Jackson-Hicks v. The East St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners

NOTICE
2015 IL App (5th) 150028
Decision filed 02/17/15,
corrected 02/19/15. The text of NO. 5-15-0028
this decision may be changed
or corrected prior to the filing of
a Petition for Rehearing or the IN THE
disposition of the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
EMEKA JACKSON-HICKS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellant , ) St. Clair County.
)
v. ) No. 14-MR-496
)
THE EAST ST. LOUIS BOARD OF ELECTION )
COMMISSIONERS, and its Members, ELMER )
D. JONES, Chairman, EDNA R. ALLEN, )
Vice-Chairman, and JOSEPH McCASKILL, )
Secretary, and ALVIN L. PARKS, JR., )
Candidate for Mayor, ) Honorable
) Heinz M. Rudolf,
Respondents-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SCHWARM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Welch and Moore concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In this expedited appeal, we are asked to determine whether substantial
compliance with the signature requirement for an independent candidate's nomination
papers is sufficient to retain his name on the ballot for an upcoming mayoral election.
For the following reasons, we conclude that it is.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 The petitioner, Emeka Jackson-Hicks, a candidate for the office of mayor of East
1
St. Louis, filed an objector's petition with the East St. Louis Board of Election
Commissioners (the Board) challenging the nomination papers of incumbent candidate
Alvin Parks, Jr. (Parks). See 10 ILCS 5/10-8 (West 2012). The petitioner maintained
that Parks' name should be excluded from the ballot for the February 24, 2015,
consolidated primary election on the grounds that his nomination papers failed to include
the minimum number of voter signatures required by law.
¶4 On December 10, 2014, the Board held a hearing on the petitioner's objection. See
10 ILCS 5/10-9 (West 2012). The evidence before the Board established that pursuant to
section 10-3 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2012)), Parks' nomination
papers required a minimum of 136 voter signatures. The evidence further established that
although Parks had garnered a total of 171 signatures, 48 had been deemed invalid. His
nomination papers thus included a total of 123 valid signatures, 13 short of the minimum
required. Notably, when arguing that the petitioner's objection should be denied, the
respondents cited Atkinson v. Schelling, 2013 IL App (2d) 130140, as controlling
precedent.
¶5 At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board unanimously voted to deny the
petitioner's objection and subsequently issued a written statement of its findings and
decision. See 10 ILCS 5/10-10 (West 2012). In its written statement, the Board held that
although Parks had been statutorily required to obtain 136 valid signatures on his
nomination papers, he had substantially complied with the requirement by obtaining 123.
The Board thus ruled that Parks' name would remain on the ballot for the February 24,
2015, consolidated primary election.
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¶6 On December 12, 2014, in the circuit court of St. Clair County, the petitioner filed
a petition for judicial review of the Board's decision. See 10 ILCS 5/10-10.1 (West
2012). On January 12, 2015, the cause proceeded to a hearing. At the hearing, citing
Atkinson and Merz v. Volberding, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1111 (1981), as directly on point, the
respondents maintained that the Board had rightfully determined that Parks' name should
remain on the ballot because he had substantially complied with section 10-3. In
response, noting that Atkinson had been decided by the Second District Appellate Court
and Merz had been decided by the First District, the petitioner argued that the circuit
court was bound to follow the Fifth District's decisions in Powell v. East St. Louis
Electoral Board, 337 Ill. App. 3d 334 (2003), and Knobeloch v. Electoral Board, 337 Ill.
App. 3d 1137 (2003), both of which held that substantial compliance with a mandatory
provision of the Election Code is insufficient. The respondents countered that Powell and
Knobeloch did not involve section 10-3 and that both cases predated Goodman v. Ward,
241 Ill. 2d 398 (2011), in which the supreme court acknowledged that substantial
compliance can satisfy a mandatory provision of the Election Code. Agreeing with the
respondents, the circuit court ultimately concluded that it was "bound" to follow Atkinson
and affirmed the Board's decision.
