Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services ex rel. Black v. Bartholomew

NO. 4-09-0197 Filed 12/8/09
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE ) Appeal from
AND FAMILY SERVICES EX REL. ELIZABETH A.) Circuit Court of
BLACK, ) Livingston County
Petitioner-Appellees, ) No. 07F53
v. )
FRANK H. BARTHOLOMEW, ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant. ) Jennifer H. Bauknecht,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
The trial court of Livingston County ordered $9,216.77
of respondent Frank H. Bartholomew's workers' compensation
settlement be applied toward child-support arrearage and interest
due the Illinois Department of Health and Family Services (De-
partment) under an administrative support order. Frank appeals
from the order, arguing workers' compensation benefits are exempt
from judgment by Illinois law, including those for child-support
arrearages. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2005, Elizabeth and Frank, who were not
married, had a son, Nicholas. Frank signed a voluntary acknowl-
edgment of paternity and "accepted the obligation to provide
child support" for Nicholas. On February 6, 2007, the Department
issued an administrative support order pursuant to its authority
under article X of the Illinois Public Aid Code (Code) (305 ILCS
5/10-1 through 10-28 (West 2006)) requiring Frank to pay child
support of $428.52 per month. On August 23, 2007, the Department
issued an income-withholding notice to Frank's employer ordering
it to withhold $428.52 per month for current child support, as
well as $85.70 per month toward a delinquency of $6,602.34.
On October 23, 2007, Elizabeth filed a petition to
establish the existence of a father-child relationship and for
other relief. With her petition, Elizabeth provided a copy of
the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, the administrative
support order, and the income-withholding notice and alleged
Frank had filed a workers' compensation claim and was awaiting
settlement. She asked the trial court to adjudicate Frank the
father of Nicholas, order him to pay child support, prohibit him
from dissipating any workers' compensation settlement, and grant
her 20% of any such settlement as current child support.
On January 3, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on
Elizabeth's petition. Frank failed to appear. On January 7,
2008, the court entered an order finding Frank the father of
Nicholas, ordered him to pay child support pursuant to the
administrative order, ordered Frank not to dissipate any of his
workers' compensation settlement without court order, and deter-
mined Elizabeth should receive 20% of the net settlement in
addition to the child-support arrearage already owed her, which
amounted to $6,602.34 as of August 23, 2007.
On January 28, 2008, Frank filed a motion to vacate the
part of the trial court's order requiring payment of past-due
support from his settlement, arguing such payment was barred by
section 21 of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820
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ILCS 305/21 (West 2008)), which prohibited workers' compensation
awards from "be[ing] held liable in any way for any lien, debt,
penalty[,] or damages." On April 1, 2008, the court entered an
amended order requiring Frank to place his settlement funds in
trust until further order of the court determining the amount to
be paid Elizabeth. The order further stated Elizabeth was
entitled to 20% of the net settlement because the settlement
constituted income to Frank but no amount was to be held for
payment of the arrearage.
Meanwhile, on February 8, 2008, the Department filed a
complaint to enforce its administrative order, alleging as of
November 30, 2007, Frank owed $8,316.42 in past-due support and
asked the trial court to order him to obey the terms of the
administrative support order. On August 15, 2008, the court
consolidated the enforcement complaint with Elizabeth's petition
and entered an order requiring Frank to obey the administrative
support order.
Thereafter, Frank received a workers' compensation
settlement of $175,000. On October 3, 2008, the trial court
entered an agreed order distributing the settlement to Frank's
counsel, Global Injury Funding, Elizabeth, and Frank. Elizabeth
received $20,473.51, which represented 20% of the net proceeds.
Frank received $72,677.27. The sum of $9,216.77, representing
the contested child-support arrearage plus interest, was held in
trust pending further order of the court. The agreed order
provided the distribution resolved any lien or claim by Elizabeth
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and the Department against the settlement "except as to the
pending claim related to the $9,216.77" being held in trust. The
order further stated it did not affect Frank's further obligation
to pay child support pursuant to any support order.
