People v. Steele

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
People v. Steele, 2014 IL App (1st) 121452Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption RODNEY STEELE, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Third Division
Docket No. 1-12-1452
Filed September 30, 2014
Rehearing denied October 10, 2014
Held On appeal from defendant’s convictions for aggravated battery to a
(Note: This syllabus peace officer and three merged counts of aggravated fleeing and
constitutes no part of the eluding a peace officer arising from an incident in which he was
opinion of the court but stopped at a late-night traffic safety check for a seat belt violation, but
has been prepared by the he sped away rather than pull aside so a citation could be written and,
Reporter of Decisions in the course of fleeing, an officer was thrown from defendant’s car
for the convenience of into oncoming traffic, the appellate court reduced his aggravated
the reader.) battery conviction to battery based on the State’s failure to present
sufficient evidence of “great bodily harm,” two of the aggravated
fleeing and eluding convictions were vacated due to the absence of
evidence that he was driving 21 miles per hour over the speed limit
and that he disobeyed traffic signals, and the cause was remanded for
resentencing on the battery conviction; furthermore, the appellate
court rejected defendant’s contention that his counsel was ineffective
in dealing with the evidence related to the injured officer and found
that the trial court did not err in failing to sua sponte conduct a Krankel
hearing.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-CR-11782; the
Review Hon. James B. Linn, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed in part, vacated in part and modified in part; cause remanded
for a new sentencing hearing.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Kathleen Weck, all of
Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Christine Cook, and Mary Beth Kinnerk, Assistant State’s Attorneys,
of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Pucinski and Justice Lavin concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In June 2011, Chicago police conducted a late-night traffic safety check–pulling cars over
for seat belt violations and other obvious infractions–in Chicago’s River West neighborhood, a
popular late-night area. Defendant, Rodney Steele, was stopped by police officers for failing to
wear a seat belt. When asked to pull to the side so a citation could be issued, Steele hit the
accelerator, ran into Chicago police officer Alvin Porrata, and sped off. Several police officers
pursued Steele to the south side of Chicago, where he ditched the car and was later caught on
foot.
¶2 Steele was charged with two counts of attempted murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(b)(1)
(West 2010)) (counts I and II), one count of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4 (West 2010))
(count III), and three counts of aggravated fleeing and eluding a peace officer by attempting to
elude the police at a rate of speed at least 21 miles per hour over the legal speed limit (625
ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1) (West 2010)) (count IV), causing bodily injury to any individual (625
ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(2) (West 2010)) (count V), and disobeying two or more official traffic
control devices (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(4) (West 2010)) (count VI).
¶3 Officer Porrata was taken to the hospital and discharged a few hours later. Although
Porrata had been thrown from the car into oncoming traffic, his hospital discharge report stated
he was treated only for bruises to his knees and arm. At trial, however, Porrata testified, over
defense counsel’s objection, that he tore ligaments in both knees and in his right shoulder and
needed surgery to remove bone fragments from his shoulder. After a bench trial, Steele was
acquitted on the attempted murder charge but convicted of aggravated battery and aggravated
fleeing and eluding a peace officer and received concurrent sentences of nine years and three
years, respectively.
¶4 Steele contends his conviction for aggravated battery should be reversed because the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause great bodily harm to
Porrata, where the evidence showed him trying to flee the scene and not injure the officer.
Alternatively, Steele argues the State failed to prove great bodily harm beyond a reasonable
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doubt because the medical evidence showed Porrata only had leg and arm abrasions. He asks
us to reduce his aggravated battery conviction from a Class 1 felony conviction to a Class 2
felony conviction.
¶5 Steele also contends the trial court erred in allowing Porrata to testify about his injuries
because he was not qualified as a medical expert and that his trial counsel was ineffective for
not moving for discovery sanctions or asking for a continuance when Porrata’s testimony on
the severity of his injuries differed from the State’s medical evidence provided in discovery.
Steele further contends his defense counsel created a per se conflict of interest by raising his
own ineffectiveness at trial during a posttrial hearing and the case should be remanded either
for another motion for a new trial with new counsel or a hearing under People v. Krankel, 102
Ill. 2d 181 (1984), to determine if his trial counsel rendered effective assistance. Lastly, Steele
asserts two of his three convictions for aggravated fleeing and eluding should be dismissed
because the State failed to prove each element of the charged offenses.
