The Habitat Company, LLC v. Peeples

2018 IL App (1st) 171420
FIRST DISTRICT
FIFTH DIVISION
June 22, 2018
No. 1-17-1420
) Appeal from the
THE HABITAT COMPANY, LLC, as agent for Elm Street ) Circuit Court of
Plaza, ) Cook County
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) No. 15 M1 700605
v. )
)
SHUN PEEPLES, ) Honorable
) Jim Ryan,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Lampkin and Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Shun Peeples appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County
denying her motion to seal her eviction court file pursuant to section 9-121(b) of the Forcible
Entry and Detainer Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/9-121(b) (West 2016)). 1 On appeal, defendant asserts
that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of section 9-121(b) of the Act and thus improperly
denied her motion to seal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit
court.
1
As of January 1, 2018, the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq.
(West 2018)) is now known as the Eviction Act. We will use the title of the Act in effect at the
time of the filing of this suit.
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¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 This matter commenced as a forcible entry and detainer action initiated by plaintiff, The
Habitat Company, LLC, as agent for Elm Street Plaza (a property management company) against
defendant (a tenant at a premises managed by plaintiff). In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that
defendant breached the terms of her lease. Specifically, plaintiff asserted that on two separate
occasions defendant verbally abused and used profanity toward the door staff at the premises in a
hostile, threatening, and aggressive manner. Plaintiff maintained that defendant’s repeated
conduct disrupted the livability of the premises, interfered with management of the premises, and
adversely affected the safety of the door staff. Plaintiff further asserted that defendant’s actions
were criminal and constituted the crime of disorderly conduct.
¶4 In lieu of a responsive pleading, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in
which she argued that she did not engage in any unlawful or criminal activities on plaintiff’s
property in violation of the terms of her lease. 2 Defendant further maintained that the “verbal
abuse” and profanity directed toward the door staff did not constitute a material violation of the
terms of the lease. In response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argued that
defendant was in material noncompliance with her lease where, on two separate occasions, she
verbally abused and used profanity towards the door staff at the premises in a hostile,
threatening, and aggressive manner. Plaintiff maintained that her conduct disrupted the livability
of the premises, interfered with the management of the premises, and adversely affected the
safety of the door staff. Plaintiff asserted that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding
whether defendant’s conduct constituted material noncompliance under her lease. Plaintiff
2
Pursuant to section 9-106 of the Act, a defendant need not file an answer or any other
pleading, but instead “may under a general denial of the allegations of the complaint offer in
evidence any matter in defense of the action.” 735 ILCS 5/9-106 (West 2016).
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attached an affidavit of Andrew Floyd (Floyd), a doorman at the premises, to its response. Floyd
averred that on December 17 and December 18, 2014, defendant approached the front desk in an
irate and aggressive manner, was verbally abusive toward him and his colleague, and stated in a
threatening manner that he and his colleague were “b*** a***” and “lazy motherf***” who
“don’t do s*** all day.” Floyd further averred that defendant continued to use inappropriate
language and he found her aggressiveness and hostility to be unsettling, threatening,
unreasonable, alarming, and disturbing. Plaintiff also attached the affidavit of Nicole Salter
(Salter), the community manager for the apartment building. Salter averred that she is “familiar
with *** incidents involving tenants, reports of incidents involving tenants, disruptions in the
livability of the premises.” Salter did, however, attest that defendant’s “verbally abusive conduct
and use of profanity toward Habitat’s door staff on December 17 and 18, 2014, disrupted the
livability of the building, adversely affected Habitat’s agents’ safety and the safety of the
premises’ tenants, interfered with the management of the building, and, in my determination,
constituted the crime of disorderly conduct.”
¶5 After the matter was fully briefed and argued, the circuit court granted defendant’s
motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. Summary judgment was granted as
to plaintiff’s allegations that defendant’s conduct was criminal or unlawful. Summary judgment,
however, was denied as to whether defendant was in material noncompliance with the terms of
the lease.
¶6 Shortly thereafter, on August 3, 2015, an “agreed settlement order” (agreed order) was
entered by the circuit court. The agreed order provided that the matter was dismissed with leave
to reinstate and that the circuit court was to retain jurisdiction over the matter until December 31,
2016. Defendant was allowed to continue to reside at the premises. She was, however,
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prohibited from verbally attacking or using profanity toward any of plaintiff’s employees. A
motion to reinstate was never filed; the agreed order dismissing the matter thus became final on
December 31, 2016. No order was entered memorializing the dismissal with prejudice on
December 31, 2016.
