People v. Craig

NO. 5-08-0360
N O TIC E
D ecision filed 08/20/10. T he text of
IN THE
this decision m ay b e changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
P e titio n fo r R ehearin g or th e
disposition of the sam e.
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Wayne County.
)
v. ) No. 98-CF-135
)
CHRISTOPHER L. CRAIG, ) Honorable
) Barry L. Vaughan,
Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE DONOVAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Respondent, Christopher L. Craig, confessed the petition to declare respondent a
sexually dangerous person filed by petitioner, the People of the State of Illinois (State), in the
circuit court of Wayne County pursuant to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (725
ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 2006)), and he was committed to the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (Department). Subsequently, respondent filed an application
showing his recovery and sought a discharge or alternatively a conditional release.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the jury found that respondent continued to be sexually
dangerous. Respondent was remanded to the custody of the Department. On appeal,
respondent contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process when the
circuit court denied his motion for an independent psychiatric evaluation at the State's
expense and instructed the jury on a burden of proof that was less than beyond a reasonable
doubt.
On August 7, 1998, the State filed an information in the circuit court of Wayne
County charging respondent with one count of sexual assault and two counts of predatory
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criminal sexual assault of a child. On October 19, 1998, the State filed a petition to declare
respondent a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Act (725 ILCS 205/3 (West 1998)).
On October 28, 1998, the circuit court appointed two qualified psychiatrists and directed
each, independently, to evaluate respondent for purposes of determining whether he was a
sexually dangerous person pursuant to section 4 of the Act (725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1998)).
On January 25, 1999, respondent confessed the State's petition and the allegations
contained therein, waived his right to a jury trial, and consented to a court-ordered
commitment to the custody of the Department under the guardianship of the Director of
Corrections (Director). On January 25, 1999, the circuit court entered an order finding that
respondent was a sexually dangerous person, appointing the Director as respondent's
guardian, and committing respondent to the custody of the Director.
In April 2002, respondent filed a pro se "Application Showing Recovery" pursuant
to section 9 of the Act (725 ILCS 205/9 (West 2002)) in the circuit court of Wayne County.
Respondent requested that the court grant a discharge from commitment or alternatively a
conditional release from commitment. The circuit court appointed an attorney to represent
respondent. Respondent's attorney filed an amended application and a motion for the
appointment of an independent expert at the State's expense to examine respondent for the
purpose of determining whether he remained a sexually dangerous person. The court denied
respondent's motion for the appointment of an independent expert. The court ordered the
Director to cause to be prepared and to be filed a sociopsychiatric report pursuant to section
9 of the Act.
An evidentiary hearing was held on May 7, 2003. At the conclusion of the trial, the
court determined that respondent continued to suffer from a mental disorder and that
respondent had a problem controlling his behavior. The court denied respondent's amended
application showing a recovery. On appeal, a panel of this court determined that respondent
2
was not entitled to an independent expert and that the State had presented overwhelming
evidence to show that respondent continued to be a sexually dangerous person; the judgment
was affirmed. People v. Craig, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1191, 876 N.E.2d 331 (2004) (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)).
On May 9, 2005, respondent filed a pro se application for a discharge or a conditional
release and a motion for the appointment of counsel in the circuit court of Wayne County.
The circuit court granted respondent's motion for the appointment of counsel. The court
ordered the Director to have a sociopsychiatric report prepared and submitted. On April 10,
2006, respondent filed an amended application. Respondent also filed a motion seeking a
Frye hearing (Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)) and the appointment of
an independent psychiatric expert at the State's expense. The court denied respondent's
requests for a Frye hearing and the appointment of an independent psychiatric expert. An
evidentiary hearing before a jury was held from December 17, 2007, through December 18,
2007. The jury found that respondent continued to be a sexually dangerous person. The
court entered a judgment on the verdict and remanded respondent to the custody of the
Director. The court denied respondent's posttrial motion seeking a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or alternatively a new trial.
