People v. Ramsey

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Appellate Court Date: 2018.08.15
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People v. Ramsey, 2018 IL App (2d) 151071
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption RUNALDO D. RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-15-1071
Filed June 12, 2018
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 12-CF-1197;
Review the Hon. Robert G. Kleeman, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed as modified.
Counsel on James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Christopher McCoy, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
Robert B. Berlin, State’s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne Hoffman
and Kristin M. Schwind, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for
the People.
Panel JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Jorgensen and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Runaldo D. Ramsey, appeals his convictions and sentences for Class X home
invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2), (c) (West 2010)) and two counts of Class 3 aggravated
battery (id. § 12-3.05(a)(1), (f)(1), (h)). He contends that the evidence was insufficient to
prove him guilty of home invasion beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was denied his right to
counsel of his choice, and that he was wrongly sentenced to an extended term for aggravated
battery. We affirm the convictions but modify the sentence for aggravated battery.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant was indicted in July 2012 and released on bond. Early on, his attorney sought
to withdraw, stating that he had not spoken to defendant for a while and had tried to call him.
Defendant then appeared in court late and told the court that he had hired new counsel. He
was given a two-week continuance. In June 2013, his counsel withdrew, and the public
defender was appointed. In July 2013, defendant failed to appear at a status hearing, and it
was noted that he had previously been late for hearings. After further continuances, the case
was set for a jury trial on July 29, 2014. On July 24, 2014, attorney Ted Gailan sought to file
an appearance, but the court denied the request because defendant failed to appear and trial
was already set. On July 29, 2014, trial was continued because the court had a scheduling
conflict, and defendant was allowed to seek to retain substitute counsel. However, defendant
did not do so. After several more continuances, trial was set for August 24, 2015. During that
time, defendant failed to appear at least once.
¶4 On August 24, 2015, defendant waived a jury trial, and the case was held over to the next
day for a bench trial. The next day, defendant’s public defender told the court that defendant
wanted a private attorney, “Mr. Kayne,” to represent him. The public defender stated that
Kayne informed him that he would be unable to go to trial that day, that it was unlikely that
the court would grant a continuance, but that, if the court did so, Kayne could go to trial in
two weeks. The State objected, arguing that the request was a dilatory tactic, and the public
defender replied that Kayne said without reservation that he was willing and able to come
into the case. The court denied the request, stating that its ruling would have been different if
made a week earlier but that it was now “59 minutes past the eleventh hour,” there were
witnesses in the hallway, and the court would not inconvenience the witnesses and the State.
¶5 Trial began, and after a recess defendant appeared 54 minutes late and was admonished
that, if he were late again, a warrant would issue. The court then revisited the issue of
defendant’s request to substitute counsel, stating that it wanted to clarify the matter for the
record. The court had since reviewed a case on the issue and provided it to counsel. Defense
counsel and the State both made brief statements. The State noted that defendant had
previously retained multiple attorneys, and it argued that defendant was trying to delay trial.
The court observed that defendant had been represented by several different attorneys and
that the case had been continued due to a scheduling conflict that gave defendant additional
time to retain private counsel, but none was retained. The court also found that the public
defender had been on the case for some time and that Kayne was not ready to make an
unconditional appearance. The court indicated that it was perhaps having different thoughts
on whether defendant subjectively was trying to delay trial but that, even if defendant did not
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subjectively intend to be dilatory, granting a continuance on the day of trial would unduly
interfere with the administration of justice.
¶6 At trial, Steven Stanley testified that, on June 8, 2012, he lived in a building with two
apartments. Stanley lived on the first floor, and his landlord lived on the second floor.
Stanley was required to enter his apartment through the back door of the building, which
opened into a laundry room. From there, a door opened into Stanley’s apartment. Another
door led to a set of stairs leading to his landlord’s apartment. Other than passing through to
his apartment, Stanley was not allowed to use the laundry room. He was not allowed to wash
his clothes there and would not leave boots or an umbrella there. When asked if his living
area started when he set foot inside of the exterior door, Stanley said “[n]o.” When asked if
he was allowed to keep other people out of the laundry room, he replied, “[i]f the outside
door is locked, yes,” but “[i]f the door is open, they are going to walk in.” He then agreed
that, whether the door was locked or not, he had a right to tell people that they could not
come in. He later stated that he used the laundry room only as a hallway to enter his
apartment. Multiple times during trial, Stanley referred to the interior door that opened to his
apartment from the laundry room as his back door. However, he also referred to the exterior
door as the back door on several occasions.