¶7 In March 2017, defendant filed a motion pursuant to section 9-121(b) of the Act (735
ILCS 5/9-121(b) (West 2016)) to seal the court file. Section 9-121(b) provides:
“Discretionary sealing of court file. The court may order that a court file in a forcible
entry and detainer action be placed under seal if the court finds that the plaintiff’s action
is sufficiently without a basis in fact or law, which may include a lack of jurisdiction, that
placing the court file under seal is clearly in the interests of justice, and that those
interests are not outweighed by the public’s interest in knowing about the record.” 735
ILCS 5/9-121(b) (West 2016). 3
In her motion, defendant maintained that the forcible entry and detainer action against her was
sufficiently without a basis in fact or law because, pursuant to the agreed order, the matter had
been dismissed and plaintiff could no longer reinstate the case. Defendant further asserted that
sealing the court file was in the interest of justice because her ability to obtain alternative
housing was being affected by this case. Defendant maintained that the interests of justice are
not outweighed by the public’s interest in the knowledge contained in the record of the eviction
action because the matter was not disposed of against her, rather it was dismissed with prejudice.
¶8 In response, plaintiff asserted that its action had a sufficient basis in fact or law, as
evidenced by the circuit court’s denial, in part, of defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
3
We observe that this section was amended effective January 1, 2018. The amendment,
however, did not substantively change subsection (b), as only the phrase “forcible entry and
detainer action” was changed to “eviction action.”
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Plaintiff stressed the importance of court records being accessible to the public and noted that
defendant’s claim regarding her failure to obtain alternative housing was incorrect where she was
not currently agreeing to vacate the premises.
¶9 In reply, defendant maintained that section 9-121(b) did not require her to demonstrate
that “both prongs of the statute are met,” only that either the action was sufficiently without a
basis in fact or law, or that sealing is in the interests of justice and those interests are not
outweighed by the public’s interest in access to the record. Specifically, defendant asserted that
there was no basis in law or fact where (1) plaintiff’s action was dismissed with leave to reinstate
and plaintiff never moved to reinstate; (2) plaintiff’s allegations were never adjudicated, thus
they remain unproven and dismissed; and (3) under the terms of the agreed order jurisdiction in
the case lapsed on December 31, 2016. Defendant further maintained that sealing the file would
serve the interests of justice by allowing her a fair opportunity to find new rental housing.
Defendant’s affidavit stated she is “a resident in good standing at Elm Street Plaza” but would
like to move but is unable to find “alternative housing.” Defendant further averred she had
applied to lease new housing, but her application was rejected because she had an “Eviction
Record Match.” Defendant also noted that the public’s interest in access to court files is not
absolute, particularly where the eviction court file is being used for an improper purpose.
Defendant observed that “on the basis of unadjudicated allegations, landlords have already used
and will continue to use their knowledge of this file to deny [defendant] access to rental
housing.”
¶ 10 After hearing argument in the matter, the circuit court initially determined that although
the motion was brought over 30 days after the case had been dismissed with prejudice, it had
subject matter jurisdiction because section 9-121(b) did not impose any time limit to bringing a
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motion to seal. Regarding the merits of the motion, the circuit court read section 9-121(b) to set
forth “three separate elements” which must be established to seal a court file. The circuit court
then concluded that defendant failed to establish the first element, that plaintiff’s action was
sufficiently without a basis in fact or law. In so concluding, the circuit court relied on the
language of the agreed order wherein defendant specifically agreed to control her conduct in
regard to plaintiff’s employees thereby establishing that plaintiff’s action did have a basis in fact
and law. The circuit court concluded that since defendant could not establish the first element, it
need not make any findings regarding the remaining elements. This appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant maintains that the circuit court improperly interpreted section 9­
121(b) of the Act and thus erred when it denied her motion to seal. In response, plaintiff first
asserts that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion to
seal, and as a result this court lacks jurisdiction. As our jurisdiction is integral to rendering a
determination in this matter, we first turn to consider this threshold issue. In re Benny M., 2017
IL 120133, ¶ 17.
¶ 13 A. Jurisdiction
¶ 14 Plaintiff maintains that the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the motion to seal because it was filed more than 30 days after the agreed order became
final on December 31, 2016. Our review of a circuit court’s decision concluding that it has
subject matter jurisdiction is de novo. Harper Square Housing Corp. v. Hayes, 305 Ill. App. 3d
955, 959 (1999).
