People v. Wallace

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
People v. Wallace, 2015 IL App (3d) 130489
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption CORRIE WALLACE, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Third District
Docket No. 3-13-0489
Filed October 16, 2015
Rehearing denied November 10, 2015
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 06-CF-536; the
Review Hon. Daniel J. Rozak, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier and Bryon Kohut (argued), both of State Appellate
Appeal Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
James Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Gary F. Gnidovec
(argued), of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of
counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices O’Brien and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In October 2008, a Will County jury convicted defendant, Corrie Wallace, of first-degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2006)) and aggravated battery with a firearm (720
ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2006)). The court sentenced defendant to 70 years for first-degree
murder and 18 years for aggravated battery to be served consecutively. Defendant
subsequently raised nine issues on direct appeal; this court affirmed his conviction and
sentences. People v. Wallace, 2011 IL App (3d) 090500-U. In May 2013, defendant filed a
postconviction petition, which the trial court dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit.
Defendant appeals the dismissal of his postconviction petition arguing: (1) he set forth an
arguable claim of actual innocence; and (2) he stated the gist of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s
postconviction petition.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 We provide a summary of the evidence presented at trial here. For a more detailed account
of the evidence, reference our previous decision. Id. ¶¶ 6-31.
¶4 The evidence at defendant’s trial showed that the victim in this case, Hallie Parish, was in a
vehicle with three other people when he was shot and killed by the defendant in March 2006.
Most notably, among those present in the vehicle with the victim were Joe Williams and
Charles McAfee. Neither Williams nor McAfee could identify the shooter. Williams was also
shot during the incident, but survived. Williams later claimed he received an apology from a
person claiming to be the shooter, though Williams refused to identify that person other than to
say it was not the defendant. The trial court would not allow Williams to testify about this
alleged conversation at trial. We note this issue was raised by defendant on direct appeal, but
deemed a forfeited issue by this court. Id. ¶¶ 54-56.
¶5 Tonya Dandridge’s and Zatella Bridge’s testimony at trial established that defendant shot
the victim while wearing a mask, immediately ran away from the scene, walked back up to the
victim shortly thereafter without the mask or gun, and taunted him before walking away again.
Their testimony also established that defendant ran away from the scene using the same path he
used to approach before the shooting and returned by way of the same path once again when he
taunted the victim. Police later discovered that this path led to the home of Tarnisha Davenport.
¶6 Officer Stubler, the first responding officer, testified that he overheard people identifying
defendant as the shooter while he was protecting the crime scene in the immediate aftermath of
the shooting. Stubler located defendant and detained him shortly thereafter behind Davenport’s
residence. Defendant matched the description of the shooter (in build as well as clothing) as
provided by witnesses on the scene that could not identify defendant. Defendant was told he
was under arrest and transported from the crime scene to the police department approximately
45 minutes after being detained by Officer Stubler.
¶7 When arrested, defendant possessed a key to Davenport’s home. In Davenport’s home,
police located a mask (described by witnesses as being worn by the shooter) and ammunition
later determined to have previously been chambered in the same gun used in the shooting.
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Defendant’s hands later tested positive for gunshot residue and his DNA was on the mask
recovered from Davenport’s home.
¶8 In May 2013, defendant filed pro se a 207-page petition for relief under the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-8 (West 2012)). The trial court
summarily dismissed defendant’s petition as frivolous and patently without merit under
section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
2012)). Defendant’s petition asserted many claims, only two of which he appeals now: a claim
of actual innocence and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
¶9 Defendant’s actual innocence claim is supported by affidavits from Darius Foster and
Adrian Ellis. Foster claims he saw Conley Ratcliffe–who testified at defendant’s trial–running
away from the area of the shooting with a gun in his hand shortly after he heard the gunshots.
Foster also claims he walked up to the vehicle shortly after the victim had been shot, along with
the defendant and other unidentified individuals. Ellis, on the other hand, avers in his affidavit
that while he was incarcerated with Ratcliffe sometime in 2008, Ratcliffe confessed to him that
he was the shooter. Ellis also claims Ratcliffe stated he previously apologized to Williams for
shooting him on accident. Defendant asserts these affidavits constitute newly discovered
evidence that support his claim of actual innocence.
¶ 10 Defendant argues in his ineffective assistance of counsel claim that his trial counsel should
have filed a motion to suppress his arrest at the crime scene, as it was not based on probable
cause. Defendant further asserts appellate counsel was equally ineffective for not arguing the
same issue on appeal. Defendant alleges his actual innocence and ineffective assistance of
counsel claims should be allowed to proceed to the second stage of postconviction
proceedings.
