Schnitker v. Springfield Urban League, Inc.

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Appellate Court Date: 2017.01.18
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Schnitker v. Springfield Urban League, Inc., 2016 IL App (4th) 150991
Appellate Court JAMIE SCHNITKER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SPRINGFIELD
Caption URBAN LEAGUE, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-15-0991
Filed November 22, 2016
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, No. 11-L-170;
Review the Hon. Jack D. Davis II, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed; cause remanded for further proceedings.
Counsel on Geri Lynn Arrindell, John L. Gilbert, and Timothy C. Sansone
Appeal (argued), of Sandberg Phoenix & Von Gontard P.C., of St. Louis,
Missouri, for appellant.
Colleen R. Lawless (argued), of Londrigan, Potter & Randle, P.C., of
Springfield, for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Steigmann and Appleton concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In June 2015, plaintiff, Jamie Schnitker, filed a second amended complaint, alleging
defendant, Springfield Urban League, Inc., failed to rehire her for a teaching position after
illegally discriminating against her based on her race and religion in violation of the Illinois
Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/1-101 to 10-104 (West 2010)). The following month,
plaintiff prevailed in a jury trial, where she was awarded $100,000 in damages.
¶2 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by tendering three of plaintiff’s proposed
jury instructions related to the Act, asserting those instructions inaccurately stated the law. For
the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Factual Overview
¶5 From September 1997 until May 2010, plaintiff was a teacher for defendant’s Jacksonville
Head Start facility. Plaintiff is Caucasian and of a non-Pentecostal religion. In March 2010,
plaintiff’s job performance was rated as above average, and she was recommended for rehire
for the 2010 to 2011 school year. During this time, plaintiff observed her site supervisor, who
was African-American and of the Pentecostal faith, slowly replacing vacant positions at the
Jacksonville facility with new staff that were African-American and/or affiliated with the
supervisor’s Pentecostal church. By January 2010, approximately half of the Jacksonville
employees were associated with the Pentecostal church. The site supervisor denied she had any
authority to make hiring or termination decisions. Plaintiff and two of her Caucasian,
non-Pentecostal coworkers complained of preferential treatment toward the new employees,
which included those employees receiving extra time off, receiving permission to complete
work for the church during school hours, and opportunities for summer employment.
¶6 Due to concerns over grant funding, in June 2010, all Head Start employees, including
plaintiff, received termination letters. However, as of August 19, 2010, all but three employees
at the Jacksonville facilities had received their return-to-work letters. Plaintiff and the two
other Caucasian, non-Pentecostal employees were the only employees who had not received
their return-to-work letters. Defendant asserted the delay in sending plaintiff and her two
coworkers return-to-work letters was attributed to a pending internal audit of random workers
throughout its numerous Head Start programs, including those three employees at the
Jacksonville facility.
¶7 On August 23, 2010, despite not receiving a return-to-work letter, plaintiff reported for
orientation but was told to leave because she was not on the list as a teacher. According to
defendant, this led to plaintiff thereafter engaging in disrespectful behavior, such as cursing,
throwing a telephone, and being disruptive to the point where she was escorted from one of the
Head Start facilities. Prior to these occurrences, defendant claimed plaintiff was scheduled to
be recalled as a teacher for the 2010 to 2011 school year once the audit had been completed.
However, defendant cited plaintiff’s behavior as its reason for not rehiring plaintiff. Plaintiff
denied all misbehavior other than cursing in a facility parking lot when she was alone with a
friend. A newly certified teacher, who was both African-American and Pentecostal, was hired
as a full-time teacher.
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¶8 B. Administrative Proceedings
¶9 Plaintiff sought review of defendant’s decision not to hire her with the Department of
Human Rights (Department) on the grounds that defendant had discriminated against her on
the basis of her religion and race. In April 2011, the Department dismissed her claim due to
lack of substantial evidence.
