110 Larkin, LLC. v. Weber

2023 IL App (3d) 210606Opinion filed February 23, 2023
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2023
110 LARKIN, LLC, ∗ et al. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) Will County, Illinois,
)
v. )
)
STEVE WEBER, Will County ) Appeal No. 3-21-0606
Treasurer and ex-officio Will ) Circuit No. 18-TX-251
County Collector, )
)
Defendant-Appellee )
) Honorable
(Woodridge Park District, Intervenor- ) John C. Anderson,
Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Brennan and Albrecht concurred in the judgment and opinion.
____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 In a tax rate objection complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the 2017 levy imposed by the
intervenor, Woodridge Park District (WPD), was unlawful because, at the time of the 2017 levy,
WPD had an illegal excess accumulation in its corporate fund. Plaintiffs and WPD filed cross-
motions for summary judgment. The circuit court denied WPD’s motion for summary judgment
∗
See Appendix A for a list of all plaintiffs.
and granted plaintiffs’ motion, finding an excess accumulation of funds in WPD’s corporate fund,
which was a sub-fund of WPD’s general fund, so that the 2017 levy at issue was unlawful. WPD
appealed, arguing that there was no excess accumulation of funds to support the court’s finding
that the 2017 levy was unlawful. We reverse.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In Illinois, park districts have the power to levy and collect taxes on taxable property in
their districts for “corporate purposes,” pursuant to sections 5-1 and 5-3 of the Park District Code
(70 ILCS 1205/5-1, 5-3 (West 2016)). On December 12, 2017, WPD adopted a levy ordinance in
accordance with sections 5-1 and 5-3 of the Park District Code for its general fund.
¶4 On November 16, 2018, plaintiffs filed a tax rate objection complaint. The tax districts in
Will County whose 2017 levies were objected to included WPD. In the complaint, plaintiffs
alleged that it was a taxpayer who owned, had an interest in, or had the obligation of paying real
estate taxes on parcels of real property in Will County. Plaintiffs sought a refund, plus interest, for
payment of the 2017 real estate taxes at issue “by reason of excessive and illegal assessments,
levies and taxes extended against such parcels.”
¶5 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged WPD levied for “corporate purposes” $3,910,740 for 2017.
Plaintiffs contended the annual audit report for WPD showed a balance in WPD’s corporate fund
at the conclusion of the 2017 fiscal year of $1,685,964, with an additional $3,558,158 for 2016
taxes that had not yet been received, for total available funds of $5,966,101. (Plaintiffs
subsequently modified this figure to contend that WPD had $3,780,072 in 2016 taxes, so that the
total funds available in WPD’s corporate fund was $6,188,012.) Plaintiffs contended that WPD’s
average expenditures for “corporate purposes” for the three preceding fiscal years (2015, 2016,
and 2017) was $1,816,106, making the assets within WPD’s corporate fund 3.5 times the average
2
annual expenditure of those funds. For that reason, plaintiffs claimed there was an excess
accumulation of funds available and, therefore, the 2017 levy was invalid.
¶6 A. WPD’s Motion for Summary Judgment
¶7 WPD filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing its attached audit documents
demonstrated that there was not an excess accumulation of funds in its general fund at the time of
the 2017 tax levy. WPD argued that plaintiffs used incorrect figures to support its tax objection
complaint. Specifically, WPD contended that plaintiffs were using information related only to
WPD’s corporate sub-fund, whereas the fund balances and expenditures related to its general fund
supported the 2017 levy. WPD’s general fund consisted of three sub-funds: (1) corporate,
(2) capital replacement, and (3) capital development. WPD argued that plaintiffs miscalculated the
ratio of funds available to the average annual expenditure of funds by “mixing and matching
figures from the General Fund and the ‘corporate’ sub-fund.”