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 At the first stage, a postconviction petition may be summarily dismissed only if it is
“frivolous” or “patently without merit.” Id. Appellate review of a first-stage postconviction
petition’s summary dismissal is de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).
Reviewing courts should determine if a postconviction petition has no arguable basis in law or
in fact to determine if it is worthy of summary dismissal. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16
(2009); People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 25. At the first stage of a postconviction
proceeding, we must determine whether the petition sets forth the “gist” of a constitutional
claim. People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 99-100 (2002). If we determine defendant’s pleadings
meet the minimum requirements, the petition proceeds to the second stage. 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1(b) (West 2012). The defendant, however, has the burden of establishing he has
suffered a substantial deprivation of a constitutional right. People v. Waldrop, 353 Ill. App. 3d
244, 249 (2004).
¶ 13 I. Defendant’s Actual Innocence Claim
¶ 14 A postconviction actual innocence claim is limited to arguments based on newly
discovered evidence. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (2009). Courts should grant relief on
this basis only when the petitioner’s argument is supported by evidence that is new, material,
noncumulative, and of such a conclusive character that it would likely change the result on
retrial. People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 84. Courts rarely grant postconviction petitions
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based on claims of actual innocence as the standard is “extraordinarily difficult to meet.”
Id. ¶ 94.
¶ 15 Defendant argues that the Foster and Ellis affidavits each set forth a colorable claim of
actual innocence. Specifically, defendant asserts it is “at least arguable” both affidavits contain
evidence that is newly discovered. In so doing, defense counsel asserts there is no proof that
defendant knew Foster was on the scene in the aftermath of the shooting, or that defendant
could have known about Ratcliffe’s confession to Ellis prior to trial. These arguments are
unavailing as they are based on indisputably meritless legal theories.
¶ 16 A. Foster’s Affidavit
¶ 17 Newly discovered evidence is evidence which was not available at defendant’s trial and
which defendant could not have discovered sooner through the exercise of due diligence.
Id. ¶ 96. Furthermore, a claim of actual innocence does not merely question the defendant’s
guilt, but is so conclusive as to be capable of completely exonerating the defendant. People v.
Savory, 309 Ill. App. 3d 408, 414-15 (1999); People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96.
Defendant’s failure to state a free-standing claim of actual innocence can fail as a matter of
law. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 31, 36-37.
¶ 18 Here, defendant’s claim of actual innocence buttressed by Foster’s affidavit fails as a
matter of law. Defendant’s argument ignores the due diligence requirement of newly
discovered evidence and relies heavily on the premise that if there is no proof defendant knew
of the evidence prior to trial, his discovery of that information afterward renders the
information newly discovered. Defense counsel cites no case law for this proposition, in
violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7), and therefore forfeits the argument. Ill. S.
Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); see People v. Clinton, 397 Ill. App. 3d 215, 223-24 (2009).
¶ 19 Moreover, defendant’s claim is explicitly contradicted by the record. By defendant’s own
admission, he provided his trial counsel with Foster’s name and contact information as a
potential witness in preparation for trial. This is prima facie evidence that defendant did know
Foster was in the area and a potential witness to the incident. That defendant did not know the
content of Foster’s alleged observations does not render its recent revelation newly discovered.
People v. Montes, 2015 IL App (2d) 140485, ¶ 24.
¶ 20 Even if Foster’s affidavit were considered newly discovered evidence, it does not
conclusively support defendant’s claim of actual innocence. Accepting the contents of Foster’s
affidavit as true, Foster cannot conclusively prove defendant was not the shooter. As the State
highlights, Ratcliffe could have been running away from the scene with the gun used by
defendant. Thus, we find the Foster affidavit is insufficient as a matter of law to support a
claim of actual innocence.
¶ 21 B. Ellis’s Affidavit
¶ 22 Generally, evidence is not considered “newly discovered,” such that it can support a
postconviction petition for relief based on actual innocence, when it presents facts already
known to the defendant at or prior to trial, though the source of those facts may have been
unknown, unavailable, or uncooperative. Id.
¶ 23 The record establishes that Williams, the other victim of the shooting, testified at trial and
was prohibited from asserting that a person he refused to identify was the shooter. McAfee
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testified at trial as well. Prior to his testimony, the State argued several motions in limine to
block specific portions of McAfee’s testimony. On the record, the State argued that McAfee
should not be allowed to testify that Williams revealed to him that Ratcliffe was the one who
apologized to Williams for shooting him in the arm. The defense ultimately conceded such
testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and McAfee did not aver such statements during his
testimony.