¶7 On June 28, 2012, between 11:30 p.m. and midnight, defendant and his girlfriend,
Tuwanda, came to Stanley’s apartment and banged on the window. Stanley’s ex-girlfriend,
Colleen, was Tuwanda’s friend, and Stanley had previously met defendant. Stanley let
defendant and Tuwanda inside. Tuwanda then said that she would wait in the car and left.
Defendant asked Stanley if he had defendant’s money. Stanley said that he did not owe
defendant money. Defendant repeated his request and said that Colleen owed him $50 and
that Stanley was her “money man.” Defendant continued to repeat that he wanted his money,
and Stanley reached into his wallet and gave defendant $20, telling him that that was all he
had. Defendant persisted in asking for money, appeared agitated, and spit in Stanley’s face.
Stanley then gently pushed defendant, and defendant pushed him back, causing him to fly
across the kitchen and hit his head on the kitchen cabinet. When Stanley got up, defendant hit
him on the ear with a beer bottle.
¶8 Stanley said that he was calling the police and ran to the bedroom for his phone. As he
was dialing, defendant tackled him into a television and began strangling him. Stanley hit
defendant in the ribs, and defendant let him go and left the bedroom. Stanley picked up his
phone, which in the scuffle had gotten about 20 numbers entered on it. He began erasing the
numbers so that he could dial 911. He also entered his kitchen to lock the interior door. As he
approached the door, defendant entered with a garden weeder in his hand. Defendant tried to
stab Stanley in the face and chest with the weeder, and its handle split down the middle.
Defendant then left the apartment again and returned with a second, “much sharper” garden
weeder with a “V-shaped blade.” Using the weeder, defendant stabbed Stanley multiple times
and told Stanley that he was a dead man if he called the police. Defendant then left. The
weeders had been stored outside the building, next to the exterior door. Exhibit No. 27 shows
a weeder leaning against the building, within an arm’s reach of the door. A person likely
could retrieve it without fully exiting the building.
¶9 Stanley called 911 and went to the hospital, where he was treated for multiple injuries.
Stanley identified defendant from a photo lineup. The investigating officer testified at trial
about the crime scene and took the picture in exhibit No. 27. During closing arguments, the
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State suggested that defendant must have left the weeder in that position when he went
outside and got the second weeder.
¶ 10 The defense moved for a directed finding, arguing that the State failed to prove the
offense of home invasion because the laundry room was part of Stanley’s dwelling and the
State failed to prove that defendant exited and reentered after his initial authorized entry. The
court denied the motion, noting circumstantial evidence that defendant left the building
entirely and noting that the laundry room was a common area. The defense rested without
providing evidence.
¶ 11 The court found defendant guilty, finding that, based on exhibit No. 27, it was persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant twice left the building in its entirety through the
outside door, recovered a weapon, and made an unauthorized entry back into the building.
Thus, the court stated that it found an unauthorized entry “regardless of the analysis about the
common area[,] which I stand by.”
¶ 12 The two aggravated-battery convictions merged into one for sentencing. The court
sentenced defendant to 17 years’ incarceration for home invasion and a concurrent 7-year
extended term for aggravated battery. Defendant’s motion to reduce the sentence was denied,
and he appeals.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Defendant first contends that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of home invasion because it failed to prove an unauthorized entry into Stanley’s
dwelling. He argues that the laundry room was part of the dwelling and that the State failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he completely left the building to get the weeders
and then reentered without authorization. The State argues that the laundry room was not part
of Stanley’s dwelling and that, in any event, there was sufficient evidence that defendant
entirely left the building.
¶ 15 A reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so
improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.
People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). On a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This standard applies regardless of whether the evidence
is direct or circumstantial, and circumstantial evidence meeting this standard is sufficient to
sustain a criminal conviction. People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009). The trier of fact
is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and
determining what inferences to draw, and a reviewing court ordinarily will not substitute its
judgment on these matters for that of the trier of fact. People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431
(2000).
¶ 16 A defendant who is not a peace officer commits home invasion when, without authority,
he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason
to know that one or more persons are present and intentionally causes any injury to any
person within the dwelling. 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 2010). A “dwelling” is defined as
“a building or portion thereof, a tent, a vehicle, or other enclosed space which is used or
intended for use as a human habitation, home or residence.” Id. § 2-6(a).
