Evans v. Godinez

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
Evans v. Godinez, 2014 IL App (4th) 130686Appellate Court WILLIAM EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S.A. GODINEZ, KEITH
Caption ANGLIN, and LAMAR COLEMAN, Defendants-Appellees.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-13-0686
Rule 23 Order filed June 18, 2014
Rule 23 Order
withdrawn December 1, 2014
Opinion filed December 1, 2014
Held Summary judgment was properly entered for defendant Department of
(Note: This syllabus Corrections officials and employees in plaintiff inmate’s action
constitutes no part of the alleging that the denial of his request for prison space and time to
opinion of the court but conduct Nation of Islam study groups and prayer sessions violated his
has been prepared by the rights under the first and fourteenth amendments, since defendants’
Reporter of Decisions decision to adhere to the requirements of the Administrative Code
for the convenience of with respect to the maintenance of safety and security at the
the reader.) correctional facility was reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest and would be deemed valid, despite the fact that an inmate’s
constitutional rights might be affected.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion County, No. 12-MR-41;
Review the Hon. Derek J. Girton, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on William Evans, of Chicago Heights, appellant pro se.
Appeal
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Carolyn E. Shapiro,
Solicitor General, and Mary C. LaBrec, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel), for appellees.
Panel JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Turner and Holder White concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In December 2012, plaintiff, William Evans, then an inmate at the Danville Correctional
Center, pro se filed a second amended complaint under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 (Civil Rights Act) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996)) and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (Religious Land Use Act) (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to
2000cc-5 (2000)) against defendants, S.A. Godinez (Director of the Department of
Corrections) (DOC) Keith Anglin (former Danville Correctional Center warden), and Lamar
Coleman (Danville Correctional Center chaplain). The underlying issue concerned Evans’
request for prison space and time to conduct separate Nation of Islam study groups and
prayer sessions on a weekly basis. Evans’ suit alleged that by denying his request,
defendants, acting under the color of state law, violated his (1) first-amendment rights to the
free exercise of religion and to peaceably assemble and (2) fourteenth-amendment rights to
equal protection and due process. Evans sought injunctive relief as well as monetary and
punitive damages.
¶2 In March 2013, defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment under section
2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West
2012)), arguing that (1) an inmate’s constitutional rights may be limited due to legitimate
prison interests and (2) the doctrines of sovereign and qualified immunity shielded them from
liability. Following an April 2013 hearing, the trial court later entered an order granting
summary judgment in defendants’ favor.
¶3 Evans appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in
defendants’ favor. We disagree and affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 A. The Genesis of Evans’ Appeal
¶6 In August 2011, Evans submitted a grievance addressed to Anglin, proclaiming his
Muslim faith and requesting, in part, that (1) his diet be changed to “lacto-ovo
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vegetarianism” and (2) Nation of Islam members be allowed to hold study groups twice a
week as other religious groups were permitted to conduct such meetings. (A lacto-ovo
vegetarian does not eat meat, but can consume dairy and egg products.) Evans objected to the
practice of allowing Nation of Islam members to attend Al-Islam Muslim study groups
because each faith had different fundamental beliefs. When Evans attempted to state his
beliefs during the Al-Islam study group, “open disputes” erupted in which he was ridiculed
and verbally assaulted. That same month, Anglin forwarded Evans’ complaint to a prison
counselor.
¶7 In September 2011, D. Laker, the counselor and grievance officer assigned to address
Evans’ grievance, spoke with Coleman, who told him that in the past, Nation of Islam
members were allowed to congregate once a week without a suitable faith or religious leader
as required by section 425.60 of Title 20 of the Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code
425.60 (1995)). In his written report, Laker noted as follows:
“In section [425.60(a) of Title 20 of the Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code
425.60(a) (1995)], the basic tenants are that ‘Religious Activities approved by the
[Chief Administrative Officer] shall be conducted or supervised by a chaplain or
religious program volunteer.’ [A]s this directive wasn’t being completely adhered to
at that time and in light of trying not to favor any particular religion over another, this
directive will be followed more strictly in the future for all religious denominations.”
