People v. Williams

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Date: 2019.08.26
Appellate Court 12:23:44 -05'00'
People v. Williams, 2019 IL App (3d) 160412Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption DONTARRIES L. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Third District
Docket No. 3-16-0412
Filed June 25, 2019
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 15-CF-119; the
Review Hon. John P. Vespa, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on James E. Chadd, Peter A. Carusona, and Matthew Lemke, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Jerry Brady, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (Patrick Delfino, David J.
Robinson, and Mark A. Austill, of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Schmidt and Justice Carter concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Dontarries L. Williams pled guilty to criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-
1.20(a)(2) (West 2014)) and was sentenced to eight years in prison with a mandatory
supervised release (MSR) term of three years to natural life. As a result of his conviction, he
was required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
(730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2016)). Within 30 days of sentencing, defendant filed a motion
to withdraw his plea, which the circuit court denied. On appeal, he argues he should be allowed
to withdraw his plea because (1) the trial court improperly considered the merits of his
proposed defense in assessing his motion, (2) he did not understand the requirements and
consequences of SORA when he entered into the plea, (3) counsel was ineffective in failing to
advise him about the requirements of SORA, and (4) the trial court failed to adequately
admonish him before accepting his plea. We affirm.
¶2 Defendant was charged by indictment with criminal sexual assault for knowingly
committing an act of sexual penetration on Latoya Coffee by use of force or the threat of force
on or about February 8, 2015. On the date of trial, the court informed defendant that, if he was
convicted, he would be sentenced to a term of 4 to 15 years in prison. The court also informed
defendant that at the end of his prison term he would “be placed on a period of mandatory
supervised release [(MSR)], or what we used to call parole, for a period of at least two years,
but it could be up to natural life. But that will be determined by authorities of the Department
of Corrections and other relevant authorities before your release.” The prosecutor reminded
the court that the minimum term of MSR was 3 years. The court then corrected its earlier
statement and informed defendant that MSR would be “[t]hree years to natural life.”
¶3 Following jury selection, public defender William Loeffel informed the court that the
parties had negotiated a plea agreement. Loeffel stated that defendant agreed to plead guilty to
criminal sexual assault, with a recommended sentence of eight years and “three years to life
mandatory supervised release at the discretion of the Department of Corrections.” The court
then admonished defendant as follows:
“If you did not have a plea agreement, in other words if you went to trial and lost and
let the judge decide, you would face the following sentencing range: This is a
nonprobational offense so it would have to be a minimum prison sentence of 4 years.
It would not exceed 15 years. You would be serving 85 percent and parole, or,
mandatory supervised release, at the end, would be three years to life. It would not
determine how much until the end of your sentence. You understand that’s what you
could have faced.”
Defendant acknowledged the court’s statement and said that he understood. The trial court did
not admonish defendant that he was required to register as a sexual offender under SORA.
¶4 The prosecutor provided the factual basis for the plea, which showed that Coffee provided
a statement indicating that defendant sexually assaulted her by force on February 8, 2015.
Within hours of the attack, Coffee went to the hospital, where a rape kit was collected. She
also identified defendant as her attacker. A buccal swab collected from the defendant matched
the DNA analysis of the sperm collected during Coffee’s examination.
¶5 The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced defendant to eight years in prison.
The written sentencing order noted that defendant was subject to “3 years to life Mandatory
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Supervised Release (parole),” and a box next to “[s]ex offender registration pursuant to statute”
was also checked.
¶6 Within 30 days, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea and vacate judgment.
Defendant alleged that Loeffel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by (1) failing to
discuss or acknowledge defendant’s options to prepare for a better defense, (2) rushing
defendant to take a plea because Loeffel was not prepared for trial, and (3) failing to present a
witness whose testimony would have changed the outcome of the case. Defendant asked for
leave to withdraw his plea and for the court to appoint new counsel.