¶ 24 Shortly after McAfee testified, Ratcliffe took the stand and the defense chose not to ask
him about his alleged statements to Williams. Therefore, the defense theory that Ratcliffe was
the shooter–and not defendant–was available to defendant at trial. The defense cross-examined
Ratcliffe, while the record demonstrates they were aware Ratcliffe had allegedly admitted to
Williams he was the shooter. Thus, defendant’s actual innocence claim, as supported by the
Ellis affidavit, is not based on newly discovered evidence.
¶ 25 Furthermore, testimony by Ellis regarding Ratcliffe’s alleged confession is hearsay, which
cannot be the basis of a defendant’s postconviction petition. People v. Coleman, 2012 IL App
(4th) 110463, ¶ 55. Generally, hearsay is insufficient to support a postconviction petition,
particularly when there is no explanation why an affidavit from the declarant is unavailable.
725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2012); People v. Coleman, 2012 IL App (4th) 110463, ¶ 55. In this
case, defendant does not explain why Ratcliffe (the declarant) is unavailable and ignores the
fact that Ratcliffe already testified at defendant’s trial and therefore actually was available.
¶ 26 Defendant counters that the Illinois Supreme Court recently rejected the argument that
evidence needs to be admissible during the first stage of postconviction proceedings in People
v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135. The majority in Allen, however, stated it is sufficient for a
postconviction petitioner to provide “substantive evidentiary content” in support of a claim
supported by “ ‘other evidence,’ ” not an affidavit. Id. ¶ 37.
¶ 27 We find that Allen speaks to the procedural requirements or defects of a defendant’s
postconviction petition. In Allen, at issue was the legal creation of defendant’s supporting
affidavit, which was procedurally insufficient. Id. ¶ 2. That is not at issue in the case
sub judice. The substantive requirements of affidavits in postconviction petitions (in this case
the status of the averred content as newly discovered evidence or admissible evidence) remains
unchanged in the wake of Allen.
¶ 28 Inadmissible hearsay cannot constitute substantive evidence by any definition. We cannot
believe the supreme court in Allen meant for any petitioner’s claim to survive the relatively
abbreviated review of first-stage postconviction proceedings without regard for the substance
of the supporting evidence. In fact, the majority explicitly rejected an overly broad
interpretation of its ruling in response to direct criticism from the dissent. Id. ¶ 38.
¶ 29 The trial court would not let Williams testify that he was given an apology by an
anonymous person claiming to be the real shooter. Nor would it let McAfee testify that
Williams told him that that person was Ratcliffe. We now have another declarant offering the
same information. The information is still inadmissible hearsay, as already ruled upon by the
trial court, and substantively cannot support a postconviction petition–even in the first stage.
Thus, we find the Ellis affidavit is insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim of actual
innocence.
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¶ 30 II. Defendant’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
¶ 31 Lastly, defendant argues the trial court erred by dismissing his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Defendant asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant also contends his appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for this same reason
on direct appeal. The State contends that probable cause existed at the time of arrest and any
motion filed by the defense to quash defendant’s arrest would have been futile.
¶ 32 Again, to survive first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition, a pro se petitioner need
only present the “gist” of a constitutional claim. People v. English, 353 Ill. App. 3d 337, 339
(2004). Postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must allege facts sufficient
to prove both prongs under Strickland in order to succeed: (1) that counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that the defendant was substantially
prejudiced as a result. People v. Gale, 376 Ill. App. 3d 344, 351 (2007); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
¶ 33 Trial counsel and appellate counsel are held to the same standard in a Strickland analysis.
People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997); People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 412
(2000). On appeal, substantial prejudice is not demonstrated by enumerating the issues
appellate counsel did not brief, as appellate counsel is not required to brief every possible
issue. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 523 (1995). Consequently, if defendant’s claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails the deficiency prong of Strickland, appellate counsel
cannot be found deficient for failing to address the same issue on appeal. Id.
¶ 34 Defendant alleges the police did not have probable cause to arrest him when Officer
Stubler placed him in handcuffs. From our review of the record, this is likely true. The
continuation of defendant’s argument, however–that defendant was therefore
unconstitutionally arrested without probable cause, in violation of the fourth amendment–is
patently false. In making this argument, defendant makes two assumptions that are legally
inaccurate and factually contradicted by the record: (1) that defendant was under arrest when
Officer Stubler placed him in handcuffs; and (2) that Officer Stubler’s knowledge needed to be
the sole basis for the probable cause supporting the decision to arrest the defendant. Absent
these assumptions, defendant’s argument falls apart.
