Jones v. The City of Calumet

2017 IL App (1st) 170236Opinion filed: December 22, 2017
FIFTH DIVISION
No. 1-17-0236
THADDEUS JONES, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County
)
v. ) No. 16 COEL 22
)
THE CITY OF CALUMET CITY, an Illinois )
Municipal Corporation, NYOTA FIGGS, in )
Her Official Capacity as City Clerk for the City )
of Calumet City, and DAVID ORR, in His )
Official Capacity as the Cook County Clerk, ) Honorable
) Margarita Kulys Hoffman,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
PRESIDING JUSTICE REYES and JUSTICE LAMPKIN concurred in the judgment and
the opinion.
OPINION
¶1 On November 8, 2016, voters in Calumet City voted in favor of a referendum providing
for a term limit for the office of mayor, applicable to mayoral candidates in the upcoming April
2017 election and subsequent elections, as a result of which plaintiff, Thaddeus Jones, a mayoral
candidate, became ineligible to run for mayor and his name was removed from the ballot. On
November 23, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint and “emergency motion” in the circuit court of
Cook County against defendants Calumet City; Nyota Figgs, in her official capacity as city clerk
for Calumet City; and David Orr, in his official capacity as Cook County clerk. Plaintiff sought:
(1) a declaratory judgment that the referendum was unconstitutional; and (2) a temporary
restraining order and permanent injunction enjoining Calumet City from implementing the
results of the referendum and from taking any actions preventing him from running for mayor.
On January 27, 2017, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, and the
election was subsequently held without plaintiff’s name on the ballot. The results have been
No. 1-17-0236
certified, and the mayoral office has been filled. Plaintiff appeals the January 27, 2017, order,
contending the referendum was unconstitutional, the election results should be voided, and a
special election for mayor should be held with his name on the ballot. We affirm.
¶2 Plaintiff is a resident of Calumet City, was elected alderman of the city’s 3rd Ward in
1997, and was reelected as alderman in 2001, 2005, 2009, and 2013. In 2016, plaintiff
announced that he was running as a candidate of the Democratic Party for mayor of Calumet
City in the February 28, 2017, primary election.
¶3 On June 18, 2016, petitioners Steven Grant and Calumet City Concerned Citizens sought
to place on the November 2016 general election (presidential) ballot a referendum question that,
if approved by the voters, would impose a three-term mayoral term limit and would disqualify
the incumbent three-term mayor, Michelle Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, from running for re­
election. In August 2016, the Cook County clerk determined that the petitioners’ proposed
referendum imposing a three-term mayoral term limit could not appear on the November 2016
ballot because there were already three referenda questions on that ballot initiated by Calumet
City. The Election Code provides a so-called “Rule of Three,” stating “[if] more than 3
propositions are timely initiated or certified for submission at an election with respect to a
political subdivision, the first 3 validly initiated, by the filing of a petition or by the adoption of a
resolution or ordinance of a political subdivision, as the case may be, shall be printed on the
ballot and submitted at that election.” 10 ILCS 5/28-1 (West 2012). By operation of the “Rule of
Three,” petitioners’ additional referendum question could not be put on the November 2016
ballot, leaving the voters to consider only Calumet City’s referenda questions.
¶4 One of the Calumet City referenda questions on the November 2016 ballot asked:
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“Shall the City of Calumet City, Cook County, Illinois, adopt the following term
limits for the Office of Mayor to be effective for and applicable to all persons who are
candidates for Mayor being elected at the Consolidated Election to be held on April 4,
2017, and subsequent elections: Mayor—No person shall be eligible to seek election to,
or hold the office of mayor where that person has held the elected office of either mayor
or alderman of the City of Calumet City for four (4) or more consecutive full four (4)
year terms.”
¶5 On September 15, 2016, plaintiff (along with petitioners Steven Grant and Calumet City
Concerned Citizens) filed suit in federal court, seeking injunctive relief that would (1) require
that petitioners’ referendum be added to the November 2016 ballot and (2) prohibit Calumet
City’s referendum from appearing on the November 2016 ballot. On September 22, 2016, the
federal district court denied the request for a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the denial. Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, 842 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir.
2016).