¶ 15 The general rule is that a trial court loses jurisdiction over a case and has no authority to
vacate or modify a final judgment once 30 days have elapsed, unless a timely postjudgment
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motion has been filed. Robinson v. Point One Toyota, Evanston, 2012 IL App (1st) 111889,
¶ 18. Every final judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is appealable as of right. Ill. S. Ct. R.
301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Supreme Court Rule 303 provides that the appellate court has
jurisdiction to hear an appeal in a civil case when the notice of appeal is filed within 30 days
after entry of a final order. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015).
¶ 16 A postjudgment motion must ordinarily be filed within 30 days of judgment. See 735
ILCS 5/2-1202(c) (West 2016) (motions in jury cases); 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2016)
(motions in non-jury cases); 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2016) (motion to vacate default
judgment). After the expiration of the 30-day period, the trial court lacks the necessary
jurisdiction to amend, modify or vacate its judgment. Robinson, 2012 IL App (1st) 111889, ¶ 18.
Once jurisdiction has been lost, the only means of challenging the judgment is through a
collateral attack, by filing a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure or by
proceeding under section 2-1301(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Jones v. Unknown Heirs or
Legatees of Fox, 313 Ill. App. 3d 249, 252-53 (2000).
¶ 17 Here, no postjudgment motion was filed within 30 days of December 31, 2016, the date
the dismissal became final. Defendant filed her motion to seal pursuant to section 9-121(b) of
the Act in March 2017, beyond the 30-day period. Looking purely at the timing of defendant’s
motion, plaintiff argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion.
¶ 18 Defendant, however, maintains she is not attacking the agreed order or the resulting
dismissal, but is instead raising a freestanding, collateral action to have her court file sealed.
Defendant contends that the circuit court properly determined that it had jurisdiction as section 9­
121(b) allows for such an action to be filed and cites People v. Mingo, 403 Ill. App. 3d 968
(2010). While we acknowledge that Mingo is a criminal matter, the pertinent issues therein were
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primarily ones of statutory construction and subject matter jurisdiction, and we find the analysis
in Mingo helpful and relevant to our considerations of the issues here.
¶ 19 In Mingo, the defendant was convicted of robbery and aggravated battery in 2004 and
was ordered to pay “an undelineated $243 in ‘[f]ines, [c]ourt [c]osts, [f]ees [and] [p]enalties’ ”
along with a $200 DNA assessment and awarded a credit of $5 per day spent in presentencing
custody, totaling $1565. Mingo, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 970. Four years later, in 2008, the
defendant filed a petition for revocation of the fines under section 5-9-2 of the Unified Code of
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-2 (West 2008)). Id. The trial court denied the petition. Id. On
appeal, defendant raised only the issue that the presentencing credit fully satisfied the DNA
assessment and the judgment should be corrected to so reflect. Id.
¶ 20 Prior to addressing the merits of the defendant’s claim, the reviewing court considered
whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s petition in that the petition
was filed more than 30 days after final judgment. Id. The Mingo court observed that the fact 30
days had passed since the judgment was entered does not “restrict the trial court’s ability to
address freestanding, collateral actions, such as postconviction petitions (725 ILCS 5/122-1
(West 2008)) or petitions brought under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2008)).” Id. at 970-71.
¶ 21 In order to determine if the defendant’s petition was a freestanding, collateral action, the
Mingo court considered the language and purpose of the statute. Id. at 971. Section 5-9-2
provides: “Except as to fines established for violations of Chapter 15 of the Illinois Vehicle
Code, the court, upon good cause shown, may revoke the fine or the unpaid portion or may
modify the method of payment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting 730 ILCS 5/5­
9-2 (West 2008)). In examining the plain language of section 5-9-2, the reviewing court
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concluded that “the legislature intended petitions for the revocation of fines to be freestanding
actions, collateral to the original action.” Id. The court noted that section 5-9-2 “does not
impose any time limit on the filing of a petition to revoke fines” and that such a limitation is
within the purview of the legislature, not the courts. Id. The Mingo court further noted that, “the
legislature has demonstrated, on numerous occasions, its ability to set time limits for the filing of
motions and petitions when it has so chosen.” Id. The court also observed that “to read section
5-9-2 as requiring the filing of a petition for revocation of fines within 30 days of the judgment
would be to make section 5-9-2 duplicative of section 5-8-1(c), thus rendering section 5-9-2
superfluous and meaningless.” Id. at 972.