¶8 WPD further indicated it maintained its general fund, under which it maintained sub-funds
for administrative purposes “to allocate revenues and expenses separate and distinct between its
corporate purposes, building repairs and building improvements in accordance with 70 ILCS
1205/5-1.” Each of the sub-funds was funded by the single levy at issue. Attaching supporting
documentation to its motion, WPD contended it had submitted a levy of $3,910,740 for its general
fund ($2,190,00 for administrative, maintenance, and planning expenses; $602,217 for capital
replacement expenses; and $1,118,523 for capital development expenses). WPD argued that under
section 5-1 of the Park District Code, it was “well within its rights to levy for corporate purposes,
building repairs and building improvements.” WPD contended that when its general fund was
viewed as a whole, there was no excess accumulation of funds and, therefore, the 2017 levy at
issue was lawful.
3
¶9 B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
¶ 10 Plaintiffs also filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs contended its objection was
not in relation to WPD’s general fund but, rather, was against WPD’s corporate sub-fund of its
general fund. Plaintiffs argued that at the time of WPD’s 2017 levy, WPD had in its corporate sub-
fund, 3.4 times the average annual expenses of the prior three years. Plaintiffs argued that because
it made a prima facie case of an excess accumulation of funds, WPD was required to, but had
failed to, produce evidence of a need for the accumulation of funds in the corporate sub-fund.
¶ 11 In response, WPD contended that plaintiffs’ arguments in relation to WPD’s corporate sub-
fund artificially constructed an excess accumulation claim. WPD argued that plaintiffs’ tax rate
objection was against the 2017 levy and the funds in relation to that levy were in WPD’s general
fund, not solely within the corporate sub-fund. WPD attached to its response the affidavit of Mike
Adams, the executive director of WPD. Adams averred that WPD maintained the following funds:
“General, Recreation, Debt Service, Social Security and IMRF, Public Liability Insurance, Audit,
Special Recreation, Jubilee, Restricted Contributions and Working Cash.” Adams further averred
that within WPD’s “General Fund,” WPD maintained three sub-funds: corporate, capital
replacement and capital development. The Will County and Du Page County clerks extended the
levy at issue under a title of the corporate fund; the funds received from the levy at issue were
deposited into WPD’s general fund and then allocated among its three sub-funds; and the total
amount received as the result of the 2017 levy in relation to the General Fund from Will and
Du Page Counties was $3,935,331 and was allocated among the three sub-funds within its general
fund—$2,696,198 to its corporate sub-fund, $600,039 to its capital replacement sub-fund, and
$639,094 to its capital development sub-fund.
4
¶ 12 C. Plaintiffs’ Response to WPD’s Motion/Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion
¶ 13 In response to WPD’s motion for summary judgment and in support of its own motion,
plaintiffs argued that tax rate objections are analyzed on a fund-by-fund basis and WPD’s general
fund was not the subject of their objection. Plaintiffs contended that, based on WPD’s own
documents, plaintiffs established an excess accumulation in the corporate sub-fund.
¶ 14 D. Trial Court’s Ruling
¶ 15 On May 17, 2021, the circuit court entered a written order indicating that plaintiffs had
filed a single objection to the corporate sub-fund of WPD’s general fund and that there had been
no objection against WPD’s general fund. The circuit court found that in 2017 there was an illegal
excess accumulation in WPD’s corporate sub-fund. The circuit court noted that plaintiffs stipulated
to, and accepted, WPD’s calculation that the district levied taxes in the amount of $86,657.71 on
plaintiffs’ property. For those reasons, the circuit court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment, ordered a refund to plaintiffs in the amount of $86,657.71 (with statutory interest), and
denied WPD’s motion for summary judgment.
¶ 16 WPD filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. WPD appealed.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 On appeal, WPD argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary
judgment and granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment where there was no excess
accumulation of funds related to the 2017 levy at issue. Summary judgment should be granted only
where the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, and affidavits, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211
Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2004). Where the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, as a
5
general rule, they agree that there are no issues of material fact and that the cause can be decided
as a matter of law. State Farm Insurance Co. v. American Service Insurance Co., 332 Ill. App. 3d
31, 36 (2002). The parties in the case at bar do not dispute the material facts; thus, this case can be
resolved as a matter of law. As such, the standard of review is de novo.
¶ 19 The crux of the issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by determining that there
was an excess accumulation in one of three sub-funds within WPD’s General Fund, rather than
examining the entirety of the General Fund to make an excess accumulation determination.
