People v. Reeves

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
People v. Reeves, 2015 IL App (4th) 130707Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption RUSSELL A. REEVES, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket Nos. 4-13-0707, 4-13-0708 cons.
Filed June 2, 2015
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Vermilion County, Nos. 07-CF-343,
Review 08-CF-17; the Hon. Michael D. Clary, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of
Appeal Springfield, and Alan D. Goldberg and Christofer R. Bendik, both of
State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Randall Brinegar, State’s Attorney, of Danville (Patrick Delfino,
David J. Robinson, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State’s Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Harris and Steigmann concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 On June 24, 2013, defendant, Russell A. Reeves, filed a motion to amend the written
sentencing judgment for his consecutive sentences in case Nos. 07-CF-343 and 08-CF-17 to
reflect a specific number of days of credit for simultaneous presentence custody on separate
charges. Four days later, the trial court summarily dismissed the motion. Defendant filed a
notice of appeal, and the court appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to
represent defendant. On appeal, OSAD moves to withdraw its representation of defendant,
contending any request for review would be without merit. We grant OSAD’s motion to
withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In June 2007, the State charged defendant with six counts of aggravated criminal sexual
assault in case No. 07-CF-343 for two 1998 incidents involving two different victims. Counts I
through III alleged defendant committed an act of sexual penetration upon V.W. by the use of
force or threat of force and caused V.W. bodily harm during the commission of a felony home
invasion in August 1998. 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2)-(4) (West 1996). Counts IV through VI
alleged defendant committed an act of sexual penetration upon R.S. by the use of force or
threat of force and caused R.S. bodily harm during the commission of a felony home invasion
in May 1998. 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2)-(4) (West 1996). Police arrested defendant and placed
him in custody on June 4, 2007. Thereafter, the State charged defendant with possession of
contraband in a penal institution in case No. 08-CF-17 for possessing a weapon on January 9,
2008, while in custody on the aggravated criminal sexual assault charges in case No.
07-CF-343.
¶4 In July 2008, defendant proceeded to a bench trial before Judge Nancy S. Fahey on case
No. 08-CF-17. The trial court found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possessing
contraband in a penal institution. In September 2008, the parties appeared for sentencing on
defendant’s possession of contraband in a penal institution conviction. The court noted
defendant was set for trial later in September 2008 on the aggravated criminal sexual assault
charges in case No. 07-CF-343. The court continued the sentencing hearing on case No.
08-CF-17 in the hopes of resolving all matters at the same time.
¶5 In October 2008, defendant entered into a partially negotiated plea deal on the aggravated
criminal sexual assault charges in case No. 07-CF-343. Defendant pleaded guilty to all six
counts and, in exchange for his plea, the State agreed to a cap of no more than 30 years’
imprisonment on all counts in case No. 07-CF-343 and case No. 08-CF-17. No one addressed
sentencing credit at any time during the hearing on the guilty plea.
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¶6 Seven months after accepting the guilty plea, Judge Fahey held a sentencing hearing on all
charges from case Nos. 08-CF-17 and 07-CF-343. Following evidence in aggravation and
mitigation, the court found counts I through III and counts IV through VI merged into two
offenses. The court sentenced defendant as follows:
“In 07 CF 343, on Count 1, you’ll be sentenced to 12 years in the Illinois Department of
Corrections. Counts 2, and 3 will merge. You’ll serve 85 percent of that time. That will
include three years of mandatory supervised release. On Count 4, you’ll be sentenced
to 12 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. Counts 5 and 6 will merge into
that count. On that count, you’ll serve 50 percent of the time, and that will also carry
three years mandatory supervised release. In 08 CF 17, you’ll be sentenced to five
years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, plus two years[’] mandatory supervised
release, and you will serve 50 percent of that time. What credit does Mr. Reeves have?”
The State advised the trial court judge: “Your Honor, in 07 CF 343, he has 718 days[’] credit.
The dates are from June 4th, 2007, through today, May 21, 2009. Then in 08 CF 17, he has 499
days[’] credit. The dates are January 9, 2008, through today’s date, May 21, 2009.” The court
accepted this credit and informed defendant he would receive 718 days’ credit on case
No. 07-CF-343 and 499 days’ credit on case No. 08-CF-17. The sentences were to run
consecutively. The written sentencing judgment provided for “credit in 07CF343 from 6/4/07
to 5/21/09; 08CF17 from 1/9/08 to 5/21/09. Def[endant] to serve 85% of sentence in [count I]
07CF343.”
¶7 Defendant appealed case No. 08-CF-17 in June 2009, docketed as case No. 4-09-0406. In
July 2010, this court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss No. 4-09-0406. In April 2012,
defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief regarding the alleged failure by the trial
court to properly admonish defendant prior to accepting the plea in case No. 07-CF-343
regarding the three-year period of mandatory supervised release attendant to his sentence of
imprisonment. That petition was summarily dismissed.
¶8 At some point, it came to defendant’s attention the Department of Corrections credited him
with 718 days of credit on case No. 07-CF-343 and no credit for the 499 days of credit on case
No. 08-CF-17. Staff at Shawnee Correctional Center declined to credit defendant the 499 days
on case No. 08-CF-17 because the date range overlapped with the time spent in custody on No.
07-CF-343. In June 2013, defendant filed a motion to amend the written sentencing judgment
to reflect the actual number of days of credit in each case, not just the date ranges defendant
spent in simultaneous presentence custody. A docket entry in the record shows Judge Michael
D. Clary denied the motion on June 28, 2013, because “[t]he mittimus shows the sentences on
these cases as imposed by the court.”
¶9 This appeal followed. The appeal of case No. 07-CF-343 was docketed as case No.