¶ 22 Finally, the Mingo court stated that the good-cause requirement in section 5-9-2 indicated
that the legislature intended the statute to “provide a defendant relief from fines when factors,
external to the original proceedings, would warrant the revocation of the fines to ease a
defendant’s financial burden.” Id. This, according to the court, would “certainly” arise after 30
days had passed from the imposition of the sentence. Id.
¶ 23 In light of Mingo, in order for us to determine here whether a motion to seal pursuant to
section 9-121(b) of the Act is a freestanding, collateral action, we must interpret the language of
section 9-121(b), which we do de novo. Bank of New York Mellon v. Laskowski, 2018 IL
121995, ¶ 12. The principles governing statutory interpretation are familiar and well settled.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s
intent. Id. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its
plain and ordinary meaning. Id. That said, a court also will presume that the legislature did not
intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Id. Consequently, where a plain or literal reading
of a statute renders such results, the literal reading should yield. Id.
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¶ 24 The plain language of section 9-121(b) indicates that the legislature intended that motions
to seal the court file could be filed while the action was pending or as freestanding actions,
collateral to the original action. 735 ILCS 5/9-121(b) (West 2016). As in Mingo, the statute
does not impose any time limit on the filing of a motion to seal the court file. See Mingo, 403 Ill.
App. 3d at 971. Thus, we cannot read the statute as requiring that the motion to seal must be
filed within 30 days of the entry of the judgment as the legislature did not express such a
requirement. See Moon v. Rhode, 2016 IL 119572, ¶ 22.
¶ 25 In addition, we acknowledge, as the Mingo court did, “the legislature has demonstrated,
on numerous occasions, its ability to set time limits for the filing of motions and petitions when it
has so chosen.” Mingo, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 971. Notably, the Act is procedurally governed by
the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2016)) (in fact it is an act
within the Code), which includes time limit prescriptions for the filing of various motions. See
735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2016) (a party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment
or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file
a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment
or for other relief); 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2016) (the court may on motion filed within 30
days after the entry of a final order or judgment set aside any final order or judgment upon any
terms and conditions that shall be reasonable). The legislature chose not to impose a time
limitation as to a motion to seal under section 9-121(b).
¶ 26 The purpose of section 9-121(b) is to provide tenants protection from the adverse impact
of eviction actions which had no sufficient legal or factual basis. The full adverse impact of an
eviction action, such as a tenant’s inability to find alternative housing due to the eviction record,
will most likely come to light after the case has been resolved. The legislature’s decision not to
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include a time limitation thus serves the purpose of section 9-121(b) and demonstrates that the
motion should be viewed as an independent proceeding. See Mingo, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 971.
Accordingly, we conclude based on the plain language and purpose of section 9-121(b) that the
legislature intended that a motion to seal is a freestanding, collateral action not subject to the
ordinary 30-day jurisdictional time limit. See id. at 972. Consequently, we find the circuit court
did not err when it determined it had subject matter jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion
to seal.
¶ 27 Nonetheless, plaintiff maintains that we lack appellate jurisdiction because the order
denying the motion to seal was not a final order.
¶ 28 Pursuant to the Illinois Constitution, our jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final
judgments. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6; Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Absent a supreme
court rule, we lack jurisdiction to review judgments, orders, or decrees that are not final.
Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 22 (citing EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Kemp, 2012 IL
113419, ¶ 9). “An order is final and thus appealable if it either terminates the litigation between
the parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or
a separate branch thereof.” Bankfinancial, FSB v. Tandon, 2013 IL App (1st) 113152, ¶ 18
(citing Wilson v. Edward Hospital, 2012 IL 112898, ¶ 19).
¶ 29 Here, as discussed, the eviction action was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety on the
basis of the agreed order and the motion to seal was an independent, collateral action. We
therefore find that the order denying defendant’s motion to seal is a final and appealable order as
it disposed of the rights of the parties as to the issue of sealing and there were no other pending
claims or issues as to the underlying litigation. See Village of Bellwood v. American National
Bank and Trust Co., 2011 IL App (1st) 093115, ¶ 15 (finding an order denying a party’s motion
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to abandon eminent domain proceedings was a final and appealable order).