¶6 We modify in part, affirm in part, and vacate in part. Although the State proved Steele
intentionally drove into Porrata causing bodily injuries, it failed to present sufficient evidence
that Porrata suffered “great bodily injury.” Thus, we reduce his aggravated battery conviction
to a battery conviction and remand for resentencing. We affirm Steele’s conviction and
sentence on one of the aggravated fleeing and eluding a peace officer counts but find the State
failed to present sufficient evidence to prove all of the elements on the two other aggravated
fleeing and eluding a peace officer counts and vacate those convictions.
¶7 BACKGROUND
¶8 On June 13, 2011, Chicago police officers were conducting a traffic safety checkpoint in
the River West area of the city, near the six-corner intersection of Kingsbury Street, Sheffield
Avenue and Weed Street. This area contains several late-night bars, restaurants, and clubs. Six
to ten uniformed Chicago police officers worked at the checkpoint or were stationed on foot
throughout the well-lit intersection. Marked squad cars with emergency lights illuminated took
positions at the intersection. When vehicles stopped at the intersection’s stop signs, officers
approached to check for violations. The officers directed vehicles with violations to a staging
area on Weed Street, where citations were issued.
¶9 At about 2:10 a.m., Steele, alone in a black Jaguar heading southbound on Kingsbury
Street, approached the six-corner intersection. (Although Steele did not own the car and it had
been reported stolen, Steele was not charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle.)
Officer Wagner testified that at the intersection, he approached Steele’s car from the passenger
side and told Steele he was being stopped for failing to wear a seat belt. Wagner then asked for
Steele’s driver’s license and insurance card. Officer Porrata was in front of the Jaguar while
other officers stood on all sides. Officer Wagner testified Steele drove slowly while Officer
Christopher Rigan, who also was there, testified the vehicle lurched forward and Steele
ignored the officers’ orders to pull into the staging area. Wagner, having moved to the driver’s
side, spoke to Steele through the window. He thought Steele was stalling and being evasive so
he reached into the car in an attempt to open the driver’s side door. That’s when Steele pressed
the accelerator and ran into Officer Porrata, who landed on the car’s hood. Porrata tried to hang
on, but as Steele made a hard turn to the left, Porrata flew off the hood and landed in the street
underneath a taxicab traveling in the oncoming traffic lane.
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¶ 10 Steele fled westbound on North Avenue to the entrance of the Kennedy Expressway and
then headed southbound while pursued by Officer Rigan and his partner in an unmarked car
with the emergency lights activated. Steele continued onto the Dan Ryan Expressway. Rigan
saw him cross over four or five lanes of traffic and exit at 31st Street. Rigan exited at 35th
Street and headed north. He found the Jaguar abandoned in a parking lot near the expressway at
31st Street and Wentworth Avenue. Rigan and his partner conducted a grid search of the area
and found Steele in a nearby alley. They arrested Steele. He was charged with two counts of
attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(b)(1) (West 2010)); one count of
aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 2010)); and three counts of aggravated fleeing
or attempt to elude a peace officer while (1) traveling at least 21 miles per hour over the legal
speed limit, (2) causing bodily injury, and (3) disobeying two or more official traffic control
devices (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1), (2), (4) (West 2010)).
¶ 11 Steele waived his right to a jury, and during his bench trial, Porrata, Wagner, Rigan and
two eyewitnesses–the taxi driver and his passenger–testified about what occurred that night.
Police surveillance videotape captured the incident, which the State admitted into evidence.
The witnesses generally agreed on the sequence of events that led to Steele’s arrest. Porrata
testified that when Steele drove into him, he tried to step out of the way, but Steele stepped on
the accelerator and Porrata became pinned to the car’s hood. Porrata tried to hold on and felt
that he was being sucked under the car. Then Steele sharply turned the car to the left, throwing
Porrata underneath an oncoming taxicab.
¶ 12 Porrata stated that before this incident he was an active person and worked out two hours a
day for five days a week. Over defense counsel’s hearsay objection, Porrata testified that as a
result of this incident, he had torn ligaments in both his knees and in his right shoulder and
loose bone fragments in his right shoulder. On cross-examination, Porrata acknowledged that
the hospital treated him just for elbow and knee abrasions and released him the same morning.
He also acknowledged he was not treated for more significant knee or shoulder injuries, nor
had he undergone surgery on his knee or shoulder. Steele did not testify.
