, the following discussion. Luster introduced
himself to defendant as Lyons’ cousin. Defendant initially sounded confused, as he was not
expecting to meet with Lyons’ cousin and no longer had contact with Lyons. Defendant told
Luster that he could not pay Luster until he bonded out of jail. Defendant expected that after he
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bonded out, he would acquire the money to pay Luster. Defendant explained that he expected
his father to bond him out of jail that weekend. Defendant then gave Luster his girlfriend’s
phone number. Defendant explained that Luster should call his girlfriend that weekend and ask
whether defendant had bonded out of jail. If she said yes, Luster should give her his phone
number, and defendant would contact him to arrange payment. If defendant had not bonded
out, “then it’s pretty much dead.” Defendant explained that if he was able to bond out, he
would acquire money to also bond out Anderson and pay Luster.
¶9 Defendant gave Luster Anderson’s full name and address so that Luster could “take a
look.” Defendant then gave Luster a description of the inside of Anderson’s residence and
identified where in the home Anderson would likely be located and where the security cameras
were. Luster asked what specifically defendant wanted done to Anderson, and defendant
responded, “I just want him gone.” When Luster asked defendant to clarify what he wanted
done to Anderson, defendant responded that he wanted Anderson “gone completely,” he did
not want Anderson seen from or heard from again. Defendant explained that he did not want
Anderson to testify at defendant’s burglary trial. Luster asked defendant where on Anderson’s
body he wanted Luster to shoot, but defendant did not answer that question.
¶ 10 Defendant testified that he “was just venting” when talking to Lyons. He stated he had no
money and never intended to give Luster any money. Defendant believed that Luster would not
take any action until and unless defendant paid him first. When defendant told Luster that he
would bond out that weekend, he did not actually believe that he would bond out.
¶ 11 The jury found defendant guilty.
¶ 12 Later in February 2014, the cause proceeded to a joint sentencing hearing on defendant’s
charges of burglary and solicitation of murder for hire. During his statement in allocution,
defendant asserted that he was “sold out” because trial counsel failed to obtain “a copy of
[Lyons’] sentencing transcripts,” and instead told defendant that they were not needed.
Defendant also stated that he asked counsel to file a motion, which counsel did not do.
(Defendant did not specify what kind of motion he asked counsel to file or whether it was
related to the Lyons transcripts.) In addition, defendant argued that he was denied his right to a
bench trial and that had his case proceeded to a bench trial, the trial court would have found
him not guilty. As to sentencing, defendant asked for a sentence less than the statutory
minimum.
¶ 13 The trial court responded that the evidence against defendant was “more than enough” to
find him guilty. The court rejected defendant’s contention that he was denied his right to a
bench trial, noting that defendant never requested a bench trial. The court asserted further that
had the case proceeded to a bench trial, the court would have found defendant guilty. The court
did not address defendant’s statements about his counsel’s performance. The court sentenced
defendant to 5 years in prison for burglary and 25 years for solicitation of murder for hire, to
run consecutively.
¶ 14 This direct appeal of defendant’s conviction followed (case No. 4-14-0226).
¶ 15 In November 2014, while defendant’s direct appeal was pending in this court, defendant
filed in the trial court a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-7 (West 2014)), in which he argued that he was denied
his sixth amendment rights to cross-examine Lyons and to the effective assistance of counsel.
The court summarily dismissed the petition, finding it frivolous and patently without merit.
Defendant appealed that decision (case No. 4-15-0133).
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¶ 16 On defendant’s motion, we consolidated defendant’s appeals.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 Defendant argues that the (1) evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of solicitation of murder for hire and (2) trial court failed to inquire into
defendant’s posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree with both
contentions. Defendant does not raise any argument regarding the summary dismissal of his
postconviction petition (case No. 4-15-0133).
¶ 19 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 20 Defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of solicitation of murder for hire. Specifically, he argues that the evidence
was insufficient to prove that an “agreement” existed between defendant and Luster because a
condition precedent to a potential agreement never occurred–namely, that defendant did not
bond out of jail. As a result, defendant argues, he was guilty of attempted solicitation of murder
for hire, if he was guilty of anything. We reject defendant’s argument.
¶ 21 1. Statutory Language
¶ 22 Section 8-1.2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) provides, as follows:
“A person commits the offense of solicitation of murder for hire when, with the intent
that the offense of first degree murder be committed, he or she procures another to
commit that offense pursuant to any contract, agreement, understanding, command, or
request for money or anything of value.” 720 ILCS 5/8-1.2(a) (West 2010).