4-13-0707 and the appeal of case No. 08-CF-17 was docketed as case No. 4-13-0708. In
December 2014, this court allowed defendant’s motion to consolidate the appeals. OSAD was
appointed and moved to withdraw, filing a brief in support of its motion. On its own motion,
this court granted defendant until January 15, 2015, to file additional points and authorities.
Defendant responded pro se, the office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor (SAAP)
filed a brief, and defendant filed a reply brief. We have considered the record and we conclude,
as did OSAD and SAAP, no meritorious issues can be raised as to the dismissal of defendant’s
motion to amend the written sentencing judgment.
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¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 OSAD contends the supreme court’s ruling in People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 703
N.E.2d 901 (1998), controls and precludes defendant from receiving 499 days’ credit toward
his sentence in case No. 08-CF-17. In Latona, the supreme court construed section 5-8-4(e)(4)
of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(e)(4) (West 1994)). The supreme court
held, “to the extent that an offender sentenced to consecutive sentences had been incarcerated
prior thereto on more than one offense simultaneously, he should be given credit only once for
actual days served.” Latona, 184 Ill. 2d at 271, 703 N.E.2d at 907. OSAD contends defendant
was simultaneously in custody on the charges in case No. 07-CF-343 during the 499 days
defendant was in custody after the State charged him in case No. 08-CF-17. Because he was
already in custody, and because his sentences are to be served consecutively rather than
concurrently, defendant is not entitled to two days’ credit for each single day he was in
simultaneous presentence custody.
¶ 12 Defendant argues a person convicted of a crime must be sentenced in accord with the law at
the time the offense was committed. Defendant argues Latona is inapplicable because he
committed the two rapes in case No. 07-CF-343 in May and August 1998, and the Latona
decision came down on November 19, 1998. Defendant argues the law before the Latona
decision allowed defendants serving consecutive sentences to receive credit more than once
for each day of presentence custody served. In his motion for an amended sentencing judgment
before the trial court, defendant argues he was entitled to double credit under People v.
Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 667 N.E.2d 1305 (1996) (simultaneous presentence custody credit
applicable to concurrent sentences for separate offenses). We find this argument unavailing, as
it ignores the salient point SAAP raises–defendant requests sentencing credit for the
possession of contraband charge, a crime committed in 2008. By 2008, the law was clearly
settled under Latona. Defendant’s argument also ignores precedent from this court’s holding in
Feazell v. Washington, 291 Ill. App. 3d 766, 768, 684 N.E.2d 1052, 1053 (1997) (finding
Robinson inapplicable to consecutive sentences and holding defendants sentenced to
consecutive sentences are entitled to only one day of credit for each day of presentence custody
served).
¶ 13 OSAD further points out defendant does not claim his plea bargain promised the double
sentencing credit. Some decisions have held a defendant is entitled to double sentencing credit
when the specified days of credit are included in the terms of the plea agreement. People v.
McDermott, 2014 IL App (4th) 120655, ¶ 27, 12 N.E.3d 148. See also People v. Clark, 2011 IL
App (2d) 091116, 956 N.E.2d 1078; People v. Lenoir, 2013 IL App (1st) 113615, 987 N.E.2d
1015. The record does not show any indication the State and defendant agreed to double credit
for the 499 days defendant served in simultaneous custody on case Nos. 07-CF-343 and
08-CF-17. The plea agreement hearing contains no reference to sentence credit, but the parties
clearly contemplated a separate sentencing hearing. Calculating sentence credit at the plea
agreement hearing would have been fruitless as there was no determined date for the
sentencing hearing.
¶ 14 At sentencing, the State began its argument by stating, “Your Honor, it’s my understanding
that the plea was for a maximum of 30. That maximum being a combination of the two counts
in the counts on the two victims in the ’07 case [(No. 07-343)], and the contraband case in the
’08 case [(No. 08-CF-17)].” The State concluded by saying, “[M]y recommendation is for the
30 years broken down 12 and 12; 12 for Counts 1 through 3 in the ’07 case, 12 years in Counts
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4, 5, and 6 in the ’07 case. Lastly, six years in the ’08 case. I do have credits when the [c]ourt
requests them.” The court ultimately ordered 718 days’ credit in No. 07-CF-343 and 499 days’
credit in No. 08-CF-17. Even if defendant had raised a benefit-of-the-bargain argument, we
conclude these statements do not suffice to support defendant’s McDermott claim. The record
shows only the State and the court mentioned sentence credit–neither defendant nor his
counsel ever mentioned sentence credit. The record does not “clearly show[ ] the terms of the
parties’ agreements included specified amounts of sentence credit” or the double sentence
credit days were “essential, bargained-for terms of defendant’s plea agreements.” (Emphasis
added.) McDermott, 2014 IL App (4th) 120655, ¶ 30, 12 N.E.3d 148. Moreover, the terms of a
plea agreement are set at the plea hearing, not at sentencing, and sentence credit was never
mentioned at the October 2008 plea hearing.
¶ 15 To summarize, the rule in Latona controls in this case, where defendant seeks to apply
double credit for simultaneous time served in presentence custody to his sentence for a crime
committed a decade after the Latona decision was filed. Further, Latona did not change
existing law, as evidenced by this court’s holding in Feazell. Defendant does not, and cannot,
raise a benefit-of-the-bargain argument where no evidence shows the parties ever agreed to
specific days of “double credit” for presentence time spent in custody. We agree with OSAD
and SAAP, i.e., the case presents no meritorious issues for review.
¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 17 For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw as counsel and affirm the trial
court’s judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment
against defendant as costs of this appeal.
¶ 18 Affirmed.
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