¶ 20 Section 5-1 of the Park District Code provides:
“Each Park District has the power to levy and collect taxes on all the taxable
property in the district for all corporate purposes. The commissioners may
accumulate funds for the purposes of building repairs and improvements and may
annually levy taxes for such purposes in excess of current requirements for its other
purposes but subject to the tax rate limitation as herein provided.
All general taxes proposed by the board to be levied upon the taxable
property within the district shall be levied by ordinance.” 70 ILCS 1205/5-1 (West
2016).
¶ 21 Section 5-3 of the Park District Code provides:
“Any park district may levy and collect annually an additional tax *** for all
corporate purposes, which tax shall be levied and collected in like manner as the
general taxes for such district. Such tax shall be in addition to all other taxes
authorized by law to be levied and collected by such district and shall not be
included within any limitation of rate contained in this code or any other law, but
shall be excluded therefrom and be in addition thereto and in excess thereof.
6
No such tax shall be levied in any such district until the question of levying
such tax has first been submitted to the voters of such district at an election held in
such district, and has been approved by a majority of such voters voting thereon.
Notice of the referendum shall be given and such election shall be conducted in the
manner provided by the general election law.” Id. § 5-3.
¶ 22 A taxing body has wide discretion in estimating the amount of money necessary to carry
out its lawful objectives, and there is a presumption a taxing body did not abuse its discretion in
making its property tax levy. In re Application of the People ex rel. Anderson, 279 Ill. App. 3d
593, 596 (1996); In re Application of Rosewell, 159 Ill. 2d 393, 402 (1994) (abuse of discretion is
the proper standard of review of a taxing body’s estimates in passing their appropriation and levy
ordinances as part of their budgets). To rebut that presumption, an objector must make a
prima facie case that a levy for a fund created an unlawful accumulation of assets. Anderson, 279
Ill. App. 3d at 596.
¶ 23 “It has long been the fixed policy in this State not to permit the unnecessary accumulation
of monies in the public treasury.” Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Miller, 42 Ill. 2d 542, 543
(1969). Although taxing authorities have reasonable discretion in fixing the amount needed to be
raised, courts will interfere to prevent a clear abuse of those discretionary powers. Id. at 543-44.
“Unnecessary accumulation of money in the public treasury is against the policy of the law, and a
levy or tax rate which results in such an unnecessary accumulation is illegal.” Anderson, 279 Ill.
App. 3d at 596 (citing In re Application of O’Connor, 80 Ill. App. 3d 354, 355 (1980)).
¶ 24 “[A] tax objector can meet its burden to show an excessive accumulation by presenting
evidence that the accumulation in the fund exceeds two to three times the average annual
expenditures from the fund.” People ex rel. Toynton v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 285 Ill. App.
73d 357, 362 (1996). Where tax objectors demonstrate an accumulation of assets that exceeds two
to three times a taxing body’s foreseeable expenditures, the taxing body must be given an
opportunity to present evidence as to why it needed to make an additional levy. Id. at 363.
¶ 25 Excess accumulation of funds claims are analyzed pursuant to the framework established
in Miller, wherein our supreme court determined the total amount of available funds in the fund of
a taxing body at the start of a fiscal year was calculated by adding the fund’s balance at the
beginning of the fiscal year and the amount of taxes that remained to be collected from the prior
year’s levy for that fund. Miller, 42 Ill. 2d at 543. The total amount of available funds in Miller
($305,477.18) was then divided by the average annual expenditures from the fund for the previous
three fiscal years ($107,368.60) (Miller ratio). Id. Our supreme court in Miller held that having
funds available for general assistance purposes in an amount that was 2.84 times the three-year
average annual expenditure and 3.24 times the prior year’s expenditure was an unlawful excess
accumulation and the levy at issue was deemed unlawful. Id. at 543-44. The Miller court cited
People ex rel. Leaf v. Roth, 389 Ill. 287 (1945), which previously declared a levy illegal where the
amount accumulated was almost twice the estimated expenditures, and People ex rel. Schaefer v.