¶ 13 Following closing arguments, the trial judge acquitted Steele of attempted first degree
murder, finding that the State failed to prove Steele intended to kill Officer Porrata. Instead, the
court held Steele guilty of aggravated battery of a peace officer causing great bodily harm,
noting that Porrata testified he had damaged leg ligaments and was “no longer the athlete that
he once was.” The trial judge also found Steele guilty on three counts of aggravated fleeing and
eluding of a peace officer.
¶ 14 Steele filed a motion asking the trial judge to reconsider his finding as to the aggravated
battery charge, arguing Porrata’s testimony regarding his torn shoulder and knee ligaments
constituted hearsay outside of an exception. Steele’s attorney asserted that to prove Porrata
suffered great bodily injury the State had to present the testimony of a treating physician. In his
motion, Steele also argued the State’s evidence regarding Porrata’s injuries amounted to a
discovery violation because all of the documents, medical records, and transcripts submitted to
the defense before trial indicated Porrata only had abrasions on his knee and nothing worse,
and that Porrata’s testimony was not credible because neither he nor the hospital indicated his
injuries were that serious and he was never treated for torn ligaments in his knee or shoulder.
As to the fleeing and eluding charges, Steele contended there was no evidence he was driving
at least 21 miles per hour over the speed limit and there was no evidence he disobeyed two or
more traffic control devices, necessary elements to those offenses.
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¶ 15 During the hearing on the motion to reconsider, Steele’s attorney told the trial judge that he
“may have been ineffective” by failing to point out at trial the discrepancies in the hospital
report regarding Porrata’s injuries and Porrata’s testimony. The trial judge responded there
was “no possible way you were ineffective whatsoever” and told defense counsel, “You don’t
need to argue your own incompetence.” At the hearing, trial counsel stated he was
“blindsided” at trial by Porrata’s testimony regarding torn ligaments and should have received
some notice or medical record to support Porrata’s testimony.
¶ 16 The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. As to Porrata’s testimony regarding his
injuries, the trial judge stated, even if Porrata had not said his ligaments were torn, “there was
enough about the things that happened to him, the things that he suffered as a result of this
incident. How his body felt so much differently and hasn’t felt the same since. That would be
enough to show great bodily harm.” The trial court then proceeded to sentencing. Porrata
testified in aggravation that before he was hit by Steele’s car, he had been in excellent physical
condition but is no longer able to work out like he used to. He stated that after being treated at
Northwestern Memorial Hospital he later saw the police department’s orthopedic surgeon,
who told him he needed surgery on his shoulder. Porrata said he had not yet been able to have
the surgery but was on medication for his shoulder pain because the “shoulder is falling apart.”
The defense presented letters in mitigation. The trial judge then sentenced Steele as a Class X
offender under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8)
(West 2010)) to nine years in prison for aggravated battery to a peace officer. The court also
merged the three counts of aggravated fleeing and eluding of a peace officer and sentenced
Steele to three years on those counts, with the sentences to run concurrently. Steele filed a
motion to reconsider the sentence, which the trial court denied. Steele filed a timely notice of
appeal.
¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 Aggravated Battery
¶ 19 Steele concedes he struck Officer Porrata while fleeing the scene of the traffic safety
checkpoint, but contends his conviction for aggravated battery should be reversed or reduced
to, at most, reckless conduct because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he intended to cause Porrata great bodily harm. Alternatively, Steele contends that even if the
State presented sufficient evidence to show intent, the State failed to prove that Porrata
suffered great bodily harm where Porrata’s testimony that he tore ligaments in both of his
knees and his right shoulder was hearsay and was not supported by the hospital medical
records.
¶ 20 To sustain a conviction on criminal charges, the State must prove every element of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. The
court must determine whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979); People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004). It is not the court’s function to
retry the defendant or to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. People v. Evans, 209
Ill. 2d 194, 209 (2004). The trial court is responsible for assessing the credibility of witnesses,
determining the appropriate weight to give to testimony, and resolving inconsistencies in the
evidence. Id. at 211. Reversal is justified when the evidence is “so unsatisfactory, improbable
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or implausible” to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. People v. Slim, 127 Ill.
2d 302, 307 (1989).