¶7 On January 20, 2015, the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On February 6,
2015, we granted the petitioner's motion to expedite her appeal pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 311(b) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).
¶8 DISCUSSION
¶9 On appeal, citing Powell and Knobeloch, the petitioner asserts that the Board
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erroneously determined that substantial compliance with section 10-3's signature
requirement is acceptable. The petitioner further suggests that Atkinson and Merz were
wrongly decided and established an amorphous and unworkable standard.
¶ 10 The respondents maintain that the provision at issue is directory rather than
mandatory and that even if it is mandatory, Atkinson, Merz, and Goodman support the
Board's decision. The respondents further distinguish Powell and Knobeloch as
"inapposite to this case."
¶ 11 Standards of Review
¶ 12 There are three types of questions that a court may encounter when reviewing a
decision of an electoral board: questions of fact, questions of law, and mixed questions of
fact and law. Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill.
2d 200, 210 (2008). "An administrative agency's findings and conclusions on questions
of fact are deemed prima facie true and correct" and will not be disturbed unless they are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. "[F]actual determinations are against the
manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident." Id.
¶ 13 "[W]here the historical facts are admitted or established, but there is a dispute as to
whether the governing legal provisions were interpreted correctly by the administrative
body, the case presents a purely legal question for which our review is de novo."
Goodman, 241 Ill. 2d at 406. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory is an issue of
law that is also reviewed de novo. O'Brien v. White, 219 Ill. 2d 86, 97 (2006).
¶ 14 "A mixed question of law and fact asks the legal effect of a given set of facts."
Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill.
4
2d 455, 472 (2005). "[I]n resolving a mixed question of law and fact, a reviewing court
must determine whether established facts satisfy applicable legal rules." Id. The "clearly
erroneous" standard of review applies to mixed questions of law and fact. Cinkus, 228
Ill. 2d at 211. A decision is considered clearly erroneous when a reviewing court is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
¶ 15 Because judicial review of an electoral board's decision is considered
administrative review, we review the Board's decision, not the decision of the circuit
court. Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 46. Here, the
Board's determination that the statutory provision at issue requires only substantial
compliance is a question of law (see O'Brien, 219 Ill. 2d at 97), while its determination
that Parks substantially complied with the statute presents a mixed question of law and
fact (see Samuelson v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 2012 IL App (1st) 120581,
¶ 11).
¶ 16 Powell and Knobeloch
¶ 17 In Powell, three mayoral candidates' names were kept off the ballot for their
failure to comply with the statement-of-economic-interest requirement set forth in section
10-5 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-5 (West 2000)). Powell, 337 Ill. App. 3d at
336. After noting that in Bolger v. Electoral Board, 210 Ill. App. 3d 958, 959-60 (1991),
the appellate court had determined that the requirement's use of the word "must" made
the requirement mandatory, the Powell court rejected the candidates' contention that their
good-faith substantial compliance was sufficient. Powell, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 337. The
court further noted that in DeFabio v. Gummersheimer, 192 Ill. 2d 63, 66 (2000), the
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supreme court held that "a mandatory provision of the Election Code" must be strictly
enforced. Powell, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 338.
¶ 18 In Knobeloch, we adhered to our holding in Powell when rejecting the candidate's
argument that his substantial compliance with the notarization requirements of sections
10-4 and 10-5 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-4, 10-5 (West 2000)) was sufficient.
Knobeloch, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1139-40. We noted that both requirements used the word
"shall" and that there was "no dispute" that the provisions at issue were "mandatory." Id.
at 1139. We further noted that a "mandatory provision is one that will describe the
consequences of failing to follow its provisions." Id.
¶ 19 In pertinent part, section 10-3 provides as follows:
"Nominations of independent candidates for public office within any district or
political subdivision less than the State, may be made by nomination papers signed
in the aggregate for each candidate by qualified voters of such district, or political
subdivision, equaling not less than 5%, nor more than 8% (or 50 more than the
minimum, whichever is greater) of the number of persons, who voted at the next
preceding regular election in such district or political subdivision in which such
district or political subdivision voted as a unit for the election of officers to serve
its respective territorial area." 10 ILCS 5/10-3 (West 2012).