¶ 30 In so finding, we reject plaintiff’s argument that by pursuing her motion to seal defendant
was attempting to unilaterally modify the agreed order. As we have found, defendant’s motion
to seal does not attack or contest the agreed order or the resulting dismissal with prejudice;
rather, defendant sought only that her court file be sealed, which was a separate and distinct
proceeding from the underlying litigation and the agreed order. See id. ¶ 16. ¶ 31 In summary, we thus conclude the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider
defendant’s motion to seal and we have jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s appeal from the
order denying that motion.
¶ 32 B. The Motion to Seal
¶ 33 On appeal, defendant maintains that the circuit court erred (1) in its interpretation of
section 9-121(b) and (2) when it denied her motion to seal. We address each claim in turn.
¶ 34 1. Statutory Construction of Section 9-121(b)
¶ 35 For ease of reference, we again set forth section 9-121(b):
“Discretionary sealing of court file. The court may order that a court file in a
forcible entry and detainer action be placed under seal if the court finds that the plaintiff’s
action is sufficiently without a basis in fact or law, which may include a lack of
jurisdiction, that placing the court file under seal is clearly in the interests of justice, and
that those interests are not outweighed by the public’s interest in knowing about the
record.” 735 ILCS 5/9-121(b) (West 2016).
¶ 36 Defendant raises two issues of statutory construction. First, defendant maintains that the
trial court improperly read the statute to require a showing of three, instead of two, separate
elements. Defendant contends that the second comma in subsection (b) should be construed as
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an “or” not “and.” Thus, defendant asserts that the trial court has the discretion to seal the
records either where the movant has demonstrated the matter is without a sufficient basis in fact
or law or where the interests of justice outweighs the public’s interest in the transparency of the
judicial system. Defendant maintains that such a construction of section 9-121(b) gives effect to
the legislature’s intent, which, according to defendant, is to “make it easier for courts to seal
eviction records” and to protect individuals who “find themselves with a black mark on their
proverbial permanent record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 96th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, Apr. 23, 2010, at 22 (statements of Representative Fritchey).
¶ 37 Plaintiff responds that the circuit court correctly determined that under section 9-121(b),
the court must make three findings, and not two, before sealing a file.
¶ 38 We agree with plaintiff that the plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature
intended for the circuit court judge to render three distinct findings under section 9-121(b). First,
the statute expressly states that the circuit court may enter an order sealing the eviction court file
upon findings that (1) the action is without a sufficient basis in fact or law, (2) the sealing is
clearly in the interests of justice, and (3) those interests of justice outweigh the public’s interest
in knowledge of the case. 735 ILCS 5/9-121(b) (West 2016). The plain language dictates such a
reading. After directing the court to make these certain findings, the statute lists those findings,
with each finding preceded by the word “that.” These necessary findings are separated by a
comma and the word “and” is employed after the final comma. The well established rules of
statutory construction require that the word “and” be read “as conjunctive and not disjunctive”
and that the use of the word “ ‘indicates that the legislature intended that all of the listed
requirements are to be met.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Soh v. Target Marketing Systems, 353 Ill.
App. 3d 126, 131 (2004) (citing 1A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 21.14, at
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129 (5th ed. 1993). We conclude that the legislature intended for these findings to be read
conjunctively in a series. Accordingly, we decline to adopt defendant’s reading of the statute,
which would require us to read a word (“or”) into the statute that does not exist. See Weather-
Tite, Inc. v. University of St. Francis, 233 Ill. 2d 385, 390 (2009) (“We will not depart from a
statute’s plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with
the legislative intent.”).
¶ 39 Second, defendant asserts that the circuit court improperly interpreted the statute to
require a determination that plaintiff’s eviction action was sufficiently without a basis in fact or
law when it was initially filed. Defendant maintains that because the statute uses the word “is” in
the phrase “if the court finds that the plaintiff’s action is sufficiently without a basis in fact or
law,” the proper reading of the statute requires the circuit court to consider whether plaintiff’s
case currently (i.e. at the time the motion to seal is filed) presents a sufficient basis. Defendant
further asserts that because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the eviction action itself
when the motion to seal was filed the action was to be viewed as “currently” being without a
sufficient basis in law or fact.
¶ 40 In response, plaintiff argues that a court lacks jurisdiction in “every single case where the
time period for taking any legal action has expired.” Plaintiff contends that defendant’s reading
of the statute would lead to absurd results where, just as a consequence of the passage of time,
the first element of section 9-121(b) can be satisfied.