New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co., 353 Ill. 518 (1933), which declared a levy illegal where
the cash on hand was three times the yearly expenses. Miller, 42 Ill. 2d at 543-44. In finding that
there was an unlawful excess accumulation, the Miller court noted that there was nothing in the
record indicating any unusual, anticipated call upon the fund or that the levy was for any other
purpose than the accumulation of monies in the fund. Id. at 544. The Miller court, therefore,
concluded the levy was not justified and was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 544-45.
¶ 26 In Anderson, the Second District of the Illinois Appellate Court held that the plaintiffs
failed to meet their burden of making a prima facie case of an excess accumulation of funds where
8
the total funds available were only 1.8 times the average annual expenditures for the past three
years and 1.61 times the prior year’s expenditure, which was well below what was found to be
excessive in Miller. Anderson, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 596-98. Accordingly, in Anderson, the tax
objectors failed to meet their burden of showing an excessive accumulation. Id. at 597-98.
¶ 27 Here, WPD had the power to levy and collect taxes for “all corporate purposes.” See 70
ILCS 120/5-1 (West 2016). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “corporate purpose” in this context as
follows:
“In reference to municipal corporations, and especially to their powers of taxation, a
‘corporate purpose’ is one which shall promote the general prosperity and the welfare of
the municipality; or a purpose necessary or proper to carry into effect the object of the
creation of the corporate body or one which is germane to the general scope of the objects
for which the corporation was created or has a legitimate connection with those objects
and a manifest relation thereto.” Black’s Law Dictionary 340 (6th ed. 1990).
¶ 28 Thus, “corporate purpose” is a broad concept, including all direct and collateral purposes
that serve the corporate body’s objectives. In this case, plaintiffs’ argument in support of its tax
objection to WPD’s 2017 levy was that there was an excess accumulation of funds in the corporate
sub-fund of WPD’s general fund so that the levy was unnecessary and, therefore, unlawful.
Plaintiffs contended that because the corporate sub-fund was the only fund that was specifically
labeled “corporate,” it was the only fund used for corporate purposes. However, the definition of
corporate purposes is broad. WPD could simply have labeled its sub-funds as “corporate fund
No. 1-administrative,” “corporate fund No. 2-capital replacement,” and “corporate fund No. 3-
capital development,” and plaintiffs would have no argument regarding an excess accumulation of
funds in relation to WPD’s singular levy for corporate purposes. Further, nothing in the law
9
required WPD to create the sub-funds; WPD could have maintained a single general fund. Again,
plaintiffs’ logic dissolves. Plaintiffs’ argument is based on the label “corporate” on one of the sub-
funds, which has absolutely no legal import or impact. Plaintiffs then use that label to separate the
sub-fund from the rest, which then skews the Miller ratio by comparing mathematical apples to
oranges. This is why plaintiffs’ logic is faulty. There is no argument or indication that the total
funds accumulated in WPD’s general fund and spent from each sub-fund were used for anything
other than appropriate corporate purposes.
¶ 29 We acknowledge that a fund-by-fund analysis is preferable, even if the monies in various
funds are to some extent transferable. Alpha Gamma Rho Alumni v. People ex rel. Boylan, 322 Ill.
App. 3d 310, 315 (2001). However, in this case, there is no indication that there were three separate
funds with corresponding separate levies; rather, there was only one fund, divided into three sub-
funds for administrative reasons, with a single levy by a single taxing district. Cf. id. at 315
(rejecting tax objector’s argument that excess accumulation objections against several taxing
districts should be analyzed across multiple funds rather than on a fund-by-fund basis); O’Connor
80 Ill. App. 3d at 355-56 (applying the Miller test on a fund-by-fund basis to four funds in
determining whether there was an excess accumulation of funds where each of the four funds had
a separate levy associated with it).