¶6 In the November 8, 2016, election, the Calumet City referendum passed with 65.4% of
the votes in favor thereof, the effect of which allowed the three-term, incumbent Mayor
Markiewicz-Qualkinbush to run for re-election, but barred plaintiff, an alderman who had served
five consecutive four-year terms, from running for mayor. The Calumet City referendum also
barred two other aldermen who had served at least four consecutive four-year terms, Alderman
Magdalena Wosczynski and Alderman Nick Manousopoulos, from running for mayor.
¶7 The Calumet City Municipal Officers Electoral Board removed plaintiff’s name from the
mayoral ballot.
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¶8 On November 16, 2016, plaintiff filed an emergency motion in the federal district court,
seeking to enjoin the implementation of the portion of Calumet City’s referendum limiting
mayoral candidates to persons who had served fewer than four consecutive four-year terms as
alderman. On November 22, 2016, the federal district court denied the emergency motion,
stating in its oral ruling that plaintiff had brought claims based on his being a class of one in
violation of the equal protection clause, but that “[t]here has to be more of a record developed
about whether there is a class of one and whether or not there’s an equal protection violation.”
The court further stated it was exercising its “discretion in allowing the voters’ choice here in
this referendum to go forward” and suggested that plaintiff “go to state court and try to enforce
the state laws.”
¶9 Defendants filed a motion in federal court to dismiss plaintiff’s class of one and equal
protection claims contained in his federal complaint. On January 12, 2017, the federal district
court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiff had failed to show he was a class of
one. The court also found a rational basis for the Calumet City referendum, stating in its oral
ruling: “[F]rom a constitutional point of view, I believe that the defendants had a right to put on
the ballot a type of term limit that would effectively prevent what we might call career politicians
from holding the office that we’re talking about here, and that’s mayoral.”
¶ 10 Meanwhile, on November 23, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint and emergency motion in
the circuit court of Cook County against defendants, seeking: (1) a declaratory judgment that the
portion of Calumet City’s referendum preventing him from running for mayor due to his having
served five consecutive four-year terms as alderman was unconstitutional; and (2) a temporary
restraining order and permanent injunction enjoining Calumet City from implementing the
results of the referendum and from taking any actions preventing him from running for mayor.
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Plaintiff argued that: (1) the portion of the referendum asking the voters to decide whether to
limit mayoral candidates to persons who have served fewer than four consecutive four-year
terms as alderman violated article VII, section 6(f) of the state constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
VII, § 6(f)), was vague and ambiguous, and was not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental function as required by the due process and equal protection clauses; and (2) the
entire referendum violated the free and equal clause of the state constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
III, § 3), by asking voters to decide two separate and distinct propositions, i.e., whether to limit
mayoral candidates to persons who had served fewer than four consecutive four-year terms as
mayor, and whether to limit mayoral candidates to persons who had served fewer than four
consecutive four-year terms as alderman.
¶ 11 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff’s motion, upholding the validity
of Calumet City’s referendum and resulting mayoral term limit.
¶ 12 The mayoral election was held without plaintiff’s name on the ballot, the office was
filled, and the results were certified.
¶ 13 Plaintiff now appeals the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendants. Defendants Calumet City and Nyota Figgs have filed an appellee’s brief; defendant
David Orr has not filed a brief. We decide the merits of the appeal based on the record and briefs
filed on appeal.
¶ 14 Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with any affidavits, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Shared Imaging, LLC v. Hamer, 2017 IL
App (1st) 152817, ¶ 13. “Although the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not
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necessarily establish the lack of an issue of material fact or obligate a court to render summary
judgment, it does indicate that the parties agree that the case involves a question of law and that
they invite the court to decide the issues based on the record.” Id. We review de novo the circuit
court’s summary judgment determination. Id.¶ 15 Initially, we note that, in this appeal, plaintiff requests this court to void the February
2017 Democratic primary election for mayor of Calumet City and the April 2017 general
election for mayor and to order a special election with plaintiff on the ballot. Plaintiff has
forfeited his request for the voiding of the primary and general election and the holding of a
special election by failing to offer any argument or authority in his appellant’s brief for how or
why such a remedy is appropriate now that the election cycle has concluded, the results have
been certified, and the office has been filled. The election contest is also now moot. See Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017); Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners,
2012 IL 111928, ¶¶ 32, 36 (the supreme court held that, on appeal, the candidate forfeited her
request for a special election where she provided no argument or citation to authority as to the
appropriateness of a special election after the normal election cycle had concluded and the office
had been filled, and the court further held that the conclusion of the election cycle rendered the
election contest moot).
