People v. Johnson

2015 IL App (3d) 130431
Order filed June 4, 2015
Motion to Publish granted July 16, 2015
Modified Opinion upon denial of rehearing July 16, 2015
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2015
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-13-0431
v. ) Circuit No. 11-CF-328
)
ROBERT L. JOHNSON, ) Honorable
) Gerald R. Kinney,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Lytton and Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.
_____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Robert L. Johnson, was convicted after a stipulated bench trial of aggravated
driving while license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2010)). Defendant challenges
the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress, the sufficiency of the State’s evidence, and the
monetary consequences imposed by the court following his conviction. We affirm and remand
for further proceedings.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 The charges arise from a traffic stop initiated by an officer who pulled defendant over for
operating a motorcycle that had a tinted plastic cover on its registration plate. The superseding
indictment in this case alleges defendant committed the offense of aggravated driving while
license revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-2) (West 2010)) by operating a motorcycle while his
driver’s license was revoked for a previous violation of the statute prohibiting driving while
under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2010)). The superseding indictment also alleged
that the instant violation was defendant’s third driving while license revoked violation.
¶4 Defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence on the grounds that
there was no legal basis for the officer to initiate the traffic stop based on the characteristics of
the clear plastic cover affixed to the motorcycle’s registration plate.
¶5 At the suppression hearing, Illinois State Trooper Guy Vancina testified that he initiated a
traffic stop on a motorcycle being operated by defendant because he believed the motorcycle was
equipped with an illegal tinted plate cover on its registration plate. Vancina “ran” defendant’s
information and discovered defendant’s license was revoked. Vancina ticketed defendant for
operating a motor vehicle without insurance and for driving while defendant’s driver’s license
was revoked. Vancina gave defendant a warning for the registration plate cover, but ultimately
placed defendant in custody for an outstanding warrant.
¶6 Defendant testified he was stopped by Vancina while driving Katerina Agnew’s
motorcycle. Defendant was familiar with the motorcycle and confirmed that there was a clear
plastic cover on the motorcycle’s registration plate, although defendant admitted the cover may
have had a slight tint. Defendant further testified Vancina arrested him for driving while his
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license was revoked after Vancina ran defendant “through the system[.]” Defense counsel made
no objection to defendant’s testimony regarding the status of his license.
¶7 Agnew testified she was the owner of the motorcycle and she let defendant take the
motorcycle for a ride. Agnew had the motorcycle on consignment at this time. Agnew testified
that a clear plastic cover was on the motorcycle’s registration plate. The owner of the
consignment shop also testified that the motorcycle had a clear plastic cover over its registration
plate.
¶8 After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The
court found the issue was “the appropriateness of the stop of [defendant] while he [was] driving a
motorcycle with a clear plate cover” on the registration plate. The court concluded section 12-
610.5 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/12-610.5(a), (b) (West 2010)) prohibited the use
of any type of cover on a vehicle’s registration plate regardless of its tint or color. Thus, the
court determined Vancina had a legal basis for initiating the traffic stop due to the clear plastic
cover on the registration plate.
¶9 After the court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, defense counsel informed the
court that defendant and the State were “agreeing to proceed *** to a stipulated bench trial.”
Defense counsel stated that the trial court “heard the evidence of the traffic stop and the
subsequent Secretary of State information that his license was suspended, revoked at the time of
the stop.” Defense counsel further informed the court that both parties would be waiving
opening and closing statements and would be “standing on the evidence that’s been presented
already.”
¶ 10 Based on the “evidence heard at the suppression hearing and the stipulation of the
parties,” the trial court found defendant guilty of aggravated driving while license was revoked.
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Defendant filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial
while explaining the motion was filed by defense counsel to preserve the registration plate cover
issue for appeal. The trial court denied the defense motion before sentencing defendant to
complete 24 months’ probation including 30 days in jail.
¶ 11 The trial court also signed a criminal cost sheet itemizing a total of $528 for costs, fees,
and statutory fines. The criminal cost sheet, bearing the judge’s signature, includes a line item
charging defendant a $100 Violent Crime Victims Assistance (VCVA) fee with citation to “725
ILCS 240/10.” The criminal cost sheet cost subtotal is $528. At the same time, the trial court
entered a probation order requiring defendant to pay the costs calculated in the criminal cost
sheet. Neither the criminal cost sheet nor the probation order includes a statutory $5-per-diem
credit for defendant’s presentence incarceration.
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, the
sufficiency of the evidence, and the calculation of the monetary assessment imposed against him.
The State argues the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress and the evidence was
sufficient to convict defendant of the offense. The State does not contest that the trial court
miscalculated defendant’s monetary assessment but disputes the amount of the miscalculation.
¶ 14 We begin by considering the trial court’s ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress.