¶7 At the hearing on defendant’s motion, Loeffel presented a motion stating that defendant
had raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and asking the court to review them under
People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). During the hearing, Loeffel acknowledged that
defendant’s pro se motion alleged that he was ineffective and suggested that another attorney
be appointed to review the allegations. In response to the court’s questioning, defendant
expressed his frustration with the guilty plea process and affirmed that he wished to withdraw
his plea. He stated, “I just kind of feel like the negotiation process didn’t go—wasn’t a two
way, and I didn’t kind of understand everything, you know, didn’t explain everything to me. I
feel like that I was just kind of left in the blind about certain things.” At the conclusion of
defendant’s testimony, the court assigned new counsel and ordered a transcript of the plea
hearing.
¶8 Newly appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw defendant’s plea. The motion alleged
that Loeffel was ineffective and that defendant felt compelled to plead guilty due to Loeffel’s
deficient representation. The motion claimed that Loeffel (1) failed to request a continuance to
obtain Facebook evidence of a conversation defendant had with Coffee hours after the alleged
attack and (2) failed to contact defendant’s caseworker, Ron Valle, who had access to
defendant’s Facebook account. Defendant claimed the conversation would have demonstrated
that he had consensual intercourse with Coffee. The motion also claimed that defendant’s plea
was not knowing and voluntary because Loeffel did not explain the terms of MSR to defendant.
¶9 At the hearing on the motion, counsel stated that he tried to obtain the Facebook
information to present to the court as proof of a meritorious defense but was unable to do so
because the account had been erased. He acknowledged that defendant had been properly
admonished regarding MSR but argued that defendant did not understand that the department
could keep him in prison for life if he was unable to obtain approved housing.
¶ 10 Defendant testified that he would not have pled guilty but for Loeffel’s ineffective
representation. He stated that he asked Loeffel to obtain the messages from his Facebook
account before trial but Loeffel failed to do so. When Loeffel was unable to get the Facebook
messages, defendant asked him to request a continuance, and Loeffel refused. Defendant also
noted that he did not understand the effect the sex offender registration would have on his MSR
term when he accepted the plea:
“[Loeffel] explained to me that everybody that would be charged would get this and
that after I come out that I could be on parole for life. That’s all he said, was that
everybody gets it and after I get out I could have life on parole, that once a sex offender,
always a sex offender.”
¶ 11 Defendant admitted that the court admonished him that the MSR term was three years to
life. But he testified that he did not understand that he could remain in prison indefinitely if he
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was unable to find suitable housing as a registered sex offender. He stated that, had he known
about the practical effects of the MSR term, he would have gone to trial.
¶ 12 On cross-examination, defendant recalled being shown a picture of Coffee. He told the
officers that he did not remember her and that he was in a relationship with another woman.
When asked if he had sex with her, he said that he did not know the victim and that he did not
have sex with her. Defendant admitted that he was now, at the motion to withdraw hearing,
admitting that he had sex with Coffee. He testified that his statement to police that he did not
know the victim or have sex with her was a misunderstanding. He also admitted that he did not
remember the Facebook messages when he spoke with officers two weeks after the incident.
¶ 13 On redirect, defendant stated that he would not have pled guilty had Loeffel obtained the
Facebook communications and if he had understood that he potentially could remain in prison
indefinitely under his MSR term.
¶ 14 The trial court then questioned defendant. The court asked defendant how he met the
victim, and he said that she reached out to him through a Facebook request on his cell phone.
Defendant then informed the court that he did not have his cell phone with him when he spoke
with police a few weeks after the incident and that he no longer had possession of it. Defendant
said he met with his social worker, Ron Valle, and he told him about the Facebook messages.
Valle followed up and told defendant that he had seen the messages. Defendant could not
explain why he did not retrieve the message from his cell phone on his own.
¶ 15 The trial court noted that defendant’s demeanor during his testimony “belie[d] him” and
that “his answers did not make sense.” The court reviewed the allegations in the motion and
defendant’s testimony and denied the motion to withdraw the plea.
¶ 16 ANALYSIS
¶ 17 I. Evaluating Defendant’s Proffered Defense
¶ 18 Defendant argues that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard to its consideration
of his meritorious defense in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate judgment. He
contends that, although the trial court had discretion to allow him to withdraw his plea, it
abused that discretion by going beyond the legal sufficiency of his proffered defense and
improperly considering the merits of his case.