¶ 16 However, plaintiff argues on appeal that even if the election contest is moot and his
requests to void the primary and general election and to hold a special election are forfeited, we
should still address his arguments regarding the constitutionality of the Calumet City
referendum, where he raised those arguments at trial and on appeal and where a finding of the
referendum’s unconstitutionality would enable him to run for mayor in the future.
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¶ 17 We agree. As plaintiff’s arguments regarding the constitutionality of the
Calumet City referendum were raised in the circuit court and on appeal, they are not forfeited
(Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017)). As a resolution of the constitutionality of the
referendum would have a practical effect on the existing controversy regarding whether Calumet
City may properly prevent him from running for mayor in the future, the mootness doctrine does
not apply. See Hanna v. City of Chicago, 382 Ill. App. 3d 672, 677 (2008) (“Mootness occurs
once the plaintiff has secured what he basically sought and a resolution of the issues could not
have any practical effect on the existing controversy.”). Therefore, we proceed to address
plaintiff’s arguments regarding the constitutionality of the Calumet City referendum.
¶ 18 First, plaintiff contends the circuit court erred in finding that the portion of the Calumet
City referendum, approved by the voters, that limited mayoral candidates to persons who had
served fewer than four consecutive four-year terms as alderman, was a constitutional exercise of
the home rule municipality’s power under article VII, section 6(f) to establish a mayoral term
limit.
¶ 19 Article VII, section 6 provides for the “Powers of Home Rule Units,” including the power
to “regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax;
and to incur debt.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(a). Section 6(f) states: “A home rule
municipality shall have the power to provide for its officers, their manner of selection and terms
of office only as approved by referendum or as otherwise authorized by law.” Ill. Const. 1970,
art. VII, § 6(f). “The intent and purpose of the home rule provisions is to severely limit the
judiciary’s authority to preempt home rule powers through judicial interpretation of unexpressed
legislative intent. [Citation.] Home rule powers should be construed liberally. ” City of Oakbrook
Terrace v. Suburban Bank & Trust Co., 364 Ill. App. 3d 506, 514 (2006).
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¶ 20 The circuit court here found that Calumet City had the power under article VII, section
6(f) to place a referendum on the ballot, asking the voters whether to limit the mayoral office to
persons who had served fewer than four consecutive four-year terms as alderman. In support of
its finding, the circuit court cited Johnson v. Ames, 2016 IL 121563. In Johnson, the supreme
court addressed the constitutionality of a referendum question that asked the Village of
Broadview voters to decide whether to limit candidates for village president to those persons
who had served fewer than two full terms in that office. Id. ¶ 10.
¶ 21 The supreme court held that the Broadview referendum question was constitutional as it
would impose a “term limit restriction by changing the eligibility requirements for those
candidates running for village president in elections beginning with the one slated for April 4,
2017,” and “that is precisely the type of change authorized [by article VII, section 6(f)] for ***
home rule units.” Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 22 In the instant case, the circuit court determined that the Calumet City referendum
similarly would change the eligibility requirements for the candidates running for mayor by
imposing a term limit restriction and that such “term limit eligibility requirements are
authorized” under article VII, section 6(f), according to Johnson.
¶ 23 Plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in finding that the portion of the term limit
approved by the voters in the Calumet City referendum barring long-serving aldermen from
running for mayor was similar to the term limit found constitutional in Johnson. Plaintiff argues
that a “term limit” is defined as “a legal restriction on the number of times a person may be
elected to and serve in a particular public office” (www.dictionary.com/browse/term-limit (last
visited Dec. 4, 2017)). Plaintiff contends that Calumet City provided for a “true” term limit only
in the portion of its referendum prohibiting a mayoral candidate from seeking another term as
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mayor where he had previously served at least four consecutive four-year terms in that same
office, similar to the referendum upheld in Johnson that prohibited candidates for village
president who had previously served two consecutive full terms in that same office. However,
plaintiff contends that the other portion of the Calumet City referendum, which prohibits a
mayoral candidate from seeking a term as mayor where he had previously served at least four
consecutive four-year terms as alderman, does not establish a “true” term limit; rather, it is an
outright prohibition banning a certain classification of people (aldermen who served at least four
consecutive four-year terms) from ever serving as mayor, much like the nonresidents, debtors,
and felons who are barred from holding municipal offices by statute.
