People v. Ross

2019 IL App (3d) 170028
Opinion filed May 7, 2019
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2019
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-17-0028
v. ) Circuit No. 14-CF-2393
)
ARTIS J. ROSS, ) Honorable
) Edward A. Burmila Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion
Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Presiding Justice Schmidt dissented, with opinion.
_____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Artis J. Ross, appeals following the revocation of his probation and
subsequent sentencing to the Department of Corrections. He argues that a portion of his
probation fee, which he paid in full, should be refunded because his probation was revoked. We
agree and remand so the circuit court may enter an order refunding defendant the sum of $440.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The State charged defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720
ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2014)). On February 16, 2016, the court sentenced defendant to a term of
30 months’ probation.
¶4 The court also ordered defendant to pay $1664 in monetary assessments. Defendant
received $1060 in monetary presentence custody credit, reducing his costs subtotal to $604. The
court then imposed a probation fee of $600. The resulting sum of $1204 was fully offset by
defendant’s bond deposit of $2000. The assessments order thus provided defendant with a refund
of $796.
¶5 On July 14, 2016, the State filed an amended petition to revoke defendant’s probation.
On October 27, 2016, defendant admitted to the allegations in the petition, and the court revoked
his probation. Defendant was remanded to custody on that date and remained in custody through
his resentencing. On January 6, 2017, the court resentenced defendant to a term of 5½ years’
imprisonment. The court did not issue a new monetary assessments order or otherwise modify its
original assessments.
¶6 II. ANALYSIS
¶7 On appeal, defendant contends that the $600 probation fee imposed by the court, which
was paid in full out of his bond deposit, contemplated 30 months of probation. Because
defendant only spent eight months under the supervision of probation services, he argues that he
is entitled to a $440 refund of this assessment. The State concedes that defendant is not obligated
to pay a fee for time in which he was not on probation and that a person in his position would
ordinarily be entitled to a refund. However, the State points out that defendant failed to raise this
issue at any point in the circuit court and argues that the matter is therefore forfeited.
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¶8 Section 5-6-3(i) of the Unified Code of Corrections mandates that the circuit court shall
impose “a fee of $50 for each month of probation or conditional discharge supervision or
supervised community service ordered by the court, unless after determining the inability of the
person sentenced to probation or conditional discharge or supervised community service to pay
the fee, the court assesses a lesser fee.” 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3(i) (West 2016). That same subsection
specifies that “[t]he fee shall be imposed only upon an offender who is actively supervised by the
probation and court services department.” Id.
¶9 The court’s imposition of a $600 probation fee, following a sentence of 30 months’
probation, contemplated a per month fee of $20. At that rate, defendant’s probation from March
through October 2016 1 would result in a total fee of $160. Having paid the full $600 fee in
advance, defendant was plainly entitled to a refund of $440, and we accept the State’s concession
on that issue.
¶ 10 We next consider whether the court’s failure to order defendant’s refund amounted to
second-prong plain error. In People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 48-49 (2009), our supreme court
held that the imposition of a street value fine without a hearing to determine the proper amount
of that fine was second-prong plain error. The court rejected the appellate court’s application of a
de minimis exception to the plain error rule, concluding:
“Plain-error review focuses on the fairness of a proceeding and the integrity of the
judicial process. [Citations.] An error may involve a relatively small amount of
money or unimportant matter, but still affect the integrity of the judicial process
1
Defendant was sentenced to probation on February 29, 2016 and remanded into the custody of
the county jail on October 27, 2016. Defendant does not argue that the October fee should be prorated,
and the State does not argue that defendant should be charged a fee for the single day in February. The
parties agree that defendant was under the supervision of probation services for eight months, and we
accept that agreement.
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and the fairness of the proceeding if the controversy is determined in an arbitrary
or unreasoned manner.
*** The trial court’s imposition of the street-value fine without any
evidentiary basis resulted in plain error.” Id. at 48.
The statement of law made in Lewis has been cited approvingly by the supreme court as recently
as 2017. People v. Fort, 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 19.
¶ 11 In the present case, the court did not address defendant’s fines and fees upon
resentencing. No effort was made to consider the impact of his probation revocation on those
monetary assessments. The error here was not a “simple mistake” in the calculation of the fee.
Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 48. Instead, the State has helped itself to $440 of defendant’s money,
without any consideration of whether that was justified, paralleling the imposition of a fine
without a hearing in Lewis. In fact, the State is not justified in keeping that money. Doing so
without any type of judicial determination fundamentally undermines the integrity of the judicial
process. See id. We therefore remand the matter with instructions that the circuit court enter an
order refunding that sum.
¶ 12 In reaching this conclusion, we note the apparent dissonance in our supreme court’s plain
error case law. On one hand, the court has emphasized that only structural errors, such as a trial
before a biased judge or jury, will constitute second-prong plain error. People v. Thompson, 238
Ill. 2d 598, 609 (2010). In accordance with this strict interpretation of the second prong, the court
has repeatedly held that error in the delivery of Rule 431(b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1,
2012)) admonishments to the jury is generally not cognizable under the second prong. People v.
Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 52. Yet, as stated in Lewis and affirmed in Fort, some monetary errors
may rise to the level of second-prong plain error. The Lewis court held that unfairness is
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unfairness, with no de minimis exception. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 48. The present case, however,
does not call for this court to resolve this apparent discord. Lewis remains good law, and under
Lewis, the circuit court here committed plain error in not refunding defendant’s money.
¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 14 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed, and the matter is remanded
with directions.
¶ 15 Affirmed and remanded with directions.
¶ 16 PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting:
¶ 17 This error does not rise to the level of plain error. Unlike Lewis, we are not talking about
a fine levied in the absence of evidence. Looking at the new Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472(c)
(eff. Mar. 1, 2019), how can one reach the conclusion that this error in the fee constitutes second-
prong plain error? I would honor the forfeiture.
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