On October 21, 2008, Frank moved the trial court to
distribute the remaining $9,216.77 to him, arguing again section
21 of the Act prohibited application of the settlement proceeds
toward past-due child support. On December 9, 2008, the Depart-
ment filed a petition for adjudication of indirect civil con-
tempt, alleging Frank had failed to comply with the court's
August 15 order to obey the administrative support order and he
was in arrears $8,692.29 as of November 30, 2008, plus interest.
That same day, the court entered an order to show cause.
On December 15, 2008, the Department filed a memorandum
responding to Frank's motion for distribution. The Department
argued, notwithstanding the provisions of section 21 of the Act
(820 ILCS 305/21 (West 2008)), Illinois law and public policy
allowed the court to apply proceeds from a workers' compensation
settlement toward a child-support arrearage. Frank filed a
response, arguing the plain language of section 21 prohibited
such use of settlement funds.
On January 9, 2009, following a hearing that was not
transcribed, the trial court entered a docket order finding a
child-support arrearage "of $8,692.29 in principal and interest
due and owing and further order[ing] that the funds being with-
held in the amt [sic] of $9,216.77 shall be applied toward the
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arrears and interest."
On January 20, 2009, the Department filed a motion to
modify the order because the arrearage finding was incomplete.
On February 27, 2009, the trial court entered a modified order
stating Frank was in arrears in child support in the amount of
$8,692.29 plus accrued interest of $1,325.47 as of November 30,
2008, and the funds previously ordered to be held in trust in the
amount of $9,216.77 shall be applied toward the child-support
arrearage and interest due under the administrative support
order. Frank appeals from the court's orders.
II. ANALYSIS
Frank makes no objection to the use of his workers'
compensation settlement to pay current child support. He argues,
however, a request for payment of an arrearage pursuant to a
child-support lien for payment of a past-due support obligation
is a debt that is barred from collection from his compensation
settlement. Frank argues workers' compensation benefits are
exempt from judicial process for child-support arrearages.
Section 21 of the Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"No payment, claim, award[,] or decision
under this Act shall be assignable or subject
to any lien, attachment[,] or garnishment, or
be held liable in any way for any lien, debt,
penalty[,] or damages." 820 ILCS 305/21
(West 2008).
Frank relies on In re Marriage of Brand, 123 Ill. App.
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3d 1047, 1051, 463 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (1984), where this court
held the provisions of section 21 of the Act did not prevent
workers' compensation benefits from being available for the
current expenses of the worker's family and this included court-
ordered child-support payments. The court also said in dicta,
however, whether the compensation benefits were liable for a
"debt" is a closer question and a substantial argument could be
made they were if the benefits were being ordered to pay past-due
support arrearages. Brand, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 1051, 463 N.E.2d
at 1040.
The Department responds the trial court's order was
proper based on the statutory exception to income exemptions for
the collection of child support (750 ILCS 28/15(d) (West 2008)).
We agree.
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law
requiring de novo review. Peoples Bank v. Bromenn Healthcare
Hospitals, 388 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1100, 905 N.E.2d 339, 342
(2009). "'[T]he primary objective of this court when construing
the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the General Assembly.'" Peoples Bank, 388 Ill. App. 3d
at 1100, 905 N.E.2d at 342, quoting Southern Illinoisan v.
Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d 390, 415, 844
N.E.2d 1, 14 (2006). When "a statute is susceptible of two
interpretations, it becomes proper to examine sources other than
its language for evidence of legislative intent." In re Marriage
of Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266, 279, 469 N.E.2d 167, 172 (1984).
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The court may also examine other legislation on the same topic as
well as statutes addressing related subjects. Logston, 103 Ill.
2d at 283, 469 N.E.2d at 174.
The exception to income exemptions from judgment
appears in section 15(d) of the Income Withholding for Support
Act (Withholding Act) (750 ILCS 28/15(d) (West 2008)), which
provides as follows:
"(d) 'Income' means any form of periodic
payment to an individual, regardless of
source, including *** workers' compensation
***[.]
* * *
Any other [s]tate or local laws which
limit or exempt income or the amount or per-
centage of income that can be withheld shall
not apply."
Notwithstanding section 21 of the Act, which exempts
workers' compensation awards from liability for debts, section
15(d) of the Withholding Act creates an exception to that exemp-
tion for the collection of child support, including arrearages.