¶ 10 C. Trial Court Proceedings
¶ 11 1. Pretrial Proceedings
¶ 12 In October 2011, plaintiff filed her first amended complaint, alleging defendant’s decision
not to rehire her was a pretext for racial discrimination (count I) and religious discrimination
(count II) and, therefore, it violated the Act. Id. Plaintiff asserted other teachers who were
non-Caucasian and Pentecostal, both those similarly situated and those of lesser experience
and seniority, were rehired.
¶ 13 In November 2013, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting plaintiff
failed to establish a prima facie case for discrimination. The trial court denied the motion in
February 2014, finding issues of material fact remained that precluded summary judgment. In
June 2015, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint containing the same allegations of racial
and religious discrimination.
¶ 14 2. Jury Instructions
¶ 15 Later that month, the parties filed their proposed jury instructions. Three of those
instructions are at issue on this appeal.
¶ 16 a. Plaintiff’s Instruction Nos. 15 and 16
¶ 17 Plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16 outline the elements of workplace discrimination
based on race and religion. The instructions are nearly identical; the only difference is that
plaintiff’s instruction No. 15 included language regarding racial discrimination, whereas
plaintiff’s instruction No. 16 included language regarding religious discrimination. Due to the
similarity of the instructions and the parties’ arguments, we address these instructions together.
¶ 18 Plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16 were tendered as follows. The bracketed language
highlights the differing language in plaintiff’s instruction No. 16. The first portion of plaintiff’s
instruction Nos. 15 and 16 outlined plaintiff’s theory that defendant’s refusal to rehire her was
based on pretext.
“In this case, Plaintiff claims that she was not rehired to her teaching position
because of her race [religion]. Defendant denies this claim and asserts that it did not
rehire Plaintiff due to her unprofessional conduct on or after August 23, 2010.
To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove five things by a preponderance of the
evidence:
First, that Plaintiff is Caucasian [non-Pentecostal];
Second, that Plaintiff applied for and was qualified to be rehired to her teaching
position;
Third, that Defendant did not rehire Plaintiff to her teaching position;
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Fourth, that Defendant rehired similarly situated non-Caucasian [Pentecostal]
teachers and other personnel who had less seniority and less education than Plaintiff[;]
Fifth, that Plaintiff sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s decision not to
rehire her[.]
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these
propositions has been proven, then your verdict should be for Plaintiff. On the other
hand, if you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these
propositions has not been proven, then your verdict should be for Defendant.”
Plaintiff cited this portion of the instruction as a modified version of Illinois Pattern Jury
Instruction, Civil, No. 250.02 (2006). Plaintiff later tendered the following additional language
to plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16, which outlines her motivating-factor theory of
liability:
“In the alternative, Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her
race [religion] was a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision not to rehire her. A
motivating factor is something that contributed to Defendant’s decision.
If you find that Plaintiff has proven that her race [religion] contributed to
Defendant’s decision not to rehire her, you must then decide whether Defendant proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would not have rehired her even if Plaintiff
was not Caucasian [was Pentecostal]. If so, you must enter a verdict for the Plaintiff but
you may not award her damages.”
¶ 19 This motivating-factor portion of plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16 cited 7th Cir.
Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 3.01 (2005 rev. ed.). Defendant objected to the fourth
element of the pretext portion—“that Defendant rehired similarly situated non-Caucasian
[Pentecostal] teachers and other personnel who had less seniority and less education than
Plaintiff”—as incorrectly omitting plaintiff’s burden to prove causation. Further, defendant
objected to the mixed-motive paragraphs as inaccurately stating the law. Accordingly,
defendant tendered alternative instructions, defendant’s instruction Nos. 11 and 12, which
omitted the mixed-motive paragraphs and amended the fourth element of the pretext
paragraphs to read: “that Defendant did not rehire Plaintiff because of her race [religion].” The
trial court denied defendant’s instruction Nos. 11 and 12 and ordered plaintiff’s instruction
Nos. 15 and 16 given over defendant’s objections. Additionally, the jury instructions contained
a scrivener’s error the parties corrected after the trial court read the instructions to the jury.
