People v. Barnes

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Appellate Court Date: 2018.02.01
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People v. Barnes, 2017 IL App (1st) 143902
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption MITCHELL BARNES, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Fourth Division
Docket No. 1-14-3902
Filed November 30, 2017
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-CR-14718; the
Review Hon. Bridget Jane Hughes, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Lauren A. Bauser, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Christine Cook, and Gavin P. Quinn, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of
counsel), for the People.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices McBride and Ellis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a jury trial, defendant Mitchell Barnes was found guilty of home invasion and
robbery, then sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of imprisonment of 18 years and
5 years, respectively. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) he was denied the right to a fair
trial where the court prohibited him from presenting evidence of the victim’s prior convictions
to support his claim of self-defense, (2) the court displayed “antagonism and bias” toward
defense counsel in the jury’s presence, and (3) the court increased his mandatory minimum
sentence by finding that he caused great bodily harm to the victim, even though that issue was
not presented to the jury for a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also contends that
his sentence is excessive in light of his youth, lack of criminal background, and rehabilitative
potential. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 A. State Witnesses
¶4 William Mallette testified that on August 12, 2011, he was staying in room 251 at the
Homestead Suites hotel in Schaumburg, Illinois. That night, he left the hotel at 9 p.m. for
dinner, returned to the hotel to change his clothes, and then left the hotel again to go to a bar.
He returned to the hotel that night and smoked a cigarette in the hotel’s designated smoking
area. Three males, two black and one white, were also in the smoking area. They were
discussing drugs, but Mallette told them that he was too old for that. He went back into the
hotel, taking his money clip out of his pocket to retrieve his hotel keycard, and then returned to
his room where he fell asleep.
¶5 He was awakened later that night by “very aggressive” knocking on his hotel room door.
The person knocking told him through the door that the hotel was on fire. Mallette opened the
door to his room where he saw a tall, black male, who punched him in the head. Mallette was
not sure if the black male was one of the people he had seen earlier that night while he was
smoking outside. The black male rushed the door, and a white male entered the room behind
him. The two males attacked Mallette with a “barrage of punches.” Mallette testified that he
was being hit so hard and fast that he went to the ground to try to protect himself. The fight
started in the kitchen area of Mallette’s hotel room, but the two males dragged him into the
living area where they continued to punch and kick him.
¶6 The black male punched him in the ribs, face, and kidneys, and Mallette asked them what
they wanted. The black male told him that they were there to “rob and kill [him].” The white
male pinned Mallette on his stomach while the black male kicked him in the ribs and stomped
on the side of his face. The black male then got onto the bed and then jumped off the bed onto
Mallette’s lower back. Mallette lost track of the white male, and the black male threw Mallette
onto the bed face down. The black male got on top of Mallette and put his arms around his neck
and tried to twist it. Mallette testified that he felt like the black male was trying to “rip [his]
neck off [his] body.” The black male told Mallette that, if he stopped fighting, he would snap
his neck, and it would be over.
¶7 Mallette tried to bite the black male’s arm, which startled him, and Mallette was able to
break free from the chokehold. Mallette punched the black male in the face and in the groin.
However, the black male was able to put Mallette back into a chokehold and continued trying
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to break his neck. Mallette lifted the black male up onto his back and tried to run through the
nearby window, but he did not make it out. The black male continued punching Mallette and
then threw him facedown onto the bed. The black male stood on top of the back of Mallette’s
head and neck and pushed off the ceiling, forcing Mallette’s face down into the mattress with
his foot. Mallette lost consciousness.
¶8 When he regained consciousness, there was no one else in the room. He called the front
desk of the hotel and the police and stated that he was in excruciating pain, could barely move,
and believed his lung was punctured. The police and paramedics transported him to the
hospital, where he stayed for one week. He discovered that his wallet, credit cards, driver’s
license, and cash were missing from his room. He testified that he has constant back pain as a
result of the injuries he suffered that night.
¶9 On cross-examination, Mallette stated that he did not have any drugs in his system on the
night of the incident but acknowledged that he drank several beers at dinner and at the bar that
night. He denied offering defendant money for oral sex and denied touching any of the three
males he saw outside while he was smoking a cigarette before the incident. He further stated
that he had complained to the hotel management several times about the three males because
they would smoke marijuana and drink beer in the hotel.
¶ 10 Joseph Stein testified that there were charges pending against him in relation to the incident
with Mallette and that, in exchange for his testimony, he was agreeing to plead guilty to a
charge of robbery and all other charges against him would be dismissed and the State would
recommend a sentence of six years with boot camp. He testified that in August 2011 he was
homeless and was friends with Joseph Pinsel, who lived at the Homestead Suites in
Schaumburg. He testified that he would visit Pinsel at the Homestead Suites, where they would
hang out with Gerard Golston and defendant, who were both students at Harper College. On
August 12, 2011, he and Golston went to the Homestead Suites around 6 p.m. to visit Pinsel.
They were drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana in Pinsel’s room and then went outside to
smoke cigarettes. Golston and Stein testified that while they were in the hotel’s designed
smoking area, Mallette approached them.
¶ 11 Stein testified that Mallette made “racial remarks” toward Golston and then put his arms
around Stein and hold him that he was cute. Golston could not hear what Mallette said about
him, but saw him touching Stein. Stein told Mallette to leave him alone and that he was a
homophobe. Mallette asked Pinsel if he knew where he could get any cocaine and then showed
the group some cash in a money clip. Mallette went back into the hotel, and Stein, Pinsel, and
Golston returned to Pinsel’s room. Defendant joined them in Pinsel’s room, and Pinsel told
him about the money clip and said that he wanted to try to steal it. Golston testified, however,
that it was defendant’s idea to steal the money clip and that defendant was the first person to
suggest robbing Mallette. Defendant started to formulate a plan to steal the money clip
whereby defendant would knock on Mallette’s hotel room door and tackle or hit him when he
opened the door. Then, Golston would go into the room and take the money clip while Stein
waited outside in case defendant needed help with Mallette. Pinsel was supposed to stay in the
hallway and be a lookout.
¶ 12 Defendant and Stein left the room, but Golston testified that he and Pinsel stayed in the
room because Golston did not want to take part in the plan. Once Golston saw defendant knock
on Mallette’s door, Golston ran out of the hotel and went to the convenience store across the
street. Stein testified that he was behind a wall when defendant knocked on the door, but after
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Mallette opened the door, Stein testified that he heard a “boom,” as if defendant had tackled
Mallette. Stein entered the room and saw defendant and Mallette fighting. Defendant was
punching Mallette in the face and ribs and then started choking him. Stein grabbed the money
clip from the kitchen counter and told defendant to leave with him. Defendant did not stop
choking Mallette, however, and told Mallette that he was going to kill him. Stein ran outside to
the parking lot, and defendant came out 45 minutes later wearing different clothes and shoes.
Defendant told Stein that he changed clothes because he had blood on the clothes he had been
wearing. He also told Stein that he was not sure if he killed Mallette or if he just hurt him badly.
Stein observed that defendant had swollen knuckles and a bite mark on his arm.
¶ 13 Stein and defendant drove to a gas station and tried to use a credit card from Mallette’s
money clip to buy gas, but the card did not work. They then went to Denny’s and used a debit
card from the money clip to pay for their meal. When they returned to the Homestead Suites,
they saw a police vehicle or ambulance in the parking lot, so they parked in the parking lot
across the street from the hotel. They returned to the Homestead Suites after the emergency
vehicle left, and Stein returned to Pinsel’s room while defendant went back to his own room.
Golston testified that later that night police officers knocked on Pinsel’s hotel room door and
they spoke to the officers. Golston further testified that the next day he saw defendant with
Mallette’s money clip. On cross-examination, Stein testified that after they saw Mallette
outside in the smoking area, Stein went to his room to apologize for telling him that he was a
homophobe. Stein stated that this was Pinsel’s idea because Pinsel wanted to see if he could
see the money clip inside the room so that they could steal it.