¶ 20 Unlike the provisions addressed in Powell and Knobeloch, the pertinent provision
of section 10-3 "does not contain mandatory language." McNamara v. Oak Lawn
Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 356 Ill. App. 3d 961, 966 (2005). When enacting
section 10-3, "[t]he legislature used the word 'may' in describing how nominations may
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be made." Id. Additionally, "[t]he word 'shall' appears several times within section 10-3
but it does not appear in the pertinent provision." Id. As a matter of statutory
construction, it has thus been held that "the legislature did not intend that this provision
be mandatory." Id.; see also People v. One 1998 GMC, 2011 IL 110236, ¶ 16 (noting
that the "legislature's use of the word 'may' generally indicates a permissive or directory
reading, rather than a mandatory one").
¶ 21 Moreover, unlike sections 10-4 and 10-5, both of which indicate that a candidate's
failure to comply will invalidate his or her nominations papers (see 10 ILCS 5/10-4, 10-5
(West 2012)), "nothing in section 10-3 addresses what the remedy is for noncompliance
with section 10-3" (Atkinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 130140, ¶ 20). "[N]or does it provide
that compliance is essential to effect a valid nomination." McNamara, 356 Ill. App. 3d at
966. When a provision of the Election Code does not provide a penalty for failure to
comply, the provision is deemed directory rather than mandatory. O'Brien, 219 Ill. 2d at
97. "By contrast, when an Election Code provision specifies the consequences of
noncompliance, the provision has been held to be mandatory." Id.
¶ 22 Because section 10-3's signature requirement is directory rather than mandatory,
the petitioner's reliance on Powell and Knobeloch is misplaced, and the Board correctly
determined that substantial compliance is sufficient. Directory provisions require only
substantial compliance. Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc., 2013 IL App (2d) 120405,
¶ 14; see also People ex rel. Meyer v. Kerner, 35 Ill. 2d 33, 39 (1966). Moreover, as the
respondents observe, Powell and Knobeloch both predate the supreme court's recognition
that in some instances, substantial compliance can satisfy even a mandatory provision of
7
the Election Code. See Goodman, 241 Ill. 2d at 409; Akin v. Smith, 2013 IL App (1st)
130441, ¶ 9.
¶ 23 Merz and Atkinson
¶ 24 In Merz, where three independent candidates' nomination papers did not contain
the minimum number of voter signatures required by section 10-3, objections seeking to
keep the candidates' names off the ballot for the impending municipal election were filed
with the electoral board. Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1113-14. Following a hearing, the
board overruled the objections and ordered that the candidates' names be placed on the
ballot. Id. at 1113. After the circuit court affirmed the board's ruling, the objectors
brought an expedited appeal to the appellate court. Id.
¶ 25 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the board's decision with respect to one of
the three candidates on the basis of estoppel, since the candidate had relied on
information provided by the city clerk as to the number of signatures that he needed. Id.
at 1115-17. With respect to the other two candidates who were unable to claim estoppel,
the appellate court held that despite the fact that they had failed to comply with the
minimum statutory signature requirement, they had "demonstrated at least a minimal
appeal to the voters." Id. at 1118. The court noted that "[t]he primary purpose of the
signature requirement is to reduce the electoral process to manageable proportions by
confining ballot positions to a relatively small number of candidates who have
demonstrated initiative and at least a minimal appeal to eligible voters" and that removing
the candidates' names from the ballot would penalize "not only the candidates
themselves, but also the voters." Id. Citing Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist
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Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979), the court further stated, "While we recognize the
State's interest in regulating elections by setting such requirements, we also recognize the
right of qualified voters to cast their votes effectively." Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1118.
The court thus determined that allowing all three candidates' names to appear on the
ballot best served the interests of justice. Id. We note that the candidates in Merz were
statutorily required to obtain at least 778 signatures, but they only had "more than 550
signatures and less than 610." Id. at 1113-14.