¶ 24 Plaintiff contends that, in contrast to Johnson, the portion of the Calumet City
referendum banning aldermen who had served at least four consecutive four-year terms from
serving as mayor “was invalid because the new eligibility requirement it established—one that
was not based on prior service in the particular office at issue—was a ‘false term limit’ and was
therefore unconstitutional and unenforceable.”
¶ 25 Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing. The Johnson court was only asked to decide whether
article VII, section 6(f), allowed a referendum prohibiting candidates for running for the office of
village president where they had already served two consecutive four-year terms in that office,
and the supreme court answered in the affirmative. Johnson, 2016 IL 121563. Unlike in the
present case, the referendum in Johnson did not also prohibit candidates from running for the
office of village president where they had already served two consecutive four-year terms in a
different office, and thus the supreme court had no cause to consider whether such a term limit
was constitutional. In the absence of a supreme court pronouncement on the issue, we turn to the
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plain language of the Illinois Constitution, which is the best guide to the document’s
interpretation. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman, 181 Ill. 2d 65, 77 (1998).
¶ 26 Article VII, section 6(f), expressly empowers a home rule municipality to “provide for
*** terms of office only as approved by referendum” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(f)). “Term of
office” is defined as the “period during which an elected officer or appointee may hold office,
perform its functions, and enjoy its privileges and emoluments.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed.
1999). The home rule municipality’s power to provide for an officeholder’s terms of office as
approved by referendum under article VII, section 6(f) necessarily includes the power to limit the
number of terms he may serve. Johnson, 2016 IL 121563, ¶ 19. However, article VII, section 6(f)
does not state how the officeholder’s terms are to be limited, i.e., for purposes of this case,
whether the officeholder’s terms are to be limited based on his prior service in the same office or
are also to be limited based on his prior service in a different office. Rather, article VII, section
6(f) leaves it to the home rule municipality (via a voter referendum) to so “provide.” Ill. Const.
1970, art. VII, § 6(f). In the present case, then, it was for the home rule municipality, Calumet
City, with the approval of its voters, to decide whether to limit the mayoral terms based on the
candidate’s prior service in that same office or also based on his prior service in the aldermanic
office.
¶ 27 Here, the Calumet City voters approved by referendum a limitation on mayoral terms
based on the candidate’s prior service as mayor or as alderman. Construed liberally, such was a
proper use of the home rule municipality’s power under article VII, section 6(f) to provide for
the terms of the mayoral office as approved by referendum. We will not preempt Calumet City’s
exercise of the power granted to it by article VII, section 6(f). See City of Oakbrook Terrace, 364
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Ill. App. 3d at 514 (the judiciary’s authority to preempt home rule powers is severely limited by
the home rule provisions of the Illinois Constitution).
¶ 28 Plaintiff contends the result of the referendum is to prevent him from ever running for
mayor of Calumet City, as he has already served more than the requisite four consecutive four-
year terms as alderman, and that such a result was never intended by article VII, section 6(f). In
effect, plaintiff is arguing that he has an absolute right to run for mayor at least once, and that
any abridgement of that right is unconstitutional. We disagree. The right to run for a statutorily
created office is not absolute (People v. Hofer, 363 Ill. App. 3d 719, 722 (2006); Coles v. Ryan,
91 Ill. App. 3d 382, 385 (1980)) and is subject to article VII, section 6(f), which, as discussed,
allows the home rule municipality to “chang[e] the eligibility requirements for those candidates
running [for office]” by limiting an officerholder’s term via a referendum approved by the
voters. Johnson, 2016 IL 121563, ¶ 19. For the reasons discussed earlier, the referendum here
approved by the voters comported with article VII, section 6(f), by changing the eligibility
requirements for those candidates running for mayor of Calumet City and providing that such
mayoral candidates may not have previously served four or more consecutive four-year terms as
either mayor or alderman. As an alderman who had served five consecutive four-year terms,
plaintiff did not meet the eligibility requirement to run for mayor and therefore he was properly
removed from the February 2017 ballot. We find no constitutional violation.