¶ 19 A defendant does not enjoy an absolute right to withdraw his or her guilty plea. People v.
Ferral-Mujica, 2017 IL App (2d) 160240, ¶ 22. To the contrary, the defendant bears the burden
of demonstrating to the trial court the necessity of withdrawing it. People v. Dougherty, 394
Ill. App. 3d 134, 140 (2009). Leave to withdraw a guilty plea is granted as required to correct
a manifest injustice under the facts of the case. Ferral-Mujica, 2017 IL App (2d) 160240, ¶ 22.
A defendant is allowed to withdraw a plea only if it appears that (1) the defendant pled guilty
due to a misapprehension of the facts or the law, (2) there is doubt as to the defendant’s guilt,
(3) the defendant has a meritorious defense, or (4) the ends of justice will be best served by
submitting the case to a jury. People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 244 (1991). If a motion to
withdraw is properly filed, the trial court should consider the motion on the merits. See People
v. Thigpen, 211 Ill. 2d 609 (2004) (supervisory order); People v. Crete, 133 Ill. App. 3d 24, 32
(1985). We will reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea only if we
conclude that the court abused its discretion. Dougherty, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 140.
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¶ 20 Here, in his motion to withdraw his plea, defendant alleged that he had a meritorious
defense. He claimed that certain Facebook messages from Coffee were exculpatory evidence
pertaining to a consent defense, and he testified at the motion to withdraw hearing in support
of that claim. The trial court considered that defendant claimed the messages were on his cell
phone, that he claimed he did not have his phone with him during the police interview, and
that he could have obtained the messages himself but failed to recover them. Defendant also
admitted that he waited until only weeks before trial to ask Loeffel to retrieve the messages
from Facebook and Loeffel was unable to do so. The court then concluded that defendant failed
to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate the necessity of allowing him to withdraw his
plea. The trial court found that defendant’s testimony was not sufficient evidence of a
meritorious defense to demonstrate a necessity for allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea.
We cannot say that the court abused its discretion or applied an incorrect legal standard in
reaching that conclusion by considering the merits of defendant’s proposed defense. See
People v. Feldman, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1124, 1128-29 (2011) (determination of whether evidence
of meritorious defense demonstrates necessity for allowing defendant to withdraw guilty plea
requires assessment of evidence in support of proposed defense).
¶ 21 Defendant cites Gearhart v. United States, 272 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1959), which warned
against weighing the merits of a proffered defense when considering a motion to withdraw. Id.
at 502. However, the rule espoused in Gearhart has been rejected by subsequent cases. See
Bennett v. United States, 726 A.2d 156, 168 (D.C. 1999); White v. United States, 863 A.2d
839, 842 (D.C. 2004) (trial court is entrusted with an initial assessment of defendant’s assertion
of innocence).
¶ 22 Moreover, Illinois courts have not adopted Gearhart’s rationale. In People v. Brown, 2017
IL 121681, our supreme court reviewed a case involving erroneous advice by counsel prior to
a guilty plea regarding the percentage of the sentence defendant would serve. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. The
court stated, “when reviewing an ineffective assistance claim related to a defendant’s defense
strategy or chance of acquittal, i.e., a defendant’s prospects at trial, the court requires a claim
of innocence or a plausible defense to establish prejudice.” Id. ¶ 45.
¶ 23 As stated by our supreme court in Davis and subsequent appellate court decisions, the trial
court’s task is to determine whether defendant had a “meritorious defense.” See Davis, 145 Ill.
2d at 244; Dougherty, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 140; Feldman, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 1128-29. In this
case, the trial court did not apply the wrong legal standard by considering the merits of
defendant’s proffered defense in denying his motion to withdraw the plea.