¶ 26 In Atkinson, two mayoral candidates submitted nomination papers with less than
the statutorily required minimum of 123 voter signatures. Atkinson, 2013 IL App (2d)
130140, ¶¶ 3-4. One of the candidates submitted 110 signatures; the other submitted 105;
and both had been told by the village clerk that they needed a minimum of 80. Id. ¶¶ 3,
5. Asserting that their failure to obtain 123 signatures rendered the candidates'
nomination papers invalid, the petitioner filed objections arguing that the candidates'
names should not appear on the ballot. Id. ¶ 4. After the electoral board overruled the
objections and the circuit court affirmed the board's decision, the petitioner appealed. Id.
¶ 8.
¶ 27 On appeal, stating that the facts before it were "almost identical" to those in Merz,
the appellate court affirmed the board's decision and adopted Merz's holding. Id. ¶¶ 13,
19. The court thus determined that the doctrine of estoppel was applicable and that,
alternatively, the candidates had "demonstrated at least a minimal appeal to the voters."
Id. ¶¶ 15, 21. The court further stated that "[i]t is a fundamental principle that access to a
place on the ballot is a substantial right and not lightly to be denied" and that denying the
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candidates access to the electoral ballot would penalize the voters as well as the
candidates. Id. ¶ 21. The court also noted that the disparities in the number of votes that
the candidates needed were less than those in Merz. Id.
¶ 28 Keeping in mind that we must balance competing interests (see Socialist Workers
Party, 440 U.S. at 184-85; Huskey v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 156 Ill. App.
3d 201, 205 (1987)), we conclude that when determining whether a candidate has
substantially complied with section 10-3's signature requirement, the "minimal appeal"
standard employed in Merz and Atkinson provides a reasoned approach that recognizes
"Illinois courts favor ballot access for candidates who wish to run for public office"
(Forcade-Osborn v. Madison County Electoral Board, 334 Ill. App. 3d 756, 760 (2002)).
The standard is further consistent with the notion that when determining whether
substantial compliance has been achieved, courts may consider "whether the deviation
impairs the purpose of the specific statutory provision at issue." Atkinson v. Roddy, 2013
IL App (2d) 130139, ¶ 17. As noted, "the primary purpose of the signature requirement
is to reduce the electoral process to manageable proportions by confining ballot positions
to a relatively small number of candidates who have demonstrated initiative and at least a
minimal appeal to eligible voters." Heabler v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 338
Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062 (2003); Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1118. We believe that this
purpose will not be frustrated where the name of a candidate who has substantially
complied with section 10-3 in good faith is allowed to appear on a ballot. We further
believe that denying such a candidate his or her right to run for office would be a drastic
remedy that would not best serve the interests of justice. See Atkinson, 2013 IL App (2d)
10
130140, ¶ 20; McNamara, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 967; Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1118.
¶ 29 We are not unsympathetic to the petitioner's position, but we are constrained to
interpret section 10-3's signature requirement as being directory rather than mandatory.
"We will not read words or meanings into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to
include them." People v. Johnson, 2013 IL 114639, ¶ 12. "Therefore, any remedy lies
with the legislature, not the courts, if the legislature may be so inclined." Id.
¶ 30 The Board's Decision
¶ 31 The evidence before the Board established that Parks was statutorily required to
have at least 136 voter signatures on his nomination papers. The evidence further
established that he submitted a total of 171 signatures. For reasons not entirely apparent
from the record, however, 48 of those signatures were deemed invalid. His nomination
papers thus included a total of 123 valid signatures, 13 less than the requisite minimum.