¶ 23 2. Standard of Review
¶ 24 The parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of review. The State urges us to apply
the usual standard used to review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Under that
standard we ask whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114, 871 N.E.2d 728, 740 (2007). Defendant, citing
People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶¶ 4-6, 980 N.E.2d 1107, argues that the present case
involves a question of statutory interpretation that should be reviewed de novo.
¶ 25 We agree with the State that the Wheeler standard is appropriate in this case. Whether an
agreement existed was a question of fact for the jury, which decided it in the affirmative. The
Wheeler standard “gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve
conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The jury’s
determination that an agreement existed is entitled to the deference granted by the Wheeler
standard.
¶ 26 Defendant argues that when the evidence is not in dispute, there is no need to defer to the
jury’s findings, and a court of review is free to determine on its own, with no deference to the
fact finder, whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Some case law
supports defendant’s contention. See, e.g., In re Ryan B., 212 Ill. 2d 226, 231, 817 N.E.2d 495,
497-98 (2004) (“Because respondent’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against him
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does not question the credibility of the witnesses, but instead questions whether the
uncontested facts were sufficient to prove the elements of sexual exploitation of a child, our
review is de novo.”); People v. Smith, 191 Ill. 2d 408, 411, 732 N.E.2d 513, 514 (2000)
(“Because the facts are not in dispute, defendant’s guilt is a question of law, which we review
de novo.”). Defendant claims that because the evidence presented was audio-recorded, there is
no dispute as to the facts and, therefore, no need to defer to the jury’s finding of guilt. We
disagree.
¶ 27 Although defendant is correct that the evidence–namely, the audio recordings–was not in
dispute, the inferences to be drawn from those conversations were in dispute. As we stated
previously, “[i]n determining a defendant’s guilt, the trier of fact is entitled to draw reasonable
inferences that flow from the evidence [presented].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
People v. Sorrels, 389 Ill. App. 3d 547, 551, 906 N.E.2d 788, 792 (2009) (quoting People v.
Kirkpatrick, 365 Ill. App. 3d 927, 929-30, 851 N.E.2d 276, 279 (2006)); see also People v.
Washington, 2012 IL 110283, ¶ 60, 962 N.E.2d 902 (“It is the jury’s function to weigh the
evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and draw
reasonable inferences therefrom.”). Because drawing inferences from the evidence was a task
for the jury, we apply the deferential Wheeler standard to review the jury’s decision finding
defendant guilty. See Sorrels, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 551, 906 N.E.2d at 792 (“[An] issue in this
case is what inferences the jury could have reasonably drawn from the facts in this case as the
jury determined those facts. Thus, the Wheeler standard of review applies ***.”).
¶ 28 We note that deferring to the jury is particularly important when the jury is considering an
audio-recorded statement as opposed to a written transcript. Spoken language contains more
communicative information than the mere words because spoken language contains
“paralanguage”–that is, the “vocal signs perceptible to the human ear that are not actual
words.” Keith A. Gorgos, Lost in Transcription: Why the Video Record Is Actually Verbatim,
57 Buff. L. Rev. 1057, 1107 (2009). Paralanguage includes “quality of voice (shrill, smooth,
shaky, gravely, whiny, giggling), variations in pitch, intonation, stress, emphasis, breathiness,
volume, extent (how drawn out or clipped speech is), hesitations or silent pauses, filled pauses
or speech fillers (e.g., ‘um/uhm,’ ‘hmm,’ ‘er’), the rate of speech, and extra-speech sounds
such as hissing, shushing, whistling, and imitations sounds.” Gorgos, supra, at 1108. The
information expressed through paralanguage is rarely included in the transcript, as there is
generally no written counterpart for these features of speech. Gorgos, supra, at 1109.