¶ 35 We note again that the record makes clear the defendant was detained at the crime scene for
approximately 45 minutes before he was placed under arrest and transported to the police
station. Shortly before transport, defendant was informed that he was under arrest at that time,
rather than detained. The legal distinction between detention and arrest is significant. An arrest
requires probable cause, while temporary detention need only be supported by reasonable
suspicion. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 544 (2006). Detention based on reasonable
suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances, which factors in the seriousness of the
crime; in this case a murder. People v. Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d 487, 491-92 (1997).
¶ 36 After reviewing the record, we find that Officer Stubler had reasonable suspicion to detain
the defendant on scene and his subsequent arrest was supported by probable cause. Contrary to
defense counsel’s assertions on appeal, the defendant was not placed under arrest by Officer
Stubler solely because he overheard anonymous people make the accusation that defendant
was the shooter. Officer Stubler’s testimony at trial belies this assertion. In relevant part,
Officer Stubler stated:
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“I made my way to where Mr. Wallace was in the back, took control of him and advised
him he was being detained in reference to [sic] a suspect of that shooting.”
Nowhere in Officer Stubler’s testimony does he say that he arrested the defendant at that time.
Police reports from other responding officers all clearly state that defendant was detained at the
scene before he was arrested.
¶ 37 Defendant was detained at the scene initially because yet-to-be-identified people were
stating that he was the shooter. This was the appropriate action under the circumstances
supported by reasonable suspicion. No reasonably prudent officer would ignore this
information. Rather, the appropriate course of action was to detain defendant to investigate
further.
¶ 38 Probable cause for arrest exists when facts known to an officer would lead a reasonably
cautious person to believe the arrestee committed a crime. People v. Wear, 229 Ill. 2d 545,
563-64 (2008). Probable cause can be based on information provided by a third party,
anonymous or identified, as long as it bears some indicia of reliability. People v. Adams, 131
Ill. 2d 387, 397 (1989). “Where officers are working together in investigating a crime, the
knowledge of each constitutes the knowledge of all, and probable cause can be established
from all the information collectively received by the officers.” People v. Ortiz, 355 Ill. App. 3d
1056, 1065 (2005).
¶ 39 Defendant’s subsequent arrest after a relatively brief detention was the result of a budding
investigation that pointed to him as the culprit. Dandridge’s testimony contains the following
relevant inquiry by the State:
“MR. KNICK [assistant State’s Attorney]: That day did you talk to the police at
both the scene, at the Fairmont housing unit, and also at the Joliet police station?
MS. DANDRIDGE [witness]: Yes.
MR. KNICK: And when you talked–were talking to the police there at the scene,
what was going on?
MS. DANDRIDGE: Everybody was outside just looking at everything that was
going on.”
Dandridge went on to say that she told the officer she was not comfortable speaking with the
police at her home, and that the officer she spoke with suggested she speak to police later, at
the station. Defense counsel on appeal emphasizes the latter portion of Dandridge’s testimony,
implying she said nothing of substance to officers on scene. This assumption, however, is
contradicted by the record.
¶ 40 Detective Jackson responded promptly to the scene and immediately began interviewing
witnesses. In describing his second interview with a witness, Detective Jackson documented
the following in a report:
“I traveled to 1514 Fairmount where Tonya Dandridge *** stated that shooter in
the above mentioned matter was a subject known to her as ‘Choke’. It should be known
that I have prior knowledge of ‘Choke’ being Corrie Wallace. At the time I obtained
this information from Tonya Dandridge there were several onlookers in the Fairmount
Housing Projects. Ms. Dandridge stated that she would feel more comfortable coming
to the Joliet Police Department giving this statement without so many onlookers and
people observing the statement of her speaking with the police. I furnished Ms.
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Dandridge with my business card and stated when her children arrived home from
school that it would be okay to [sic] the Joliet Police Department.”
Hence, the police had probable cause to arrest defendant after they spoke with Dandridge, an
eyewitness to the shooting, on scene.
¶ 41 Given the record before this court, it is apparent that defense counsel’s efforts at trial to
quash defendant’s arrest would have been futile. The testimony of the witnesses at trial,
supplemented by police reports from investigating officers, establish that the police had
probable cause to arrest defendant before transporting him to the station. Had defense counsel
filed a motion to quash defendant’s arrest, it would have been denied. Defendant’s detention
on scene in the aftermath of a shooting for approximately 45 minutes was reasonable. His
eventual arrest was supported by probable cause. Trial counsel’s subsequent decision not to
file a motion to quash defendant’s arrest was objectively reasonable as well. Likewise,
appellant counsel was not deficient for failing to raise the same issue on direct appeal. As a
result, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails the first prong of the Strickland
analysis.
¶ 42 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction
petition.
¶ 43 CONCLUSION
¶ 44 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 45 Affirmed.
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