¶ 21 Under section 12-3(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code), a battery is committed when a
person “knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an
individual.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) (West 2010). Aggravated battery is, of course, a more
serious offense that is separated into two general categories. One category, embodied in
subsection 12-4(a) of the Code, creates the offense of aggravated battery by both the nature of
the act and its result–“causes great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement”–and
it is that result which elevates the battery to an aggravated battery. 720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West
2010). A second category, embodied in subsections 12-4(b), 12-4(c), 12-4(d), 12-4(d-3), and
12-4(d-5), centers only on the nature of the act–a “simple battery” in subsection 12-4(b) and
other acts specified in subsections 12-4(c), 12-4(d), 12-4(d-3), and 12-4(d-5)–together with
surrounding circumstances, such as the location of the offense or the age, occupation, or
physical state of the victim, which elevate the crime to an aggravated battery. For instance,
under section 12-4(b)(18) a person commits aggravated battery by committing a battery
against someone known “to be an officer or employee of the State of Illinois [or] a unit of local
government *** engaged in the performance of his or her authorized duties” (720 ILCS
5/12-4(b)(18) (West 2010)), such as a police officer.
¶ 22 Defendant Acted Knowingly
¶ 23 The State charged Steele under section 12-4(a) of the Code. 720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West
2010). (The State could have but opted not to charge Steele under section 12-4(b)(18) (720
ILCS 5/12-4(b)(18) (West 2010)) because Porrata was a police officer.) Section 12-4(a)
requires the State to prove a defendant intentionally or knowingly caused great bodily harm.
720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 2010). A person acts knowingly if he or she is consciously aware
that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause great bodily harm. People v. Vazquez, 315
Ill. App. 3d 1131, 1133 (2000). In contrast, a person acts recklessly if he or she consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the victim would be harmed. People v.
Moore, 358 Ill. App. 3d 683, 688 (2005). Where the defendant denies intent, as here, the State
may prove the defendant’s intent through circumstantial evidence. People v. Phillips, 392 Ill.
App. 3d 243, 259 (2009). Intent can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, the
defendant’s words, the weapon used, and the force of the blow. People v. Conley, 187 Ill. App.
3d 234, 242 (1989).
¶ 24 Steele contends the evidence shows he acted recklessly, but not knowingly or intentionally,
when he drove into Porrata because he was attempting to flee the scene and striking Porrata
was an inadvertent result of his fleeing. Thus, Steele asserts his conviction for aggravated
battery should be reversed or reduced to a Class 2 felony of reckless conduct. We disagree.
¶ 25 The evidence sufficiently supports the trial court’s finding that Steele acted knowingly or
intentionally. Although, as Steele asserts, no evidence indicates he made threats to the police
officers indicating he intended to injure any of them, the circumstances surrounding the
incident show he had the requisite intent under section 12-4(a) of the Code. 720 ILCS
5/12-4(a) (West 2010). Testimony at trial showed that Steele was stopped by police officers
and directed to proceed to a staging area so an officer could issue a ticket. Rather than comply
with the request, Steele inched the car forward and, after Officer Wagner reached into the car,
Steele hit the accelerator, ramming into Porrata, who was standing directly in front of it. Given
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the proximity of Officer Porrata and other officers to the car, Steele must have been
consciously aware that hitting the accelerator and driving straight at Porrata was practically
certain to cause bodily harm. Further, after Porrata became pinned to the hood of the car, Steele
made a sharp U-turn that threw Porrata off and into oncoming traffic. Even if Steele had not
intended to initially strike Porrata and only intended to flee the scene, his driving maneuver
dislodged Porrata from the vehicle’s hood and directly into oncoming traffic–showing that he
knowingly or intentionally caused bodily harm.
¶ 26 Great Bodily Harm
¶ 27 Under section 12-4(a) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 2010)), the State was also
required to prove that Porrata’s injuries amounted to “great bodily harm.” Steele contends the
State failed to do so because the photographic evidence and medical report showed he suffered
nothing more than abrasions to his knees and elbow. Steele asserts that although Porrata
testified that he had torn ligaments in both legs and his shoulder, that testimony constitutes
inadmissible hearsay and was not corroborated by the medical evidence. Steele further
contends that on cross-examination Porrata acknowledged that on the day of the incident, he
was told he only sustained bruises and abrasions. Accordingly, in the absence of evidence of
great bodily harm, Steel asks that his conviction be reduced from a Class 1 to a Class 2 felony.