Because the scrivener’s error does not impact our analysis of this case, we will not address it.
¶ 20 b. Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 17
¶ 21 Plaintiff’s instruction No. 17 read:
“You must decide whether Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because of her
race or religion. The fact that Defendant may have treated some Caucasians or
non-Pentecostal employees favorably does not immunize it from liability in this case.
In other words, you may find Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff even though
Defendant did not discriminate against other Caucasian or non-Pentecostal
employees.”
This nonpattern instruction cited an unpublished federal district court case, Woods v. Von
Maur, Inc., No. 09 C 7800, 2012 WL 2062400 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 2012). Defendant objected to
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this instruction, asserting it inaccurately conveyed the law. The trial court gave the instruction
over defendant’s objection.
¶ 22 3. The Verdict and Posttrial Proceedings
¶ 23 At the conclusion of the July 2015 jury trial, the parties presented their closing arguments,
wherein plaintiff argued, “This case is about, [plaintiff] was discriminated [against] based on
race and religion in her termination. Was she terminated in August 2010 because of her race
*** and/or because of her religion? Was her race and religion a motivating factor for the
defendant when they did determine that she was terminated?” Plaintiff also argued the reasons
defendant gave for failing to rehire plaintiff were a pretext for its actual, discriminatory
reasons.
¶ 24 The jury subsequently returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on both
counts and assessed damages in the amount of $100,000. In October 2015, defendant filed a
motion for a new trial, asserting, in part, plaintiff’s jury instructions discussing plaintiff’s
claims under the Act failed to accurately state the law, confused and misled the jury, and
resulted in prejudice to defendant. The following month, the trial court denied defendant’s
motion.
¶ 25 This appeal followed.
¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 On appeal, defendant asserts the trial court erred by tendering three of plaintiff’s proposed
jury instructions related to the Act, arguing those instructions inaccurately stated the law. We
begin by outlining the relevant provisions of the Act.
¶ 28 A. The Act
¶ 29 One of the public policies behind the Act is:
“To secure for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination against
any individual because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry,
age, order of protection status, marital status, physical or mental disability, military
status, sexual orientation, or unfavorable discharge from military service in connection
with employment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the
availability of public accommodations.” 775 ILCS 5/1-102(A) (West 2010).
With respect to discrimination in a place of employment, the Act makes it a civil-rights
violation:
“For any employer to refuse to hire, to segregate, or to act with respect to recruitment,
hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship,
discharge, discipline, tenure or terms, privileges or conditions of employment on the
basis of unlawful discrimination or citizenship status.” 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A) (West
2010).
¶ 30 When Illinois courts analyze employment-discrimination cases brought under the Act, we
adopt the same analytical framework set forth in United States Supreme Court decisions
addressing claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (2006)). Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 178, 545
N.E.2d 684, 687 (1989).
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¶ 31 Having set forth some of the pertinent aspects of the Act, we now turn to the standard of
review.
¶ 32 B. Standard of Review
¶ 33 Depending on the issue presented, appellate courts must determine which of two standards
of review apply to the trial court’s decisions regarding jury instructions. Typically, we review
the court’s decision to grant or deny certain jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Studt v.
Sherman Health Systems, 2011 IL 108182, ¶ 13, 951 N.E.2d 1131. In those instances, we must
determine “whether, taken as a whole, the instructions are sufficiently clear so as not to
mislead and whether they fairly and correctly state the law.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. However, when the issue is whether the jury instructions accurately conveyed the
applicable law, our review is de novo. Id.
¶ 34 Whenever possible in a civil case, the trial court should use any applicable pattern jury
instructions. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 239(a) (eff. Apr. 13, 2013). In this particular case, however, the
parties agree no standard pattern instructions are available, which required the parties to craft
their own nonpattern instructions. Where a nonpattern instruction is given, that instruction
should be “simple, brief, impartial, and free from argument.” Id.
