People v. Lomeli

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People v. Lomeli, 2017 IL App (3d) 150815Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption FABIAN LOMELI, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Third District
Docket No. 3-15-0815
Filed December 15, 2017
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 15-TR-16380; the
Review Hon. Daniel L. Kennedy, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Thomas A. Lilien, and Josette Skelnik, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino,
Lawrence M. Bauer, and Nicholas A. Atwood, of State’s Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion.
Justices Lytton and Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The defendant, Fabian Lomeli, appeals his conviction for driving on a suspended license,
arguing that the court erred in granting the State’s motion for directed finding at the close of
the defendant’s evidence during a motion to suppress.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 On March 11, 2015, the defendant was issued traffic citations for having an obstructed
windshield (625 ILCS 5/12-503(c) (West 2014)) and driving on a suspended license (625 ILCS
5/6-303(a) (West 2014)). The defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence,
alleging that Officer Shaughnessy did not have a sufficient basis for a traffic stop where he
“unreasonably determined the object reportedly hanging from the Defendant’s rearview mirror
was a material obstruction.” A hearing on the motion was held on September 21, 2015.
Shaughnessy testified that on March 11, 2015, he was a patrol officer for the City of Joliet and
was on duty around 8 p.m. It was dark, and he observed a vehicle in front of him. He followed
the vehicle for a block or two and observed an object hanging from the rearview mirror. He did
not recall what the object was. He initiated a traffic stop based on the object suspended in the
rearview mirror. Shaughnessy went to the defendant’s passenger side window and asked the
defendant for his driver’s license and insurance. The defendant gave Shaughnessy his firearm
owner’s identification card. Shaughnessy ran the defendant’s information and found that the
defendant had a suspended license. He then issued the defendant citations for having an
obstructed windshield and driving on a suspended license. The following exchange took place:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What is a material obstruction?
[SHAUGHNESSY]: A material obstruction is something that blocks the view of
the driver.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Is everything that hangs and is between the driver and the
windshield a material obstruction?
[SHAUGHNESSY]: No.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Have you had any training on what is and what is not a
material obstruction?
[SHAUGHNESSY]: No.”
¶4 Shaughnessy was shown photographs of the vehicle and the windows. After viewing the
photographs, he stated that there was slight tinting to the back and side windows. He noted that
in the windshield was a rosary and an I-Pass. He agreed that the rosary was the item he had
observed hanging from the rearview mirror. Defense counsel asked Shaughnessy how big the
rosary was, and Shaughnessy replied that it was “[n]ot very big,” and approximately “[a] half
inch” thick. On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:
“[STATE]: Officer, you observed a vehicle with what reasonably appeared to be an
obstruction in his windshield?
[SHAUGHNESSY]: I did.
[STATE]: In your mind that day it was reasonable to you?
[SHAUGHNESSY]: Yes.”
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¶5 The defendant testified that he took the pictures of the windshield and the vehicle that were
previously shown to Shaughnessy and stated that they fairly and accurately portrayed the
vehicle as it had been on March 11, 2015. The defendant said the rosary was a circle of beads
with a single strand necklace at the bottom. He stated that the rosary hung down about halfway
between the rearview mirror and the dashboard and was “[a] few centimeters” wide. At the
close of the defendant’s evidence, the State moved for a directed finding, arguing that the
defendant did not meet his burden of showing a prima facie case that the stop was
unreasonable. The court granted the motion, stating, “Reasonable articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot. There was no testimony that it was a hunch or a fishing expedition
here.”
¶6 The case immediately proceeded by way of a stipulated bench trial with the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing. The State further introduced the defendant’s driving
abstract, showing that his license was suspended on March 11, 2015. The court found the
defendant guilty of driving on a suspended license and not guilty of having an obstructed
windshield. He was sentenced to 24 months’ court supervision, 240 hours of community
service, and $350 in monetary assessments.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 On appeal, the defendant argues that “[t]he trial court erred in denying the defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence because no reasonably objective officer could have believed the
object hanging from the rear view mirror of the car the defendant was driving materially
obstructed the driver’s view.”
¶9 Both the defendant and the State advocate for the two-part standard of review ordinarily
employed when reviewing a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to suppress. However, as the
court did not just grant or deny the motion to suppress, but instead granted the State’s motion
for a directed finding, the standard is different.