The Withholding Act was enacted in 1999 to "consoli-
date[] into a single new Act the lengthy and nearly identical
provisions relating to income withholding for support that were
formerly contained in" the Code (305 ILCS 5/10-16.2 (West 2008)),
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS
5/706.1 (West 2008)), the Non-Support of Spouse and Children Act
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(750 ILCS 15/4.1 repealed; now see 750 ILCS 16/22 (West 2008))
and the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/20 (West
2008)). 750 ILCS 28/5 (West 2008). Section 20(c)(3) of the
Withholding Act provides for the withholding of "income" for
payment of child support including "the amount of any arrearage"
from any payor of income to a child-support obligor. 750 ILCS
28/20(c)(3) (West 2008).
The language of section 15(d) of the Withholding Act is
clear and straightforward. Any other state or local law purport-
ing to exempt statutorily defined income, which includes workers'
compensation benefits, does not apply to proceedings involving
the collection of child support.
Frank's reliance on the dicta of Brand is misplaced.
While the court there noted a "substantial argument" could be
made orders to pay child-support arrearages could amount to a
"debt" for which section 21 of the Act made workers' compensation
benefits exempt from liability, the argument is not a winning
one. The Brand court's comments, made in 1984, are interesting,
but if the legislature wanted to exempt workers' compensation
payments from collection of child-support arrearages, it could
have done so when it enacted the Withholding Act in 1999.
Instead, the language of section 15(d) of the Withholding Act is
clear: any other state or local laws purporting to grant such an
exemption are overridden by the provisions of section 15(d).
Other cases decided since Brand, some dealing with the
precursors to section 15(d) (see In re Support of Matt, 105 Ill.
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2d 330, 473 N.E.2d 1310 (1985); Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266, 469
N.E.2d 167) and some dealing with section 15(d) itself (see In re
Marriage of Murphy, 338 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 792 N.E.2d 12 (2003)),
have found both maintenance and child support, including
arrearages, may be withheld from statutorily defined income even
when another statute exists "exempting" that particular income.
As noted by the court in Matt, "the General Assembly established
that it is the public policy of Illinois to ensure that support
judgments are enforced by all available means." Matt, 105 Ill.
2d at 334, 473 N.E.2d at 1312.
Applying Frank's workers' compensation settlement funds
to his past-due child support also serves the intent of the Act.
The Illinois workers' compensation scheme was enacted "to furnish
a measure of financial protection to the workman and his depend-
ents for injuries received by him which arose out of and in the
course of his employment." Baker & Conrad, Inc. v. Chicago
Heights Construction Co., 364 Ill. 386, 393, 4 N.E.2d 953, 957
(1936). Sections 7 and 8 of the Act recognize a worker's depend-
ents are intended beneficiaries. Section 7 provides for compen-
sation to go directly to a worker's dependents in the event of a
fatal injury (820 ILCS 305/7 (West 2008)), and section 8(b)
provides a worker's compensation for nonfatal injuries is in-
creased if he has a spouse and/or child (820 ILCS 305/8(b)(1),
(b)(2), (b)(2.1) (West 2008)).
Because dependents are intended beneficiaries of
workers' compensation awards, the public policy furthered by the
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exemption in section 21 of the Act is to protect workers and
their dependents from the claims of outside creditors, not to
shield workers from their own internal family obligations. As
the supreme court explained in Logston, the purpose of income
exemptions in general is to ensure creditors cannot deprive
debtors of the means of supporting themselves and their depend-
ents. Logston, 103 Ill. 2d at 279-80, 469 N.E.2d at 172-73.
Illinois law and public policy allow a trial court to
apply proceeds from a workers' compensation settlement toward a
child-support arrearage. Accordingly, the trial court did not
err when it ordered Frank's child-support arrearage plus interest
be paid from his workers' compensation settlement. As noted in
Murphy, even though the court's docket entry did not state it was
applying the exception of section 15(d) of the Withholding Act to
the income exemption of section 21 of the Act claimed by Frank,
we can affirm the court's judgment on any basis supported by the
record. Murphy, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 1098-99, 792 N.E.2d at 15.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
TURNER and POPE, JJ., concur.
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