¶ 24 II. Whether Defendant’s Plea Was Knowingly and Intelligently Made
¶ 25 Next, defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea where the record demonstrates that his plea was not knowingly and
intelligently made. He claims that his plea was not made voluntarily because the trial court
failed to adequately admonish him regarding the mandatory registration requirements under
SORA and the effect those requirements could have on his term of MSR. 1
Defendant also claims that the trial court failed to properly admonish him under the Sexually
1
Violent Persons Commitment Act (SVP Act) (725 ILCS 207/20 et seq. (West 2016)). We decline to
address that claim, however, because the record indicates that defendant was not convicted under the
SVP Act.
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¶ 26 A trial court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion to vacate his guilty plea is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 519 (2009). In that context, the
failure to properly admonish a defendant, standing alone, does not automatically establish
grounds for reversing the judgment or vacating the plea. When a defendant alleges that
inadequate admonishments have been given, due process concerns arise, and we must
determine whether the plea was made voluntarily and intelligently. People v. Guzman, 2015
IL 118749, ¶ 16. With respect to voluntariness, the important knowledge the trial court must
impart to the defendant prior to accepting a plea includes only the direct consequences of the
guilty plea. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 520.
¶ 27 Direct consequences of a guilty plea are limited to penal consequences, and our supreme
court has held that SORA and related laws are not punitive. People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski,
233 Ill. 2d 185, 207 (2009). As such, registration as a sex offender is a collateral consequence
of a defendant’s conviction and does not give a defendant standing to challenge his conviction.
See People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 387-89 (1991); People v. Cowart, 2015 IL App (1st)
131073, ¶ 20; People v. Steward, 406 Ill. App. 3d 82, 90 (2010). Whether a defendant could
be subject to incarceration during any portion of his or her MSR term is also a collateral
consequence of a defendant’s guilty plea, and the trial court is not required to inform a
defendant of that consequence prior to accepting the plea. See People v. Boykins, 2017 IL
121365, ¶¶ 19-20; People v. Isringhaus, 38 Ill. App. 3d 535, 537 (1976). The trial court is only
required to inform a defendant of the MSR term itself because it is part of the sentence imposed
by the court; in other words, it is a direct consequence of the defendant’s plea. Isringhaus, 38
Ill. App. 3d at 536-37.
¶ 28 In this case, defendant’s argument that the admonishments were inadequate fails to
demonstrate that his guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently made. First, the absence
of SORA admonishments does not invalidate defendant’s guilty plea. Sex offender registration
is a collateral consequence of defendant’s conviction. See Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 387-89;
Cowart, 2015 IL App (1st) 131073, ¶ 20. Thus, the trial court’s failure to admonish defendant
regarding SORA registration and restrictions does not render defendant’s guilty plea
unknowing or involuntary.
¶ 29 Turning to the MSR admonishments, defendant was advised by the court that MSR would
apply and that the term would range from three years to natural life in prison. See 730 ILCS
5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2014). Any potential effect SORA registration might have on defendant’s
MSR term is also a collateral consequence, and the trial court was not required to inform
defendant of that consequence prior to accepting his plea. Thus, no due process violation
occurred in defendant’s admonishments that would render his guilty plea unknowing or
involuntary.
¶ 30 Defendant recognizes our supreme court’s position that SORA requirements are not
punitive. See Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 207. But he argues that the 2106 SORA-related laws are
much more onerous and that the additional restrictions are punitive. We agree that the current
SORA-related statutes are punitive. See People v. Cetwinski, 2018 IL App (3d) 160174, ¶¶ 50-
54 (current statutory scheme of lifetime penalties to which sex offenders are subject constitutes
punishment under the eighth amendment and proportionate penalties clause). Defendant,
however, entered his guilty plea in 2015. He was not admonished under the current SORA-
related laws, and as we have concluded below, the recent amendments to the admonishments
under section 113-4(c) do not apply retroactively to his guilty plea proceeding. Therefore, we
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cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea based on inadequate admonishments.
¶ 31 III. Counsel’s Effectiveness
¶ 32 Defendant claims that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because counsel was
ineffective in failing to explain the mandatory restrictions of SORA and the consequences of
those restrictions on his term of MSR.