¶ 35 Even if the trial court errs by giving an improper instruction, a reviewing court will
ordinarily not reverse the trial court unless the instruction “clearly misled the jury and resulted
in prejudice to the appellant.” Schultz v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 201
Ill. 2d 260, 274, 775 N.E.2d 964, 973 (2002).
¶ 36 We now turn to the merits of defendant’s argument.
¶ 37 C. Plaintiff’s Instruction Nos. 15 and 16
¶ 38 Plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16 each contain two sets of law based on two differing
theories of the case. In the initial paragraphs, plaintiff’s instructions intended to outline the law
as it relates to pretext. In other words, plaintiff sought to prove defendant’s reason for failing to
rehire her—her alleged misbehavior—was pretext for discrimination. In the final paragraphs,
plaintiff intended to outline the law as it relates to a mixed motive for discrimination. Said
another way, plaintiff sought to prove defendant had mixed motives—both legitimate and
illegitimate reasons—for failing to rehire her. We address these two theories separately, but
first, we must address plaintiff’s argument that defendant has forfeited any issues with respect
to plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16.
¶ 39 1. Forfeiture
¶ 40 Plaintiff asserts defendant has forfeited any challenge to these instructions by failing to
raise these issues before the trial court and tendering alternative instructions. See Deal v.
Byford, 127 Ill. 2d 192, 202-03, 537 N.E.2d 267, 271 (1989) (“To preserve an objection to a
jury instruction a party must both specify the defect claimed and tender a correct instruction.”).
The record contradicts this assertion. Defendant specifically objected to plaintiff’s instruction
Nos. 15 and 16 for failing to accurately convey the law and offered alternative instructions.
Nonetheless, plaintiff asserts defendant failed to provide a definition of the phrase “because
of” in its alternative instruction regarding the fourth element, which renders the argument
forfeited. However, plaintiff fails to explain why such a definitional instruction was necessary.
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“When words used in a jury instruction have a commonly understood meaning, the court need
not define them with the use of additional instructions; this is particularly true where the
pattern jury instructions do not provide that an additional definition is necessary.” People v.
Manning, 334 Ill. App. 3d 882, 890, 778 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (2002). Thus, we conclude
defendant has not forfeited its argument that plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16 failed to
accurately state the law.
¶ 41 2. Pretext Instruction
¶ 42 The first portion of plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16 sets forth five elements plaintiff
was required to prove to support her theory that defendant’s reasoning for terminating her was
based on pretext (i.e., a lie). The only element contested on appeal is the fourth element, which
reads, “that Defendant rehired similarly situated non-Caucasian [Pentecostal] teachers and
other personnel who had less seniority and less education than Plaintiff.”
¶ 43 Defendant asserts plaintiff’s fourth element failed to include the element of causation that
defendant included in its alternative instruction. Plaintiff asserts she does not need to prove
causation because discrimination based on pretext is not a tortious offense that requires the
element of causation.
¶ 44 In support of its argument, defendant points to the language of the Act as requiring
causation. Defendant notes the purpose of the Act is “[t]o secure for all individuals within
Illinois the freedom from discrimination against any individual because of his or her race,
color, [or] religion.” (Emphasis added.) 775 ILCS 5/1-102(A) (West 2010). Accordingly, “[i]t
is a civil rights violation *** [f]or any employer to refuse *** renewal of employment *** on
the basis of unlawful discrimination.” (Emphasis added.) 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A) (West 2010).
Defendant highlights the aforementioned use of (“because”) and (“on the basis of”) in the
statute as requiring plaintiff to demonstrate causation.
¶ 45 According to defendant, as plaintiff’s instructions read, plaintiff only needed to show
defendant hired similarly situated teachers who were either non-Caucasian or Pentecostal,
regardless of reasoning. We agree and conclude the language of the Act requires plaintiff to
demonstrate a link between her race or religion and defendant’s decision not to rehire her when
asserting the basis for the termination was pretextual.