¶ 29 The jury has the responsibility to interpret the paralanguage and draw the appropriate
inferences therefrom. In this case, the jury and this court both have had access to the same
recordings of defendant’s conversations with Lyons and Luster. However, we might reach
different conclusions about the meaning of the conversations based on differing interpretations
of the paralanguage involved. Under the principles of appellate review embodied in the
Wheeler standard, this court is obliged to defer to the jury’s interpretations. Therefore, contrary
to defendant’s contention, the jury had fact-finding work to do. In light of that work, the
deferential Wheeler standard of review is applicable to our determination of the jury’s decision
that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 30 3. Whether the Evidence Was Sufficient in This Case
¶ 31 Applying the appropriate standard of review to defendant’s claim, we ask whether,
viewing the evidence–and the inferences to be drawn therefrom–in a light most favorable to
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the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential
elements of solicitation of murder for hire. Defendant does not contest that the evidence was
sufficient to prove that defendant and Luster were discussing the murder of Anderson. Instead,
defendant argues that no “agreement” was reached between him and Luster. Therefore, the
question we resolve on appeal is whether a rational juror could have found that an “agreement”
existed between defendant and Luster that Luster would kill Anderson.
¶ 32 Defendant urges us to apply principles of contract law to determine whether an
“agreement” existed. According to defendant, the term “agreement” in the solicitation of
murder for hire statute should be defined the same as the definition of a contract under contract
law. Thus, defendant cites Lyntel Products, Inc. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d
176, 180, 437 N.E.2d 653, 656-57 (1981), and argues that an agreement is not “effective” if a
condition precedent to that agreement has not been performed. Applying Lyntel to the present
case, defendant argues that his bonding out of jail was a condition precedent to the agreement
between him and Luster that Luster would kill Anderson in exchange for $1,000. Defendant
concludes that because the condition precedent was not met, there was no effective agreement
and defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of solicitation of murder for
hire. Instead, defendant argues, the evidence proved him guilty at most of attempted
solicitation of murder for hire, an offense recognized by People v. Boyce, 2015 IL 117108,
¶¶ 25-32, 27 N.E.3d 77.
¶ 33 We reject defendant’s argument that principles of contract law should be applied to define
the term “agreement” in the solicitation of murder for hire statute. Agreement is a term of
common use, and a jury should need no help in understanding that term. See People v.
Sanchez, 388 Ill. App. 3d 467, 477-78, 904 N.E.2d 162, 170 (2009) (“When words in a jury
instruction have a commonly understood meaning, the court need not define them with
additional instructions.”). If the legislature had intended “agreement” to have a more technical
meaning, it could have provided such a definition by statute. Likewise, had the legislature
meant for agreement to take on the meaning of a contract as defined by contract law, it could
have used the word “contract” instead of “agreement.” The statute contains no indication that
the legislature intended for the term “agreement” to incorporate the meaning of a “contract” as
defined by contract law.
¶ 34 In further support of our decision, we note that adopting the principles of contract law to
define “agreement” would require us to instruct the jury on contract principles such as “offer,”
“acceptance,” “consideration,” and “condition precedent.” Although the legislature chose to
define several terms in the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/2-1 to 2-22 (West 2010)), it did not
provide definitions for “agreement” or any of the contract terms previously mentioned. The
lack of definitions for those terms further supports our conclusion that the legislature intended
the jury to give the term “agreement” its plain and ordinary meaning and not the meaning
established legal principles have ascribed to a contractual agreement. In addition, defendant
did not seek a jury instruction to define “agreement” in the trial court but, instead, chose to
leave that definition for the jury.
¶ 35 In reaching this conclusion, we also note that in section 8-1.2(a) of the Criminal Code (720
ILCS 5/8-1.2(a) (West 2010)), the legislature uses the term “contract” but then immediately
goes on to mention “agreement, understanding, command, or request for money or anything of
value.” By doing so, the legislature clearly meant this terminology to be far broader than the
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term “contract” alone. This observation further supports our rejection of defendant’s argument
that the nuances of civil contract law should somehow apply to this section.
¶ 36 Having concluded that “agreement” was a term of common understanding for the jury to
define, we determine further that the evidence presented here was sufficient for the jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that an agreement existed between defendant and Luster. A rational
juror could have found that defendant and Luster agreed that Luster would kill Anderson in
exchange for $1,000 from defendant. Although defendant never spoke the word “kill,” the jury
could infer that defendant intended for Luster to kill Anderson based on defendant’s statements
that he wanted Anderson “gone completely” and that Anderson never be seen or heard from
again. The fact that the arrangement seemed to be predicated upon defendant’s release from
jail did not preclude the jury from finding that an “agreement” existed between defendant and
Luster. The evidence was therefore sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of solicitation of murder for hire.