¶ 14 Schaumburg police officer Jim Hackett testified that on August 13, 2011, at 4:45 a.m., he
was assigned to a battery at the Homestead Suites hotel. When he arrived, he observed two
officers and paramedics were already with Mallette in room 251. He spoke with Mallette for
less than one minute and, as a result of the conversation, went to speak with the occupants of
room 254. He spoke to Mallette later that day in the hospital and noticed injuries to his face and
legs. On cross-examination, Officer Hackett stated that Mallette told him he had “contact” with
two black males and one Hispanic male, but the 911 call said three black males had been
involved in the incident. He also stated that Mallette told him that “the black guy in room 254
just kicked my ass.” Officer Hackett stated that he had an issue with Mallette’s timeline of the
events because Mallette told him the attack occurred 20 minutes before the 911 call at 4:45
a.m. but also said that the attack occurred between 1:30 and 1:50 a.m.
¶ 15 Dr. Elizabeth Schupp was qualified as an expert in the field of critical care medicine and
pulmonary medicine and testified that she treated Mallette at the hospital on August 13, 2011.
She noted that he was having trouble moving his lower extremities and complained of chest
pain. Mallette told her that he had been assaulted in a hotel room, and she observed that he had
the imprint of the sole of a shoe near his right ear. He repeated the version of events as
recounted in his testimony but told Dr. Schupp he had lain still on the ground because he
thought the two men would leave if he played dead and did not tell her that he lost
consciousness. Dr. Schupp took an X-ray of his chest and discovered a partially collapsed lung.
Dr. Schupp could tell from the X-ray that Mallette had previously sustained injuries to the right
side of his chest and collarbone, but he had recovered from those injuries.
¶ 16 Dr. Schupp noted that although Mallette denied drug use, his drug screen tested positive for
opiates. Dr. Schupp opined that the positive drug screen could be explained by the fact that the
paramedics gave Mallette a Fentanyl IV in the ambulance. Dr. Schupp took Computerized
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Tomography (CT) scans of Mallette’s chest and back. She observed a contusion to his right
lung and fractures of the transverse L2 and L3 lumbar spine. Dr. Schupp testified that a lot of
force, 200 or 300 pounds of force, is required to fracture the transverse spine. The chest CT
also showed a deflation of the right lung and three rib fractures.1 Dr. Schupp also took a CT
scan of Mallette’s neck, which showed a fracture of the thyroid cartilage. Dr. Schupp testified
that the thyroid cartilage can be fractured when someone tries to choke another person. She
also testified that fractured thyroid cartilage is a very rare injury because it takes a lot of force
to fracture the cartilage. Dr. Schupp explained that a fractured thyroid cartilage can be a
life-threatening injury.
¶ 17 Dr. Schupp learned that Mallette was HIV positive but did not believe his HIV status had
any effect on his injuries. She testified that she did not see very many people with the level of
trauma Mallette exhibited. She testified that she was particularly “impressed” with the fact that
Mallette had the imprint of a boot mark on his cheek because it meant that someone had
stepped down on him with a lot of force while he was lying down. She further testified that the
information Mallette provided her about the incident was “very consistent” with the injuries he
exhibited. On cross-examination, Dr. Schupp acknowledged that at the time he arrived at the
hospital, Mallette’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.162, well above the legal limit of 0.08.
¶ 18 Schaumburg police sergeant Greg Klebba testified that he was previously a detective with
the criminal investigations bureau and was assigned to investigate the incident at issue in this
case. He read the reports of officers who had previously worked on the case and then began
looking for Mallette, defendant, and Pinsel. He spoke to Mallette at the hospital with his
partner, Detective Tillema. He then went to the Homestead Suites, where he learned that
defendant and Pinsel had been asked to leave the hotel. He went to defendant’s room and found
a pair of high top shoes with a red stain on them that Sergeant Klebba thought could have been
blood. The blood was later swabbed and sent to the Illinois State Police Crime Lab for testing
in conjunction with a buccal swab from Mallette. The testing showed that the blood on the
shoes was consistent with having originated from Mallette.
¶ 19 Sergeant Klebba learned that Pinsel was staying at another hotel in Hanover Park. Another
detective interviewed Pinsel, and while he did, Stein arrived. Both Stein and Pinsel were taken
to the Schaumburg police department, where Stein gave a statement to police. Pinsel returned
to the Schaumburg police department a few days later, and Sergeant Klebba learned that
defendant was staying at 5628 South Michigan Avenue in Chicago.
¶ 20 Sergeant Klebba and a team of officers and U.S. Marshals followed Pinsel to that address.
Sergeant Klebba observed defendant enter Pinsel’s vehicle, and U.S. Marshals surrounded the
vehicle. Sergeant Klebba arrested defendant and took him to the Schaumburg police
department. On cross-examination, Sergeant Klebba acknowledged that Mallette told him that
he was unconscious after the attack and that Officer Hackett’s report of the incident was not
accurate.
¶ 21 Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Michael O’Malley testified that he met with defendant at
the Schaumburg police department on the evening of August 18, 2011. He gave defendant his
Miranda warnings, and defendant agreed to speak with him. Defendant’s account was
memorialized in a typewritten statement, which ASA O’Malley typed while defendant was
1
Dr. Schupp also observed two old rib fractures on Mallette’s CT scan that she testified were a
result of a motor vehicle accident Mallette had been injured in before the incident.
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sitting next to him. ASA O’Malley testified that defendant reviewed the completed statement
and was able to make corrections, which were marked by defendant’s handwritten initials.
ASA O’Malley then published defendant’s statement to the jury.
¶ 22 In the statement, defendant acknowledged that he was smoking marijuana and drinking
alcohol in Pinsel’s hotel room with Golston and Stein on the night of the incident. Stein and
Pinsel told him that a “gay guy” (Mallette) had hit on Stein and said racist remarks to Golston.
Defendant also learned from them that Mallette had $500 in cash in a money clip and that he
was staying in the hotel room across the hallway from Pinsel’s room. Defendant stated that
everyone started talking about robbing Mallette and the plan was that defendant would knock
on the door and when Mallette opened the door, he and Stein would hold him or knock him out.
Golston would then enter the room and grab the money, and Pinsel would be the lookout.
¶ 23 Defendant knocked on Mallette’s hotel room door, and when Mallette answered, defendant
grabbed him, tackled him into the room, and put him into a chokehold, but Mallette did not
pass out. After a few minutes, Stein entered the room and kicked Mallette while defendant was
choking him. Stein grabbed something from inside the room, but defendant could not see what
it was. Stein then left the room, but defendant kept choking Mallette. Mallette tried to bite him,
so defendant briefly released him but then put him into another chokehold. Mallette then tried
to grab defendant’s crotch, and defendant “freaked out” because he had been sexually
assaulted by his brother when he was younger. Defendant worried that he could not leave
Mallette conscious, so he clasped his hands together and slammed them down on the back of
Mallette’s neck and then started elbowing Mallette’s spine. Defendant told him that he was
going to knock him out and kept kicking and punching him while Mallette was on the floor.
Defendant then stomped on Mallette’s spine with the heel of his right foot “because [the heel]
is the hardest part of the foot.” Defendant also stomped on Mallette’s head with his heel.
Mallette stopped moving, and defendant left the room.
¶ 24 Defendant stated that the fight lasted about 30 minutes and, after he left Mallette’s hotel
room, he went back to his own room and changed his clothes, including the red shoes he had
been wearing during the fight. Defendant was worried he might have killed Mallette. After
changing clothes, he met up with Stein, and the two of them went to a gas station. They tried to
use the credit cards from Mallette’s money clip to pay for gas, but the cards did not work. They
then went to Denny’s and used one of the debit cards to pay for their food. Defendant stated
that Stein signed the receipt.