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¶ 17 There is little case law addressing when a common area such as the laundry room in this
case is part of a dwelling for purposes of proving home invasion. In People v. Pavic, 104 Ill.
App. 3d 436, 447 (1982), the First District stated in dicta that the basement of an apartment
building was part of the victims’ dwelling. There, the defendant followed the victims home
and tampered with a circuit breaker in the basement of their building. When the victims left
to turn the electricity back on, the defendant entered their apartment and raped them upon
their return. In affirming the defendant’s conviction of home invasion, the court noted that,
although apartment dwellers live in their apartments, they necessarily use other portions of
the building such as to get to and from their apartments or to do laundry. Id. The court
ultimately stated, though, that it need not conclude that the basement was part of the
dwelling, because the victims’ constructive presence in the apartment was sufficient. Id.
However, our supreme court overruled Pavic in People v. Pettit, 101 Ill. 2d 309 (1984).
¶ 18 In People v. Pettit, 114 Ill. App. 3d 876 (1983), the defendants invaded a first-floor
apartment but later moved the victims to an empty second-floor apartment. The defendants
were charged with home invasion only in connection with their entry into the second-floor
apartment. We reversed the defendants’ convictions because the victims were not present in
the second-floor apartment when the defendants invaded it, noting that the purpose of the
home-invasion statute is solely to protect the personal safety of people in their homes. Id. at
881. Our supreme court affirmed. Pettit, 101 Ill. 2d at 315. In doing so, the court discussed
Pavic and referred to the apartment in Pavic as the victims’ “ ‘dwelling.’ ” Id. at 313. The
court noted that the Pavic court ruled that the basement of the apartment building was also
part of the victims’ dwelling. The court then stated, “We do not agree with this interpretation,
and we hold that the statute requires the physical presence of one or more persons in the
dwelling to constitute a home invasion. To the extent this opinion is inconsistent with the
interpretation in Pavic we now overrule it.” Id.
¶ 19 Whether a common area is part of a dwelling has also been discussed in various burglary
cases. See, e.g., People v. Silva, 256 Ill. App. 3d 414, 421 (1993) (unoccupied basement and
apartment used for storage in a two-flat constituted a dwelling); People v. McIntyre, 218 Ill.
App. 3d 479, 481-82 (1991) (attached, enclosed porch part of the dwelling). Also in regard to
burglary, in People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 519-20 (1990), our supreme court held that a
garage attached to a multiunit dwelling was not part of the victim’s dwelling. We later
interpreted Thomas to mean that normally an attached garage is part of the dwelling because
it is part of the structure in which the owner lives. Under Thomas, however, an exception
applies when the garage is attached to a multiunit dwelling, because, without that distinction,
the entry into the garage would constitute a burglary to every unit in the building. People v.
Cunningham, 265 Ill. App. 3d 3, 9 (1994).
¶ 20 Although defendant relies on a number of burglary cases, the cases he relies on focus on
single-unit dwellings or on areas actively being used by the victims. This case, however,
involves a common area of a multiunit dwelling, which defendant used only to pass through.
We also note that the crime of burglary uses a definition of “dwelling” that includes “a
house, apartment, mobile home, trailer, or other living quarters in which at the time of the
alleged offense the owners or occupants actually reside or in their absence intend within a
reasonable period of time to reside.” 720 ILCS 5/2-6(b) (West 2010). Here, our focus is on
whether the victim used or intended to use the location as a human habitation, home, or
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residence. Id. § 2-6(a). We conclude that, in this case, there was sufficient evidence that the
laundry room was not used by Stanley in such a manner.
¶ 21 Other than passing through to enter his apartment, Stanley was not allowed to use the
laundry room. He was not allowed to wash his clothes there and would not leave boots or an
umbrella there. When asked if his living area started when he set foot inside the exterior
door, Stanley said “[n]o.” Although he admitted that he had the right to tell people not to
enter, he also stated that he used the laundry room only as a hallway to enter his apartment.
He also referred to the interior door that opened to his apartment from the laundry room as
his back door, albeit inconsistently. Despite the inconsistencies, we find that there was
sufficient evidence for the trial court to infer that Stanley did not use the location as part of
his habitation, home, or residence. Instead, it was a common area that he merely passed to
reach his apartment, which was his actual dwelling. See Pettit, 101 Ill. 2d at 313. As a result,
when defendant left Stanley’s apartment, he exited the dwelling and then returned
unauthorized, making him guilty of home invasion. Because we determine that the laundry
room was not part of the dwelling, we need not decide whether there was sufficient evidence
that defendant left the building entirely.