¶ 32 Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the Board's finding that Parks
substantially complied with section 10-3 is clearly erroneous. Had all of the signatures
that Parks submitted been valid, he would have had 35 more than he needed, but he
ultimately fell 13 signatures short. He nevertheless demonstrated initiative and "at least a
minimal appeal" to the eligible voters. Atkinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 130140, ¶ 21; Merz,
94 Ill. App. 3d at 1118; cf. Samuelson, 2012 IL App (1st) 120581, ¶ 36 ("A candidate is
deemed not to be in substantial compliance with the Election Code when he 'completely
ignores one of the statutory elements.' " (quoting Jones v. Dodendorf, 190 Ill. App. 3d
557, 561 (1989))). Furthermore, removing Parks' name from the ballot would deprive
him of his right to run for office and would prevent the voters of East St. Louis from
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reelecting their incumbent mayor if they desire to do so. See Atkinson, 2013 IL App (2d)
130140, ¶ 21; Merz, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1118. Because we are not left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made, we accordingly affirm the circuit court's
judgment affirming the Board's decision.
¶ 33 We lastly address the petitioner's contention that allowing electoral boards to
employ the minimal-appeal standard will result in confusion and random results. In
Merz, for instance, the candidates obtained less than 80% of the required signatures. In
Atkinson, the candidates obtained less than 90%. In the present case, after the invalid
signatures were discounted, the candidate obtained 90%. Understandably, the petitioner
thus asks, "Where does an electoral board or court draw the line?" We cannot answer
that question, however, even if we were inclined to do so.
"It is the duty of this court to decide actual controversies which can be carried into
effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the
case before it [citation], as decisions of this nature could have an advisory effect
only." South Stickney Park District v. Village of Bedford Park, 131 Ill. App. 3d
205, 209 (1985).
¶ 34 Moreover, it is an electoral board's duty to decide whether a candidate's
nomination papers "are valid or whether the objections thereto should be sustained" (10
ILCS 5/10-10 (West 2012); People ex rel. Martin v. White, 329 Ill. App. 81, 91 (1946)),
and as noted, we review an electoral board's determination as to whether a candidate has
substantially complied with the signature requirement of section 10-3 as a mixed question
12
of law and fact (see Samuelson, 2012 IL App (1st) 120581, ¶ 11). "Such review is
significantly deferential to an agency's experience in construing and applying the statutes
that it administers." Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc., 216 Ill. 2d at 472.
Affording such deference, we trust that an electoral board employing the minimal-appeal
standard will exercise its judgment judiciously and will consider all relevant facts and
circumstances when deciding whether a candidate has substantially complied with section
10-3's signature requirement. Rather than solely focusing on a specific percentage, such
decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis giving due consideration to the
requirement's primary purpose. We lastly note that a candidate would be ill-advised to
view the standard as a safety net.
¶ 35 CONCLUSION
¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the circuit court's judgment affirming
the Board's denial of the petitioner's objection.
¶ 37 Affirmed.
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2015 IL App (5th) 150028
NO. 5-15-0028
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
EMEKA JACKSON-HICKS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellant, ) St. Clair County.
)
v. ) No. 14-MR-496
)
THE EAST ST. LOUIS BOARD OF ELECTION )
COMMISSIONERS, and its Members, ELMER )
D. JONES, Chairman, EDNA R. ALLEN, )
Vice-Chairman, and JOSEPH McCASKILL, )
Secretary; and ALVIN L. PARKS, JR., )
Candidate for Mayor, ) Honorable
) Heinz M. Rudolf,
Respondents-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: February 17, 2015
______________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable S. Gene Schwarm, J.
Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J., and
Honorable James R. Moore, J.,
Concur
______________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Eric W. Evans, Evans Blasi, 1512 Johnson Road, Granite City, IL 62040
for
Appellant
______________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Garrett P. Hoerner, Becker, Paulson, Hoerner & Thompson, P.C., 5111
for West Main Street, Belleville, IL 62226 (attorney for Alvin L. Parks, Jr.);
Appellees Richard Sturgeon, Attorney at Law, 23 South First Street, Belleville, IL
62220 (attorney for Edna R. Allen, East St. Louis Board of Election
Commissioners, Elmer D. Jones, Joseph McCaskill)
______________________________________________________________________________