¶8 Because Evans (1) did not have “an Ima[m] or suitable religious volunteer” to conduct
services for the Nation of Islam members and (2) failed to comply with section 425.60(f) of
Title 20 of the Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code 425.60(f) (1995))–which outlines a
six-step process to permit faith-based groups to congregate absent a suitable religious
representative–Laker recommended that Anglin deny Evans’ grievance as to that issue. As to
Evans’ dietary demand, Laker acknowledged that Evans had been placed on a vegan diet,
which was a suitable alternative under section 425.70 of Title 20 of the Administrative Code
(20 Ill. Adm. Code 425.70 (1995)). (A vegan does not eat meat, eggs, dairy products, or any
animal-derived substances.) That same month, Anglin concurred with Laker’s
recommendation.
¶9 Shortly thereafter, Evans appealed to Godinez, claiming that Coleman was refusing to do
his job and supervise Nation of Islam study groups and prayer services. In December 2011,
the Administrative Review Board (ARB) found that (1) Evans’ dietary requests had been
adequately changed and (2) any religious-group services must comply with section 425.60 of
Title 20 of the Administrative Code. Godinez later concurred with the ARB’s determination.
¶ 10 In January 2012, Evans filed a second grievance, alleging “religious discrimination”
through the “denial of religious services.” Evans claimed that he had written to the national
headquarters of the Nation of Islam requesting a religious representative for their study
group, but six months had passed without a response. Citing section 425.60 of Title 20 of the
Administrative Code, Evans requested that he and another inmate, Tyrone Harvey, be
allowed to conduct Nation of Islam study groups and prayer services. Shortly thereafter, the
assigned counselor noted that earlier that same month, Godinez had addressed the issues
Evans raised in his second grievance.
¶ 11 In February 2012, Evans and Harvey pro se filed a complaint under section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act, alleging defendants, acting under the color of state law, violated their (1)
first-amendment rights to the free exercise of religion and freedom to assemble and (2)
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fourteenth-amendment right to due process when defendants refused to allow Nation of Islam
members to hold separate group-study and prayer sessions to practice their religion. (Because
Harvey is not a party to this appeal, we omit any further reference to his participation in the
subsequent filings that prompted Evans’ appeal.)
¶ 12 In July 2012, Evans pro se filed an emergency motion requesting sanctions for retaliation.
In his motion, Evans alleged that defendants had retaliated against him by strictly adhering to
the guidance contained in section 425.60 of Title 20 of the Administrative Code, which
ended the study-group sessions of at least 50 Al-Islamic prisoners, among others. Evans
asserted that defendants acted deliberately to “pit us against one another[ ]” or intimidate him
into withdrawing his complaint. That same month, Evans pro se filed a motion for summary
judgment under section 2-1005 of the Civil Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West
2012)).
¶ 13 In September 2012, defendants filed their own motion for summary judgment. Later that
same month, Evans pro se filed a motion for leave to amend his February 2012 complaint to
add claims under the Religious Land Use Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(775 ILCS 35/1 to 99 (West 2012)). Shortly thereafter, Evans filed a third grievance,
claiming a “failure to provide religious diet change.” Specifically, Evans claimed that his
vegan diet was (1) too restrictive because Nation of Islam members can consume dairy and
egg products and (2) not restrictive enough in that the vegan diet allowed for the
consumption of certain vegetables which Nation of Islam members cannot consume. Evans
requested immediate accommodation of his dietary requirements and permission to cook his
own meals.
¶ 14 The assigned counselor responded to Evans’ third grievance by attaching an August 2012
memorandum entitled “Religious Diet Termination Notice” from Chaplain Chris Easton.
Easton informed Evans that his purchase of “ramen noodles” in July and August 2012
violated his religious-diet agreement. Easton cautioned that another violation would result in
termination of his dietary accommodation under section 425.70 of Title 20 of the
Administrative Code. Laker reviewed Evans’ grievance and recommended that it be denied,
noting that Evans did not complain about his vegan diet until he received Easton’s notice.
Laker also noted that because Evans was assigned as a prison cook, he had “some” control of
his diet. In October 2012, Anglin concurred with Laker’s recommendations. Evans then
appealed the denial of his grievance to Godinez, who concurred with the ARB’s
recommendation to deny Evans’ dietary grievance because it had been appropriately
addressed.