¶ 30 As is required by law, plaintiffs’ tax rate objection was filed against the specific 2017 levy
at issue, not against a particular fund or sub-fund. See 35 ILCS 200/23-15(b)(1) (“[t]he court,
sitting without a jury, shall hear and determine all objections specified to the taxes, assessments,
or levies in question”). In looking at the balance of the entire general fund at the time of the 2017
levy, and applying the Miller calculation, we conclude that there was no excessive accumulation
of funds. WPD’s general fund balance was $6,312,557 as of April 30, 2017. The property taxes
10
yet to be received from the 2016 levy for the general fund was $3,780,072. Thus, the funds
available were $10,092,629. The three-year average annual expenditures from the general fund
were $9,152,145. Thus, the Miller ratio was approximately 1.1. WPD’s calculation of the Miller
ratio is the correct calculation. The tax levy at issue funds all three sub-funds, which are divided
for administrative purposes only. If each sub-fund had its own corresponding levy, then the
approach set forth in Alpha Gamma and O’Connor would be the correct approach. However, they
do not. The correct Miller calculation compares all the funds available (the funds on hand at the
beginning of the fiscal year together with the funds due from the previous year’s levy) in all three
sub-funds that make up the general fund to the average expenditures from all three sub-funds over
the past three years. That calculation yields a Miller ratio of approximately 1.1. Simply put, WPD
is not accumulating excess funds beyond what it has historically been spending to run the park
district. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and
denying WPD’s motion for summary judgment.
¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 32 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed.
¶ 33 Reversed.
11
¶ 34 APPENDIX A
110 LARKIN LLC
1355 LAKEVIEW DRIVE LLC
18500 NORTH CREEK DRIVE LLC
18520 81ST TP LLC
190TH STREET REAL ESTATE LLC
24111 W 103RD ST LLC
253 EAST BRUCE ST LLC
2675 SYCAMORE RD INC
2700 ELLIS RD ACQUISITION CORP. C/0 NORTHER BUILDERS
2700 W HAVE ROAD
3540 EAGLE NEST DRIVE LLC
494 BOUGHTON RD LLC
50/30 ACQUISITION LLC
916-918 W JEFFERSON LLC
AEB REAL ESTATE INC
AFFILIATED REALTY & MANAGEMENT COMPANY
ALAIMO, JOSEPH JAN ET TR 91856
ALLEGIANCE COMMUNITY BANK
ALLEGRO, MARIO A.
ALML COMRCL PROPERTIES TWO LLC
AMB INSTITUTIONAL ALLIANCE
AMERICAN MULTI-CINEMA, INC.
AMERICAN TECH PUBLISHERS INC.
ANDERSON COPPER & BRASS CO.
ARC CAFEUSAOOl LLC
ART VAN-MW
ASHLEY FURNITURE IND
ASHLEY REAL ESTATE LLC
ASHLEY REAL ESTATE LLC
AT NEW LENOX IL-INLINE LLC
AT NEW LENOX IL-OUTLOTS LLC
AT WHEATLAND NAPERVILLE IL LLC
BANK FINANCIAL
BANK OF AMERICA
BARRIOS, BALDOMERO
BASSWOOD 2001 LLC ET AL
BIMBA MANUFACTURING CO.
12
BLOCK INDUSTRIAL CNTR I
BOLINGBROOK EQUITY 1 LP
BOLINGBROOK MENARDS PLAZA
BOLINGBROOK PLAZA
BOLINGBROOK PROP PRTNRS LLC
BRE ALPHA INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
BRE THRONE FRANKFORT XING LLC
BREIT IN DUSTRIAL HS PROPERTY
BROADSTONE EWD IUINOIS LLC
BURCAR, CONSTANCE E DEC TR
BURKE, DR. MICHAEL T.
BURRIS W EST BUILDING LLC
BURTON PLACE LP
BYPASS TRUST
CABOT ACQUISITION, LLC
CABOT IV IL 1804 LLC
CAPITOL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
CAPUTO PAUL V SR 2008 TRUST
CAPUTO'S FRESH MARKETS
CATELLUS DEVELOPMENT CO.
CATELLUS FINANCE I, LLC
CATELLUS OPERATING LTD. P.
CATON CROSSING TOWN SQUARE
CBOCS WEST, INC.
CENTERPOINT INTERMODAL, LLC
CENTERPOINT JOLIET LLC
CENTERPOINT JOLIET TERMINAL
CENTERPOINT PROPERTIES TR.