¶ 33 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that
(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the
deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant such that, but for counsel’s errors,
a different result would have been reached. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984).
¶ 34 Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be reviewed on direct appeal
unless “the record is incomplete or inadequate for resolving the claim.” People v. Veach, 2017
IL 120649, ¶ 46. Defendants are required to raise ineffective assistance claims on direct review
if the claims are apparent on the record or risk forfeiture. See People v. Kokoraleis, 159 Ill. 2d
325, 328 (1994). However, procedural default does not preclude a defendant from raising an
issue on collateral review that depends on facts not found in the record. Veach, 2017 IL 120649,
¶ 47. If the record is incomplete or inadequate, ineffective assistance of counsel claims may be
better suited to review under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2016)). See Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 46; People v. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d 122, 135 (2008)
(ineffective assistance claims may be better suited to collateral proceedings when the record is
inadequate). Collateral review is appropriate for deciding ineffective assistance claims if the
necessary facts are not in the trial record. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d at 135 (ineffective assistance claim
raised on direct appeal more appropriately raised under the Act).
¶ 35 In Veach, our supreme court noted that ineffective assistance claims may sometimes be
better suited to collateral proceedings but only when the record is incomplete or inadequate for
resolving the issue. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 46. There, the defendant claimed that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by stipulating to the admission of recorded statements
of the State’s two main witnesses. The record on direct appeal contained defense counsel’s
reason for stipulating to the admission of the recorded statements. Defense counsel stated on
the record that he believed the use of the recordings for impeachment opened the door for the
State to admit character evidence and prior inconsistent statements. With that statement, the
court concluded that the record was sufficient to resolve defendant’s ineffective assistance
claim on direct review. Id. ¶¶ 50-51.
¶ 36 Here, the record is not adequate for us to resolve defendant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. The record is silent as to whether Loeffel informed defendant about the SORA
requirements and the effects of pleading guilty to sexual assault or how those requirements
could impact his term of MSR. To resolve defendant’s claim, this court would need to guess
as to whether that information was provided to defendant. Unlike Veach, the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim defendant raises cannot be addressed on the record because defense
counsel did not testify as to his conversations with defendant prior to defendant’s decision to
accept the plea. Loeffel did not testify at the hearing before new counsel was appointed, nor
did he testify at the motion to withdraw hearing.
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¶ 37 Under these circumstances, we find that defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is better
suited to a collateral proceeding. Further, we see no risk of forfeiture on collateral review.
Although issues that could have been raised and considered on direct review are deemed
procedurally defaulted, procedural default does not preclude a defendant from raising an issue
on collateral review that depends on facts not found in the record. See id. ¶ 47; People v.
Thomas, 38 Ill. 2d 321, 323-24 (1967). This case falls within that category.
¶ 38 IV. Admonishments
¶ 39 Last, defendant asks this court to find that the recent amendment to section 113-4 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/113-4 (West 2016)) should be
applied retroactively to his guilty plea proceeding.
¶ 40 Effective January 1, 2017, the General Assembly amended section 113-4(c) of the Code.
Pub. Act 99-871 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017) (amending 725 ILCS 5/113-4). The new version of the
statute requires the trial court to inform the defendant of certain consequences of pleading
guilty before accepting the defendant’s guilty plea:
“(c) If the defendant pleads guilty such plea shall not be accepted until the court
shall have fully explained to the defendant the following:
(1) the maximum and minimum penalty provided by law for the offense which
may be imposed by the court;
(2) as a consequence of a conviction or a plea of guilty, the sentence for any
future conviction may be increased or there may be a higher possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences;
(3) as a consequence of a conviction or a plea of guilty, there may be
registration requirements that restrict where the defendant may work, live, or be
present; and
(4) as a consequence of a conviction or a plea of guilty, there may be an impact
upon the defendant’s ability to, among others:
(A) retain or obtain housing in the public or private market;
(B) retain or obtain employment; and
(C) retain or obtain a firearm, an occupational license, or a driver’s license.”