¶ 15 B. The Issue Prompting Evans’ Appeal to This Court
¶ 16 In December 2012, Evans pro se filed a second amended complaint under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act and the Religious Land Use Act against each defendant “in their
individual capacity as prison officials.” Specifically, Evans alleged that defendants, acting
under color of state law, violated his (1) first-amendment rights to the free exercise of
religion and to peaceably assemble and (2) fourteenth-amendment rights to equal protection
and due process. In his prayer for relief, Evans sought injunctive relief for himself and all
similarly situated prisoners of the Nation of Islam. Evans also sought $500,000 in
compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages from each defendant.
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¶ 17 In March 2013, defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment, asserting that
(1) an inmate’s first-amendment rights may be limited due to legitimate prison interests, such
as prison safety and security and (2) the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded defendants
from liability. Appended to this motion was Anglin’s August 2012 affidavit, in which he
explained that the recent shift to strictly adhere to the plain language of section 425.60 of
Title 20 of the Administrative Code was, in part, to avoid the appearance of favoring one
religious group over another. Anglin added the following rationale:
“Having inmate-led religious services, such as those requested by certain Nation
of Islam inmates, pose[s] a threat to the order and security of the institution. This is
due to the fact that a number of inmates would then be gathered in a single place
without proper supervision. Having an inmate take a position of authority over other
inmates also implicates security concerns, as they may then have undue influence
over other individuals.”
¶ 18 In April 2013, the trial court conducted a telephonic hearing on defendants’ second
motion for summary judgment. Defendants argued, in pertinent part, that despite Evans’
numerous constitutional claims in his December 2012 second amended complaint, he failed
to provide any evidentiary support to refute Anglin’s concerns regarding prison safety and
security.
¶ 19 Evans argued that a correctional officer’s presence or video monitoring were the least
restrictive means to address prison-security concerns. Evans continued that requiring suitable
religious representatives would not address security concerns but, instead, exacerbate them
because the representative would be unfamiliar with prison rules. Evans also argued that
other DOC prisons, such as Pinckneyville Correctional Center, which has a higher security
posture than Danville Correctional Center, permitted inmate-led religious services. Evans
stated that (1) he was not seeking a special title or increased authority for inmates who lead
religious groups and (2) permitting inmates to be religious leaders was similar to inmates
who are paralegals or law clerks, which confers authority over other inmates. Evans also
alleged discrimination in that defendants had implemented special diets for Jewish inmates
but relegated Nation of Islam members to vegan diets.
¶ 20 In rebuttal, defendants noted that as to Evans’ least-restrictive-means claim, section
425.60(f) of Title 20 of the Administrative Code provided a six-step process to obtain the
relief Evans sought, but he had yet to avail himself of that process.
¶ 21 Following argument, the trial court entered a July 2013 order granting defendants’
motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the court found that defendants had
“demonstrated a legitimate penological concern, specifically, the safety and security of the
institution, [by] denying separate, inmate-led Nation of Islam services.”
¶ 22 This appeal followed.
¶ 23 II. THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR
¶ 24 A. Summary Judgment and the Standard of Review
¶ 25 “ ‘Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and
admissions on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Hughes v. Godinez, 2014 IL App (4th) 130056,
¶ 16, 11 N.E.3d 842 (quoting West Bend Mutual Insurance v. Norton, 406 Ill. App. 3d 741,
744, 940 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (2010)). “We review de novo the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment.” Uphoff v. Grosskopf, 2013 IL App (4th) 130422, ¶ 11, 2 N.E.3d 498.
¶ 26 B. Religious Activities as Governed by the Administrative Code
¶ 27 Section 425.60 of Title 20 of the Administrative Code, entitled, “Religious Activities,”
provides, as follows:
“a) Religious activities approved by the Chief Administrative Officer shall be
conducted or supervised by a chaplain or religious program volunteer.
b) The Chief Administrative Officer, after consultation with the facility chaplain,
shall regulate the time, place, and manner in which religious activities are conducted.
The Chief Administrative Officer may limit, restrict, discontinue, or deny a religious
activity based upon concerns regarding security, safety, rehabilitation, institutional
order, space, or resources.