¶ 25 B. Defense Witnesses
¶ 26 Schaumburg police officer Troy Stanley testified on behalf of defendant that on August 13,
2011, he responded to a battery at the Homestead Suites hotel. There, he spoke with Mallette,
who told him that, after he heard a knock at his hotel room door, he looked though the peephole
and recognized a black male he had been smoking with outside earlier that night. He opened
the door, and the black male began punching him and demanded $1000. Officer Stanley
acknowledged that Mallette did not say anything about the black male choking him or trying to
break his neck. Mallette told Officer Stanley that the black male left the room after kicking
him. On cross-examination, Officer Stanley stated that he was the first officer on the scene and
arrived before the paramedics. He also acknowledged that when he arrived, Mallette was
bleeding and in obvious pain.
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¶ 27 Michael Hansen, a firefighter and paramedic for the village of Schaumburg, testified that
he treated Mallette before he was taken to the hospital. Hansen testified that Mallette told him
that he was assaulted by three people in his hotel room but did not mention anyone choking
him or trying to break his neck. Hansen noted that Mallette had swelling and a boot print on his
face. On cross-examination, Hansen stated that he gave Mallette a Fentanyl IV in the
ambulance, which is an opiate, and that Mallette complained of pain in his chest and back.
¶ 28 Defendant testified that in August 2011 he was attending Harper College in Palatine,
Illinois. He attended the college on a full-time sports and educational scholarship, and his
father paid the remainder of his expenses. Harper College did not have dorms but had an
arrangement with the Homestead Suites to offer Harper College students discounted rates. On
August 12, 2011, he was speaking with Stein at the Homestead Suites, and as a result of their
conversation, defendant went to room 251 at the hotel. He knocked on the door, and Mallette
opened it and told him to come in. Mallette said “you finally made it,” but defendant had never
seen Mallette before. Mallette told defendant to “show [him] something,” and defendant
removed his shirt. Mallette started walking around and touching defendant.
¶ 29 Mallette then asked defendant to perform oral sex on him, and defendant agreed, but then
Mallette changed his mind and asked if defendant would have anal sex with him. Mallette told
defendant that if he did not want to, he would pay him to do so, but defendant stated that he did
not need any money. Mallette asked defendant if he would consider having sexual intercourse
with him without using a condom, but defendant said that he would not. Defendant started to
leave, and Mallette asked him why he came up to his room. Mallette then grabbed defendant on
the arm and asked him where he was going. Defendant pushed Mallette in the chest, and
Mallette grabbed defendant’s neck and told him to get on the bed. Defendant testified that this
interaction brought back memories of when he was raped by his older brother when he was 10
years old.
¶ 30 Defendant was afraid Mallette was going to rape him, so he punched him in the nose.
Defendant kept punching him and fighting with him and was eventually able to leave the room.
Defendant called Stein, and the two of them went to Denny’s. Stein paid for their meal, and
defendant testified that he believed Stein had used his own credit card to pay. Defendant was
arrested on August 18, 2011, and taken to the police station.
¶ 31 The officers at the police station told defendant that he could go home if he signed a
statement admitting that he committed a robbery with Stein and Pinsel, but defendant refused
to sign the statement. Defendant testified that he was interviewed by multiple officers and
eventually an ASA walked into the interview room with a statement saying that defendant had
robbed and attacked Mallette. Defendant had not seen the statement before and did not agree
with its contents but signed it anyway because he thought he would be able to leave if he did so.
On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that he did not call police after the incident
with Mallette.
¶ 32 C. Verdict and Sentencing
¶ 33 Following closing argument, the jury found defendant guilty of home invasion and
robbery. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued in mitigation that
defendant had no criminal background and noted defendant’s potential for rehabilitation based
on his supportive family. Defense counsel also pointed out defendant’s age, 22 years old at the
time of sentencing, and the fact that he was attending college at the time of offense. Defense
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counsel also noted defendant’s “troubled background,” which included being put up for
adoption by his birth parents and being molested at a young age by his older brother. Defense
counsel also acknowledged that, for purposes of sentencing, the court would have to determine
whether Mallette suffered great bodily harm and noted that, although the injuries in this case
were severe, they were not permanent. In aggravation, the State focused on Mallette’s injuries
as detailed by Dr. Schupp and contended that based on her testimony defendant caused serious
harm, which was a factor the court should consider.
¶ 34 In sentencing defendant, the court noted that it found the testimony of Dr. Schupp to be
particularly significant. The court noted that it already made a finding that Mallette suffered
great bodily injury, which allowed the court to consider home invasion as a triggering offense
to the robbery, so that the terms of imprisonment could be imposed consecutively. The court
stated that it had reviewed all the statutory factors in mitigation and aggravation. The court
found that “one of the most significant” factors in aggravation was the injuries to Mallette. The
court also found that defendant’s lack of criminal background was “the significant factor” in
mitigation. The court thus sentenced defendant, as a Class X offender, to consecutive terms of
imprisonment of 18 years for home invasion and 5 years for robbery, to be served at a
minimum of 85% instead of 50% time because of the court’s finding that defendant had caused
great bodily harm to Mallette. In denying defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence, the
court found the fact that defendant caused great bodily harm was shown by the evidence.
¶ 35 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 36 On appeal, defendant raises four contentions. First, he asserts that the trial court erred in
prohibiting him from supporting his claim of self-defense by introducing evidence of
Mallette’s prior convictions for violent acts. Defendant also asserts that the court’s
“antagonism and bias” against defense counsel in front of the jury deprived defendant of a fair
and impartial trial where the case was a “credibility contest” between defendant and the State’s
witnesses. Defendant further maintains that the court erred in finding that he caused great
bodily harm to Mallette and increasing his mandatory minimum sentence where that fact was
not submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, defendant contends
that his sentence is excessive in light of his young age, lack of criminal background, and other
mitigating factors that demonstrate his rehabilitative potential.
¶ 37 A. Mallette’s Prior Convictions
¶ 38 Defendant first contends that the court erred in prohibiting him from supporting his theory
of self-defense by introducing evidence of Mallette’s prior convictions for violent acts.
Defendant asserts that his defense at trial was that it was Mallette who initiated the fight after
defendant refused his sexual advances and defendant injured Mallette while attempting to
protect himself. Defendant intended to support his defense, pursuant to People v. Lynch, 104
Ill. 2d 194 (1984), with evidence of Mallette’s prior criminal convictions from 1991 for battery
and for resisting arrest.
¶ 39 1. Standard of Review
¶ 40 A trial court’s ruling regarding the admission of evidence will not be reversed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010). A court abuses its
discretion where its decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable
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person would adopt the view taken by the trial court. Id.
¶ 41 2. People v. Lynch
¶ 42 Where a defendant raises a theory of self-defense, he may offer evidence of the victim’s
aggressive or violent character under one of two circumstances. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d at 199-200.
If the defendant knew of the victim’s violent character or prior criminal acts, the evidence may
be offered to support the defendant’s contention that he reasonably believed the use of force in
self-defense was justified. Id. at 200. That circumstance is not present in this case, as defendant
never claimed to be aware of Mallette’s criminal record prior to the incident in question. A
defendant may also present evidence of the victim’s violent character where there are
conflicting witness accounts about how the events in question transpired and the evidence
proffered by the defendant serves to bolster his claim that the victim was the initial aggressor.
Id. Defendant asserts that this second prong of Lynch applies in this case. Evidence under the
second prong of Lynch is admissible only if it constitutes “reasonably reliable evidence of a
violent character.” Id. at 201. This court has held that the supreme court in Lynch “stopped
short of holding that refusal to admit such evidence [of the victim’s prior convictions for
violent crimes] is per se prejudicial and, thus, preserved the trial court’s discretion to exclude it
based upon the facts of each case.” People v. Armstrong, 273 Ill. App. 3d 531, 534 (1995).
¶ 43 3. Mallette’s Prior Convictions
¶ 44 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine, which contained his contentions pursuant
to Lynch. This motion, however, is not included in the record filed on appeal. Nonetheless, our
review of this issue is not hindered where there is sufficient information to support the trial
court’s ruling included in the report of proceedings. The court discussed the prior convictions
with defense counsel and the State prior to trial and instructed defense counsel to get more
information about the convictions but noted that the convictions occurred 21 years before the
incident. The court therefore granted the State’s request that defense counsel be precluded
from mentioning Mallette’s prior convictions in opening statements so that the court could
determine how relevant and probative the convictions were.