Defendant contends the trial court misconstrued section 12-610.5 of the Vehicle Code when
concluding the cover on the registration plate provided a lawful basis for the traffic stop.
¶ 15 The trial court’s interpretation of a statute is reviewed de novo. People v. Donoho, 204
Ill. 2d 159, 172 (2003). At the time of the offense, section 12-610.5 of the Vehicle Code
provided, in pertinent part:
4
“(a) In this Section, ‘registration plate cover’ means any tinted, colored,
painted, marked, clear, or illuminated object that is designed to:
(1) cover any of the characters of a motor vehicle’s registration plate;
or
***
(b) It shall be unlawful to operate any motor vehicle that is equipped with
registration plate covers.” 625 ILCS 5/12-610.5(a), (b) (West 2010).
¶ 16 When interpreting a statute, courts should not ignore the statute’s plain meaning. People
v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323-24 (2007). On this basis, we reject defendant’s strained reliance on
the language “[i]t shall be unlawful to operate any motor vehicle that is equipped with
registration plate covers” (625 ILCS 5/12-610.5(b) (West 2010)) for the proposition that the
motorcycle he was operating was in compliance with the statute because it was only equipped
with a single registration plate cover.
¶ 17 Instead, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous in that it prohibits any object,
tinted or clear, designed to cover any of the characters of a motor vehicle’s registration plate.
There is no dispute that the motorcycle defendant was operating was equipped with a plastic
cover on its registration plate and that the cover was placed over the characters of the
motorcycle’s registration plate. Thus, the plastic cover over the registration plate of the
motorcycle defendant was operating, regardless of its tint or color, was prohibited under the plain
meaning of the statute. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined the officer’s
observations provided a legal basis to initiate the traffic stop. Consequently, we conclude the
trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
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¶ 18 Next, defendant contends his aggravated driving while license revoked conviction should
be reversed because the evidence at the stipulated bench trial was insufficient to prove his license
was revoked at the time of the traffic stop. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2011); People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235
Ill. 2d 213, 224 (2009). A conviction will only be overturned where the evidence is so
improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.
Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d at 8.
¶ 19 In this case, defendant was charged with aggravated driving while license revoked.
Under section 6-303 of the Vehicle Code, a person commits driving while license revoked when
a defendant drives a motor vehicle on a highway of this State and defendant’s license is revoked.
625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2010). Defendant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as
it relates to the nature of the stipulation regarding status of his license at the time he was pulled
over.
¶ 20 Notably, when informing the court that the parties agreed to proceed by way of a
stipulated bench trial, defense counsel affirmatively represented to the court that the court heard
the evidence at the suppression hearing revealing that defendant’s license was revoked at the
time of the occurrence. It is disingenuous for defendant to now come before this court and argue
for the first time that the evidence was insufficient to prove his driver’s license was revoked at
the time of the traffic stop. Here, defense counsel affirmatively represented to the court that
defendant’s license was revoked at the time of the traffic stop. It is clear when defendant chose
to proceed by way of stipulated bench trial that he was stipulating to the State’s evidence
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concerning the status of his driving privileges. In addition, defendant failed to raise any
argument before the trial court contesting the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. We conclude
based on the stipulation recited by defense counsel that the evidence was sufficient to prove all
elements necessary to establish defendant was guilty of the offense of aggravated driving while
license revoked.
¶ 21 Defendant’s final contention on appeal is that his monetary assessments should be
reduced because the trial court failed to apply the statutory $5-per-day presentence incarceration
credit to offset his fines. Defendant also argues that his monetary assessments should be reduced
because the trial court violated ex post facto principles by calculating a VCVA fee under the law
as it existed at the time of sentencing instead of applying the law as it existed at the time of the
offense. The State does not contest the court miscalculated various charges but disputes the
amount of the miscalculation of the VCVA fee.
¶ 22 In the absence of a concession of error by the State, recently this court has attempted to
develop a consistent approach to remand monetary miscalculations to the trial courts because
“[a]ny miscalculations with regard to monetary charges are best addressed in the trial court, with
both parties present.” People v. Hunter, 2014 IL App (3d) 120552, ¶ 17. It has been the position
of this court that on remand the trial court should reconsider a defendant’s costs in their entirety.
See, e.g., People v. Dillard, 2014 IL App (3d) 121020, ¶ 15. Accordingly, we remand the matter
to the trial court with directions to review and correct any and all errors in the monetary
assessments by written order. Lastly, defendant’s presentence incarceration credit should be
applied against any fines subject to the credit pursuant to statute or applicable case law. 725
ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2010). Additionally, defendant’s VCVA fee should be calculated
according to the correct version of the law. See 725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2010). Finally, the
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probation order should be amended to accurately reflect any change in the criminal cost sheet
subtotal.
¶ 23 CONCLUSION
¶ 24 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part, and remanded for
further proceedings.
¶ 25 Affirmed in part, and remanded with directions.
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