Clinton Landfill, Inc. v. Mahomet Valley Water Authority

NO. 4-10-0704 Filed 12/23/10
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
CLINTON LANDFILL, INC., ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Piatt County
MAHOMET VALLEY WATER AUTHORITY, ) No. 09CH55
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) John P. Shonkwiler,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Steigmann and Pope concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
OPINION
Plaintiff, Clinton Landfill, Inc., is in the process of
seeking the necessary permits for a chemical-waste landfill. In
July 2010, plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction
against defendant, Mahomet Valley Water Authority. Plaintiff
sought to enjoin defendant from contesting or being involved in
plaintiff's permitting process on the basis that defendant lacked
the authority to do so. The trial court denied plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction.
Plaintiff appeals, arguing it established all the
requirements for a preliminary injunction. We disagree and
affirm. Plaintiff is essentially seeking to bar defendant, a
governmental entity, from expressing an opinion to another
governmental entity regarding a matter adverse to its
stewardship. This it cannot do.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff operates Clinton Landfill No. 3, which is
located in an area known generally as the Mahomet Valley Water
District. Defendant is a water authority established pursuant to
the Water Authorities Act (Act) (70 ILCS 3715/1 through 27 (West
2008)). The Act provides for the incorporation of a contiguous
territory as a water authority. 70 ILCS 3715/1 (West 2008). A
water authority is governed by a board of three trustees. 70
ILCS 3715/3 (West 2008). The Act details the powers of the
board, which include inspecting wells, regulating the use of
water through a period of actual or threatened shortage,
supplementing the water supply, and levying and collecting a
general tax. See 70 ILCS 3715/6 (West 2008). A water authority
also has additional powers with respect to any area acquired for
reservoir purposes. 70 ILCS 3715/14 (West 2008). The board may
select "an engineer, an attorney[,] and such other employees as
they deem expedient who shall serve during the pleasure of the
board." 70 ILCS 3715/4 (West 2008).
At some unspecified time, plaintiff began the process
of obtaining permits for a chemical-waste landfill through the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) and the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). The chemical-
waste landfill would be located within a portion of Clinton
Landfill No. 3.
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In November 2009, defendant held a special meeting,
during which the trustees voted to "become involved in contesting
[plaintiff's] permit application" and to retain counsel. In
December 2009, counsel for defendant asked the IEPA to extend the
deadline for the filing of public comment. In January 2010,
counsel for defendant made requests, pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act (5 U.S.C. §552 (2006))), upon the IEPA and USEPA.
Defendant also hired a consultant to review data and evaluate
whether defendant should participate in plaintiff's pending
permit process.
In December 2009, plaintiff filed suit against
defendant. In March 2010, after the initial complaint was
dismissed, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against
defendant, seeking (1) a declaration that defendant lacked the
authority to contest plaintiff's permit applications or be
involved in plaintiff's permitting process and (2) a preliminary
and permanent injunction barring defendant from contesting
plaintiff's permit applications or being involved in plaintiff's
permitting process. Plaintiff alleged defendant was a non-home-
rule entity that possessed only those powers specifically
conveyed by the constitution or by statute. Plaintiff alleged
neither the constitution nor the Act vested defendant with the
power to expend funds to oppose the chemical-waste landfill or
engage in the permitting process. (Plaintiff ultimately conceded
defendant had the statutory authority to hire attorneys and
engineers.)
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Although plaintiff had obtained the IEPA permit in
January 2010, the USEPA permitting process was still ongoing. In
fact, the IEPA permit specifically noted that plaintiff would be
able to accept polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) wastes if the USEPA
"permits the [chemical-waste unit] as a 'chemical waste
landfill.'"
In April 2010, plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiff asserted defendant lacked the authority to
oppose the chemical-waste landfill or to engage in the permitting
process because, as a non-home-rule entity, defendant only had
those powers granted to it by the constitution or by statute.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion on
the basis that questions of fact remained.
On July 13, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion to
reconsider the denial of the motion for summary judgment and a
motion for a preliminary injunction. In the motion for a
preliminary injunction, plaintiff sought to preliminarily enjoin
defendant from (1) filing written public comment with the USEPA,
although the time for public comment had not yet commenced; (2)
offering oral public comment at the as-yet unscheduled USEPA
hearing; (3) seeking leave to intervene in the USEPA proceedings;
and (4) attempting to appeal an eventual grant of a permit.
Plaintiff alleged it had a right to seek a permit
without unlawful interference. Plaintiff also alleged it had no
adequate remedy at law and would suffer irreparable harm if
defendant participated in the permitting process. Plaintiff
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claimed that defendant, as a local governmental unit, might
unduly influence the USEPA. Plaintiff asserted it was likely to
succeed on the merits and that the benefits of granting the
preliminary injunction outweighed any injury to defendant.
Plaintiff sought the preliminary injunction until such time as a
hearing on the merits of the amended complaint could be heard.