CENTERPOINTTERMINAL RAIL
CF LLC
CHANCEY, DAVID CHRISTINA
CHERRY HILLJB LLC
CHICAGO TITLE LANO TRUST CO TR 28305
COLLISION CENTERS OF AMERICA
COLUMBIA RETAIL SHOREWOOD XING
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. {CHANNAHON TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (CRETE TOWNSHIP)
13
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO . (CUSTER TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (DU PAGE TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (FLORENCE TOWNSH IP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (FRANKFORT TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (GREEN GARDEN TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (HOMER TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (JACKSON TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (JOLIET TOWNSH IP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (LOCKPORT TOWNSH IP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (MANHATTAN TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (MONEE TOWNSH IP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (NEW LENOX TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (PEOTONE TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (PLAINFIELD TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (REED TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (TROY TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (WASH INGTON TOWNSH IP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (WESLEY & WILM INGTON
TWSHPS)
COMMONWEALTH ED ISON CO. (WHEATLAND TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. (WILL TOWNSHIP)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. {WILTON TOWNSHIP)
COUNTRYSIDE RIVER APTS (INLAND)
CROSSROADS BUSINESS PARK OWNERS
CUBESMART #609 JOLIET
CUBESMART #615 PLAINFI ELD
CUBESMART #675
CUBESMART #867
CVS CAREMARK 2
DE ER CREEK GOLF LLC
DELANEY, MICHAELJ
DG CHANNAHON EAMES LLC
DHILLON SAWAANJIT S
DHILLON, SAWAANJIT
DINOLFO, CHARLES
DOLLAR TREE DISTRIBUTION, INC.
DONATI CHET 82067
14
DREMCO, INC.
DRE MONAS, JAMES
DUGAN FINANCING LLC
DUGAN REALlY LLC
DUKE REALTY CORPORATION
DUKE REALlY LP
DUKE SECURED FINAN CING-1
EATMAN, MR. LOREN
EBL LEASING LLC
ECLIPSE KENSINGTON LARKIN AVE
EDWARD HEALTH VE NTURES
EKDK MOKENA LLC
ELLIOTT RE HOLDING CO LLC
ENBRIDGE PIPELINE (S LIGHTS) LLC
ESSINGTON PROPERTIES
ESSINGTON SHOPPES, LLC
ESTANCIA SIX LLC
EXECUTIVE PROPERTIES
F9 PROPERTIES LLC
FAH SHOREWOOD LLC
FIRST AMERICAN BANK
FIRST STATE BANK
FLEX CAPITAl LLC
FLEX CAPITAL LLC
FOUNTAIN SQUARE LLC
FRANK COSTA II LLC
FRASCA DONALD TRUST · FRASCA ARLYNE TRUST
G & W PARTNERS C/0 G BERKOWITZ
GAP VII GB ROM EOVILLE LLC
GARBER, ROBERT
GC NET LEASE JOLIET INVST LLC • CATERPILLAR
GEORGE, LARRY · GEORGE, ROSEMARY
GJ 14 37, LLC
GJN, LLC
GLL PROPERTIES
GREENCORE USA CPG PARTNERS
HAMPTON MERCURY INV CL, LLC
15
HARBOR TOOL BU ILDING LLC
HARLEM 193RD ST. PLAZA
HARRIS BANK TR 2508
HARRIS NA (MADIGAN)
HART 155 INDUSTRIAL, LLC
HARTZ CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
HEIDNER/YORMAK PROP II LLC
HENKEL, PATRICK W DEC TR
HERITAGE TRUST CO TR 91-4367
HICKORY CRE EK MARKET PLACE (INLAND)
HIGHLAND CORPORATE CENTER
HOME RUN INN
HP 55-80 LLC
HSRE DMG JOLI ET LLC
HSRE MOKENA LLC
HTW, LLC
IG CAPJTAL LLC
IIT CHICAGO PORTFOLIO I LLC
IKEA PROPERTY INC
INTERNTL UNION OPERATING ENG LOCALS 150 150A 1508 150C
IPT 1-55 DC LLC
IPT PINNACLE DC II LLC
IPT WINDHAM IC LLC
J.C. PENNEY COMPANY, INC.