On appeal, respondent argues that he was deprived of constitutional safeguards when
the circuit court refused to appoint an independent expert at the State's expense and when the
court instructed the jury on a burden of proof that was less than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Respondent contends that the circuit court's decision to instruct the jury on a burden of proof
that was less than beyond a reasonable doubt in conjunction with its decision to deny his
motion for a psychiatric expert resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional right to due
process in the recovery proceeding because he was required to proceed to a trial without the
ability to offer any evidence to counter the Department's experts while the State was faced
3
with a lesser burden of proof.
The standard of review for determining whether an individual's constitutional rights
have been violated is de novo. Patel v. Illinois State Medical Society, 298 Ill. App. 3d 356,
370, 698 N.E.2d 588, 597 (1998). Matters of statutory construction and statutory
interpretation are also reviewed de novo. In re Detention of Kish, 395 Ill. App. 3d 546, 554,
916 N.E.2d 595, 601 (2009).
The Sexually Dangerous Persons Act provides for the involuntary civil commitment
of respondents declared sexually dangerous persons, as an alternative to criminal
prosecutions. 725 ILCS 205/2, 3 (West 2006). The Act serves both the individuals and
society, in that it offers to provide treatment for sexually dangerous persons with the goals
of rehabilitation and recovery and it protects the public by sequestering sexually dangerous
persons until they have recovered. People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318, 323-24, 752 N.E.2d
1055, 1058-59 (2001); see generally People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91, 100-02, 481 N.E.2d 690,
694-95 (1985), aff'd, 478 U.S. 364, 373, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 307, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2994 (1986).
Proceedings under the Act are characterized as civil in nature, and the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2006)) and Illinois Supreme Court rules apply
to all proceedings under the Act, except where otherwise provided in the Act. 725 ILCS
205/3.01 (West 2006). Though civil in nature, the Act provides to respondents certain due
process protections afforded to criminal defendants, because an involuntary commitment
entails a loss of liberty. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d at 100-02, 481 N.E.2d at 694-95. In any
proceeding under the Act, a respondent has the right to demand a trial by jury and to be
represented by counsel. 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2006). A respondent also has the right to a
speedy trial and a right to challenge the State's evidence and to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses testifying against him. People v. Lawton, 212 Ill. 2d 285, 295, 818 N.E.2d 326,
332 (2004).
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The Act is composed of two separate but interrelated proceedings: an initial
commitment proceeding (725 ILCS 205/3 (West 2006)) and a recovery proceeding (725
ILCS 205/9 (West 2006)). Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 326, 752 N.E.2d at 1060. The proceedings
under the Act are civil in nature, but "the burden of proof required to commit a defendant to
confinement as a sexually dangerous person shall be the standard of proof required in a
criminal proceedings [sic] of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West
2006). If the State meets its burden, the respondent is committed to the custody of the
Director for an indeterminate period until he has recovered and is released. 725 ILCS 205/8
(West 2006).
Section 9 of the Act governs the recovery proceeding. 725 ILCS 205/9(a) (West
2006). Under section 9(a), a respondent who has been adjudicated sexually dangerous may
file a written application that contains facts to show he has recovered and that requests a
discharge or a conditional release. 725 ILCS 205/9(a) (West 2006). The application is filed
in the circuit court in which the respondent was committed. 725 ILCS 205/9(a) (West 2006).
Once the application is filed, the circuit clerk is required to forward a copy of the application
to the Director, and the Director is required to obtain a sociopsychiatric report concerning the
applicant. 725 ILCS 205/9(a) (West 2006). The circuit court then sets a hearing date. 725
ILCS 205/9(a) (West 2006). The applicant or the State may elect to have a hearing before
a jury, and the State has the burden of proving by clear-and-convincing evidence that the
applicant is still a sexually dangerous person. 725 ILCS 205/9(b) (West 2006).
Prior to January 1, 2006, the Act did not have a provision identifying the burden of
proof and the bearer of that burden during the recovery proceeding. In August 2005, the
Illinois General Assembly passed a bill (94th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 245, 2005 Sess.)
that amended certain provisions in section 9 of the Act, and the amended version of section
9 became effective January 1, 2006 (Pub. Act 94-0404, §5, eff. January 1, 2006). Subsection
5
(b) of section 9, as amended, provides that in a recovery proceeding the State bears the
burden to prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that a respondent is still a sexually
dangerous person. 725 ILCS 205/9(b) (West 2006).