In its response in opposition to the motion for a
preliminary injunction, defendant noted that on July 22, 2010,
its retained engineer, KPRG and Associates, Inc., submitted a
report to the USEPA identifying a number of "serious concerns and
failures with [plaintiff's] permit application." Specifically,
the report noted that "domestic and municipal water supply wells
that produce water from both the glacial sediments and Mahomet
Aquifer establish that human[s] are potential receptors of
contaminants released from the Clinton Landfill." (At the
hearing, the parties agreed that the time for public comment had
not yet commenced when defendant submitted the report.) In its
response, defendant also argued (1) plaintiff had no right that
needed protection; (2) plaintiff would not suffer any harm absent
an injunction; (3) plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law,
namely the trial; (4) plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the
merits because defendant had the statutory power to submit public
comment; and (5) the benefits of denying the preliminary
injunction outweighed any injury to plaintiff. Defendant further
asserted it was charged with protecting the water quality and the
water supply for the Mahomet Valley and was statutorily mandated
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to ensure an adequate drinking supply.
On August 19, 2010, the trial court held the hearing on
the motion for a preliminary injunction. During the hearing, the
court noted defendant had filed a report with the USEPA but
agreed with plaintiff, without explanation, that the case was not
moot. Also during the hearing, the court expressed concern that
plaintiff's request was broad and asked plaintiff about its
irreparable harm, noting that plaintiff could mitigate
defendant's actions by having its own engineer refute defendant's
engineer's report. The court ultimately concluded:
"Counsel, I just do not see the extreme
existence of an emergency in this case. So
on that basis, I know that you don't have to
prove that you are entitled to the relief you
seek in this, but I still--the court believes
that it's such an extraordinary remedy. I
think what's requested is so broad, that the
court is going to deny your motion for
injunctive relief."
This interlocutory appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
This court initially notes that the case was set for
trial on November 1, 2010. However, according to the trial
court's docket entry, the court, on its own motion, vacated that
setting. A new trial date has not been set. See N B D Highland
Park Bank, N.A. v. Wien, 251 Ill. App. 3d 512, 520, 622 N.E.2d
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123, 130 (1993) (court may take judicial notice of public
documents). Therefore, the trial on the merits of plaintiff's
amended complaint has not yet occurred.
On appeal, plaintiff argues it was entitled to a
preliminary injunction because it established all of the
requirements for a preliminary injunction. Defendant asserts the
claim is not ripe and that plaintiff did not demonstrate the
factors required for a preliminary injunction.
A. Standard of Review Is De Novo for Questions of Law
and Otherwise Is an Abuse of Discretion
A preliminary injunction preserves the status quo until
the merits of the case are decided. Citadel Investment Group,
LLC v. Teza Technologies LLC, 398 Ill. App. 3d 724, 733, 924
N.E.2d 95, 103 (2010). The remedy is an extraordinary one and
should be granted only in situations of extreme emergency or
where serious harm would result if the preliminary injunction was
not issued. In re Marriage of Slomka, 397 Ill. App. 3d 137, 143,
922 N.E.2d 36, 40 (2009). At the preliminary-injunction stage of
proceedings, "controverted facts on the merits of the case are
not decided." Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d 142,
156, 601 N.E.2d 720, 727 (1992).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party
must show "(1) a clearly ascertained right in need of protection,
(2) irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, (3) no
adequate remedy at law, and (4) a likelihood of success on the
merits of the case." Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 225
Ill. 2d 52, 62, 866 N.E.2d 85, 91 (2006). The trial court may
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also deny a preliminary injunction where the balance of hardships
does not favor the moving party. Bollweg v. Richard Marker
Associates, Inc., 353 Ill. App. 3d 560, 572, 818 N.E.2d 873, 883
(2004). The party seeking a preliminary injunction must raise a
fair question as to each element required to obtain the injunct-
ion. See People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle, 202 Ill. 2d
164, 177, 781 N.E.2d 223, 230 (2002) ("[o]n appeal, we examine
only whether the party seeking the injunction has demonstrated a
prima facie case that there is a fair question concerning the
existence of the claimed rights"), superceded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Dunlap v. Village of Schaumburg, 394 Ill.
App. 3d 629, 639, 915 N.E.2d 890, 899 (2009). "In balancing the
equities, the court should also consider the effect of the
injunction on the public." Kalbfleisch v. Columbia Community
Unit School District Unit No. 4, 396 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1119, 920
N.E.2d 651, 664 (2009).
This court generally reviews a trial court's grant or
denial of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion.
Lifetec, Inc. v. Edwards, 377 Ill. App. 3d 260, 268, 880 N.E.2d
188, 195 (2007). "A trial court abuses its discretion only when
its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no
reasonable person would adopt the court's view." People ex rel.
Madigan v. Petco Petroleum Corp., 363 Ill. App. 3d 613, 634, 841
N.E.2d 1065, 1082 (2006). Where, however, a court does not make
any factual findings and rules on a question of law, our review
is de novo. Mohanty, 225 Ill. 2d at 63, 866 N.E.2d at 91 (stating
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that "whether injunctive relief should issue to enforce a
restrictive covenant not to compete in an employment contract
depends upon the validity of the covenant, the determination of
which is a question of law" and reviewing that determination de
novo).