¶ 29 Next, plaintiff contends he was denied substantive due process and equal protection by
the portion of the Calumet City referendum approved by the voters, which limited mayoral
candidates to those persons who had served fewer than four consecutive four-year terms as
alderman and thereby prevented him from running for mayor. Both parties agree that as there is
no fundamental right to run for office (Hofer, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 722; Coles, 91 Ill. App. 3d at
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385), the rational basis test applies. Under the rational basis test, the mayoral term limit
established by the referendum and approved by the voters will be upheld if the term limit bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest (Walgreen Co. v. Illinois Liquor
Control Comm’n, 111 Ill. 2d 120, 124 (1986)). Under the rational basis test, the court may
hypothesize reasons for the term limit established by the referendum, and if there is any
conceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the referendum will be upheld. See People
ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1998); Shachter v. City of Chicago, 2011 IL
App (1st) 103582, ¶ 99.
¶ 30 In finding that the mayoral term limit established by the Calumet City referendum passed
the rational basis test, the circuit court stated:
“This court finds that the term limits are rationally related to the legitimate
interest of providing more opportunity for people to hold government office by limiting
ballot access to long-term office holders. The referendum is not arbitrary because it only
prevents individuals who have served four [consecutive] terms as mayor or alderman
from running for mayor. This court can take judicial notice of the Calumet City
ordinances which provide that the city council of the City of Calumet City consists of the
mayor and the aldermen. It is not irrational for the voters of Calumet City to limit the
ability of long-standing aldermen and mayors to run for the office of mayor while not
limiting the ability of other elected officials, such as city clerk and city treasurer, who are
not members of the city council.”
¶ 31 We agree with the circuit court that there is a legitimate governmental interest in
encouraging candidates for mayor who are not long-standing members of the city council and
who may have new, different ideas for running the government. The term limit established by the
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referendum, limiting mayoral candidates to persons who have served fewer than four consecutive
terms as mayor or as alderman, will provide more opportunities for such new candidates to run.
Accordingly, the mayoral term limit established by the referendum passed the rational basis test.
¶ 32 Plaintiff argues, though, that there were better ways of accomplishing the governmental
interest, such as by imposing mayoral term limits against all long-serving governmental officers,
not just city council members, and/or also by imposing mayoral term limits against longtime
aldermen whose prior terms of service were not consecutive.
¶ 33 However, the mayoral term limit approved by the Calumet City voters need not be the
best means of accomplishing the governmental objective; as long as it is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest, it will be upheld. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d at 124; Shachter, 2011 IL
App (1st) 103582, ¶ 99. As discussed, the mayoral term limit bears a rational relationship to the
legitimate governmental interest of encouraging residents, other than long-term politicians in the
city council, to run for mayor. Accordingly, we find no substantive due process or equal
protection violations.
¶ 34 Next, plaintiff contends the Calumet City referendum violates the free and equal clause of
the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 35 The free and equal clause provides: “All elections shall be free and equal.” Ill. Const.
1970, art. III, § 3. The court in Clark v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2014 IL App (1st)
141937, explained the clause in the context of another term limit ballot initiative:
“The free and equal clause guarantees the right to vote in Illinois and reflects a
broad public policy to expand the opportunity to vote. [Citation.] Under the clause, every
qualified voter has a right to vote and all votes must have equal influence. [Citation.]
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Further, the free and equal clause gives constitutional priority to the state’s public policy
of encouraging the full and effective participation of the entire electorate. [Citation.]
The free and equal clause is violated when separate and unrelated questions are
combined in a single proposition on a ballot. [Citation.] It has been said that such
combining of separate and unrelated questions prevents a voter from giving a free and
equal expression of preference as to each proposition. [Citations.] In the context of a
ballot initiative, our supreme court has stated that separate questions may be combined in
a single proposition as long as they are reasonably related to a common objective in a
workable manner. [Citation.] An additional consideration is whether the questions are
compatibly interrelated to provide a consistent and workable whole in the sense that
reasonable voters can support the entire proposition.” Id. ¶¶ 27-28.