¶ 28 As noted, the aggravated battery statute contains two separate categories. A conviction
under section 12-4(a) requires proof of “great bodily harm,” an injury of a greater and more
serious nature than simple battery and centers on the injuries the victim actually received. In re
J.A., 336 Ill. App. 3d 814, 815 (2003). In the context of aggravated battery, great bodily harm
has been held not susceptible of precise legal definition. People v. Figures, 216 Ill. App. 3d
398, 401 (1991). Bodily harm as it relates to ordinary battery requires “some sort of physical
pain or damage to the body, like lacerations, bruises or abrasions.” People v. Mays, 91 Ill. 2d
251, 256 (1982). Great bodily harm then must be more serious or grave than lacerations,
bruises, or abrasions. In re J.A., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 817. We review the evidence of great bodily
harm in the light most favorable to the State, to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the element proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Jessica M., 399 Ill.
App. 3d 730, 736 (2010).
¶ 29 The State did not prove the element of great bodily harm beyond a reasonable doubt. The
medical report from Northwestern Memorial Hospital shows doctors treated Porrata for
abrasions on his knees and discharged him a few hours later, at 5:58 a.m. The State entered into
evidence a photograph showing Porrata also had abrasions on his right elbow. These injuries
alone fall short of constituting great bodily harm. In re J.A., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 817 (great
bodily harm more serious or grave than lacerations, bruises, or abrasions).
¶ 30 At trial, Porrata testified to injuries more severe than bruises and abrasions, stating that he
had torn ligaments in both knees and in his right shoulder and bone fragments in his right
shoulder. While these injuries would likely be sufficient to support a finding that Porrata
suffered great bodily harm, that finding here was erroneous because it is not supported by the
record. As noted, the hospital report did not indicate Porrata had suffered torn ligaments and,
as Porrata acknowledged on cross-examination, he was not diagnosed at that time as having
torn ligaments in his knees or shoulder.
¶ 31 During the sentencing hearing, Porrata did state that some time after being treated at
Northwestern Memorial Hospital, he saw another doctor who diagnosed him with torn
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ligaments and advised him to have surgery on his shoulder. He also said he suffered a lot of
pain and took pain medications. But this was not “evidence at the trial” because it was argued
as aggravation during sentencing. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Ybarra, 156
Ill. App. 3d 996, 1005 (1987). If Porrata received a medical diagnosis showing more serious
injuries than originally thought, the State needed to have offered scans, X-rays, medical
reports, or medical testimony, something, to show that diagnosis. Generally, it is not necessary
to present expert testimony on the issue of causation when the relationship between cause and
effect is readily apparent based on common knowledge and experience. People v. Anderson,
95 Ill. App. 3d 143, 148 (1981). But where the question of causation is beyond the general
understanding of the public, the prosecution must present expert evidence. Id. Because Porrata
was treated at a hospital and released with only abrasions and bruising, the cause of the injuries
to which he testified–torn ligaments and loose bone fragments in his shoulder–would not be
readily apparent based on common knowledge and experience. Thus, expert testimony that the
incident with Steele caused Porrata’s injuries was required.
¶ 32 Further, assuming Porrata was diagnosed with those injuries in the months following the
incident, the State also should have provided that evidence to the defense before trial. Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 415(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 1971) imposes on a party a continuing duty to disclose
to the other party (and the court if trial has already commenced) any additional material or
information which is subject to disclosure. Indeed, had the State obtained evidence showing
Porrata was diagnosed with more severe injuries after his initial hospital visit, the State was
obligated to provide that evidence to the defense before Porrata testified.
¶ 33 At trial, defense counsel objected to Porrata’s testimony on hearsay grounds (and also
raised the issue in his posttrial motions) but the trial judge overruled the objection. Porrata
contends the trial court erred in permitting Porrata to testify about his medical diagnosis. We
agree.
¶ 34 Generally, this court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion
standard. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001). But a trial court’s ruling on whether a
statement is hearsay may be reviewed de novo when that determination does not involve fact
finding or weighing the credibility of the witnesses. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d 105,
109 (1994). In ruling on defense counsel’s hearsay objection, the trial judge stated, “No,
[Porrata] can talk about his own body. One of the allegations is aggravated battery with great
bodily harm to a peace officer, knowing he [or she] was a peace officer. These are elements of
the offense and he can talk about–anybody can talk about their own bodies.” We agree that
Porrata was competent to testify about his physical condition since the accident and any
adverse effects from it. Ill. R. Evid. 803(3) (eff. Apr. 26, 2012) (excluding from hearsay rule
“[a] statement of the declarant’s then existing *** physical condition (such as *** pain, and
bodily health)”). But Porrata was not competent to testify about an apparent medical diagnosis
that he had torn ligaments or that those injuries were the result of this incident. Robinson v.
Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 104 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1026 (1982) (plaintiff could describe her
symptoms and physical limitations which she did not experience before her false
imprisonment at department store, and how she felt, but because plaintiff was not qualified as
expert, she was incompetent to testify regarding specific medical diagnoses).
¶ 35 Aside from the testimony by Porrata, the only evidence presented regarding Porrata’s
injuries–the discharge report from Northwestern Memorial Hospital and the State’s photo
exhibits–showed his injuries to (fortunately) be nothing more extensive than bruises and
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abrasions. Because Porrata’s testimony was the only evidence offered by the State and no
medical evidence supported his assertions that he suffered more extensive injures, the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Porrata suffered great bodily harm. But the State
did establish under section 12-3(a) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2010)) that Steele,
acting intentionally or knowingly without legal justification, caused bodily harm to Porrata,
and thus committed battery.
¶ 36 We reduce Steele’s conviction to battery as the lesser included offense of aggravated
battery (People v. Virgil, 19 Ill. App. 3d 744, 747 (1974)) and remand for a new sentencing
hearing.
¶ 37 Effective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 38 Steele next contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel
failed to ask for discovery sanctions against the State or a continuance when Porrata testified
that he had more serious injuries than indicated in the medical records tendered in discovery.
Generally, to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish: (1) counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel’s alleged
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). We accord substantial deference to an attorney’s decisions as there is a strong
presumption that an attorney acted adequately. Id. at 689. A defendant must overcome the
strong presumption the challenged action or inaction “might have been the product of sound
trial strategy.” People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999). Every effort must “be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Because effective assistance refers to competent and not perfect
representation, mistakes in trial strategy or judgment will not, of themselves, render the
representation incompetent. People v. Calhoun, 404 Ill. App. 3d 362, 383 (2010). To satisfy
the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must demonstrate that, but for defense
counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. If a reviewing court finds that the defendant did not suffer
prejudice, it need not decide whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.
People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 213 (1999).
¶ 39 Steele argues, as did trial counsel in a posttrial motion to reconsider, that the State may
have committed a discovery violation by not disclosing all of the medical records in its
possession because the medical records the State produced did not indicate torn knee and
shoulder ligaments. Steele’s trial counsel admitted the State blindsided him.
¶ 40 Steele also asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek sanctions against the
State for a discovery violation or request a continuance to prepare for trial in light of the new
evidence. Steele contends both prongs of the Strickland test are satisfied because (i) trial
counsel’s failure to seek discovery sanctions or a continuance to further investigate Porrata’s
surprise testimony fell below a reasonable level of representation and (ii) he was prejudiced by
his counsel’s failure to ask for a continuance so as to present any evidence to counter Porrata’s
testimony. We disagree.
¶ 41 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412 provides that on written motion of defense counsel, the
State shall disclose “any reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the
particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests,
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experiments, or comparisons, and a statement of qualifications of the expert.” Ill. S. Ct.
R. 412(a)(iv) (eff. Mar. 1, 2001). Supreme Court Rule 415(b) places a continuing duty to
disclose on the parties to disclose, providing that if a party discovers additional material or
information subject to disclosure, he or she must promptly notify the other party or his counsel
of the existence of the additional material. Ill. S. Ct. R. 415(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 1971). In his brief,
Steele acknowledges “the record is silent as to whether the State knew before trial that Porrata
would testify as he did or whether the State possessed additional medical reports about
Porrata’s injuries that it failed to disclose.” In the absence of evidence that the State had
medical reports that it failed to disclose, it is highly unlikely a motion for discovery sanctions
would have succeeded, and thus, Steele cannot show he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure
to request them.
¶ 42 Steele also contends his counsel was ineffective by failing to request a continuance to
further investigate Porrata’s testimony and the existence of medical records to substantiate his
claims. Initially, we note that during trial defense counsel cross-examined Porrata regarding
his injuries, asking whether on the day of the incident he was diagnosed with torn ligaments in
his knees and shoulder or whether he had surgeries for those injuries, and Porrata responded to
both inquiries that he had not. At the hearing on Steele’s posttrial motion to reconsider, defense
counsel suggested he may have been ineffective for failing to “bring out certain things”
contained in Porrata’s medical records. The trial judge responded there was “no way” trial
counsel was ineffective, noting he was prepared, skillful, and articulate and presented multiple
theories. In denying Steele’s posttrial motion, the trial judge stated, “even if [Porrata] had not
said my ligaments were torn *** I think there was enough about the differences that happened
to him, the things he suffered as a result of this incident. His body felt so much differently and
hasn’t felt the same since. That would have been enough to show great bodily harm.” These
comments indicate that a continuance to gather more information would not have been likely
to change the result, because the trial judge was inclined to find great bodily harm absent
Porrata’s testimony about torn ligaments. Thus, the trial judge’s comments, counsel’s success
in obtaining an acquittal on the two most serious charges, and that Steele cannot show a
continuance would have aided his case convince us that Steele has failed to show that the
representation in the trial court was constitutionally deficient or the result would have been
different had his counsel asked for a continuance.