JAM ES CAMPBELL COMPANY, LLC
JANKO ASSET MANAGEMENT
JCC REALTY LLC
JEFFERSON & LARKIN LLC TR.12719 C/0 R. E. HEIDNER
JEFFERSON JOLIET PLAZA
JEFFERSON VILLAGE, LLC
JESSUP, MICHAEL JAMI
JEWEL COMPANIES, INC. (ALBERTSON$)
JGMBG HOLDINGS LLC
JL MEYER PROPERTIES, LLC
JOLIET COMMONS PHASE I (INLAN D)
JOLIET COMMONS PHASE II
JOLIET EXT LODGING ASSOC LLC
16
JOLIET HILLCREST, LLC
JOLIET INVESTMENT PARTNERS LLC
JOLIET/55 LODGING ASSOC.
JOLIET-SO LODGING PTR
JOYCEJOLIET PLAZA
JWP PARTNERS JOLIET LAND LLC
KARABEL, WILLIAM EDWARD
KASSULAT, RICHARD A. TR. 11047610
KC ROMEO DEVELOPMENT LLC
KENOSHA PW LLC c/o Crown Group
KENSINGTON CENTER PROPS LLC
KOHL'S DEPT. STORES, INC.
LAMASTUS T ASKOUN IS K TRUST
LA MASTUS, TERRY H
LAKEWOOD NURSING HOME
LAMBRECHT, PATRICIA
LARKIN VILLAGE LP
LAWLER, TIMOTHY
LCMC ASSOC IATES LLC
LGP REALTY HOLDINGS LP
LIBERTY ILLINOIS LP
LIBERTYVILLE BANK AND TRUST
LIFE STORAGE, LP
LIGHT, DANI EL LEAH RAE
LINOLNSH IRE COUNTRY CLUB
LOCKPORT 3S5 LLC
LPF 740 ROMEOVILLE, LLC
LUBIENSKI MARK BAND COLLEEN A
LUCKY DEVELOPMENT LLC
LUNDY PARTNERSHIP RL
MALLIKA PBJ LLC
MANNY, MARIE T 2010 TRUST
MAPLE PARK PLACE SHOPPING CNTR (INLAND)
MARATHON OI L CO.
MATTHEWS, MS. JAYNE
MAUScRCORP
MC GOWAN, MR. EDWARD T.
17
MEIJER STORES
METRO CHICAGO IN D ACQSTN CORP
MIRANTE, JOSEPH
MLRP KOPPERUD PHASE II LLC
MMJA PROPERlY LLC
MOKENA COMMERCIAL
MOKENA MARKETl'LACE (INLAND)
MOKENA PROPERTIES SIX LLC
MOKENA REAL ESTATE HOLDING CO
MONARCH OFFICE PROPERTIES LLC
MWD BOLI NGBROOK LLC
NAPERVILLE RT. 59/9STH PLAZA
NEW MIDWEST RENTALS UC
NORTHERN BUILDERS INC.
NORTHERN BUILDERS, INC.
OLD SECOND NATIONAL BANK
OYEDIJO DOTUN
PAC FINANCE 1, LLC
PACGWLUC
PARKVIEW PLAZA PARTNERS LLC
PARKWAY BANK & TRUST TR 8619
PELLEG RINO, ORLANDO
PERINO, JOSEPH A
PEWAG REAL ESTATE INC.
PHEASANT LAKE ESTATES
PICSTAR EAT LLC
PINE MEADOWS APARTMENTS TR 9406
PLAINFIELD 59 LLC - LFI REAL ESTATE
PLAINFIELD INVESTMENTS LLC
PLAINFIELD PLAZA
PLAINFIELD PLAZA Ill
PLAINFIELD SQ DEV PRTNERS LLC
PLDAB, LLC
PRAIRIE CROSSING
PRG/555 INVESTORS, LLC
PROFESSIONAL RESOURCE DEV INC
ProLogis
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ProLogis Development Serv
PROLOGIS ILLINOIS LLC
PROVENA HEALTH CARE
PROVENA PROPERIES INC
PS Tl NLEY LLC
PSS VENTURES LLC
PUBLIC STORAGE, INC.
QUADRANGLE OEVEELOPMENT CORP.
