Perez v. Illinois Department of Children and Family Services

Filed 8/22/08 NO. 4-07-0854
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
LAURA PEREZ, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Vermilion County
THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN ) No. 06MR161
AND FAMILY SERVICES; and ERWIN McEWEN, )
Director of the Illinois Department ) Honorable
of Children and Family Services, ) Joseph P. Skowronski,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Laura Perez, appeals the Vermilion County
circuit court's September 2007 order, which denied her motion for
summary judgment; granted the summary-judgment motion filed by
defendants, the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) and its Director, Erwin McEwen; and affirmed
DCFS's dismissal of plaintiff's appeal from an indicated finding
of abuse or neglect. We reverse the circuit court's affirmation
of DCFS's dismissal of plaintiff's appeal and remand with direc-
tions.
I. BACKGROUND
At some point, DCFS indicated plaintiff for (1) ty-
ing/close confinement, (2) sexual penetration, (3) sexual moles-
tation, and (4) substantial risk of sexual injury.
According to docket sheets, on June 28, 2004, the State
charged plaintiff with one count of predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a) (West 1998)) for her
actions between January 1, 1999, and January 1, 2001. People v.
Perez, No. 04-CF-394 (Cir. Ct. Vermilion Co.) (hereinafter case
No. 394). A juvenile case was also brought against plaintiff,
which was dismissed on October 21, 2004.
In a September 24, 2004, letter, plaintiff stated her
desire to appeal DCFS's decision to indicate her. On October 20,
2004, a DCFS administrative law judge (ALJ) stayed plaintiff's
administrative appeal due to the criminal charge.
On April 19, 2005, the State made a motion to nol-pros
the criminal charge against plaintiff. Plaintiff objected, and
the trial court granted the State's motion and canceled plain-
tiff's bond. The court's nolle prosequi order stated it was
subject to being recommenced. Eight days later, a bond-refund
check was mailed to plaintiff. The last entry on the docket
sheets for case No. 394 is a September 23, 2005, motion to
continue, which plaintiff's counsel asserted was an error.
In an August 11, 2006, letter to DCFS, plaintiff's
counsel noted the dismissal of the criminal charge and requested
a hearing on plaintiff's appeal or the removal of the indicated
report. On October 13, 2006, the ALJ entered an order, dismiss-
ing plaintiff's appeal from her indicated report. The order
stated, "[plaintiff]'s notification of the resolution of circuit
court proceedings was received more than 45 days after that
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decision and is untimely."
On November 13, 2006, plaintiff filed a two-count
complaint against defendants. The first count was brought under
the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 through 3-113
(West 2006)) and sought review of DCFS's dismissal of her appeal.
That count was filed within 35 days of the dismissal order, and
thus was timely. See 735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 2006). The second
count was for mandamus and sought a judgment, directing DCFS to
conduct a hearing on her appeal. In January 2007, the circuit
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss count II.
In March 2007, plaintiff filed a summary-judgment
motion, asserting the 45-day deadline did not apply to her
because the circuit court in her criminal case did not make a
final judicial determination in her favor. That same month,
defendants filed a brief in support of the administrative deci-
sion and requested the brief be considered a cross-motion for
summary judgment.
In May 2007, DCFS filed a motion to substitute McEwen,
the acting director of DCFS in place of Brian Samuels, the former
director. The circuit court granted the motion without objec-
tion.
In June 2007, the circuit court held a hearing on the
summary-judgment motions. In August 2007, the court wrote a
letter opinion, finding DCFS's decision was not clearly errone-
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ous. Thus, the court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment and denied plaintiff's. On September 13, 2007, the
court entered a written order consistent with the opinion letter.
On October 9, 2007, plaintiff filed a timely appeal
from the circuit court's September 13, 2007, order.
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues the circuit court erred in its inter-
pretation of section 336.110(a)(1)(A) of Title 89 of the Illinois
Administrative Code (89 Ill. Adm. Code §336.110(a)(1)(A), as
amended by 26 Ill. Reg. 4175 (eff. March 8, 2002)). We note the
only remaining count addressed in the summary-judgment order was
brought under the Administrative Review Law, and thus we review
the agency's determination, not the circuit court's (Odie v.