¶ 46 A plaintiff may present either direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. Lalvani v.
Human Rights Comm’n, 324 Ill. App. 3d 774, 790, 755 N.E.2d 51, 64 (2001). Direct evidence
is that which “prove[s] the particular fact in question, without reliance on inference or
presumption.” Id. at 791, 755 N.E.2d at 65. Under the direct method, “once a plaintiff in a Title
VII case establishes by direct evidence that the employer placed substantial reliance on a
prohibited factor, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same decision even if the prohibited factor had not been
considered.” Id. at 790, 755 N.E.2d at 65. Nothing in the record demonstrates plaintiff
presented direct evidence of discrimination.
¶ 47 By contrast, under the indirect method, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case,
then the defendant employer must rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating, not
proving, “a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.” Kalush v. Department of
Human Rights Chief Legal Counsel, 298 Ill. App. 3d 980, 993, 700 N.E.2d 132, 141 (1998).
The plaintiff “must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s
articulated reason was not its true reason, but was instead a pretext for unlawful
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discrimination.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lalvani, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 790, 755
N.E.2d at 64 (quoting Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 179, 545 N.E.2d at 687). “In this approach, the
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that there was unlawful discrimination remains
at all times with the plaintiff.” Id.
¶ 48 Plaintiff relies on Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir.
1995), to support her contention that an employee need not demonstrate but-for causation to
support an employment-discrimination claim. In Hennessy, the plaintiff filed a discrimination
lawsuit against her employer under Title VII, alleging her gender was the employer’s
motivating factor in terminating her position after she became pregnant and gave birth. Id. at
1350. Hennessy is distinguishable from the present case because, unlike the matter before us,
the plaintiff in Hennessy proceeded under the direct-evidence approach, which required the
employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even if the prohibited factor had not been considered. Accordingly, we conclude
plaintiff’s reliance on Hennessy is misplaced with respect to plaintiff’s pretext claim.
¶ 49 During oral argument, plaintiff maintained United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), supports her claim that but-for causation is not
required in employment-discrimination cases. In Aikens, a black postal service employee sued
the United States Postal Service, alleging discrimination against him in promotion decisions.
There, the United States Supreme Court held as follows: (1) where the suit was fully tried on
the merits, it was unnecessary for the parties thereafter to address the question of a prima facie
case, and by so doing, the parties unnecessarily evaded the ultimate question of discrimination;
and (2) a plaintiff in an equal-employment-opportunity case may prove his case by direct or
circumstantial evidence, and the district court should not have required the plaintiff to submit
direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 713-14.
¶ 50 According to the Supreme Court, when the defendant fails to persuade the “court to dismiss
the action for lack of a prima facie case, and responds to the plaintiff’s proof by offering
evidence of the reason for the plaintiff’s rejection, the factfinder must then decide whether the
rejection was discriminatory.” Id. at 714-15. The Supreme Court determined the prima facie
case was not an appropriate issue for the jury; rather, the ultimate issue was “whether the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. [Citation.] In other words, is the
employer ... treating some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 715. The Court
went on to point out intentional discrimination can be proved not only by direct evidence but
also by circumstantial evidence. Thus, although the Aikens case does prohibit requiring direct
evidence, contrary to plaintiff’s argument, it also demonstrates that a plaintiff must prove he or
she was discriminated against because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
¶ 51 Plaintiff asserts several of her instructions discussed the requirement of causation, thus
curing any defect in the elements instructions. During questioning from this court at oral
argument, counsel for plaintiff asserted the language at the beginning of (1) plaintiff’s
instruction Nos. 15 and 16, which begins with, “Plaintiff claims that she was not rehired to her
teaching position because of her race,” and (2) plaintiff’s instruction No. 17, which begins,
“You must decide whether defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because of her race or
religion,” (emphases added) satisfies the causation requirement. We disagree.
