People v. Kitchell

NOTICE
2015 IL App (5th) 120548
Decision filed 06/29/15. The
text of this decision may be NO. 5-12-0548
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Peti ion for
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Lawrence County.
)
v. ) No. 10-CF-108
)
FREDERICK G. KITCHELL, ) Honorable
) Robert M. Hopkins,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Cates and Justice Chapman concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Frederick G. Kitchell, appeals from an order of the circuit court of
Lawrence County granting the State's motion to dismiss his postconviction petition in
which he alleged ineffective assistance of guilty plea counsel. The issue on appeal is
whether the circuit court erred in granting the State's motion to dismiss the postconviction
petition alleging ineffective assistance of guilty plea counsel where plea counsel's advice
was incorrect concerning available sentencing credit. In this appeal, the State has filed a
motion to cite additional authority. This court grants the State's motion. We reverse and
remand.
1
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant was charged by information with home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-
11(a)(2) (West 2008)), but ultimately pleaded guilty to attempted home invasion (720
ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2), 8-4(a) (West 2008)) and was sentenced to 10 years in the Illinois
Department of Corrections (Department) and 2 years' mandatory supervised release as
part of a fully negotiated plea. During negotiations, defendant's attorney advised him he
would be eligible to receive good-conduct credit while serving time in the Department if
he participated in various educational, vocational, and drug rehabilitation classes.
Defendant participated in such classes, but did not receive any good-time credit because
he was ineligible for such credit pursuant to section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of
Corrections, "Rules and Regulations for Early Release" (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2008)),
and section 107.520 of Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code "Eligibility" (20 Ill.
Adm. Code 107.520 (1996)).
¶4 On February 9, 2012, defendant filed a pro se petition for relief from judgment in
which he argued that he agreed to a negotiated plea agreement because he was promised
he could receive earned good-conduct credit, but he had since learned he was not eligible
for such credit and, therefore, he "did not receive his benefit of the bargain." The circuit
court appointed counsel to represent defendant. Appointed counsel withdrew the pro se
petition and filed instead a postconviction petition, alleging defendant was denied
effective assistance of plea counsel due to the erroneous advice plea counsel gave
defendant regarding good-time credit, asserting that plea "counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel when he incorrectly informed [defendant] that he would be eligible
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for good[-]conduct credit for participation in various [Department] programs, and
furthermore, the inaccurate advice of his counsel made his plea involuntary." Attached to
the petition was defendant's affidavit in which he averred that he participated in various
educational and vocational classes while in the Department, but failed to receive any
good-conduct credit for such participation, and he "would not have entered into the plea
agreement in this case if he would not have been erroneously informed by his defense
counsel that he was eligible to receive good[-]conduct credit for participation" in such
programs. The State filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court granted the State's
motion to dismiss. Defendant now appeals.
¶5 ANALYSIS
¶6 The issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in granting the State's motion
to dismiss defendant's postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of plea
counsel where plea counsel's advice was incorrect concerning available sentencing credit.
Defendant contends he would not have entered into his guilty plea if he had not been
erroneously informed by plea counsel that he was eligible to receive good-conduct credit.
He insists the erroneous advice of plea counsel amounted to ineffective assistance of
counsel and the circuit court erred in granting the State's motion to dismiss the
postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of guilty plea counsel. We agree.
¶7 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) provides a method by which a person
under criminal sentence may assert that his or her conviction resulted from a substantial
denial of his or her rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2012); People v. Tate, 2012 IL
112214, ¶ 8, 980 N.E.2d 1100. A postconviction proceeding is commenced by the filing
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of a petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2012). Each proceeding has three distinct
stages. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244, 757 N.E.2d 442, 445 (2001). The
instant appeal is from a second stage dismissal of a postconviction petition. At the
second stage, the circuit court must determine whether the petition and any
accompanying documents make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.
Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246, 757 N.E.2d at 446. If the petition fails to make a substantial
showing of a constitutional violation, it is dismissed, but if such a showing is made, the
petition advances to the third stage, where the court conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725
ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2012); Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246, 757 N.E.2d at 446. The
dismissal of a postconviction proceeding at the second stage is reviewed de novo. People
v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 389, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1075 (1998).
¶8 A challenge to a guilty plea based upon allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel is subject to the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 334-35, 841 N.E.2d 913, 920 (2005). In
order to obtain relief under Strickland, a petitioner must show both that (1) counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have
been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Plea counsel performs inadequately where
he or she fails to ensure that the defendant's plea was entered voluntarily and
intelligently. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d at 335, 841 N.E.2d at 920.