Department of Employment Security, 377 Ill. App. 3d 710, 713, 881
N.E.2d 358, 360 (2007)). The interpretation of an administrative
regulation presents a question of law, and thus we review the
matter de novo. People v. Wilhelm, 346 Ill. App. 3d 206, 208,
803 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (2004).
Courts construe administrative rules and regulations
under the same principles that govern the construction of stat-
utes. Thus, our primary objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the drafters' intent. We begin by examining the
regulation's language since it is the best indication of the
drafters' intent. Wilhelm, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 208, 803 N.E.2d
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at 1034. In doing so, we give the language its plain and ordi-
nary meaning (Wilhelm, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 208, 803 N.E.2d at
1034) and read the regulatory scheme as a whole, "so that no part
of it is rendered meaningless or superfluous" (People v. Jones,
214 Ill. 2d 187, 193, 824 N.E.2d 239, 242 (2005)). When the
regulation's language is clear and unambiguous, our only function
is to apply the regulation as written. Wilhelm, 346 Ill. App. 3d
at 208, 803 N.E.2d at 1034. Here, both parties assert the
language is clear and unambiguous.
Section 336.110 of Title 89 of the Illinois Administra-
tive Code provides, in pertinent part, the following:
"a) The Chief [ALJ] shall:
1) Upon notification from [DCFS]'s
representative that a criminal or juve-
nile court action is pending based on
the same facts as the administrative
expungement appeal, issue a stay of the
appeal process for all appellants named
as defendants or respondents until a
final judicial decision has been made.
The time period, from the filing of the
criminal charges or the juvenile peti-
tion, shall not be considered a delay on
the part of [DCFS] in issuing and imple-
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menting its final administrative deci-
sion.
A) If the circuit court makes
a final decision favorable to the
appellant, the appellant shall
notify the [a]dministrative
[h]earings [u]nit in writing that a
final order has been entered in the
criminal or juvenile case and the
[a]dministrative [h]earings [u]nit
shall schedule a hearing on the
appeal. The appellant shall notify
the [a]dministrative [h]earings
[u]nit within 45 days after any
such decision. If the appellant
fails to notify the
[a]dministrative [h]earings [u]nit
of these findings of fact within 45
days, the appellant shall not be
entitled to a hearing under this
[p]art.
B) If the circuit court makes
a finding that the alleged perpe-
trator abused or neglected a child,
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the Chief [ALJ] or an [ALJ] shall
enter an order upholding each indi-
cated finding based on the same
facts as the court finding of abuse
or neglect and the alleged perpe-
trator shall not be entitled to a
hearing on those indicated find-
ings. If, after entering such an
order, there are no remaining indi-
cated findings of abuse or neglect,
the Chief [ALJ] or an [ALJ] shall
dismiss the appeal.
C) The [a]dministrative
[h]earings [u]nit may schedule
status hearings to determine the
status of any appeal stayed because
of circuit court action." 89 Ill.
Adm. Code §336.110(a), as amended
by 26 Ill. Reg. 4175 (eff. March 8,
2002)).
At issue in this case is the meaning of both the
language "final decision" and "favorable to appellant" contained
in section 336.110(a)(1)(A). We will first address the "final
decision" language and note section 336.110(a)(1) contains
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similar language, i.e., "final judicial decision." 89 Ill. Adm.
Code §336.110(a)(1), as amended by 26 Ill. Reg. 4175 (eff. March
8, 2002)).
We begin our analysis by looking to the plain meaning
of "final" and "decision." Our supreme court has defined "final"
as "last; conclusive; pertaining to the end." Saylor v. Duel,
236 Ill. 429, 432, 86 N.E. 119, 121 (1908). "'Decision' means
the act of deciding or settling a dispute or question by giving a
judgment; the act of making up one's mind; a judgment or conclu-
sion reached or given; a determination." Hankenson v. Board of
Education of Waukegan Township High School District No. 119, Lake
County, 10 Ill. App. 2d 79, 94, 134 N.E.2d 356, 363 (1956), rev'd
on other grounds, 10 Ill. 2d 560, 141 N.E.2d 5 (1957). Thus, the
issue is whether the language refers to the last determination in
the pending criminal or juvenile cases filed or the last determi-
nation resolving the criminal or juvenile matter forever.