¶ 41 We agree with plaintiff that defendant’s interpretation (that any time the court lacks
jurisdiction over the claim the action would automatically be without a basis in fact or law)
would lead to an absurd result. See Christopher B. Burke Engineering, Ltd. v. Heritage Bank of
Central Illinois, 2015 IL 118955, ¶ 17 (this court “avoids interpreting statutes in a manner that
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would create absurd results”). Clearly, the legislature did not intend for this first element to be
met solely on the basis of the passage of time, e.g., that 30 days had expired since the circuit
court rendered a final judgment or a determination on a posttrial motion in the eviction action.
To allow such a result would essentially render this element superfluous, for in order to satisfy
the first element all a party in an eviction action would need to do is wait until the circuit court
no longer had jurisdiction and then file the motion to seal. See Better Government Association v.
Illinois High School Association, 2017 IL 121124, ¶ 22 (“A reasonable construction must be
given to each word, clause, and sentence of a statute, and no term should be rendered
superfluous.”). This cannot be what the legislature intended.
¶ 42 The inclusion of the phrase “which may include a lack of jurisdiction” thus informs us of
the timing of the preceding clause, “if the court finds that the plaintiff’s action is sufficiently
without a basis in fact or law.” 735 ILCS 5/9-121(b) (West 2016). As lack of jurisdiction cannot
mean a lack of jurisdiction simply because the matter has concluded at the time the motion to
seal is filed, it must therefore mean a lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction while the
case was pending. As previously discussed, the “which may include a lack of jurisdiction”
language thus contemplates a defendant challenging subject matter or personal jurisdiction issues
at the outset of the matter, but at least before the matter concludes. Id. Therefore, it follows that
the circuit court is to examine whether a plaintiff’s action is sufficiently without a basis in fact or
law on all other ground as well while the matter was pending.
¶ 43 In sum, the plain language of section 9-121(b) of the Act requires the circuit court to
render findings regarding three distinct elements, where determination of the first element must
be made in consideration of whether the case when pending had a sufficient legal and factual
basis.
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¶ 44 2. The Propriety of the Circuit Court’s Ruling on the Motion to Seal
¶ 45 Having so interpreted the statute, we now turn to consider whether the circuit court
correctly denied defendant’s motion to seal solely on the first prong of section 9-121(b), when it
found that plaintiff’s action had a sufficient basis in fact or law. See 735 ILCS 5/9-121(b) (West
2016).
¶ 46 A circuit court’s determination as to whether court records should be sealed is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill. 2d 214, 233 (2000). The
threshold for finding an abuse of discretion is a high one and will not be overcome unless it can
be said that the circuit court’s ruling was “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or that no
reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the [circuit] court.” Sharbono v.
Hilborn, 2014 IL App (3d) 120597, ¶ 29. When reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate
court does not substitute its judgment for that of the circuit court or determine whether the circuit
court acted wisely. Andersonville South Condominium Association v. Federal National
Mortgage Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 161875, ¶ 28.
¶ 47 On appeal, defendant argues that plaintiff’s eviction action had no basis in law because at
the time the motion to seal was filed, the eviction action had been dismissed with prejudice and
thus the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the eviction action. We disagree. As previously
discussed, this argument is based on a misinterpretation of section 9-121(b). If we were to agree
with defendant’s argument, any defendant who waited until the circuit court lost jurisdiction over
the eviction action would automatically satisfy the first prong of the statute. This cannot be what
the legislature intended as there would be no discretion for the circuit court to exercise regarding
this element. See Landheer v. Landheer, 383 Ill. App. 3d 317, 321 (2008) (a court may not
depart from the plain language of the statute and read into it conditions that are inconsistent with
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the express legislative intent). Defendant has offered no other argument that the case had an
insufficient basis in fact or law. It is not “the obligation of this court to act as an advocate or
seek error in the record” (U.S. Bank v. Lindsey, 397 Ill. App. 3d 437, 459 (2009)), nor is it the
province of this court to substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court (Andersonville South
Condominium Association, 2017 IL App (1st) 161875, ¶ 28). Defendant has thus forfeited
further review of this issue. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2017) (points not argued on
appeal are forfeited); see Vine Street Clinic v. HealthLink, Inc., 222 Ill. 2d 276, 301 (2006)
(arguments not raised in either the circuit or appellate court are forfeited); Guarantee Trust Life
Insurance Co. v. Platinum Supplemental Insurance, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 161612, ¶ 41
(declining to consider an argument not raised on appeal). Consequently, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to seal.
¶ 48 CONCLUSION
¶ 49 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the determination of the circuit court of Cook
County.
¶ 50 Affirmed.
17