¶ 52 An elements instruction is a roadmap for the jury, guiding its review of the evidence and
defining what evidence it should look for in making its decision. The portion of plaintiff’s
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instruction Nos. 15, 16, and 17, to which plaintiff refers, does inform the jury of the nature of
plaintiff’s claim. However, the language following, “To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must
prove five things by a preponderance of the evidence,” instructs the jury as to what must be
proved in order to entitle plaintiff to a verdict in her favor. As given, the instructions failed to
instruct the jury that in order to succeed on her claim, plaintiff was required to show she was
not rehired because of her race or religion. Despite some instructions discussing the necessity
of proving causation, the elements instruction, which sets forth the essential elements plaintiff
needed to prove, omitted the necessity of proving causation. Rather, defendant’s proffered
instructions (Nos. 11 and 12), which the trial court rejected, more accurately stated the law by
including the element of causation as required by the Act. Accordingly, we conclude the court
erred by giving plaintiff’s jury instructions, which inaccurately conveyed the law.
¶ 53 Further, we conclude the error prejudiced defendant. See Schultz, 201 Ill. 2d at 274, 775
N.E.2d at 973. “The function of jury instructions is to convey to the jury the correct principles
of law applicable to the submitted evidence and, as a result, jury instructions must state the law
fairly and distinctly and must not mislead the jury or prejudice a party.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593,
¶ 77, 20 N.E.3d 1. The only contested legal issue for the jury to determine regarding plaintiff’s
pretext theory—whether defendant failed to rehire plaintiff because of her race or
religion—was not provided to the jury. The failure to include this component in the elements
instruction was both inaccurate and misleading. Given that we do not know which theory of
liability the jury relied upon when it found in plaintiff’s favor, we conclude the failure to
provide such an instruction was prejudicial to defendant. That plaintiff argues her instructions
already contained more issues of proof than necessary is unpersuasive, as the jury was
deprived of an instruction regarding the critical issue of causation. Regardless of the evidence,
the fact that the jury was not provided with the correct instructions regarding the law requires
reversal.
¶ 54 3. Motivating-Factor Instruction
¶ 55 Although we have already determined plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16 inaccurately
stated the law, thus requiring remand for a new trial, we address the remaining issues with the
jury instructions as they are likely to arise again on remand. Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064,
¶ 56, 978 N.E.2d 1000.
¶ 56 The portion of the instructions regarding the motivating-factor language stated:
“In the alternative, Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her
race [religion] was a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision not to rehire her. A
motivating factor is something that contributed to Defendant’s decision.
If you find that Plaintiff has proven that her race [religion] contributed to
Defendants’ decision not to rehire her, you must then decide whether Defendant proved
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would not have rehired her even if Plaintiff
was not Causasian [was Pentecostal]. If so, you must enter a verdict for the Plaintiff but
you may not award her damages.”
This addition to plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16 cited 7th Cir. Pattern Jury Instructions,
Civil, No. 3.01. According to the Committee Comments, Instruction No. 3.01 is based on the
case of Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 1994). 7th Cir. Pattern Jury
Instructions, Civil, No. 3.01, Committee Comments (2005 rev. ed.) However, the language in
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plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16 does not mirror the language included in 7th Cir. Pattern
Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 3.01. Rather, the language used by plaintiff comes from a
recommendation in the Committee Comments based on the reasoning used by other circuits
when the plaintiff asserts the defendant had a “mixed motive” for terminating the plaintiff’s
employment or failing to rehire the plaintiff. The committee comment concludes by saying,
“Without clear guidance in the circuit case law, the Committee cannot offer assistance in
determining when a ‘mixed motive’ instruction is appropriate.” 7th Cir. Pattern Jury
Instructions, Civil, No. 3.01, Committee Comments (2005 rev. ed.).
¶ 57 That being said, Illinois courts do recognize the mixed-motive method of determining
discrimination. See, e.g., Chicago Housing Authority v. Human Rights Comm’n, 325 Ill. App.