¶ 43 In addition, Steele argues that he received ineffective assistance because trial counsel
argued his own ineffectiveness in the posttrial proceedings and asks us to remand for the
appointment of new counsel to represent him in a motion for a new trial. Alternatively, Steele
asks that the case be remanded for “an adequate Krankel inquiry.” A criminal defendant’s sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the right to conflict-free
representation. People v. Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d 356, 374 (2010). The Illinois Supreme Court has
identified two categories of conflicts of interest: per se and actual. Id. Steele claims counsel
had a per se conflict in arguing his own ineffectiveness. Once a per se conflict is found, there is
no need to show that the conflict affected the attorney’s actual performance. Id. at 374-75.
Unless a defendant waives his or her right to conflict-free representation, a per se conflict of
interest requires reversal. Id. at 375.
¶ 44 The Illinois Supreme Court has set out three situations where a per se conflict exists: (1)
where defense counsel has a prior or contemporaneous association with the victim, the
prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution; (2) where defense counsel
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contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; and (3) where defense counsel was a
former prosecutor who had been personally involved in the prosecution of defendant. Id. at
374. In People v. Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d 752, 761 (2011), the appellate court held that an
attorney alleging his own ineffectiveness does not fall within any of these three categories
recognized as per se conflicts of interests. In Perkins, as here, the defense counsel asserted his
own incompetence. In finding no per se conflict, the court noted that the defendant was
represented by different counsel on appeal, “who was unencumbered by any conflict in
arguing ineffective assistance by trial counsel and did so zealously.” Id. at 762.
¶ 45 Steele contends the Perkins rationale does not apply–although he is presented by new,
conflict-free counsel in this appeal, it appears from defense counsel’s statements at the
posttrial hearing that he had X-rays and range of motion studies performed on Porrata that
could have been used for impeachment purposes and his appellate counsel does not have
access to those documents. But, as noted, the trial judge stated that he would have found great
bodily injury even if Porrata had not testified regarding torn ligaments based on the effect the
incident had on his overall physical health (albeit during the sentencing phrase). Thus, Steele’s
trial counsel was not ineffective.
¶ 46 Defendant alternatively asks us to remand because the trial court erred in failing to conduct
a sua sponte Krankel inquiry into whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance
after defense counsel suggested in the posttrial motion that he may have been ineffective for
not properly using the medical records to impeach Porrata’s credibility about his injuries.
¶ 47 The supreme court’s decision in Krankel has led to the rule that when a defendant raises a
pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court should examine the
factual basis of the claim. People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-78 (2003). In the absence of a
sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by the defendant, that inquiry is required.
People v. Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d 68, 77 (2010). Steele did not make a pro se complaint; however,
he maintains that even where a defendant has not raised a claim of ineffectiveness, a trial court
has a duty to act sua sponte when the record provides a clear basis for an allegation of
ineffectiveness. In making that argument, Steele relies on People v. Williams, 224 Ill. App. 3d
517, 524 (1992).
¶ 48 In Williams, the defendant was found guilty of murder, and defense counsel filed a motion
for a new trial, informing the court of two witnesses who would have supported defendant’s
alibi defense that had not been called at trial in spite of his knowledge of their existence. Id. at
521-23. The trial court denied the motion. In doing so, the trial court rejected defense counsel’s
claim that these witnesses constituted new evidence, referring to counsel’s argument as
“ ‘ridiculous.’ ” Id. at 522. Before the appellate court, defendant argued that the trial court
erred in failing to conduct a sua sponte Krankel inquiry into defense counsel’s ineffectiveness,
which was readily apparent from counsel’s statements regarding the alibi witnesses he did not
call at trial. Id. at 523. The appellate court noted that the two witnesses would have provided
critical support of defendant’s alibi defense and that the trial court’s strong comments to
counsel indicated that it was made aware of counsel’s possible neglect. Id. at 524. The court
thus held that where the record discloses a clear basis for an allegation of ineffectiveness of
counsel, a defendant’s failure in explicitly making that allegation does not result in waiver, and
it remanded the case to the trial court for a preliminary investigation into defense counsel’s
performance. Id.