In 2001, before the amendments to section 9 that took effect in January 2006, the
Illinois Supreme Court was called upon to consider the underlying issue of the applicable
burden of proof in a recovery proceeding as it construed the Act for purposes of determining
whether the State was entitled to move for a summary judgment in a recovery proceeding.
Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 325, 752 N.E.2d at 1059. In reviewing the applicable provisions of
the Act, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that there was a provision which explicitly stated
that the burden of proof required to commit a respondent to confinement was "beyond a
reasonable doubt" and that there was no such provision declaring the burden of proof in a
recovery proceeding. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 332, 752 N.E.2d at 1063. The supreme court
applied fundamental rules of statutory construction, considered the plain language in section
9 in conjunction with sections 3 and 5, and determined that the filing of an application by a
respondent triggers a recovery hearing in which the State is the petitioner and bears the
burden of proof. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 334-35, 752 N.E.2d at 1065; 725 ILCS 205/3, 5, 9
(West 1998). The supreme court concluded that in the absence of an explicit legislative
statement, the burden of proof in a recovery proceeding would be the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard utilized in the initial commitment proceeding. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 335, 752
N.E.2d at 1065. As a result of the decision in Trainor and until the legislative amendments
to section 9 of the Act became effective on January 1, 2006, in recovery proceedings the
State was charged with the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a respondent was
still a sexually dangerous person.
A long-held principle of statutory construction provides that where a court has
construed terms used in a statute and the legislature thereafter defines those terms, the
6
presumption is that the court's construction was not in accordance with the original intent of
the legislature. Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue, 413 Ill. 55, 66, 108 N.E.2d 8,
14 (1952). Conversely, when the court construes a statute and its construction is not altered,
the presumption is that the construction is in harmony with the legislative intent. Modern
Dairy Co., 413 Ill. at 66, 108 N.E.2d at 14. "Where statutes are enacted after judicial
opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature acted with knowledge of the
prevailing case law." People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 262, 644 N.E.2d 1147, 1153
(1994). An amendment to a statute is presumed to be intended to effect a change in the law
as it formerly existed. In re C.M.J., 278 Ill. App. 3d 885, 889, 663 N.E.2d 498, 501 (1996).
Statutory language is given its ordinary meaning with the presumption that the legislature
meant what it said. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d at 262, 644 N.E.2d at 1153.
The presumptions that arise from the legislative amendments to section 9 are that the
General Assembly intended to effect a change in the law as it formerly existed or that the
supreme court's interpretation in Trainor was not in accordance with the General Assembly's
original intent. The amended version of section 9 was in effect at the time of the evidentiary
hearing in the recovery proceeding in the case at bar, and its provisions were followed and
applied in the circuit court.
Section 9(b), as amended, expressly provides that the burden of proof in a recovery
proceeding is "clear and convincing" evidence. 725 ILCS 205/9(b) (West 2006). Illinois
courts have said that clear-and-convincing evidence is "the quantum of proof that leaves no
reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder as to the truth of the proposition in question."
Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213, 647 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1995). Although this
description is stated in terms of reasonable doubt, our courts consider clear-and-convincing
evidence to be more than a preponderance of the evidence and not quite approaching the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense. In
7
re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1226 (2004); Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d at 213, 647
N.E.2d at 276.
The minimum standard of proof that will satisfy due process in a given type of
proceeding reflects the weight of the private and pubic interests affected and a societal
judgment about how the risk of error should be allocated between the parties. Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 329, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1808 (1979); In re D.T., 212
Ill. 2d at 361, 818 N.E.2d at 1225. The party who has the more stringent burden of proof
bears more of the risk of an erroneous decision. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-25, 60 L. Ed.