3d 1115, 759 N.E.2d 37 (2001). The question is whether plaintiff met the standard for
establishing defendant’s decision was based on a mixed motive in order to tender such a jury
instruction.
¶ 58 The legal concepts of pretext and mixed motive are not interchangeable. Unlike pretext,
wherein the plaintiff may rely on indirect evidence of discrimination, “to use the mixed-motive
method, the plaintiff must show direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial
negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. at 1124, 759 N.E.2d at 46. The employee’s evidence must do more than
create an inference of discrimination; rather, it must establish a clear nexus between the
employer’s reliance on an impermissible factor and its subsequent decision to discharge the
employee. See Board of Education of Schaumburg Community Consolidated School District
No. 54 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 247 Ill. App. 3d 439, 461, 616 N.E.2d
1281, 1295 (1993); Chicago Housing Authority, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1125, 759 N.E.2d at 47.
Once the plaintiff has provided the direct evidence that the employer relied on illegitimate
criteria, the employer must demonstrate it would have reached the same decision even if it did
not rely on illegitimate criteria. Id. at 1124, 759 N.E.2d at 46.
¶ 59 Here, plaintiff presented no direct evidence of discrimination showing that the decision
makers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegal criterion in deciding not to rehire her.
Moreover, plaintiff’s case did not rest on the allegation that defendant’s motives were both
legitimate and illegitimate; plaintiff vehemently denied engaging in the misbehavior cited by
defendant as the reason for her termination. Rather, plaintiff’s theory of the case was that
defendant’s reason for not rehiring her was based solely on pretext, which allows the plaintiff
to rely on indirect evidence. Id. at 1123, 759 N.E.2d at 45.
¶ 60 Because plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendant’s reason for terminating her was
based on a mixed motive, it was erroneous for the trial court to give such an instruction.
¶ 61 D. Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 17
¶ 62 Defendant next asserts the trial court erred by allowing plaintiff’s instruction No. 17, based
on an unpublished district court case, Woods, 2012 WL 2062400. During the instruction
conference, plaintiff represented the proposed instruction was given in the Woods case. The
instruction read:
“You must decide whether Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because of her
race or religion. The fact that Defendant may have treated some Caucasians or
non-Pentecostal employees favorably does not immunize it from liability in this case.
In other words, you may find Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff even though
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Defendant did not discriminate against other Caucasian or non-Pentecostal
employees.”
¶ 63 Given Woods is devoid of any discussion of the use of the above instruction, citing Woods
to the trial court seems questionable. However, plaintiff’s instruction does contain an accurate
statement of law. In Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455 (1982), the Supreme Court
concluded Title VII “never intended to give an employer license to discriminate against some
employees on the basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats other members of the
employees’ group.” Rather, the statute was written for the “protection of the individual
employee, rather than the protection of a minority group as a whole.” Id. at 453-54. Although
the parties point to no published Illinois cases that include this statement in their jury
instructions, that does not make the statement inaccurate. The Act contains the same
framework as that contained in Title VII, and we analyze cases under the Act according to
Supreme Court decisions based on Title VII. Chicago Housing Authority, 325 Ill. App. 3d at
1123, 759 N.E.2d at 45. The Teal case stands for the proposition stated in plaintiff’s instruction
No. 17: “The fact that Defendant may have treated some Caucasians or non-Pentecostal
employees favorably does not immunize it from liability in this case.” Accordingly, we
conclude this instruction contains an accurate statement of the law and the trial court properly
tendered it to the jury.
¶ 64 We note the first line of the instruction, however, would be redundant once the elements
instructions (plaintiff’s instruction Nos. 15 and 16) are corrected. See Montefusco v. Cecon
Construction Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 319, 325, 392 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (1979) (repetitious jury
instructions should be avoided).
¶ 65 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 66 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 67 Reversed; cause remanded for further proceedings.
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