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¶ 49 Unlike in Williams, defense counsel’s statements did not concern Steele’s guilt or
innocence of the charged offense, and the court was not presented with evidence of defense
counsel neglecting to present witnesses or put on a defense. People v. Henney, 334 Ill. App. 3d
175, 190 (2002). Further, unlike in Williams, even if defense counsel had questioned Porrata
about his injuries and the medical reports, it is unlikely the outcome would have been different,
as the trial judge stated that he was convinced Porrata suffered great bodily injury even without
the evidence of torn ligaments. Under these circumstances, we find no error by the trial court in
failing to conduct a sua sponte Krankel inquiry.
¶ 50 Aggravated Fleeing and Eluding a Peace Officer
¶ 51 In addition to the aggravated battery charge, the State also charged Steele under section
11-204.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1 (West 2010)) with three counts of
aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer. Specifically, the State alleged that in
fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, Steele was travelling at a rate of speed at least 21
miles per hour over the legal speed limit (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(1) (West 2010)) (count IV),
caused bodily injury to an individual (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(2) (West 2010)) (count V), and
disobeyed two or more official traffic control devices (625 ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(4) (West
2010)) (count VI). The trial court convicted on all three counts and sentenced Steele to three
years on each count. Although the court merged the three counts, the mittimus reflects three
convictions. Steele contends the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as
to counts IV and VI and that the mittimus must be corrected to reflect the merger of the three
counts. Because we agree that the State failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to
counts IV and VI, we need not address the merger contention.
¶ 52 It is fundamental that the due process clause protects the accused against conviction unless
the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to encompass the crime
charged. People v. Carpenter, 228 Ill. 2d 250, 264 (2008). When a defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, the relevant question on review is whether,
after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2011). The trier of fact determines the credibility of
witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence, and this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on
these matters. People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005). If, after a careful examination of
the evidence, we “are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to establish the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we must reverse the conviction.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) People v. Hernandez, 312 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1036 (2000). Although
the determinations of the trier of fact are given great deference, they are not conclusive. People
v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001). We will set aside a criminal conviction if “the evidence is
so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of defendant’s
guilt.” Id.¶ 53 Steele concedes the evidence at trial proved that in fleeing the scene he caused bodily
injury to Porrata and thus does not contest his conviction as to count V. But he contends the
State presented no evidence that he was traveling at least 21 miles per hour over the speed limit
or that he disobeyed two or more traffic signals. We agree. Officer Rigan, who pursued Steele
from the scene of the traffic safety check until he found the car abandoned on the south side,
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testified he did not know and could not estimate how fast Steele traveled down the Kennedy
Expressway. Although Steele most likely was speeding, no testimony and no evidence at trial
indicates he drove at more than 21 miles per hour over the speed limit. Similarly, there was no
mention of traffic signals at trial and no testimony or evidence that Steele disobeyed at least
two of them. One can presume that a person fleeing the police may travel at a high rate of speed
and disobey multiple traffic signals. But, a trier of fact must determine a defendant’s guilt on
the evidence presented at the trial and not presume evidence when there is none. Due to the
absence of evidence on these two issues, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Steele was guilty as to counts IV and VI. Thus, we reverse those counts and affirm his
conviction as to count V. Because we are vacating two of the three aggravated fleeing and
eluding counts, we need not address Steele’s request that the mittimus be corrected due to the
one-act, one-crime violation.
¶ 54 CONCLUSION
¶ 55 In the absence of evidence to support Porrata’s testimony that he suffered torn knee and
shoulder ligaments, the State failed to present sufficient evidence of “great bodily harm” to
support a conviction under section 12-4(a) of the Code. 720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 2010).
Thus, we reduce Steele’s conviction to battery under section 12-3(a) of the Code (720 ILCS
5/12-3(a) (West 2010)) and remand for resentencing on that count. We also vacate two of the
aggravated fleeing and eluding counts and affirm the conviction and sentence on the third
aggravated fleeing and eluding count.
¶ 56 Affirmed in part, vacated in part and modified in part; cause remanded for a new
sentencing hearing.
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