***
d) Nothing in this Part shall require the Department to provide each separate
religious group or sects within a group with a chaplain or with separate religious
activities regardless of the size of the religious group or the extent of the demand for
the activities.
e) Committed persons shall be prohibited from assuming a position of authority or
leadership over other committed persons. This does not preclude committed persons
from actively participating in religious activities.
f) Religious activities for which religious program volunteers or chaplains of that
particular faith are unavailable on a permanent or protracted basis may be permitted if
the following conditions are satisfied:
1) The committed persons submit written verification to the facility chaplain
that they attempted to locate and secure the services of religious leaders or faith
representatives from the community and that such persons refused or were not
approved to conduct religious activities;
2) Security, program, or chaplaincy staff are available to attend and supervise
the religious activity;
3) Written verification that attendance at existing religious activities does not
satisfy the recognized tenets of their faith is received;
4) Written agreement by a chaplain, faith representative, or recognized
religious leader of that faith group to provide general oversight and guidance of
the religious activity is received;
5) The Religious Practice Advisory Board recommends approval; and
6) The committed person submits a copy of any proposed sermon or doctrinal
interpretation to the Chief Administrative Officer or staff designated to supervise
the religious activity for review and approval prior to delivery, based on safety
and security concerns.
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g) The staff supervisor may call upon various committed persons to guide
portions of the religious activity subject to safety and security concerns.
h) Religious activities defined under subsection (f) of this Section shall be
prohibited where based solely on the temporary or occasional unavailability of a
chaplain or a religious program volunteer.
i) The Chief Administrative Officer may limit, restrict, or discontinue religious
activities permitted under subsection (f) of this Section based upon concerns such as
security, safety, rehabilitation, institutional order, space, or resources and may require
periodic rotation of committed persons permitted to guide portions of religious
activities.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code 425.60 (1995).
¶ 28 C. Evans’ Claims of Error
¶ 29 Evans argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in defendants’
favor. We disagree.
¶ 30 1. Evans’ Request for Injunctive Relief
¶ 31 As we have previously noted, in December 2012, Evans pro se filed a second amended
complaint under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act and the Religious Land Use Act against
each defendant in his or her individual capacity as a prison official, seeking injunctive relief
for himself and all similarly situated prisoners of the Nation of Islam. Specifically, Evans
sought “a preliminary injunction and restraining order stopping any retaliation and
compelling defendants and their successors, if any, [to] provide [a] time and place *** to
conduct [Nation of Islam] study groups and prayer sessions.”
¶ 32 However, defendants claim and the DOC website confirms that on March 17, 2014, DOC
released Evans from Danville Correctional Center. See Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner Review
Board, 376 Ill. App. 3d 429, 430, 876 N.E.2d 659, 660 (2007) (the appellate court can take
judicial notice of information posted to DOC’s website). Because we agree with defendants
that addressing Evans’ injunctive claim would not afford him any relief because he is no
longer subjected to DOC’s policies or defendants’ control, we dismiss Evans’
injunctive-relief claim as moot. See People ex rel. Department of Corrections v. Millard, 335
Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1069, 782 N.E.2d 966, 968 (2003) (“When events have occurred that make
it impossible for the reviewing court to render effectual relief, a case is rendered moot.”).
Evans’ request for injunctive relief for similarly situated Nation of Islam members does not
require that we address his claim because he failed to request that the trial court certify his
complaint as a class action as required by section 2-801 of the Civil Procedure Code (735
ILCS 5/2-801 (West 2012)). See Smith v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 223 Ill. 2d 441, 447, 860
N.E.2d 332, 336 (2006) (a complaint may proceed as a class action only if the trial court
finds that the four elements listed under section 2-801 of the Civil Procedure Code exist).
¶ 33 We also note that the United States Congress enacted the Religious Land Use Act
pursuant to the spending clause of the Constitution of the United States (U.S. Const., art. I,
§ 8), which does not permit suits against prison officials in their individual capacity. Maddox
v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 717 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 889 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“Construing [the Religious Land Use Act] to provide for damages actions against
officials in their individual capacities would raise serious questions regarding whether
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Congress had exceeded its authority under the Spending Clause. *** [W]e decline to read
[the Religious Land Use Act] as allowing damages against defendants in their individual
capacities.”). Accordingly, we reject the claims Evans raises against defendants under the
Religious Land Use Act.