¶ 22 Defendant next argues that he was denied his right to counsel of his choice when the trial
court denied his motion to continue in order to substitute counsel.
¶ 23 A defendant has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel (U.S. Const., amends.
VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8), which includes the right to counsel of his choice.
People v. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d 341, 349 (1980). A defendant may not, however, wield this
right “as a weapon” to “thwart the administration of justice or to otherwise embarrass the
effective prosecution of crime.” Id. In ruling on a defendant’s request for a continuance for
substitution of counsel, the trial court must balance “the fundamental right of the defendant
to counsel of his choice [citations], against the interests of the State, the courts and the
witnesses in the efficient disposition of cases without unreasonable delay [citations].” People
v. Little, 207 Ill. App. 3d 720, 723-24 (1990). Whether to allow a continuance for a defendant
to retain new counsel is a matter left to the trial court’s discretion, and we will not overturn
its decision absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 245
(2000); People v. Curry, 2013 IL App (4th) 120724, ¶ 49.
¶ 24 “ ‘In balancing the judicial interest of trying the case with due diligence and the
defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of choice, the court must inquire into the actual
request to determine whether it is being used merely as a delaying tactic.’ ” People v. Tucker,
382 Ill. App. 3d 916, 920 (2008) (quoting People v. Burrell, 228 Ill. App. 3d 133, 142
(1992)). “Factors to be considered include: whether defendant articulates an acceptable
reason for desiring new counsel; whether the defendant has continuously been in custody;
whether he has informed the trial court of his efforts to obtain counsel; whether he has
cooperated with current counsel; and the length of time defendant has been represented by
current counsel.” Id. “[W]hen a defendant cannot ‘articulate an acceptable reason for desiring
new counsel and is already being represented by an experienced, court-appointed criminal
lawyer, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant’s trial-day request for a
continuance.’ ” People v. Staple, 402 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1103 (2010) (quoting People v.
Jackson, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (1991)).
¶ 25 Most important, a court must balance the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice
against the need for the efficient and effective administration of justice. Curry, 2013 IL App
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(4th) 120724, ¶ 48. Thus, our supreme court has made clear that “a trial court will not be
found to have abused its discretion in denying a motion for substitution of counsel in the
absence of ready and willing substitute counsel.” Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d at 245. Thus, if new
counsel is specifically identified and stands ready, willing, and able to enter an unconditional
appearance, the motion should be allowed. However, if any of those requirements is lacking,
a denial of the motion is not an abuse of discretion. See People v. Koss, 52 Ill. App. 3d 605,
607-08 (1977).
¶ 26 Curry is instructive. There, the defendant was arrested on January 28, 2012, and charged
with driving under the influence. Less than a month later, attorney Mark Harmon entered an
appearance on the defendant’s behalf. On May 23, 2012, the case was set for trial on June 11.
On June 1, 2012, Harmon learned that the defendant had hired attorney Richard Frazier to
represent him, and on the day of trial he filed a motion to continue the case in order to
determine the nature of Frazier’s relationship with the defendant. At the hearing on the
motion, Harmon advised the court that the defendant wanted Frazier to represent him, that
the defendant had paid Frazier a retainer, and that Frazier had conditioned his representation
on Harmon’s obtaining a continuance. The State objected, noting that Frazier would not enter
his appearance unless the case were continued. The court denied the motion as untimely,
stating, “ ‘we don’t do motions to continue on the morning of the jury trial.’ ” Curry, 2013 IL
App (4th) 120724, ¶ 15. Frazier asked if the defendant could make a statement, and the court
responded that it was “ ‘not going to accept any pro se statement by a defendant who is here
represented by counsel.’ ” Id. ¶ 16.
¶ 27 The defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied his right to counsel of his choice, and
the Fourth District affirmed. The court stated that, when a trial court conducts an inquiry into
the circumstances of a defendant’s motion to substitute counsel and those circumstances
demonstrate that substitute counsel does not stand ready, willing, and able to make an
unconditional appearance, the court does not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant’s
motion. Id. ¶ 51. Distinguishing cases in which no inquiry at all was made into the request to
substitute counsel, the court noted that the trial court did inquire into the circumstances and
discovered that Frazier would not enter an appearance unless there were a continuance. Id.