¶ 45 Prior to cross-examining Mallette, the court held a sidebar outside the presence of the jury
where defense counsel informed the court about the circumstances leading to Mallette’s
convictions for resisting arrest and battery.2 The two offenses precipitating the convictions
occurred “four or five days apart from each other” and were pled together. The complaint
alleged that police officers arrived at an apartment in response to a fight in progress between
two male subjects. The officers knocked on the apartment door, and Mallette answered and
started yelling at the officers. The officers attempted to enter the apartment, and Mallette
closed the apartment door on one officer’s hands. The officers then entered the apartment to
handcuff Mallette, and he “resisted some more.”
2
We note that the State and defense counsel disagreed over whether the prior conviction was for
“straight battery” or for domestic battery. Defense counsel asserted that the complaint charged Mallette
with domestic battery, and in his brief before this court, defendant asserts that the prior conviction was
for domestic battery. The State maintains that the victim was a police officer and, therefore, the charge
must have been for battery. We find the distinction is not relevant to either the trial court’s ruling on this
issue or to our review of the court’s ruling.
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¶ 46 After hearing argument from both defense counsel and the State, the court ruled that it was
going to exclude the evidence of the prior convictions “simply on the basis that [they were] 21
years old.” The court noted that although there was battery against a police officer, the “sole
reason” the court was excluding the evidence of the prior convictions was the “remoteness in
time from the date that the incident [in this case] occurred and the date that [Mallette] was
convicted of [the prior] offense.” Defense counsel asked the court if length of time was another
element of Lynch, but the court stated that it was within its discretion to not allow the prior
convictions in as evidence. Following Mallette’s testimony, the court clarified its ruling,
stating that it did not allow evidence of the prior convictions to be presented to the jury because
the only evidence that had been presented at trial so far was Mallette’s testimony, which did
not include any indication that defendant acted in self-defense. The court also noted that the
court in Lynch discussed the timing of the prior convictions, noting that the prior convictions in
that case were “very recent” in relation to the incident at issue. Accordingly, the court observed
that because the supreme court in Lynch considered the length of time that had passed since the
prior convictions, the trial court could do so as well in this case.
¶ 47 4. Remoteness Under Lynch
¶ 48 Defendant now contends that the court erred in excluding evidence of Mallette’s prior
convictions solely on the basis of their remoteness in time. Defendant asserts that the passage
of time is not a relevant consideration in determining whether to admit evidence pursuant to
Lynch and that it was proper for him to present evidence of Mallette’s violent character through
the prior convictions to support his claim that Mallette was the initial aggressor. Defendant
maintains that the age of the convictions is a consideration for the jury in determining the
weight of the evidence, rather than a consideration for the court in determining the
admissibility of the evidence.
¶ 49 Contrary to defendant’s contentions, in interpreting Lynch, both this court and our supreme
court have implicitly recognized that remoteness in time is a valid consideration in determining
whether it is reasonable for the trial court to allow the admission of evidence pursuant to
Lynch. See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 455-57 (2001) (finding that the court did
not err in excluding Lynch evidence on the grounds of remoteness of the prior conviction);
People v. Ellis, 187 Ill. App. 3d 295, 301-02 (1989) (excluding evidence of a victim’s prior
convictions because the conviction occurred more than 10 years before the defendant’s trial).
Although defendant contends that neither Morgan nor Ellis stand for the proposition that a
circuit court may consider remoteness in time in determining admissibility under Lynch, we
decline to adopt defendant’s narrow reading of these cases.
¶ 50 In Morgan, the supreme court noted that it failed to see how the testimony of a witness’s
childhood from “many years earlier” was relevant to the claim of self-defense. Morgan, 197
Ill. 2d at 457. Likewise, in Ellis, this court noted that under both Lynch and People v.
Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516-19 (1971), “the court could have also excluded the admission
of the victim’s 1972 conviction because it occurred more than 10 years before the trial in this
matter.” Ellis, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 301-02. Although the court in Ellis was discussing the
evidence under both the Montgomery standard, which has an explicit 10-year limitation period,
and the Lynch standard, there is nothing in the decision to suggest that the remoteness analysis
applied solely to the evidence under Montgomery, as defendant suggests, and not under both
standards.
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¶ 51 Defendant, nonetheless, relies on People v. Gibbs, 2016 IL App (1st) 140785, ¶ 34, where
this court affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow the defendant to present evidence of the
victim’s 14-year-old conviction for domestic violence via stipulation. The defendant in Gibbs
sought to question the victim on cross-examination regarding the prior conviction, but the trial
court required the prior conviction to be introduced via stipulation only. Id. In affirming the
trial court’s ruling, this court found that “[t]he trial court certainly could have exercised its
discretion to allow limited questioning of [the victim], but given the age of the conviction and
its factual dissimilarity to the charge in this case, it was likewise appropriate to address the
matter via stipulation.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, although the court in Gibbs affirmed the
trial court’s ruling to allow admission of the evidence, the court also acknowledged that the age
of the conviction was a relevant factor for the trial court to consider in determining how the
evidence should have been presented at trial. The court also recognized that these
considerations are within the discretion of the trial court and the trial court’s ruling on these
matters should not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. ¶ 33 (citing People v.
Coleman, 347 Ill. App. 3d 266, 269 (2004)). Thus, the court deferred to the trial court’s
discretion and affirmed its ruling based on the specific factors present in that case. We find the
same deference is warranted here. See Armstrong, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 534.
¶ 52 Moreover, although the trial court in this case stated that its ruling was based solely on the
remoteness in time, we observe that the court also could have excluded the evidence of
Mallette’s prior convictions because of its lack of relevance.3 Although the evidence may have
indicated that Mallette had a lack of respect for police officers or had the capacity to act
insolently, it did not indicate that Mallette was physically violent toward others. There was no
evidence that Mallette intentionally tried to attack the officers—the battery apparently
occurred when Mallette slammed the door on the officer’s hand—or anyone else or even
threatened violence. There was no evidence presented regarding the “fight in progress”
between Mallette and the other individual at his apartment. Thus, the proffer did not constitute
reasonably reliable evidence of Mallette’s violent character as required for admissibility under
Lynch. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d at 201. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to
preclude admission of Mallette’s prior convictions was so arbitrary or fanciful that it
constituted an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Because we find that the court did not err in
excluding this evidence, we need not address defendant’s contention that the court’s error was
not a harmless error. See People v. Nash, 2012 IL App (1st) 093233, ¶ 33.
¶ 53 B. The Trial Judge’s Bias
¶ 54 Defendant next contends that the trial judge’s “antagonism and bias” toward defense
counsel in front of the jury denied him a fair and impartial trial, where the case was a
“credibility contest” between defendant and the State’s witnesses and the trial judge’s
comments to defense counsel damaged defendant’s credibility in the eyes of the jury.
Defendant asserts that following an exchange outside of the jury’s presence, the trial judge
displayed antagonism toward defense counsel during defendant’s testimony. Defendant
3
Although the trial court did not rely on the lack of relevance of the prior convictions in precluding
defendant from introducing them as evidence, we note that we may affirm the trial court’s ruling on any
basis apparent from the record, regardless of whether it was relied upon by the trial court. See People v.
Gumila, 2012 IL App (2d) 110761, ¶ 56.
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maintains that the trial judge’s “repeated[ ] berating” of defense counsel in front of the jury
was highly prejudicial and suggested to the jury that defendant’s testimony was not truthful.
¶ 55 1. Forfeiture
¶ 56 Initially, we observe that defendant has forfeited this issue for review. In order to preserve
an issue for appeal, defendant must specifically object at trial and raise the specific issue again
in a posttrial motion. People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005). In this case, defendant
neither objected at trial, nor raised the issue in a posttrial motion. Defendant acknowledges the
forfeiture, but contends that we should review this issue under plain error.