B. Trial Court Did Not Err or Abuse Its Discretion
in Denying the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
The trial court did not err by denying plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff failed to raise a
fair question (1) of the likelihood of success on the merits, (2)
of a clearly ascertained right in need of protection, (3) of
irreparable harm, or (4) that the balance of hardships favored
plaintiff.
First, plaintiff did not raise a fair question that
plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits. The parties agree
defendant is a non-home-rule unit of local government. As a non-
home-rule unit, defendant possesses only those powers "expressly
granted, powers incident to those expressly granted, and powers
indispensable to the accomplishment of the declared objects and
purposes of the municipal corporation." Pesticide Public Policy
Foundation v. Village of Wauconda, 117 Ill. 2d 107, 112, 510
N.E.2d 858, 861 (1987) (citing Consumers Co. v. City of Chicago,
313 Ill. 408, 411-12, 145 N.E.114, 116 (1924), 1 J. Dillon,
Municipal Corporations §237 (5th ed. 1911)).
Under the Act, defendant is essentially charged with
regulating and maintaining the water supply. See, e.g., 70 ILCS
3715/6 (West 2008) (setting forth the powers of the board,
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including inspecting wells; requiring data concerning the supply,
withdrawal, and use of water; regulating the use of water during
a shortage; and supplementing the existing water supply). The
powers incident to doing so necessarily include, among other
things, expressing an opinion about activities that may affect
the area's water supply. In fact, at oral arguments, counsel for
plaintiff conceded finding no authority for bringing such a
claim. This is not surprising, given that such claim is without
merit.
Second, this court finds, as a matter of law, that
plaintiff did not raise a fair question whether it had a clearly
ascertainable right to prevent allegedly unauthorized entities
from making public comment or otherwise becoming involved in a
USEPA permit procedure.
Third, the trial court did not abuse its discretion to
the extent it found that plaintiff failed to make a fair showing
of irreparable harm. See, e.g., Kalbfleisch, 396 Ill. App. 3d at
1116, 920 N.E.2d at 661 (finding the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by finding irreparable harm). Some courts have
held that irreparable harm exists only where a party has no
adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., Hensley Construction, LLC v.
Pulte Home Corp., 399 Ill. App. 3d 184, 190, 926 N.E.2d 965, 971
(2010) ("irreparable harm[] 'occurs only where the remedy at law
is inadequate'") (quoting Franz v. Calaco Development Corp., 322
Ill. App. 3d 941, 947, 751 N.E.2d 1250, 1256 (2001)). Such
approach appears to combine the irreparable-harm factor with the
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no-adequate-remedy-at-law factor.
This court concludes that those factors are separate.
See, e.g., Bollweg, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 577, 818 N.E.2d at 887
(noting a party need not show an injury beyond repair or
compensation in damages; transgressions of a continuing nature
may also demonstrate irreparable injury). For instance, in
Slomka, 397 Ill. App. 3d 137, 922 N.E.2d 36, the appellate court
examined the irreparable-harm factor and inadequate-remedy-at-law
factor separately. In its examination of the irreparable-harm
factor, the appellate court found the petitioner failed to allege
facts supporting irreparable harm and found the case did not
represent the type of extreme emergency situation that posed
serious harm. Slomka, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 144-45, 922 N.E.2d at
42 (involving father's attempt to obtain a preliminary injunction
to bar the mother from taking the children to therapy).
Similarly here, plaintiff alleged only the possibility
that defendant, as a unit of government, might unduly influence
the USEPA in the permit process. The alleged harm articulated by
plaintiff does not represent the type of extreme emergency
situation that poses serous harm. "A preliminary injunction is
an extraordinary remedy and is generally employed only in matters
of great injury, and then only with the utmost care and caution."
Charles P. Young Co. v. Leuser, 137 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1052-53,
485 N.E.2d 541, 547 (1985).
Finally, this court concludes the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by finding the balance of the hardships did
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not favor plaintiff and plaintiff did not make a fair showing of
irreparable harm. See, e.g., Bollweg, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 572,
818 N.E.2d at 883 (applying the abuse-of-discretion standard
where the trial court heard conflicting expert testimony and
balanced the benefits of granting the preliminary injunction
against the hardship the defendant might suffer as a result);
Kalbfleisch, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 1116, 920 N.E.2d at 661
(reviewing for an abuse of discretion the trial court's finding
on irreparable harm).
The balance of hardships does not favor granting the
preliminary injunction. The potential harm of not allowing
defendant to participate, if so authorized, outweighs the
potential harm to plaintiff if defendant does participate in the
permit process. Plaintiff can respond to any issues or
information defendant may raise before the USEPA. As the parties
noted, the time for public comment has not yet commenced,
although defendant had submitted a report to the USEPA. The
merits of the case will be decided at trial. Defendant's
potential interest in protecting the water supply outweighs
plaintiff's interest in preventing a governmental entity from
commenting on or becoming involved in plaintiff's permitting
process. Moreover, the effect an injunction would have on the
public also favors the denial of plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction. Consequently, the court did not abuse
its discretion by denying the preliminary injunction here.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
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