¶¶ 50-52. At that point, the facts revealed that counsel was not ready, willing, and able to
make an unconditional appearance, and the denial of the motion was not an abuse of
discretion. Id. ¶ 52; see also Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d at 245 (denial of counsel’s motion to
withdraw and continue for substitute counsel was not an abuse of discretion when substitute
counsel had not been identified and secured).
¶ 28 Here, as in Curry, substitute counsel was not ready, willing, and able to enter an
unconditional appearance. While Kayne said that he was willing and able to take the case, he
did not appear, and he said that he could do so in two weeks. Since he was not present, he
could enter an appearance only if the continuance were granted. Thus, as in Curry, his
representation of defendant was conditioned on a continuance.
¶ 29 Defendant, citing a number of cases, argues that, despite the request for a continuance,
the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make an inquiry into the reasons that he
sought new counsel. In particular, he relies on People v. Adams, 2016 IL App (1st) 141135.
There, on the day of trial, the defendant, who was represented by the public defender,
requested a continuance to hire private counsel. The trial court, without inquiring into the
reasons that the defendant wanted to retain private counsel, denied the request because it was
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made on the day of trial and the witnesses were already there. The First District reversed,
holding that, even when new counsel was not identified, reversal was warranted when the
trial court failed to inquire into whether the defendant was using the request as a delay tactic.
Id. ¶ 15. Noting that the trial court focused only on the facts that it was the day of trial and
that witnesses were present, and conceding that both facts supported the court’s decision, the
appellate court held that the trial court’s “utter failure” to make any kind of inquiry into the
basis for the request outweighed those considerations. Id. ¶ 16. While the appellate court
found that the failure to inquire by itself justified reversal, it also noted that, when the
defendant made his request, the case had been pending for only 70 days, there were no
previous continuances, and he had been in continuous custody.
¶ 30 We apply Curry. We observe that, while Adams cited Segoviano, it failed to adhere to its
rule “that a trial court will not be found to abuse its discretion in denying a motion for
substitution of counsel in the absence of ready and willing substitute counsel.” Segoviano,
189 Ill. 2d at 245. Further, unlike in Adams and other cases cited by defendant, the trial court
here carefully considered defendant’s intent. The trial court discussed the matter twice, the
second time after it reviewed case law on the issue. The court specifically noted the number
of previous continuances and substitutions of counsel and that defendant once failed to obtain
new counsel after he was given the opportunity to do so. Defendant, through his failures to
appear and tardiness, also suggested an interest in delaying the proceedings, and after his
tardiness on the day of trial, the trial court suggested that this was defendant’s subjective
intent. To the extent that defendant would require the court to directly ask him about his
intent, the case law requires an inquiry, but it does not require direct questioning of a
defendant who is represented by counsel. In light of all the circumstances, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the request for substitution of counsel.
¶ 31 Finally, defendant argues that the seven-year extended-term sentence for aggravated
battery should be reduced to the maximum nonextended term of five years. The State agrees.
When a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses that are part of a continuing course of
conduct, he may be sentenced to an extended term only for those offenses that are within the
most serious class. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 2010); People v. Smith, 345 Ill. App. 3d 179,
190 (2004).
¶ 32 Here, the court sentenced defendant to an extended term for Class 3 aggravated battery
(720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(h) (West 2010)), but he was also sentenced for Class X home invasion
(id. § 12-11(c)), when the charges were based on the same course of conduct. Although
defendant did not object to the extended-term sentence or include it in a posttrial motion, the
erroneous imposition of an extended-term sentence is routinely reviewed as second-prong
plain error. See, e.g., People v. Wilkins, 343 Ill. App. 3d 147, 149 (2003).
¶ 33 Here, the extended-term sentence was imposed on the offense that was not within the
most serious class. Thus it was error. Accordingly, pursuant to our authority under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), we reduce defendant’s sentence for
aggravated battery to the maximum nonextended term of five years.
¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 There was sufficient evidence that the laundry room was not part of the dwelling. Further,
the trial court did not erroneously deprive defendant of his right to counsel of his choice.
However, the extended-term sentence was imposed on the offense that was not within the
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most serious class; thus we reduce the sentence for aggravated battery to the maximum
nonextended term of five years. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page
County is affirmed as modified. As part of our judgment, we grant the State’s request that
defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2016); see
also People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 178 (1978).
¶ 36 Affirmed as modified.
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