¶ 57 Plain Error
¶ 58 The plain error rule allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved claims of error
regardless of forfeiture. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 (2010). Plain error applies
when there is a clear or obvious error and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error
would change the outcome of the case or when there is a clear or obvious error that is so serious
that it affected the fairness of defendant’s trial. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565
(2007). Defendant contends that both prongs of the plain error analysis could apply to our
review of this issue. The first consideration in addressing defendant’s plain error argument is
determining whether an error occurred, which requires a “ ‘ “substantive look” ’ ” at the issue.
People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 191 (2008).
¶ 59 2. Standard of Review
¶ 60 Every defendant, regardless of the nature of the proof against him, is entitled to a trial that
is free from improper and prejudicial comments on the part of the trial judge. People v. Stokes,
293 Ill. App. 3d 643, 648 (1997). Allegations of judicial bias or prejudice must be viewed in
context and should be evaluated in terms of the trial judge’s specific reaction to the events
taking place. People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247, 277 (2001). Remarks belittling defense
counsel or demonstrating hostility to defense counsel may prevent the defendant from
receiving a fair trial. People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 137 (1988). However, the fact that a
judge displays displeasure or irritation with an attorney’s behavior is not necessarily evidence
of judicial bias against the defendant or his counsel. People v. Urdiales, 225 Ill. 2d 354, 426
(2007) (citing Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d at 277). “[I]n order for a trial judge’s comments to constitute
reversible error, a defendant must demonstrate that the comments constituted a material factor
in the conviction or were such that an effect on the jury’s verdict was the probable result.”
Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 137. We review de novo the question of whether the trial judge’s conduct
requires reversal of the judgment. See People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 485 (2009).
¶ 61 3. Discussion Before Defense Case
¶ 62 Defendant contends that the trial judge’s antagonism toward defense counsel began
following a discussion held outside the jury’s presence with the trial judge, defense counsel,
and the State. During this discussion, which took place after the close of the State’s case,
defense counsel informed the trial judge that it would be calling Officer Stanley, paramedic
Hansen, and defendant as witnesses. The trial judge noted that Hansen was not in court that
day, but defense counsel informed the trial judge that Hansen was on “phone hold” and that he
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would be at the courthouse as soon as defense counsel called him. The trial judge told defense
counsel to call Hansen immediately and that defendant could testify second and Hansen last so
that the court did not have to stop the trial. Defense counsel objected, stating that such a
decision would violate defendant’s constitutional rights to present his defense. Defense
counsel stated that he would call Hansen now, and the trial judge told defense counsel to “[g]et
him on the phone right now. Right now. Go in there and get him on the phone. Right now. Call
him. *** I want to see how far away he is.”
¶ 63 Defense counsel then informed the trial judge that he was texting Hansen, and the trial
judge told defense counsel that he was “playing games” and that he should have had Hansen at
the courthouse ready to testify. After further colloquy, the trial judge asked defense counsel to
make an offer of proof as to what he believed Hansen would testify. Defense counsel informed
the trial judge that Hansen would testify that Mallette told him he was attacked by three men
and did not mention anyone choking him or trying to snap his neck. He would further testify
that Mallette seemed to be in good physical and mental condition. The following then took
place:
“THE COURT: All right, listen. [Officer Stanley is] going to testify next. If
[Hansen] is here or if he calls back and he’s in the building, he can go on next. If not,
I’m not waiting. You can stip out the testimony. You can work out a stipulation as to
what is in that report. [Defense counsel], he was here yesterday. I—
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, can I—
THE COURT: No, no, no, no, no. I’m talking now. Then you get to respond. I get to
talk.
***
THE COURT: All of you had time to speak with [Hansen when he was at the
courthouse the day before] so it wasn’t—the State insisted in making him available to
you. I saw you speak with him.
I don’t know why he’s not here, but you should have called him over lunch. You
just told me ten minutes ago that you hadn’t called him and he was on phone hold. I
cannot stop a jury. I cannot release the jury today. I cannot stop them just to bring
[Hansen] in when this testimony can easily be stipped out between the parties. So for
that reason, I’m not going to wait for him.”
¶ 64 The trial judge then told defense counsel that his two options were to work out a stipulation
of Hansen’s testimony with the State or to have defendant testify after Officer Stanley and have
Hansen testify last. Defense counsel protested, stating that he preferred live witnesses on the
stand and should not be “forced” to stipulate to testimony if live testimony was available. The
trial judge told defense counsel that he was “holding this entire courtroom and a jury in a
hostage situation.” The trial judge noted that Hansen would testify consistently with the
information in his report and the State was willing to stipulate to all of his testimony. The trial
judge expressed her desire to keep the jury trial on schedule and have closing arguments and
jury deliberations the following day. The trial judge explained how she was considering the
schedule of all of the attorneys, the witnesses, and the jurors and stated that she had to make a
“judgment call.”
¶ 65 The ASA then informed the trial judge that court personnel had spoken to Hansen and
Hansen was “under the understanding that he was testifying [the following day.]” The trial
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judge asked that ASA if she was saying that Hansen was never put on phone hold, and the ASA
confirmed that Hansen thought he would be testifying the following day. The trial judge
concluded the discussion by telling defense counsel that he was “lying to the court” and
“playing games.” The trial judge stated that “[t]he jury is going to know that this is the defense
case, too, that we’re stopping at the defense case. *** I’m not going to tell them. I’m not going
to say a word, but smart people figure these things out.” Defense counsel told the trial judge
that he did not mean any disrespect, but the trial judge replied that “[y]ou are disrespectful to
the Court, and you’re disrespectful to every person’s time in this room.” The trial judge
informed defense counsel that he had “caused significant damage to your reputation with me.”
The trial then resumed with Officer Stanley testifying for defendant. The case was continued
until the following morning where Hansen testified, followed by defendant.
¶ 66 4. Comments During Defendant’s Testimony
¶ 67 Defendant contends that following this exchange, the trial judge displayed “antagonism
and bias” toward defense counsel in the presence of the jury. Defendant identifies several
statements made by the court to defense counsel during defendant’s testimony, which he
contends illustrate the trial judge’s bias and “repeated[ ] berating” of defense counsel.
Defendant presents many of these statements without context; however, as noted, allegations
of judicial bias or prejudice must be viewed in context and should be evaluated in terms of the
trial judge’s specific reaction to the events taking place. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d at 277.
Accordingly, we will examine the trial judge’s comments to defense counsel in light of the
context in which they were said and the surrounding circumstances.
¶ 68 During defendant’s testimony, the trial judge repeatedly instructed defense counsel to
return to the podium while asking defendant questions and instructed defendant to speak
louder so that everyone could hear him. Defense counsel requested a sidebar in which he stated
that the trial judge had “displayed irritability to [defendant.]” The trial judge disagreed, stating
that “I asked him to speak up because he’s whispering ***. And the jury—I can see the jury
straining to hear him.” The trial judge further explained that she asked defense counsel to
return to the podium because she believed that it helps the witness speak louder when the
attorney is further away.
¶ 69 Following this sidebar, defendant specifically identifies several statements by the trial
judge that he believes demonstrated the trial judge’s antagonism and bias. The first instance
identified by defendant occurred when defense counsel was asking defendant about his
interactions with the officers in the vehicle after his arrest.
“[Defense Counsel]: And what else was said to you [by the officers in the police
vehicle]?
THE COURT: [Defense counsel], you’re not laying a proper foundation.
[Defense Counsel]: I’m sorry, Judge.
[Defense Counsel]: What was the demeanor of the officers as they were talking to
you?
THE COURT: That is not foundation, ask a foundational question.
[Defense Counsel]: Who was driving the vehicle? How many officers were in the
car with you?
[Defendant]: There were two officers.”
- 14 -
Defendant then testified regarding the circumstances leading to him being interviewed by
officers at the Schaumburg police department.
“[Defense Counsel]: Did they ask you questions?
[Defendant]: Yes
[Defense Counsel]: What were they telling you?
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[Defense Counsel]: Did they ask you questions about your background?