RDK VENTURES, LLC
REZIN FAMILY INVESTMENTS
RIVERWALK HOMES LLC
RMS PROPERTIES
ROUNDY'S SUPERMARKET
RR CRESTHILL LLC
RREEF AMERICA REIT II CORP
RYAN COMPANIES US, INC.
SCF RC FU NDING LLC
SCHEERER FMLY TR SCHEERER JOHN ANGELA
SEN IOR STAR LIVING
SF PACIFIC PROPERTIES, LL
SHI II AMERCN HSE CEDARLAKE LLC
SHOREWOOD HORIZON LP
SHOREWOOD STATION LLC
SHURGARD IL PROPERTIES, INC. #8060
SMITH GAEL REV TRUST
SOUTHCREEK ENTERPRISES, LLC
SOUTHCREEK INDUSTRIAL LLC
SOUTHLAND DEVELOPMENT
SOVRAN ACQ LP
SPG GREEN GARDEN & CNTRY CLUB
SPIRIT MASTER FUNDING LLC
SS BOLINGBROOK LLC 11502
SSG BOLING BROOK LLC
SSGT 1302 MARQUffiE DR UC
ST JAM ES INDUSTRIAL
STALTER!, JAMES TR 21187
STANTON, PATRICK
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STAR-WEST LOUIS JOLIET LLC
STARWOOD RETAIL PARTNERS - BOLINGBROOK PROMENADE
STATE BANK OF COUNTRYSIDE TRUST NO. 09-3
STEAK N SHAKE INC
STREIT KAREN
SWC 87TH & STONEY LLC
TARGET CORP. T-1403
TARGET CORP. T-2028
TARGET CORP. T-2035
TARGET CORPORATION · T-1881
TARGET CORPORATION T-0867
TARGET CORPORATION T-0894
TARGET STORE T-2293
TARGET STORE T-2521
TARGET T-2710
THE HOME DEPOT
THOMAS, MR. JAMES G.
THORNTON$, INC.
THORNWOOD HOUSE· UNIVERSITY PARK APARTMENTS
TI NLEY HARLEM PLAZA
TOM KELLY'S CHOPHOUSE PUB LLC
TOMMY NEVIN'S RL EST NAPER LLC
TOWN SQUARE LLC
TOYS "R" US, INC.
TR 1000 DALTON LANE CORP.
TREAN MOKENA LLC
TREAN MOKENA PROMEADE LLC
TRIDENT HOLDINGS LLC
TWO RIVERS BOLINGBROOK LLC
TWO RIVERS PLAZA (INLAND)
ULTIMATE MACHINING
UNIVERSITY PARK APARTMENTS, LP
US BANK (Ryan)
US BANK NA
USAA REAL ESTATE COMPANY (AMAZON CHICAGO)
VACANT LAND CHERRY HILL H
VEREIT MT PLAINFIELD IL LLC
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VETERANS PARKWAY INDUSTRIAL
VICTORY ASSOC II LP
VICTORY ASSOC LP TR 123135-08
VIP MOG, l.L.C.
VIP MOKENA CROSSINGS LLC
VIP REMINGTON LAKES, LLC.
VIP ROMEOVILLE II, LLC
VIP ROMEOVILLE Ill LLC
VIP ROMEOVILLE, LLC.
VIP TINLEY PARK LLC
WEDOFF, THOMAS LISA
WENDYS OLD FASHIONED HAMBURGERS, INC.
WENDYS/ARBYS GROUP
WEST SUBURBAN BANK
WESTERN A MIDWEST IL LLC
WESTERN C REIT PARK 355 LLC
WHITING CORP
WILLIAMS CHARLES E CYNTHIA
WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP.
WOLSKI, MS. ELLEN
WONG HUBERT LVG TR
2ENITH HOLDINGS LTD
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2023 IL App (3d) 210606Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 18-TX-251;
the Hon. John C. Anderson, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Donald E. Renner III, Allen Wall, and Scott E. Nemanich, of
for Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Ltd., of Chicago, for intervenor-
Appellant: appellant.
Attorneys Evan B. Karnes II and Everardo Martinez, of Karnes Law Chtrd.,
for of Chicago, for appellees 110 Larkin, LLC, et al.
Appellee:
No brief filed for other appellee.
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