¶ 36 Plaintiff argues that the Calumet City referendum violates the free and equal clause by
improperly combining two separate questions that are not reasonably related to a common
objective in a workable manner. Specifically, the voters were asked to decide: (1) whether
mayoral candidates should be limited to persons who have served fewer than four consecutive
four-year terms as mayor; and (2) whether mayoral candidates should be limited to persons who
have served fewer than four consecutive four-year terms as alderman. Plaintiff contends that
because it is possible for voters to want to vote “yes” to the first question but “no” to the second
question, the questions should have been submitted as separate resolutions.
¶ 37 In finding no violation of the free and equal clause, the circuit court stated:
“[T]he two questions presented in the referendum are clearly related to a common
objective: establishing a term limit for the office of mayor. Whether reasonable people
might prefer to vote ‘Yes’ for one portion of the referendum and ‘No’ for another portion
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is not the test for whether there is a violation of the free and equal clause. Since the
questions are reasonably related in a workable manner, there is no violation of the free
and equal clause.”
¶ 38 We agree with the circuit court. As discussed, Calumet City had a legitimate interest in
providing a term limit for the office of mayor so as to encourage persons who were not long-
serving politicians in the city council to run for that office. The two questions presented in the
referendum reasonably related to the common objective of providing such a term limit, and
reasonable voters could (and did) support the entire proposition; as such, the referendum did not
run afoul of the free and equal clause.
¶ 39 Next, plaintiff contends the Calumet City referendum is vague, ambiguous, and not self-
executing because it is unclear as to whether a person’s service as mayor or alderman prior to the
referendum is to be considered in determining if that person has served four or more consecutive
four-year terms in one or more of those positions. The Illinois Supreme Court has determined
that any referendum initiated under article VII, section 6(f) must be able to stand on its own
terms and may not be vague and ambiguous in regards to the information needed for its
implementation and enforcement. Leck v. Michaelson, 111 Ill. 2d 523, 530-31 (1986).
¶ 40 There is no unconstitutional ambiguity here. The first clause of the Calumet City
referendum presents voters with the question of whether the office of mayor of Calumet City on
or after April 4, 2017, should be subject to new term limit requirements. The second clause
defines those term limit requirements, limiting mayoral candidates to those persons who have
served fewer than four consecutive four-year terms as mayor or as alderman. We conclude that
the meaning of the referendum is sufficiently clear: a person’s service as mayor or as alderman
prior to the referendum is to be considered in determining if he has served four or more
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consecutive four-year terms in one or more of those positions. See also Johnson, 2016 IL
121563, ¶ 17 (holding that a similarly worded referendum was not vague or ambiguous).
¶ 41 In his reply brief, plaintiff argues that we should find the referendum’s term limit
ambiguous and void for preventing aldermen who had served four or more consecutive four-year
terms from running for mayor. Plaintiff is essentially rearguing his claim that only a so-called
“true” term limit, whereby a person may be prevented from holding an office when he has
previously served terms in that same office, is constitutionally allowable. As discussed earlier in
this opinion, though, article VII, section 6(f) contains no such distinctions between so-called
“true” and “false” term limits, and instead allows the voters in the home rule municipality to
decide for themselves, via a referendum, how to best limit an officeholder’s term. We find no
ambiguity in the Calumet City referendum that allowed voters to decide whether to limit mayoral
candidates to those persons who had served fewer than four consecutive four-year terms as either
mayor or as alderman.
¶ 42 Finally, plaintiff contends that the ex post facto clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, § 16) is violated by the portion of the Calumet City referendum preventing
him from running for mayor based on his prior five consecutive four-year terms as alderman.
Generally, the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws concerns only criminal
matters and has no application to civil law. Toia v. People, 333 Ill. App. 3d 523, 528 (2002).
Even applying the ex post facto clause here, we note that a law is ex post facto only when it is
improperly retroactively applied (People v. Scalise, 2017 IL App (3d) 150299, ¶ 8). Here, the
Calumet City referendum passed in November 2016 only provided term limits for candidates in
future elections (starting in April 2017), and thus had no retroactive impact. See Johnson, 2016
IL 121563, ¶ 19 (holding that a referendum altering the eligibility requirements for candidates in
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future elections by providing for a term limit has no retroactive impact). Accordingly, plaintiff’s
ex post facto claim fails.
¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court.
¶ 44 Affirmed.
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