[Defendant]: Yes, they did.
[Defense Counsel]: And did you tell them who you were and where you grew up?
[Defendant]: Yes, I did.
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[Defense Counsel]: At any point in time did the officers, any of those two officers
in the first interview room with you, did they ever ask you anything related to this
alleged crime that occurred?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: And what were they telling you in relation to this alleged crime
that occurred on August 13, 2011?
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[Defense Counsel]: Were they asking you if you had committed a crime on August
13, 2011?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, sidebar.
THE COURT: [Defense counsel], you have to lay a foundation. Ask a proper
question. Rephrase it. And go back to the podium.
***
[Defense Counsel]: The two officers that were talking to you, where were they
seated?
[Defendant]: Well, they were seated on—one was seated across from me and one
was like almost to the side at the table.
Q. Which one of the officers was talking to you?
A. Well, I don’t remember which one was actually questioning me.
Q. Were both officers questioning you?
A. Yes, both officers asked me questions.
Q. And how was the demeanor of the officers as they were questioning you?
A. They seemed upset.
Q. Were you upset?
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A. I wasn’t really upset, no, I was really scared because they were telling me I
committed a robbery and I have never been locked up before.
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Objection.
THE COURT: [Defense counsel].
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I can’t move to strike the answer.
THE COURT: No, you can’t[,] but you can ask proper questions, proper direct
examination questions.
[Defense Counsel]: I believe I have.
Q. Mr. Barnes, when you—when the police officers accused you of being involved
in this so-called crime, did you tell them—
THE COURT: Stop for one second, I need to do this.
The jury is not to consider what this defendant answered. The objection is sustained
and the jury is to disregard the last answer the witness gave.”
¶ 70 Viewed in context, these comments by the trial judge do not suggest antagonism or bias by
the trial judge, but rather show the trial judge’s rulings on the State’s objections and her
repeated reminders to defense counsel to establish foundation for his questions. Laying a
foundation involves “[i]ntroducing evidence of certain facts needed to render later evidence
relevant, material or competent.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Here, defense
counsel was skipping this crucial element of defendant’s testimony, and the trial judge was
continually reminding him to lay a proper foundation before posing further questions. Defense
counsel failed to lay a proper foundation and simply asked defendant what the officers told him
while inserting the relevant information into the question rather than allowing defendant to
describe the relevant information through his testimony. The State properly objected to these
questions and the trial judge ruled on the State’s objections, informing defense counsel that she
was sustaining the State’s objections because defense counsel had failed to lay a proper
foundation. As this court has recognized, the court may exercise its role to control the trial, and
comments made with a valid basis do not display a specific bias or prejudice against defense
counsel. People v. Garrett, 276 Ill. App. 3d 702, 713 (1995). The same analysis applies to the
other statements of the trial judge identified by defendant.
¶ 71 Defendant refers to the trial judge’s comments later in his testimony admonishing defense
counsel for leading defendant and for testifying for defendant. Defendant asserts that these
comments were particularly damaging where they suggested to the jury that defendant was
being coached through his testimony and was not testifying truthfully. Like the trial judge’s
other comments, however, when viewed in context, they do not show the antagonism or bias
that defendant suggests. Rather, as with the previously examined comments, they show the
trial judge ruling on the State’s objections and informing defense counsel how to properly
examine defendant as a witness on direct examination.
“[Defense Counsel]: At some point in time did you ask [sic] these officers that you
wanted to speak to your coach?
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[Defense Counsel]: Did you ask them—
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Objection.
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THE COURT: Sustained. [Defense Counsel], this is direct examination you can’t
cross examine the witness.
[Defense Counsel]: I’m sorry, Judge.
THE COURT: Ask proper questions.
[Defense Counsel]: Did you tell the police officers that you wanted to talk to
anyone?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Objection.
THE COURT: All right, the answer will stand. Ask another question. But please,
[Defense Counsel], you can’t lead the witness.
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I’m not leading my witness.
THE COURT: Ask him what he said if anything, please.
***
[Defense Counsel]: At some point in time, Mr. Barnes, did you understand that the
officers [were] referring to Mr. Mallette?
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Objection.
THE COURT: Sustained. [Defense counsel], you cannot lead the witness on direct
examination.
[Defense Counsel]: Sorry, Judge.
THE COURT: Please rephrase your question.
[Defense Counsel]: Thank you. At some point in time did the officers tell you who
the victim was?
[Defendant]: Yes, they did.”
Defendant then testified that the officers left the interview room and an ASA entered the room
with a document detailing his involvement in the incident and asked defendant to sign the
statement. Defendant did not agree to the contents of the document so he refused to sign it, and
the ASA left the room and two other officers came into the room.
“[Defense Counsel]: When the new police officers arrived after the attorney walked
out, you said you weren’t sure how long had passed, did you sign some documents
when they entered the room?
[Assistant State’s Attorney]: Objection.
[Defendant]: No.
THE COURT: The witness said no so the answer will stand. [Defense counsel].
[Defense Counsel]: I’ll round it up, Judge.
THE COURT: No, you have to ask open-ended questions, you cannot testify for
your client.
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I am not testifying for my client.
THE COURT: Please rephrase the question.
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I’ll make a record. You made a record in front of the
jury.
THE COURT: Please rephrase the question.
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[Defense Counsel]: I am not testifying for my client.
THE COURT: [Defense counsel], please rephrase your question.
[Defense Counsel]: Mr. Barnes.
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
[Defense Counsel]: Did you at any point in time sign any documents?
[Defendant]: Yes, I did.”
¶ 72 Despite defendant’s contentions, it is clear from the record that rather than displaying
“antagonism and bias” toward defense counsel, that the trial judge was ruling on the State’s
objections and advising defense counsel how to properly question defendant on direct
examination. As the State’s objections suggest and the trial judge’s rulings show, defense
counsel was asking defendant improper leading questions on direct examination, i.e., his
questions were suggesting the answer by putting into defendant’s mind the words or thoughts
of the answer. See People v. Lane, 256 Ill. App. 3d 38, 59 (1993). Generally, it is improper to
lead a witness except on cross-examination (id. at 59-60), and we find nothing inappropriate
about the trial judge’s comments, which merely served to inform defense counsel of the
reasons that the trial judge was sustaining the State’s objections, to instruct defense counsel
how to proceed to avoid further objections, or to ask him to rephrase the question to avoid
impropriety. The trial judge’s comments, read in context, do not suggest that the trial judge
was indicating to the jury that defendant was falsifying his testimony with his counsel’s
assistance, as defendant suggests, but rather show the trial judge’s rebuking of defense counsel
after repeatedly admonishing him to not ask leading questions of defendant. As the record
shows, the trial judge permitted defense counsel to proceed uninterrupted when he asked
defendant proper, open-ended questions.
¶ 73 Defendant identifies a final exchange between defense counsel and the trial judge, during
which defendant contends the trial judge exhibited “unprofessional sarcasm” toward defense
counsel. During the State’s cross-examination of defendant, defense counsel objected to the
relevance of one of the State’s questions. After the trial judge overruled defense counsel’s
objection, defense counsel stated: “Sidebar.” The trial judge responded, “Judge, please, could
we have a sidebar, is that what you meant to say?” The trial judge then held a sidebar after
defense counsel replied, “Excuse me, Judge, I want to have a sidebar.” This exchange does not
represent “repeated[ ] berating” of defense counsel as defendant suggests. More importantly,
defendant fails to establish how the trial judge’s “comments constituted a material factor in the
conviction or were such that an effect on the jury’s verdict was the probable result” (Harris,
123 Ill. 2d at 137), where the court merely ruled on the State’s objections and instructed
defense counsel how to proceed to avoid further objections. This exchange between the trial
judge and defense counsel does nothing to support defendant’s argument in this regard.
¶ 74 We also note that although defendant does not directly contest the sufficiency of the
evidence presented at trial to sustain his conviction, he repeatedly contends that the evidence at
trial was closely balanced and came down to a “credibility contest” between the State’s
witnesses and defendant. We believe defendant far overstates the closeness of the evidence
presented. Mallette’s version of the incident was corroborated by the expert testimony of Dr.