Defendants contend the plain language of a "final
decision" indicates a ruling that renders the filed case no
longer pending or, in other words, terminates it. Defendants
argue their interpretation makes common sense, since once a final
decision ends the pendency of the current litigation, a stay of
the appeal in the DCFS proceedings is no longer needed. Plain-
tiff contends that interpretation ignores the "these findings of
fact" language in the last sentence of section 336.110(a)(1)(A)
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of Title 89 of the Illinois Administrative Code (89 Ill. Adm.
Code §336.110(a)(1)(A), as amended by 26 Ill. Reg. 4175 (eff.
March 8, 2002)), which would indicate a final resolution of the
criminal or juvenile matter. Defendants respond, inter alia,
that "these findings of fact" refer to (1) "a final decision" and
(2) "favorable to appellant."
Defendants' assertion is flawed because "a final
decision" and "favorable to appellant" are not findings of fact.
"Findings of fact are determinations from the evidence of a case,
either by a court or administrative agency, concerning facts
averred by one party and denied by another." Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Hardisty, 269 Ill. App. 3d 613, 618, 646 N.E.2d 628, 632
(1995). Moreover, we note DCFS used the "these findings of fact"
language in referring to what notification it must receive when
it could have simply repeated the "final order" notification
language it used in the first sentence of section
336.110(a)(1)(A). Thus, that language must have been included
for a reason. We point out section 336.110(a)(1)(B) also refers
to a "finding." 89 Ill. Adm. Code §336.110(a)(1)(B), as amended
by 26 Ill. Reg. 4175 (eff. March 8, 2002).
In interpreting a provision, a court "must construe the
statute so that each word, clause, and sentence is given a
reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous, avoiding an
interpretation that would render any portion of the statute
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meaningless or void." Cassens Transport Co. v. Illinois Indus-
trial Comm'n, 218 Ill. 2d 519, 524, 844 N.E.2d 414, 421 (2006).
Defendants' interpretation of the statute is unreasonable as it
renders the "findings of fact" language superfluous.
Defendants further contend that, if a final order must
have involved findings of fact, then criminal or juvenile cases
in which no findings of fact were made are not addressed in
section 336.110(a)(1) of Title 89 of the Illinois Administrative
Code (89 Ill. Adm. Code §336.110(a)(1)(A), as amended by 26 Ill.
Reg. 4175 (eff. March 8, 2002)). They contend such a result is
absurd.
As stated earlier, in interpreting the regulation, we
must construe the regulatory scheme as a whole. Jones, 214 Ill.
2d at 193, 824 N.E.2d at 242. Accordingly, the final decision
language in section 336.110(a)(1) must have the same meaning
throughout the provision. Thus, if a decision is final when
findings of fact have been made, the stay is not lifted under
section 336.110(a)(1) for cases in which the cause was terminated
without findings of fact. We recognize that result is problem-
atic.
With section 336.110 of Title 89 of the Illinois
Administrative Code, a reasonable interpretation cannot be
rendered that would recognize all of the language in the section
and not produce an absurd result. The language used by DCFS in
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the regulation appears to be an oversight by the agency of
termination of cases without an adjudication on the merits. DCFS
addresses the impact of a decision in a criminal or juvenile case
on the DCFS appeal in only two situations, where the court made a
finding of abuse or neglect and when the court rendered "a final
decision favorable to the appellant." See 89 Ill. Adm. Code
§§336.110(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), as amended by 26 Ill. Reg. 4175(eff. March 8, 2002). DCFS could have made a bifurcation,
addressing (1) findings of abuse or neglect and (2) then all
other resolutions. Instead, it chose to specify two situations,
leaving some situations not addressed by the regulation.
Here, the appropriate resolution is for the agency to
address the oversight and amend the regulation, rather than try
to compensate for the oversight with a strained and unreasonable
interpretation. Since section 336.110(a)(1) fails to address
dismissals without an adjudication on the merits, DCFS's finding
the 45-day provision contained in section 336.110(a)(1)(A)
applied to plaintiff was clearly erroneous. See City of
Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d
191, 205, 692 N.E.2d 295, 302 (1998) (reviewing a mixed question
of fact and law under the clearly erroneous standard of review).
Accordingly, we reverse the agency's dismissal of plaintiff's
appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
order.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse both the circuit
court's affirmation of DCFS's dismissal of plaintiff's appeal and
DCFS's dismissal and remand the cause to DCFS for further pro-
ceedings.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
MYERSCOUGH and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.
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