2d at 329-30, 99 S. Ct. at 1808-09; In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 361, 818 N.E.2d at 1225. So, in
a criminal case, the interests of the accused are of such a magnitude that the standard of proof
is "designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment," and
society has assumed nearly all the risk of error. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24, 60 L. Ed. 2d
at 329, 99 S. Ct. at 1808. The clear-and-convincing standard of proof has been used in civil
cases involving allegations of fraud and some quasi-criminal wrongdoing by a respondent
where the interests "are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money" and in civil
cases "to protect particularly important individual interests." Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24,
60 L. Ed. 2d at 329-30, 99 S. Ct. at 1808. So a party burdened with the clear-and-convincing
standard "shoulders a greater share of the risk of an erroneous determination." In re D.T.,
212 Ill. 2d at 362, 818 N.E.2d at 1226.
In considering the appropriate standard of proof in an involuntary civil commitment
proceeding, the United States Supreme Court has stated that courts should assess both the
extent of the individual's interest in not being involuntarily confined indefinitely and the
state's interest in committing the emotionally disturbed under a particular standard of proof
and, in so doing, should remain mindful that the function of legal process is to minimize the
risk of an erroneous decision. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 330, 99 S. Ct. at
8
1809. In Addington, the United States Supreme Court determined that in cases involving
involuntary commitment, due process does not require the state to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt and that the clear-and-convincing standard adequately balances the
individual's interest in not being indefinitely confined with the state's interests in providing
care and in protecting the public and meets the demands of due process. Addington, 441 U.S.
at 431-33, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 334-35, 99 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
Our Illinois Act clearly satisfies the due process requirements under Addington. In
the initial commitment proceeding, the State is held to a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden
of persuasion (725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 2006)), and thus the Act exceeds the minimum
demands of due process. In the recovery proceeding, the State is held to a clear-and-
convincing-evidence burden of persuasion (725 ILCS 205/9(b) (West 2006)), and the Act
meets the minimum demands of due process. Respondent suggests that the burden of proof
in the initial commitment proceeding and the burden of proof in the recovery proceeding
should be no different because a respondent is at risk for the loss of his liberty in each
proceeding. The Illinois legislature could have rationally concluded that in an initial
commitment proceeding a respondent should be the beneficiary of the more stringent beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof because he has not been previously convicted of a
sexual offense or found to be sexually dangerous in any prior proceeding and that the State
should carry nearly all the risk of an erroneous determination. Additionally, the legislature
could have rationally concluded that in a recovery proceeding the State should bear the
slightly less stringent clear-and-convincing burden of proof because it has already proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that a respondent is a sexually dangerous person. In the recovery
proceeding the focus is on whether a respondent has recovered and has been adequately
rehabilitated. The legislature could have determined that a respondent, having some
responsibility for his own recovery, should bear some risk of the erroneous decision but that
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the State should continue to bear the greater risk of an erroneous decision, i.e., the risk of
discharging into the community a person who has not recovered and remains sexually
dangerous. The clear-and-convincing burden of proof in a recovery proceeding adequately
ensures the level of certainty about the fact finder's factual determinations to satisfy due
process. Respondent has not shown an inherent contradiction between requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in the initial commitment proceeding and requiring proof by clear-
and-convincing evidence in the recovery proceeding. See In re Detention of Kish, 395 Ill.
App. 3d at 555-56, 916 N.E.2d at 602 (there is no logical contradiction in the Act's use of the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in the initial commitment proceeding and the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in a conditional-release-revocation proceeding).
Respondent argues that the circuit court's decision to instruct the jury on a burden of
proof that is less than reasonable doubt in conjunction with its decision to deny his motion
for a psychiatric expert resulted in the deprivation of his right to due process because he was
required to proceed to a trial without the ability to offer any evidence to counter the
Department's experts while the State was faced with a lesser burden of proof.
As previously noted, commitment proceedings under the Act are civil in nature, with
the goals of treatment and rehabilitation for those committed and protection for the public.