Schupp regarding Mallette’s injuries, the testimony of Stein and Golston, defendant’s
statement to ASA O’Malley, the testimony of the police officers, and the physical evidence
including the blood on the bottom of defendant’s shoe, which matched the buccal swab taken
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from Mallette. Defendant’s version of the events was evidently rejected by the jury and
defendant has failed to demonstrate that the court’s comments to defense counsel influenced
that result. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 137. We recognize the minor inconsistencies among the
witnesses’ testimony that defendant identifies, i.e., what time the attack occurred, how many
people attacked Mallette, and whether he was choked or not; however, these minor
discrepancies do not create a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt, nor do they indicate that
the evidence was closely balanced in light of the other evidence presented. People v. Lee, 376
Ill. App. 3d 951, 956 (2007) (citing People v. Crespo, 118 Ill. App. 3d 815, 819 (1983)).
¶ 75 We further find the authority relied upon by defendant in support of this contention
unpersuasive. In People v. Mitchell, 228 Ill. App. 3d 167, 169-70 (1992), the trial judge
“mock[ed]” defense counsel by commenting on his questions of the witnesses and remarking
on the physical evidence presented. In addition, the trial judge displayed “direct hostility”
toward the defendant during defense counsel’s direct examination and interrupted the
defendant’s testimony to interject the judge’s own opinion of the testimony. Id. at 170.
Following the State’s objection to one of defense counsel’s questions of defendant, the trial
judge stated that “ ‘it’s quite obvious there was no conversation like the one you just made
up.’ ” Id. This court also found that the trial judge’s bias was evident through his inconsistent
rulings of law. Id. at 171. During opening statements, the trial judge permitted the State to
explain the legal standards to be applied to the evidence but repeatedly interrupted defense
counsel sua sponte when he tried to do the same. Id.
¶ 76 Here, we cannot say the trial judge’s conduct in this case rose to the level of the conduct
found prejudicial in Mitchell. The trial judge here did not display hostility toward defendant,
did not make inconsistent rulings of law, and did not interrupt defense counsel sua sponte
during arguments. All of the trial judge’s remarks were made either in response to the State’s
objections, to ask defense counsel to rephrase a question into a proper form for direct
examination, or in response to defense counsel’s request for a sidebar. Crucially, the court
made no remarks on the evidence presented and only told defense counsel to stop testifying for
defendant in an effort to prevent defense counsel from asking leading questions on direct
examination. Following the court’s admonishments, the court permitted defense counsel to
properly elicit the testimony without comment.
¶ 77 We likewise find Stokes, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 648, distinguishable where in that case, the
trial judge interrupted defense counsel’s cross-examination of a witness and stated that the
cross-examination was driving him “ ‘crazy.’ ” The judge also suggested that maybe he could
do a better job than defense counsel and told the jury that they could ignore defense counsel’s
cross-examination of another witness: “ ‘I don’t know where we are going. I am telling you
something right now, ladies and gentlemen, when and if this is not tied up, all this stuff you can
ignore.’ ” Id. The trial judge then asked defense counsel if he was going to start crying. Id. at
649.
¶ 78 The trial judge’s comments in the case at bar are clearly distinguishable from the
comments made by the trial judge in Stokes that this court found served to “belittle[ ]” defense
counsel and suggest to the jury the judge’s opinion of defense counsel and the case. Id. As
discussed, the trial judge’s comments in this case served to exercise its role to control the trial
by ruling on the State’s objections and direct defense counsel how to proceed. The trial judge’s
comments were made with a valid basis (see Garrett, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 713), did not suggest
the trial judge’s opinion of the evidence being presented, and did not display a specific bias or
- 19 -
prejudice against defense counsel through unwarranted comments as in the cases cited by
defendant. Accordingly, we find no error warranting plain error review and honor defendant’s
forfeiture of this issue. See People v. Johnson, 238 Ill. 2d 478, 491 (2010).
¶ 79 C. Section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii)
¶ 80 Defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to serve his
consecutive sentences at 85% time, rather than 50% time, based on its finding that he caused
great bodily harm to Mallette. Defendant asserts that section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) of the Unified
Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) (West 2010)), which the trial
court used to determine that he should serve his sentence at 85% time, is unconstitutional on its
face following the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.
99, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), which expanded on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).4 Defendant contends that this section is unconstitutional because
it allows the trial court to use a fact in sentencing to increase his mandatory minimum sentence
without submitting that element to the jury to determine that the factual predicate exists
beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 81 In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. The Court explained
that the difference between an element of an offense, for which defendant has a right to a jury
trial and proof beyond reasonable doubt, and a sentencing factor, which can be decided by a
judge, is whether “the required finding expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than
that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.” Id. at 478-79, 494. The Supreme Court expanded
on Apprendi more than a decade later in Alleyne. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that “any
fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an ‘element’ [of the crime] that must
be submitted to the jury [and found beyond a reasonable doubt].” (Emphasis added.) Alleyne,
570 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. The Court explained that the “touchstone” for determining
whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is “whether the fact
constitutes an ‘element’ or ‘ingredient’ of the charged offense.” Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 2158
(Thomas, J., joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.). The Court noted, however, that
not all factual findings that affect a sentence must be made by a jury:
“Our ruling today does not mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must
be found by a jury. We have long recognized that broad sentencing discretion,
informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g,
Dillon v. United States, [560 U.S. 817, 828-89 (2010)] (‘[W]ithin established limits[,] .
. . the exercise of [sentencing] discretion does not contravene the Sixth Amendment
even if it is informed by judge-found facts’ (emphasis deleted and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Apprendi, [530 U.S. at 481] (‘[N]othing in this history suggests that it
is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion—taking into consideration various
factors relating both to offense and offender—in imposing a judgment within the range
4
Although defendant acknowledges that he forfeited this issue by failing to raise it before the trial
court, we recognize that defendant may challenge the facial constitutionality of a statute at any time.
People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 279 (2001).
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prescribed by statute’).” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 2163 (majority
op.).
¶ 82 Here, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve his consecutive 23-year term of
imprisonment for home invasion and robbery at 85% under section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) of the
Unified Code. That section is part of the “truth-in-sentencing” scheme that “the Department of
Corrections uses to calculate good-conduct credit.” People v. Salley, 373 Ill. App. 3d 106, 109
(2007). Under the Unified Code, an incarcerated individual generally receives day-for-day
good-conduct credit. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West 2010). If, however, defendant is
convicted of certain enumerated offenses, including home invasion, and the court finds that
defendant caused “great bodily harm” to a victim in the commission of that offense, the
defendant will receive “no more than 4.5 days of good conduct credit for each month of his or
her sentence of imprisonment.” 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) (West 2010); Salley, 373 Ill. App.
3d at 109.
¶ 83 Defendant asserts that Section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) requires the trial court to determine whether
defendant caused “great bodily harm” upon its own review of the evidence. Defendant
contends that such a finding violates Alleyne because it raises the mandatory minimum
sentence defendant must serve by raising the “minimum floor for a defendant from 50% time
to 85% time.”
¶ 84 Although this court has not addressed the constitutionality of section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) in
light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Alleyne, we find this court’s analysis in its
post-Apprendi precedent relevant to the issue before us. In People v. Robinson, 383 Ill. App. 3d
1065, 1071 (2008), this court explained that section 3-6-3 “d[id] not change the prescribed
maximum penalty of the underlying offense” although we recognized that it “may well affect
the sentence defendant ultimately serves.” This court concluded that the statute did not violate
Apprendi because it did not affect the sentence imposed and that, because the statute concerns
good-time credit, “its application is not definite, immediate, or automatic.” Id. In essence, this
court has found that section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) does not “expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
Robinson and other post-Apprendi cases of this court have distinguished between findings of
fact that impact the actual jail time a defendant must serve and those that impact the sentence
imposed. See, e.g., Robinson, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 1071; People v. Garry, 323 Ill. App. 3d 292,
299 (2001) (“[T]he finding of great bodily harm simply had an impact upon the amount of time
by which defendant—through his own ‘good conduct’—could decrease his sentence” and did
not “trigger any penalty for [the] crimes.” (Emphases omitted.)). We find that the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Alleyne does not change our analysis with regard to section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii).