¶ 34 2. Evans’ Religious-Activities Claim
¶ 35 In support of his argument that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in
defendants’ favor, Evans contends–as he did to the court during the April 2013 hearing on
defendant’s second motion for summary judgment–that defendants denied him the
opportunity to exercise his religious freedom under the first amendment by refusing to allow
weekly, inmate-led, Nation of Islam group-study and prayer sessions. We reject Evans’
characterization of defendants’ actions concerning his religious freedoms.
¶ 36 In Dupree v. Hardy, 2011 IL App (4th) 100351, ¶ 26, 960 N.E.2d 1, this court outlined
the narrow constitutional rights afforded to inmates, which concern basic human needs,
reasonable access to the courts, and “a reasonable opportunity to exercise religious freedom
under the first amendment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We earlier quoted the
majority of section 425.60 of Title 20 of the Administrative Code to illustrate the mandates
placed upon a chief administrative officer of a correctional facility to “regulate the time,
place, and manner in which religious activities are conducted” and the discretion afforded
that official to “limit, restrict, discontinue, or deny a religious activity based upon concerns
regarding security, safety, rehabilitation, institutional order, space, or resources.” 20 Ill.
Adm. Code 425.60(b) (1995).
¶ 37 Although we earlier noted our de novo standard of review, we also acknowledge the
overarching deference afforded to prison administrators tasked with the day-to-day
operations of their respective correctional facilities:
“[B]ecause the problems that arise in the daily operation of a corrections facility are
not susceptible to easy solutions, prison administrators should be accorded
wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in
their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Savage, 361 Ill.
App. 3d 750, 757, 838 N.E.2d 247, 253-54 (2005).
¶ 38 In this case, the record reveals that defendants elected to implement the clear provisions
of section 425.60 of Title 20 of the Administrative Code in a nondiscriminatory fashion to all
religious activities at the Danville Correctional Center regardless of denomination. In so
doing, defendants did not refuse or prohibit Evans from exercising his religious freedoms as
he contends. Instead, defendants required the supervision of religious activities by an
appropriate religious representative, citing, in pertinent part, the legitimate penological
concerns pertaining to prison security, which defendants undoubtedly recognized as a result
of the religious tension Evans experienced during the unsupervised, inmate-led Al-Islam
prayer sessions.
¶ 39 Evans responds that a prison chaplain could have supervised the study groups and prayer
sessions to eliminate defendants’ security concerns. His proposed solution, however, ignores
the scarce resources available to prison administrators and the numerous other religious
denominations that would likely seek the same religious accommodation, which would
exacerbate defendants’ concerns. In addition, section 425.60(f) of Title 20 of the
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Administrative Code allowed for a waiver of the religious-representative requirement if
certain requirements were satisfied, but Evans did not pursue that option. Essentially, Evans’
claim to this court is that defendants did not permit him to practice his religion as he desired.
We conclude, however, that defendants’ decision to strictly adhere to the provisions
contained in section 425.60 of Title 20 of the Administrative Code was reasonably related to
a legitimate penological interest–namely, to maintain safety and security at the Danville
Correctional Center. See People ex rel. Department of Corrections v. Fort, 352 Ill. App. 3d
309, 314, 815 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 (2004) (“A prison regulation, even one that impinges on an
inmate’s constitutional right, is valid if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest.”). Accordingly, we reject Evans’ claim of error to the contrary.
¶ 40 In so concluding, we note that Evans also claims–without any citation to controlling
authority–that defendants denied him the opportunity to exercise his religious freedom under
the first amendment by refusing to provide him “religiously suitable foods” for his diet. We
note, however, that despite his pro se status, Evans is still required to comply with Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013), which mandates the argument section of a
brief “contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the
authorities” relied upon. See People v. Hood, 210 Ill. App. 3d 743, 746, 569 N.E.2d 228, 230
(1991) (“A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent
authority cited and is not simply a depository into which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research.”). “Bare contentions in the absence of argument or citation
of authority do not merit consideration on appeal and are deemed waived.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Styck’s Body Shop, Inc., 396 Ill.
App. 3d 241, 254, 918 N.E.2d 1195, 1207 (2009). Accordingly, we need not consider Evans’
dietary claim.
¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 43 Affirmed.
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