¶ 37 B. Posttrial Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 38 Defendant argues that the trial court failed to inquire into his posttrial claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The State responds by arguing that defendant’s claims were not
sufficient to warrant an inquiry by the court. We agree with the State.
¶ 39 Under People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984), and its progeny, when a
defendant makes a colorable posttrial claim that his counsel was ineffective, the trial court
must conduct an inquiry–known as a Krankel hearing–to determine whether new counsel
should be appointed to help defendant present that claim. However, a defendant’s claim must
meet certain minimum requirements to trigger an inquiry by the court. People v. Ward, 371 Ill.
App. 3d 382, 431, 862 N.E.2d 1102, 1147 (2007).
¶ 40 “[A] pro se defendant is not required to do any more than bring his or her claim to the trial
court’s attention.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d 68, 76, 927
N.E.2d 1172, 1176 (2010) (quoting People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 79, 797 N.E.2d 631, 638
(2003)). However, a bald allegation that counsel was inadequate is insufficient to trigger a
Krankel hearing. People v. Radford, 359 Ill. App. 3d 411, 418, 835 N.E.2d 127, 133 (2005).
Instead, a defendant’s claim must be specific and supported by facts. Id.
¶ 41 In People v. Reed, 361 Ill. App. 3d 995, 998-99, 838 N.E.2d 328, 331 (2005), after the
defendant was found guilty, he wrote the trial court a letter stating that counsel was ineffective
for failing to subpoena certain witnesses. The court did not respond to defendant’s allegations
and instead sentenced defendant. Id. On appeal, this court held that the defendant’s
“conclusory allegations” did not merit remand for a Krankel hearing because they did “not
specify what the witnesses would have said on the stand or how they would have helped his
case.” Id. at 1003, 838 N.E.2d at 335. However, we noted “that if defendant can flesh out his
claim with sufficient factual allegations, he may still petition for postconviction relief.” Id. at
1004, 838 N.E.2d at 335.
¶ 42 In this case, defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) secure
transcripts of Lyons’ sentencing hearing and (2) file an unspecified motion. Defendant did not
explain what relevance Lyons’ sentencing proceeding might have on defendant’s case. Nor did
defendant explain what kind of motion counsel should have filed or what effect that motion
might have had on the outcome of the proceedings. Defendant’s claims were bald allegations
of ineffectiveness that did not necessitate a Krankel hearing. As in Reed, defendant’s assertions
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are conclusory and do not explain how the sentencing transcripts or the motion might have
helped his case. Remand for a Krankel hearing is therefore unnecessary.
¶ 43 Defendant cites People v. Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d 326, 833 N.E.2d 396 (2005), in support
of his argument that remand for a Krankel hearing is required. We disagree and find the facts of
Peacock distinguishable. In Peacock, after being found guilty of home invasion and other
crimes, defendant wrote a letter to the trial court containing the following language:
“ ‘[M]y attorney[,] John Taylor[,] did not represent [me] to the full[e]st of his ability[.]
[T]he reason I say that is because he did not send out any [subpoenas] for all my
[witnesses] and he also did not cross[-]examine the [witnesses] to prove [whether] their
test[i]mony was cred[i]ble or not. [H]e would not ask any of the questions I wanted him
to ask or show how the victim told the police and investigators two different stories in
the motion of discovery. [He failed to elicit] the fact that I still lived in the house until
the day I turned myself [in to] the Champaign County jail[.] [F]or that reason[,] I would
like for you to grant me a new trial so I can have all of these things brought forth.’ ” Id.
at 330, 833 N.E.2d at 400.
The trial court sentenced defendant without responding to the allegations of ineffective
assistance contained in his letter. On appeal, this court found that the trial court failed to
conduct a proper Krankel hearing and remanded for that purpose.
¶ 44 We conclude that the facts in Peacock are distinguishable from those of this case. In
Peacock, the defendant provided more than mere bald allegations. He supported his allegations
of ineffective assistance with facts to explain how counsel failed to cross-examine the
witnesses and what a sufficient cross-examination would have revealed. The facts of Peacock
are in contrast to this case, in which the defendant made generalized conclusory allegations
without any factual support. Those allegations were insufficient to require a Krankel inquiry.
¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 46 For the foregoing reasons we affirm the trial court’s judgments. As part of our judgment,
we award the State it $75 statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.
¶ 47 No. 4-14-0226, Affirmed.
¶ 48 No. 4-15-0133, Affirmed.
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