¶9 In support of his ineffective assistance claim, defendant relies on People v. Young,
355 Ill. App. 3d 317, 822 N.E.2d 920 (2005). Young is factually similar to the instant
4
case because it also involved a guilty plea which was procured through an affirmative
misstatement of the consequences of a guilty plea. The issue in that case was whether
trial counsel was ineffective when he incorrectly informed the defendant that he would
serve less actual prison time by pleading guilty to a Class 1 felony with a 12-year prison
term than he would serve by pleading guilty to a Class X felony with a 10-year prison
term. Young, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 321, 822 N.E.2d at 923-24. The State moved to dismiss
the petition, arguing that the claim was not supported by the record, and the circuit court
granted the motion. Young, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 320, 822 N.E.2d at 923. In reversing, our
colleagues in the Second District distinguished a case cited by the State, relied on our
supreme court's analysis in another case, and discussed in detail the difference between
an attorney's passive failure to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of a
guilty plea and an affirmative misrepresentation of the consequences as follows:
"As defendant points out, [People v.] Maury[, 287 Ill. App. 3d 77, 678
N.E.2d 30 (1997),] completely fails to consider People v. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d
541[, 485 N.E.2d 307] (1985), which draws a crucial distinction between 'the
passive conduct of counsel in failing to discuss with a defendant the collateral
consequences of a guilty plea' and 'unequivocal, erroneous, misleading
representations' that counsel makes in response to a defendant's specific inquiries.
Correa, 108 Ill. 2d at 551-52[, 485 N.E.2d at 311]. Correa involved the latter
situation. While the court refused to decide whether the defendant's counsel
would have been ineffective had he 'simply failed to advise the defendant of the
collateral consequence' (Correa, 108 Ill. 2d at 550[, 485 N.E.2d at 311]), it held
5
that counsel's 'unequivocal, erroneous, misleading representations' about the
collateral consequences of the plea amounted to ineffective assistance that
rendered the defendant's plea involuntary. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d at 552[, 485 N.E.2d
at 311]. ***
***
Defendant's allegation that he pleaded guilty based on [plea counsel's]
erroneous advice is legally sufficient under the Act. Of course, whether defendant
can actually prove his contention must be resolved at an evidentiary hearing."
Young, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 323-24, 822 N.E.2d at 925-26.
¶ 10 Young concluded the defendant was entitled to a hearing on his claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective and his plea was not voluntary and, therefore, reversed the trial
court's judgment and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. Young, 355 Ill. App.
3d at 325, 822 N.E.2d at 926-27.
¶ 11 Nevertheless, in the instant case, the State asserts that because defendant indicated
to the circuit court that there were no "promises" made by his attorney that persuaded him
to accept the plea agreement, his argument on appeal must fail. However, we find that
neither the fact that defendant stated on the record that no promises were made nor the
fact that his attorney recited the plea agreement terms and failed to mention Department
program credit is material. The question of good-time credit for program participation is
directly related and a direct consequence of the charge to which defendant pled guilty.
Here, there is no controversy that plea counsel's advice that defendant would be eligible
for credit was erroneous.
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¶ 12 The recent case of People v. Clark, 2011 IL App (2d) 100188, 957 N.E.2d 162, is
instructive on the showing required to establish ineffectiveness of trial counsel. In Clark,
the defendant alleged in a postconviction petition that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel during his guilty plea hearing when his attorney told him there were
no witnesses available to support his defense of insanity. In support of his claim, the
defendant attached the affidavit of the victim, who averred that the defendant was
schizophrenic and had not been taking his medications at the time of the offense, that he
heard voices telling him to stab her, and that she knew he did not mean to harm her. The
reviewing court found that the defendant made a substantial showing that counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate the witness and that he was prejudiced because
counsel told him that there were no witnesses available to support his defense. Clark,
2011 IL App (2d) 100188, ¶¶ 28-29, 957 N.E.2d 162. Similar to Young, Clark also
contained an allegation of an unequivocally false misrepresentation, not mere passive
conduct, sufficient to warrant a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel should the
defendant be able to prove his allegations.
¶ 13 In the instant case, defendant attached to his petition an affidavit in which he
specifically averred that he would not have pleaded guilty but for the erroneous advice of
plea counsel that defendant was eligible to receive good-conduct credit for participation
in certain Department programs. As our colleagues in the Fourth District stated,
"Defendant's contention that counsel gave him wrong advice and he relied on that advice
is sufficient under the Act to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing ***." People v.
Stewart, 381 Ill. App. 3d 200, 206, 887 N.E.2d 461, 467 (2008). Whether defendant can
7
prove his contention will be determined at the evidentiary hearing.
¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand for
an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 15 Reversed and remanded.
8
2015 IL App (5th) 120548
NO. 5-12-0548
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Lawrence County.
)
v. ) No. 10-CF-108
)
FREDERICK G. KITCHELL, ) Honorable
) Robert M. Hopkins,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
__________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: June 29, 2015
__________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.
Honorable Judy L. Cates, P.J., and
Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.,
Concur
__________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Ellen J. Curry, Deputy
for Defender, Robert S. Burke, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of
Appellant the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 909 Water Tower
Circle, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
__________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Hon. Christopher M. Quick, State's Attorney, Lawrence County
for Courthouse, Courthouse Square, Lawrenceville, IL 62439, Patrick
Appellee Delfino, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Whitney E.
Atkins, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor, 730 East Illinois Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt.
Vernon, IL 62864
__________________________________________________________________________