Allen, 107 Ill. 2d at 100-02, 481 N.E.2d at 694-95. In filing a commitment petition under the
Act, the State opts to seek a civil commitment in lieu of a criminal prosecution. 725 ILCS
205/3 (West 2006). Nevertheless, the Act affords a number of due process protections to
respondents in recovery proceedings. A respondent has a right to file a written recovery
application, which triggers a hearing. 725 ILCS 205/9(a) (West 2006). A respondent has the
right to demand a jury trial, the right to the assistance of counsel, and the right to test the
evidence and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, including the Department's
psychiatric experts. 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2006). The Act does not provide a respondent
10
with the right to demand the appointment of an independent psychiatric expert at the State's
expense in either the initial commitment proceeding or the recovery proceeding, but a
respondent may move for the appointment of an independent psychiatric expert if he believes
that the Department's experts are biased or prejudiced. See People v. Burns, 209 Ill. 2d 551,
569, 809 N.E.2d 107, 118-19 (2004); People v. Capoldi, 37 Ill. 2d 11, 18-19, 225 N.E.2d
634, 638 (1967). If the fact finder determines that a respondent continues to be a sexually
dangerous person, the respondent is permitted to file a new application no less than one year
after the finding, except if a subsequent application is accompanied by a statement from the
treatment provider that he has made exceptional progress and the application contains facts
showing his condition has so changed that a hearing is warranted, then the respondent may
file a new application sooner. 725 ILCS 205/9(d) (West 2006).
It is clear that an unsuccessful application for recovery results in a respondent's
continued commitment and loss of liberty. It is also clear that the State has strong interests
in providing treatment for persons adjudged sexually dangerous and in protecting the
community by sequestering those persons until they are recovered and rehabilitated. It is
important to note that in a recovery proceeding the State bears the burden to prove that a
respondent continues to be sexually dangerous and that the clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard nearly approaches the criminal standard of proof in terms of the allocation of the
risk of error between the parties. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 361, 818 N.E.2d at 1225. It is also
important to note that the Act imposes no limit on the number of recovery applications that
can be filed and that bestowing on a respondent the right to demand the appointment of an
independent psychiatric expert at the State's expense for each and every recovery application
would impose substantial fiscal and administrative burdens on the State. Burns, 209 Ill. 2d
at 567, 809 N.E.2d at 117. When we consider the foregoing factors, respondent has not
convinced us that because the clear-and-convincing evidence applies in a recovery
11
proceeding, due process requires the appointment of an independent expert at the State's
expense. Respondent has not established a violation of due process where the circuit court
denied him an independent expert and then instructed the jury on a burden of proof that was
less than reasonable doubt in a recovery proceeding where a loss of liberty was at risk.
In this case, respondent demanded and received a jury trial. He was represented by
court-appointed counsel. Respondent did not show any bias or prejudice on the part of the
Department professionals who testified during the recovery proceedings, and there is no
presumption that the Department professionals are biased. Burns, 209 Ill. 2d at 567-68, 809
N.E.2d at 118. Respondent had an opportunity to test the State's position, to cross-examine
the State's witnesses, and to present evidence in support of his application. The circuit court
properly instructed the jury that the State bore the burden to prove by clear-and-convincing
evidence that respondent remained a sexually dangerous person. The instruction was given
in accordance with subsection (b) of section 9 of the Act (725 ILCS 205/9(b) (West 2006)),
and the burden of proof as set forth in that subsection is clear and unambiguous. Respondent
has failed to establish a due process violation.
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GOLDENHERSH, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.
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NO. 5-08-0360
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
___________________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Wayne County.
)
v. ) No. 98-CF-135
)
CHRISTOPHER L. CRAIG, ) Honorable
) Barry L. Vaughan,
Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
___________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: August 20, 2010
___________________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable James K. Donovan, J.
Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, P.J., and
Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J.,
Concur
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Jason M. Barnhart, Endicott, Finch & Barnhart, P.O. Box 545, Carmi, IL 62821
for
Appellant
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Hon. Kevin Kakac, State's Attorney, Wayne County Courthouse, Fairfield, IL
for 62837; Patrick Delfino, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Jennifer
Appellee Camden, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730
E. Illinois Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
___________________________________________________________________________________