¶ 10 When proceeding on a motion to suppress, the defendant must make a prima facie case of
an unlawful search or seizure. People v. Mott, 389 Ill. App. 3d 539, 542 (2009). If the
defendant makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to present evidence
justifying the search or seizure. Id.“However, as here, when the denial of a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence
is based on the grant of a motion for directed finding, ‘the trial court does not view the
evidence [in the light] most favorabl[e] to the [nonmovant] but, rather, (1) determines
whether the [nonmovant] has made out a prima facie case, then (2) weighs the
evidence, including that which favors the [movant].’ Zankle v. Queen Anne
Landscaping, 311 Ill. App. 3d 308, 311 (2000); see also 735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West
2008). The trial court’s decision will only be reversed if it is against the manifest
weight of the evidence.” People v. Green, 2014 IL App (3d) 120522, ¶ 28.
In sum, though we use a bifurcated standard of review when reviewing a ruling on a motion to
suppress, we review the circuit court’s grant of a motion for directed finding during a motion to
suppress under the manifest weight of the evidence standard.
¶ 11 “A police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer can
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20. The
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officer’s belief that the intrusion is warranted must amount to more than a hunch, but “ ‘need
not rise to the level of suspicion required for probable cause.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Close,
238 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2010)).
¶ 12 We find Hackett particularly applicable in this case. In Hackett, a police officer was
driving behind the defendant and noticed the defendant’s vehicle slightly cross into the other
lane on two separate occasions. Id. ¶ 12. The officer pulled the defendant over and ultimately
charged him with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol and aggravated driving
while license revoked. Id. ¶ 1. The defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress
evidence, arguing that the officer lacked probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop. Id. The
circuit court granted the motion, holding that the “defendant’s ‘momentary crossings’ of a
highway lane line did not give the officer ‘reasonable grounds’ to make the stop,” and the
appellate court affirmed. Id.
¶ 13 On appeal, the supreme court reversed. Id. In doing so, the court considered the difference
between reasonable, articulable suspicion and probable cause. The court noted that in order to
establish probable cause that the defendant had committed a violation of the improper lane
usage statute, the officer would have had to point to facts to support a reasonable belief that the
defendant had violated each element of the statute: (1) that he had deviated from his lane, and
(2) that it was not practicable for him to have remained in his proper lane. Id. ¶ 27. However,
the court stated that “a traffic stop may be justified on something less than probable cause. A
police officer can effect a lawful Terry stop [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] without first
‘considering whether the circumstances he or she observed would satisfy each element of a
particular offense.’ ” Id. ¶ 28 (quoting Close, 238 Ill. 2d at 510). Therefore, the court held:
“Where, as here, a police officer observes multiple lane deviations, for no obvious
reason, an investigatory stop is proper. For probable cause and conviction, there must
be something more: affirmative testimony that defendant deviated from his proper lane
of travel and that no road conditions necessitated the movement. An investigatory stop
in this situation allows the officer to inquire further into the reason for the lane
deviations, either by inquiry of the driver or verification of the condition of the
roadway where the deviation occurred.” (Emphases in original.) Id.¶ 14 Section 12-503(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) states, in pertinent part, “No person
shall drive a motor vehicle with any objects placed or suspended between the driver and the
front windshield *** which materially obstructs the driver’s view.” 625 ILCS 5/12-503(c)
(West 2014). Therefore, as in Hackett, in order for a police officer to have probable cause that
a violation had occurred, the officer would have to point to specific facts to support a
reasonable belief that the defendant had violated each element of the offense: (1) that the
defendant was driving a vehicle with an object placed or suspended between him and the
windshield, (2) that the object obstructed the driver’s view, and (3) such obstruction was
material. Id. However, an officer may conduct an investigatory stop with reasonable,
articulable suspicion, which is less than probable cause, and “without first determining
whether the circumstances he observed would satisfy each element of a particular offense.”
People v. Little, 2016 IL App (3d) 130683, ¶ 18. The stop then allows the officer to further
investigate “to either confirm or dispel [his] suspicion” that the offense occurred. Id. ¶ 16.
¶ 15 Here, Shaughnessy observed an object hanging from the defendant’s rearview mirror that
he stated he reasonably believed to be an obstruction. In granting the State’s motion for
directed finding, the court found that Shaughnessy had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
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the defendant had committed a traffic violation, stating: “Reasonable articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot. There was no testimony that it was a hunch or a fishing expedition
here.” Based on the evidence, we cannot say that such a decision was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
¶ 16 In coming to this conclusion, we note that it is not necessary for us to determine whether
Shaughnessy reasonably believed the obstruction was material at the time he initiated his
investigatory stop. “The answer to that particular question would only be implicated when
determining whether [the officer] had probable cause to cite defendant for a violation” of
section 12-503(c) of the Code, which is not a question before us on appeal. People v.
Lubienski, 2016 IL App (3d) 150813, ¶ 16. The stop in this situation simply allowed
Shaughnessy to investigate further into the obstruction hanging from the defendant’s rearview
mirror.
¶ 17 CONCLUSION
¶ 18 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 19 Affirmed.
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