Although the finding of great bodily harm by the court may change the actual amount of jail
time defendant serves, it does not increase defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence and thus
does not violate Alleyne. Accordingly, we find that section 3-6-3(a)(2)(iii) is not
unconstitutional on its face.
¶ 85 1. Sixth Amendment
¶ 86 For the same reasons, we find that the trial court’s sentence did not violate defendant’s
sixth amendment rights to due process or a trial by jury. The fourteenth amendment right to
due process and the sixth amendment right to a trial by jury, “[t]aken together, ***
indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to ‘a jury determination that he is guilty of every
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element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 476-77 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)). Defendant
contends that, although he failed to preserve this issue for review, we should review this issue
under the plain error doctrine, or, in the alternative, because his counsel was ineffective for
failing to preserve the issue for appeal. Defendant contends that he suffered prejudice where
the cause and extent of Mallette’s injuries were contested at trial. We disagree.
¶ 87 As discussed, the court’s finding that defendant caused great bodily harm was not an
element of the offense but rather was a sentencing element. We further recognize that the
court’s finding was supported by the record, particularly Dr. Schupp’s testimony that Mallette
had fractured ribs, fractures to his spine, a collapsed lung, fractured thyroid cartilage, and the
imprint of the bottom of a shoe on his face. Dr. Schupp testified that Mallette’s version of the
events was consistent with the injuries he exhibited, and Sergeant Klebba and Hansen both
testified that Mallette was in obvious pain when they arrived at the scene of the incident.
Defendant did not present any evidence to contest the extent of Mallette’s injuries but merely
relies on the testimony of Hansen and Officer Stanley that defendant did not mention to them
that he had been choked. This was insufficient to rebut the trial court’s finding that defendant
caused great bodily harm to Mallette. Accordingly, we find no error warranting plain error
review and honor defendant’s forfeiture of this issue. See Johnson, 238 Ill. 2d at 491. We
likewise find defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unavailing. “[I]f the
ineffective-assistance claim can be disposed of on the ground that the defendant did not suffer
prejudice, a court need not decide whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally
deficient.” People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1999). Prejudice occurs where defendant
demonstrates a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different. People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401,
411 (2000). As discussed, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that defendant
caused great bodily harm, and we therefore find no prejudice as a result of defense counsel’s
alleged deficient performance.
¶ 88 D. Excessive Sentence
¶ 89 Lastly, defendant contends that his sentence is excessive in light of his young age, lack of
criminal history, family background, and other factors that demonstrate his potential for
rehabilitation. Defendant asserts that the court improperly focused on one “most significant”
factor in aggravation and one in mitigation in determining his sentence, ignoring the remaining
mitigating factors presented. Defendant maintains that, given these mitigating factors, the
minimum term of imprisonment allowable by statute was appropriate in this case and the court
erred by sentencing him to a term of 23 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 90 1. Standard of Review
¶ 91 A reviewing court will not alter a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion by the
trial court. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). A trial court abuses its discretion
in determining a sentence where the sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose
of the law or if it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id. The trial court is
afforded such deference because it is in a better position than the reviewing court to weigh the
relevant sentencing factors such as “ ‘defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral
character, mentality, social environment, and age.’ ” People v. Stevens, 324 Ill. App. 3d 1084,
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1093-94 (2001) (quoting People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991)). In the absence of evidence
to the contrary, we presume that the sentencing court considered all mitigating evidence
presented. People v. Gordon, 2016 IL App (1st) 134004, ¶ 51.
¶ 92 2. Defendant’s Sentence
¶ 93 Here, defendant was found guilty of robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2010)) and home
invasion (720 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 2010) (renumbered as 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2) by Pub. Act
97-1108 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013))). Robbery is a Class 2 felony, which carries a sentencing range of
three to seven years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2010)). Defendant was
eligible for Class X sentencing for his conviction for home invasion because he intentionally
caused injury in the commission of the offense (720 5/12-11(a)(2), (c) (West 2010)
(renumbered as 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2), (c) by Pub. Act 97-1108 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013))), which
carries a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West
2010)). The court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment of 5 years for
robbery and 18 years for home invasion. Thus, the sentence imposed fell within the statutorily
prescribed range.
¶ 94 Defendant contends, however, that the court abused its discretion in determining his
sentence by considering only the “most significant” factors in mitigation and aggravation
instead of considering all statutory factors. The record shows that in announcing defendant’s
sentence, the court stated that “one of the most significant” factors in aggravation was the
injuries to Mallette and that defendant’s lack of criminal background was “the significant
factor” in mitigation. Defendant construes this explanation by the court to indicate the court
considered only these factors in determining defendant’s sentence and ignored the other factors
presented in mitigation and aggravation. The record shows, however, that the court also stated
that it had “reviewed all the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation.” (Emphasis
added.).
¶ 95 The record shows that during the sentencing hearing, defense counsel identified the same
mitigating factors defendant brings to our attention on appeal, including defendant’s youth,
lack of criminal background, and rehabilitative potential. It is not our function to
independently reweigh these factors and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.
Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 214-15. Although the trial court did not specifically identify which
factors it considered in determining defendant’s sentence, we observe that a trial court is not
required to specify on the record the reasons for the sentence imposed (People v. Acevedo, 275
Ill. App. 3d 420, 426 (1995)) nor is it required to recite and assign value to each factor
presented at the sentencing hearing (People v. Baker, 241 Ill. App. 3d 495, 499 (1993)).
Rather, it is presumed that the trial court properly considered all mitigating factors and
rehabilitative potential before it, and the burden is on defendant to affirmatively show the
contrary. People v. Brazziel, 406 Ill. App. 3d 412, 434 (2010). Here, defendant has failed to do
so. Although we are cognizant of Justice Hyman’s concurring opinion in People v. Bryant,
2016 IL App (1st) 140421, ¶ 26 (Hyman, J., specially concurring), which is cited by defendant
and calls into question the practice of trial courts not stating on the record the basis for their
sentencing decision, it does not change our well-established precedent.
¶ 96 We further find defendant’s reliance on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), unpersuasive.
This line of Supreme Court cases has recognized the special characteristics of juvenile
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offenders, including their lack of maturity, underdeveloped brains, and rehabilitative potential,
and requires sentencing courts to consider these factors in sentencing. See Roper, 543 U.S. at
569; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Miller, 567 U.S. at 471. Defendant contends that under this
precedent, the trial court did not adequately consider defendant’s age, 19 years old at the time
of the incident, in sentencing him to a term of imprisonment of 23 years.
¶ 97 Our supreme court has repeatedly held, however, that the rationale of Miller, Roper, and
Graham applies “only in the context of the most severe of all criminal penalties,” namely
capital punishment, natural life imprisonment, or de facto life imprisonment. People v.
Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 110; see also People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9 (holding that
under Miller, Roper, and Graham, a juvenile offender’s eighth amendment rights are violated
where the juvenile is sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment that has the functional
equivalent of life in prison without the possibility of parole). Here, defendant did not receive
“the most severe of all criminal penalties.” His 23-year sentence does not amount to a de facto
life sentence, and as such the rationale of Miller, Roper, and Graham does not apply to his
sentence. Even if defendant’s sentence were considered a de facto life sentence, this court has
declined to apply the rationale of Miller, Roper, and Graham, where, as here, defendant is an
adult, i.e., over the age of 18. See People v. Thomas, 2017 IL App (1st) 142557, ¶¶ 26-28.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion where the sentence imposed was within the
prescribed statutory range, does not greatly vary from the purpose of the law, and is not
manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Brazziel, 406 Ill. App. 3d at 433-34
(citing People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000)).
¶ 98 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 99 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 100 Affirmed.
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