725 ILCS 5/113-4(c) (West 2016).
¶ 41 In People v. Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, our supreme court reviewed the proper analysis
courts must employ when determining the temporal reach of a statute and noted the adoption
of the analysis in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). Hunter, 2017 IL
121306, ¶¶ 19-22. Under Landgraf, courts must first ask whether the legislature has clearly
indicated the statute’s temporal reach; if so, the legislature’s intent will be given effect. See id.
¶ 20. If the legislature’s intent is not clear, the court must then determine whether the statute
has a retroactive impact, i.e., whether the statute “would impair rights a party possessed when
he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. If there is no
retroactive impact, the amendment may be applied retroactively, but if there is a retroactive
impact, the court presumes that the legislature intended the amendment to apply prospectively.
Id.
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¶ 42 Hunter, however, acknowledged that section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4
(West 2016)) actually renders the second prong of the Landgraf analysis unnecessary. Hunter,
2017 IL 121306, ¶ 21. Section 4 provides:
“No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, *** or any right accrued, or
claim arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect any such offense
or act so committed or done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or
any right accrued, or claim arising before the new law takes effect, save only that the
proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the
time of such proceeding.” 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016).
Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes is a general savings clause, which has been interpreted as
meaning that, unless the legislature has expressly indicated the temporal reach of an
amendment, procedural changes to statutes will be applied retroactively, while substantive
changes will only apply prospectively. People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729,
¶ 20. Thus, under the Statute on Statutes, substantive amendments may not be applied
retroactively, but procedural changes will apply retroactively to “ ‘ongoing proceedings.’ ” Id.
¶ 28 (quoting People v. Ziobro, 242 Ill. 2d 34, 46 (2011)).
¶ 43 Here, the statutory amendment to section 113-4(c) does not contain a specific date
designating its temporal reach. Our analysis is then governed by section 4 of the Statute on
Statutes, and we must determine whether the amendment is substantive or procedural. As this
court recently found in People v. Young, 2019 IL App (3d) 160528, the amendment to the
admonishment statute is procedural in nature. See id. ¶ 17 (noting that the changes to section
113-4(c) merely describe new practices, which direct the course of proceedings in the court
(citing Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, 122 Ill. 2d 303, 310-11 (1988))).
¶ 44 Since the changes are procedural, they may be applied retroactively to ongoing
proceedings. The question is whether defendant’s appeal qualifies as an “ongoing proceeding.”
See 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016). Hunter speaks to this issue as well. The defendant in that case
contested amendments to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 that changed the transfer requirements
of juveniles to adult court. The transfer proceedings were completed in 2011, but while the
defendant’s case was on appeal, the statute was amended in 2016. Defendant argued on appeal
that the procedural amendment should apply retroactively. The supreme court concluded that
“[b]ecause Hunter’s trial court proceedings have been concluded, and no further
trial court proceedings are necessitated by reversible error, applying the amended
statute retroactively to Hunter’s case would result in this court effectively creating new
proceedings for the sole purpose of applying a procedural statute that postdates his trial
and sentence. We have grave concerns about such a result.” Hunter, 2017 IL 121306,
¶ 33.
The court refused to apply the procedural amendment retroactively, noting that procedural
amendments should apply retroactively only “so far as practicable,” and it was not practicable
in that case. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 37.
¶ 45 In this case, the retroactive application of the statute also lacks practicality. The
proceedings in the trial court were completed well before the statute was amended, and there
are no pending trial court motions or hearings to which the amended statute could apply.
Defendant pled guilty, was sentenced, and began serving his term of incarceration in 2015, and
his motion to withdraw was denied on July 12, 2016. One week later, he filed his notice of
appeal. At that time, the proceedings in the trial court were over. Six months later, the
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legislature enacted Public Act 99-817 and amended section 113-4(c). If we accept defendant’s
argument, we would remand this case to the trial court because it did not give admonishments
that were not included in the admonishment statute at the time the court accepted defendant’s
guilty plea. Following the rationale in Hunter, we conclude that such a result is concerning and
impractical.
¶ 46 CONCLUSION
¶ 47 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
¶ 48 Affirmed.
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